











SURVEY OF WORLD CULTURES



USSR

its people its society its culture

Thomas Fitzsimmons
Peter Malof
John C. Fiske

and the Staff and Associates of the Human Relations Area Files

HRAF PRESS New Haven

Already Published in this Series

- 1 Poland
- 2 Jordan
- 3 Iraq
- 4 Saudi Arabia
- 5 Cambodia
- 6 China

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PROBABLY AT NO TIME IN HISTORY have thoughtful men everywhere been so conscious of the need to know about the different peoples of the world. Such knowledge is not in itself a formula for human understanding but it is an indispensable first step. The Survey of World Cultures, of which USSR is the seventh in the series, is one of several means by which the Human Relations Area Files seeks to promote and facilitate the comparative study of human behavior and a greater understanding of cultures other than our own.

These surveys, though augmented by original research, are primarily a collation and synthesis of the best and most authoritative materials, published and unpublished, on the societies selected. For many of these societies excellent specialized studies exist, but the materials are often so widely scattered as to be virtually unavailable to all except the most determined scholar. It was to meet the need for a comprehensive readable volume, bringing together all those aspects of a country and culture usually studied separately, that these books were undertaken.

The present series is based in part on background studies prepared for limited distribution. Under the direction of the Human Relations Area Files an interdisciplinary team with area competence was assembled for each study. The enterprise involved, in all, contributions from several hundred scholars resident at some twenty universities.

The original studies have been extensively revised: materials have been added and the body of the work rewritten, edited, and adapted to a new format. Owing to special requirements imposed on the program, footnotes and citations customary in works of this nature were omitted. Both lack of funds and dispersal of the original teams of scholars have unfortunately made it impossible to supply this critical apparatus. However there are cited in the editor's note and in the bibliography at the end of each volume the most important materials on which each study is based.

One result of the process of collecting and selecting information from many, often widely scattered, sources has been to reveal new relationships, making explicit in these surveys much which had remained implicit in previous separate studies. Gaps in existing knowledge have become apparent. The series should, then, raise a number of general questions, at the same time offering certain factual answers and providing guidance for further research. That there will also result increased understanding of the seemingly endless and diverse ways in which men approach the experience of living with one another is the wish of all who have participated in making this series.

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This study has, of course, drawn on many other works as well; each source cited in the bibliography is, in all justice, due an acknowledgment.

Acquaintance with the people of the USSR has been further supplemented by systematically conducted interviews, particularly by Harvard University's Russian Research Center, with thousands of defectors who left the USSR during and after World War II.

Names of ethnic groups follow in general the form given in the Outline of World Cultures by George P. Murdock (Revised Edition,

1958).

Although gratefully acknowledging the contributions of many others to this book, the authors and editor assume sole responsibility for whatever errors and shortcomings it may have.

THE HUMAN RELATIONS AREA FILES

THE HUMAN RELATIONS AREA FILES is a nonprofit research corporation affiliated with Yale University and sponsored and supported by its twenty member organizations. HRAF was established in 1949 "to collect, organize, and distribute information of significance to the natural and social sciences and the humanities." It has concentrated upon furthering a fresh approach to the study of societies, culture, and social behavior.


The Files themselves contain carefully selected sources analyzed according to G. P. Murdock's *Outline of Cultural Materials*. Located at each of the member institutions, they are a new kind of reference library in which basic information about nearly two hundred peoples can be consulted with ease and speed. Preparation of the present study was facilitated by the use of the following Files: Soviet Union, Baltic Countries, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Great Russia, Caucasia, Turkestan, Siberia, and ten other Files devoted to specific ethnic groups.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THAT ANYONE SHOULD VIEW the USSR with certain preconceptions is almost inevitable; the authors of this book have tried to take account of their own preconceptions and to control them. This study is not an attempt to make a "case" either for or against the USSR; it is, like the other books of this series, an effort to show what goes on in the country — how the people live, why they choose one course of action rather than another, what they value and why, and how the Communist dictatorship has affected, and been affected by, their traditional way of life.

Soviet society is the product of many factors, and the behavior of the Soviet citizen cannot be explained as simply the result of his ancient heritage, the land and climate in which he lives, or the rulers who govern him. He is in part formed by all these things, and the authors, approaching the subject on the basis of their respective disciplines and experiences, have taken account of this multiplicity and have been constantly aware of the interplay of the many factors that shape both the Soviet citizen and the society in which he lives.

Communism in the USSR derives its essentially Russian character not only from the fact that the Soviet leaders rule over a land that is predominantly Russian, but also from the fact that no matter how profound their Maxist indoctrination the leaders are them-

selves the products of a Russian heritage.

The Bolshevik revolution brought enormous changes, but the land is still Russian. Continuity and change are inseparably mingled. The Russians constitute a clear majority of the population and are beyond question the leading political, cultural, and economic group—making and enforcing policy for the nation as a whole. It is, then, the Russian people—their attitudes and activities, their unique history and their rulers—who provide the clearest insight into the functioning of the USSR today.

The minority peoples, however, are an essential part of the total picture and the integration of these various and frequently hostile peoples into the Soviet pattern creates grave problems for the regime. In many cases minorities have been awarded some degree of theoretical autonomy; in practice, actual control remains with the central government in Moscow, a Russian government. A survey of existing ethnographic and linguistic information concerning these minority peoples within the USSR is offered in the special appendix at the end of this volume.

Although Communism is an international as well as a Russian movement, the object of this book is not to discuss Communism in general but to treat those of its aspects that directly affect the

people of the USSR today.

The book which follows, then, is an analysis that seeks to define the dominant sociological, political, and economic aspects of a functioning society, to present that society's strengths and weaknesses, and to identify the patterns of behavior characteristic of its members. It does not include all the data examined nor does it catalog current events, but the analysis it provides should be of value in interpreting both present and future developments.

Thomas Fitzsimmons

November 30, 1959

PERSPECTIVE



RUSSIAN CULTURE AND SOVIET SOCIETY

THE CHARACTER OF SOVIET SOCIETY TODAY reflects the forcible imposition of a system of modern revolutionary theories and programs — specifically Western in their dynamism, specifically materialistic in their assumptions — on a profoundly religious congeries of peoples who for centuries lived by essentially static social norms in isolation from the Western world.

Impelled by a dynamic philosophy of history and with a formidable territorial base of operations, the Russian Communists, to maintain power and to push the rapid industrialization of a nation that was largely agrarian and technically backward, have established a monopoly of control over all aspects of society. From the party's

point of view, all Soviet life is political.

Many of the tensions in Soviet society arise from the fact that the regime has forced upon its citizens ways that are foreign not only to their traditions but to their character. The Russians themselves have been a frank and open people, rather violent in the display of their emotions within defined limits of social control, gregarious and argumentative, given to passionate discussion of the broadest abstractions. They highly value group membership and are dependent upon the group, especially its leaders; but this need cannot be satisfied mechanically or impersonally, the Russian seeks a personal, particularistic relationship. Veering between extremes of work and idleness, deprivation and indulgence, delight and despair, the Russians have never been remarkable for the individual orderliness of their lives.

It was such a people that the Communists had to regiment. Rapid industrialization required order and discipline and the Communist ideology demanded single-minded acceptance of its principles. Resistance led to compulsion and suspicion. Religion was seen as a dangerous force that had to be counteracted. The huge bureaucracy erected by the regime was not geared to offer personal attention. The insistence that the individual had and must fulfill responsibilities to the state destroyed the traditional dependence upon those in authority. The Russian, cut off from many traditional sources of personal strength, was forced to hide his emotions, curb his curiosity, work efficiently and consistently, and be very careful about his talk and his associations.

The problems created by the revolution - primarily those of industrialization and the practical application of an often inexact and loosely drawn social theory by centralized power - are still being worked out, and the society is still in flux. But although control is in the hands of relatively few people, capable of drastically changing policy or its implementation at a given moment, there are

limits upon even the Soviet regime's power.

The sources of these limits are found within the current ideology and system of political practice and also in prerevolutionary Russian culture and tradition. No regime can control a society yet remain untouched by the cultural context within which that society functions. The Soviet regime is a Russian government and has had to work with what it inherited; indeed, its ability to use the cultural heritage has been a major source of strength.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is still Russia. What is new has been built upon and retains much of the old. The changes, as they have been made, have not fully conformed with the desires or the plans of the theorists and, ironically, the disjuncture between plan and practice often has been the salvation of the Communist

state.

The Inheritance

The cultural inheritance of the Russian people achieved its basic forms in an agricultural society considerably influenced by Byzantium - a universe unto itself, relatively untouched by the scientific, rational, and industrial currents that swept through the Western world. The Bolsheviks took power over a European people who had broken with serfdom later than any major Western nation, who had maintained a system of absolutist government reinforced by the Church, and who had been bypassed by the Renaissance and Reformation. Isolation of Russia from the West has been an important element in Russian history, just as today isolation enforced by the regime promotes the goal of forcing a peculiar and unique development on the Russian people. From the thirteenth century to the fifteenth, Russia was dominated by the Mongol-Tatar hordes which conquered the greater part of European Russia and cut it off from the Western world. Prior to the Asiatic invasion Christianity had been brought into Russia from Byzantium and had been generally accepted. Under Mongol-Tatar rule Christianity survived, and for lack of communication with the Mother Church in Constantinople, the Orthodox Church assumed an independent, distinctly Russian character.

Inherited with the Byzantine Church was a Byzantine concept of government - absolutist, despotic centralism. This was reinforced by the models of autocratic rule and administration the Russians had before them during the nearly 250 years of Mongol domination. With the disintegration of the Tatar empire in the fifteenth century, the independent Muscovite autocracy identified itself with the Russian Orthodox Church and through the symbolic power of the Church finally and conclusively united the Russian princes and the Russian people under one all-powerful ruler. As the anointed representative of God, the tsar was elevated above all mortals and above the Church - he was an integral part of and symbol for the shining truth of "Holy Russia." The Church became a refuge and an aesthetic joy, a symbol of the equality and brotherhood of men before their God, a place of adoration of the eternal and protective Mother, whether she be Mary, the Volga, or the Russian land, and of veneration for the Father, be he God or the tsar. Denial of the tsar, his power and rule, was not only political dissidence, it was heresy - a denial of God Himself.

Through his identification with the Church the tsar was able to tap the Russian love and reverence for the soil. The vast plains of central Russia have always been an object of awe and pride to this people. But harsh climate and few roads in the great stretches of plain left men huddled together in tight, lonely communities. Survival was for the hardy and for those who learned that their only hope lay in the physical warmth and social protection offered by the group, An individual counted for nothing against the limitless and formless plain. Yet those who survived reveled in the breadth of the land they occupied, and Russians continue even today to call themselves "a broad people."

The land and the immutable forces of nature which acted upon the land were treated as sacred long before the introduction of Christianity. This pagan religion was syncretized with Christianity. For the mass of the people, God, the motherland, and the tsar became a triumvirate of powers, all of whom would come to the aid of the individual if they could be reached through the proper channels and by use of the right form of appeal. This reverence for the motherland, *rodina*, was effectively used by the regime during World War II, when political, specifically Soviet appeals met with little response. The inviolability of the motherland is a source of strength for any regime seeking to defend Russia against invasion.

But for the individual Russian "God is high and the Tsar is far away," while the earth and nature have made survival an immediate, everyday problem. Even during the generations of serfdom, the primary units of allegiance - apart from the country and the tsar were the household unit and the communal village, or mir. The household was headed by a patriarch whose rule was absolute. The village elder, starosta, was responsible for the periodic redistribution of the land held by the mir, which was allotted to the household units on a basis of need. The starosta's power derived from the community. Leadership was not sought: it was considered a burden. All decisions were made unanimously, on the basis of consensus without a vote, and once reached had the moral force of law and an aura of sanctity. Since making decisions depended on the absence of open disagreement, there was tremendous social pressure upon individuals to go along with the group. No provision was made in the mir for a dissenting minority or a loyal opposition. The roots of the present-day Soviet stress on "mass participation" lie in the councils of the mir.

As in many other peasant communities, control over the individual was exercised through gossip and sensitivity to public shame and ridicule. Those who were unresponsive to such pressures and kept themselves apart, or who refused to join in community activities and failed to observe the communally enforced patterns of behavior, were likely to be looked upon with fear, even loathing. Those who in violating norms endangered the very life of the community were dealt with by the community, violently and unmercifully.

In areas of life that did not directly impinge upon the survival of the mir, the individual was left in relative freedom. In accordance with Church doctrine, all men were conceived of as basically sinful, and complete control of the emotions was regarded as an impossible task for the individual. Emotional and violent actions were expected, and limits set by community, state, and Church were

important in the eyes of all. Limits represented order, an order the individual could not hope to achieve as an individual. Order was essential to the existence of the community on which survival depended. The individual found order in the Church and in the unanimity of the mir. For his own inevitable fall from grace, confession in the Church provided a release and a continuing promise of surcease from the difficult round of existence in this life.

The power wielded by agencies outside the mir was rarely questioned, but it was expected that their power would be used to promote order, justice, and benevolence — to reflect in miniature the power and benevolence of the tsar. They often failed to meet these expectations, and when the burdens on the peasant became too great there was revolt against oppressive landlords and "unjust judges." The tsar remained untouched in this periodic ferment and was often viewed as a captive of the bureaucrats and landowning nobility. If only he could be reached, he would set things right; this was the eternal hope. Even the nineteenth-century writer Leontiev expressed this faith: "Sometimes I dream that a Russian tsar may put himself at the head of the Socialist Movement and organize it, as Constantine organized Christianity."

Soviet Political, Social, and Economic Goals

Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to remake the Russian people according to the theories of Karl Marx. But Marx had envisaged the socialist revolution taking place in a society with a fully developed industrial-capitalist economy. The main necessity, therefore, in Lenin's plan for a direct transition to socialism was industrial development. Indeed, the Bolsheviks displayed a simplistic faith in the liberating and rationalizing power of secular industrial society once it was freed from the "fetters" of private property. With this faith went a corresponding contempt for what Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto called the "idiocy of rural life." The peasant, who during the 1920's withheld much-needed food from the urban workers, was to be recast in the mold of the urban worker. Rationality, science, and "progress," defined in material terms, were to replace the static and traditionalist bias of the peasant world with its reliance on magic and religion.

According to Marx, all social and cultural phenomena were seen as a "superstructure" dependent upon and largely shaped by the economic base of society. The government itself, literature, the arts, science, the means of communication, morality, religion, and the family all were either products of this base or the servants of those who controlled the means of production. In conformity with this doctrine, all existing institutions would either disappear or have to be radically changed, as the economic base itself changed from a system of capitalist exploitation to one of control by the proletariat.

As interpreted by Lenin, a direct transition from a backward agricultural society to a modern industrial one was possible but the old superstructure had to be swept away if this was to be achieved. All morality - even God Himself - was merely the creation and tool of a ruling class. It was to be replaced by revolutionary Marxism, which held the promise of a paradise on earth. Allegiance to God and the tsar was to be supplanted by allegiance to the new regime which, as the precursor of a worldwide proletarian revolution, was "in step with history" and would lead the Soviet people to new greatness. If family allegiance interfered with lovalty to the state. then the state must take over the care of the children and rear them as loval members of the socialist state. Once the society was fully industrialized and all vestiges of capitalism were destroyed, the people would take over the going industrial plant, and, there no longer being a need for repressive political controls, the state itself would "wither away." A classless society would emerge operating under the slogan: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

The planning that became an essential part of the scheme of things after 1928 followed a period of much trial and error. The centralization of production inevitably brought into being a complex of bureaucratic machinery; rapid industrialization required broad integration of the economy and forced sacrifices on the part of the masses, who were considered not yet able or willing to think in terms of ultimate, common goals. Support of the new order was not universal and spontaneous. Resistance was not limited to those who had been "in control of the means of production." Even "backward elements" among the industrial workers resisted. The real masses, the peasantry, were left relatively free at first but, as a result of the forced collectivization drive initiated by the first Five Year Plan, found themselves being reduced to a state as miserable as that

from which they had begun to emerge.

Marxism was at best a loose design, subject to endless manipulation by a regime that under all circumstances would fight to maintain its power. The regime had to devise methods to meet resistance – sometimes in unexpected places – and to solve problems in a country that, according to Marx, should not have had a revolution when it did. The methods devised by Lenin and Stalin and their theoretical justification became part of Soviet doctrine, which by now is a synthesis of the ideology of Marx, the experience of some forty years of Communist rule, and the judicious, although not always conscious, use of older Russian tradition.

Implementation

To implement Communist practice the ruling group developed a control system characterized by the absence of distinct lines of authority and sharp divisions of function. This confusion and overlapping stem partly from the speed with which the Soviet bureaucracy was formed. Less accidentally, they derive from the dictatorship's need to fragment authority, lest one part or another of the control apparatus develop into an independent center of power.

Closely intertwined with the government, with nearly identical personnel at the top, is the Communist party, the only political party in the USSR. The Presidium (formerly called Politboro) of the party's Central Committee formulates policy for the entire country. Chosen from among some eight million party members, thoroughly indoctrinated "activists" carry the doctrine to all levels of society and check adherence to party objectives. By its monopoly of education, the arts, and all means of communication, the party has attained an unprecedented degree of control and influence over the minds of the people.

Proceeding on the premise that its program must be pushed, no matter what the resistance and human toll, the regime developed an extensive police system to eliminate any possible disaffection or subversion. The political police enjoyed arbitrary and extralegal powers of arrest and conviction and thus became a source of terror for the majority of the people, despite their traditional acceptance

of strong central authority.

Intimidation, as used by the regime, is a device for preventing people from engaging in openly hostile behavior. It is, however, relatively inefficient as a positive means of motivation. The regime has had to walk a thin and not always easily discernible line between too much intimidation and too little. Too much destroys initiative and the minimal framework and legality necessary to maintain the total social-political-economic system upon which its power depends. Too little diminishes control at the center by permitting the growth of independent centers of authority within the bureaucracy or the larger society. This is part of the dilemma the present regime faces

now, and an ever-present problem of a totalitarian regime. The authorities, then, have had to rely upon a variety of means to motivate

the population and bring a kind of order into society.

A society governed solely through the use of capriciously applied force is a society that cannot function. If a society is to function, its members must have a basis upon which they can to some degree predict official behavior as well as the probable repercussions of their own acts. The Soviet regime consequently has found it necessary to use a number of devices to provide a sense of legality and order. The introduction of material and social incentives, highly developed techniques of mass participation, and the resurrection of some traditional institutions have all been called upon to accomplish this end.

The Constitution of the USSR bears a superficial resemblance to those of Western democracies. Indeed, in its overt insistence on "mass participation" it goes much further than do those of the Western democracies. In practice this consists chiefly of constant social pressure on the masses for industrial and agricultural production and positive support of the policies of the leadership.

Theoretically, the masses, through a pyramid of soviets or mass councils beginning at the village level and tapering to an apex in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, participate fully in governing the country. Actually, the soviets at the higher levels can do little more than approve the decisions of the party leaders. At the lower levels they serve to feed information into the government apparatus and to carry out directives. The keynote of mass participation is the "right" of the individual to acquiesce, both to policy—which if it succeeds reflects credit on the group—and to punishment of the policy's champion if it fails, for failure is an individual responsibility. The withholding of approval, the failure of consensus which is manifested by apathy, is taken as a sign of hostility.

Mass participation, combined with a tight control of all communications media and the ever-present threat of extralegal government action, actually operate to isolate the individual. In Soviet society the individual is rarely detached enough to look beneath the surface of mass participation (which amounts to mass acceptance) and to perceive that others feel as he does, resentful of the regime or its policy but afraid to voice such opposition. Mass participation thus promotes a collective ignorance and passivity which serves some of the purposes of the regime. The social pressure exerted through the mechanisms of mass participation is enhanced through the regime's use of shaming. In large gatherings one person,

an official, for example, is singled out for criticism. He is expected both to receive criticism from party leaders and others in the meeting and to confess. A denial or defense is automatically an attack on the regime, which is bringing the criticism, and this is intolerable, for the Communist party, in step with history and aware of the

needs of the people, is infallible.

Shaming, confession, and mass participation are traditional Russian devices of social catharsis and control. They have, however, been put into a totally new context by the Soviet regime. Formerly, social pressure was brought to bear upon the individual by his friends and neighbors. Now it is exerted by strangers. When the village banded together against a thief, the threat to the community was clear and the punishment was therefore justified by the visible effect of the thief's action. In a national context these threads of connection become lost or weakened. Shaming promoted by official sources is not as potent a weapon against dissidents today as it was in the mir, although no man wishes to be singled out. The person who is labeled a threat to the community, "an enemy of the state," is labeled by the regime, not the community, and the basis for labeling is not always clear. Indeed, if terror or intimidation is to act as a deterrent, the basis for labeling cannot be made clear: otherwise the feeling of insecurity that is the essence of the terror will be lost. Terror, as a political weapon, is by definition capricious.

Concurrently the regime has developed a series of incentives, both material and honorific, as a positive means of motivating the population to produce at the breakneck pace demanded by the economic planners. With the establishment of a system of differential incentives "according to work," the basis was laid for a class system that bears many resemblances to that of any other highly industrialized society. This has occurred despite official avowals that the society consists of only two classes, the workers and the peasants, united by common interests. In practice, Soviet society could not function without the existence of a third group, which the regime refuses to set off as a separate "class." This "stratum," known as the intelligentsia, consists of bureaucrats, professionals, factory managers, and artists, as well as the party functionaries who actually control the destinies of the nation.

The tripartite division of society into peasants, workers, and intelligentsia is oversimplified. There is, for example, a mass of white-collar workers who aspire to belong to the intelligentsia and who look down upon any form of directly "productive" work. Within the major groups a number of subdivisions are necessary to give an

adequate picture of the structure. The equalitarian ideal, widely proclaimed at the time of the revolution, has receded into a very distant future. Today's society is stratified in terms of both economic and social status, and unequal distribution of educational oppor-

tunity weakens the possibilities for social mobility.

Although industrialization has changed the composition of Russian society, expanding the industrial labor group and crowding the cities, about half the total population is still engaged in farming. The basic unit of rural life today is, as it has been for centuries, the family, despite early Communist efforts to hasten its "withering away." Rural families still live in grouped villages; but village life is at least partly submerged in that of the kolkhoz (collective farm), of which the majority of peasant families are members. A kolkhoz theoretically is a cooperative enterprise, generally including two or three villages, with land held in perpetuity from the government and farmed communally by its members. In return for the land the farm must sell a specific and major portion of its crop to the government at prices usually far below the market value. Despite recent improvements in their condition, collective farmers in the USSR today still represent the lowest stratum of society, with the exception of the forced laborers.

Collectivization did carry over one vestige of the traditional system as a concession to the peasants. This is the household plot awarded each household, the proceeds of which accrue directly and almost entirely to the individual household. As it has worked out, the peasant wishes to, and often does, spend more time working this plot than tilling the collective farm lands. For the majority of peasants during the Stalin period the household plots were the only thing that stood between them and starvation. There has been much discussion of reducing the size of the plots and eventually doing away with them entirely, but the regime is evidently unsure of the effects of this on agricultural production. So long as he maintains his plot, however, the peasant is a peasant with a peasant viewpoint rather than a worker in a "factory in the field."

The industrial worker ranks higher, economically and socially, than the farmer and has more opportunity for advancement in the social system; but he is hemmed in by innumerable restrictions and is generally ill-housed, barely adequately fed, and constantly pushed

to increase production.

The intelligentsia as a group embrace the widest range in occupation, income, and prestige: party and government leaders and the highest army officers, who are at the top of the scale and can live in considerable luxury; artists, writers, scientists, and industrial managers, who receive many rewards but are subject to irritating and often stultifying restrictions; and a large number of intermediate

functionaries down through the white-collar group.

Superimposed upon the class structure is the Communist party. It is primarily through membership or approval of the party that an individual can achieve economic and social mobility. Mobility was achieved during the early years after the revolution and during the later purges by the simple expedient of destroying those at or near the top and moving people up into the vacancies. In the early days people were moved up on the basis of politics rather than technical competence. Compromise was inevitable if the society was to continue to function and fully industrialize. Thus, party officials have had to play a series of roles from agitator to political administrator, then to engineer-administrator or policeman.

The crystallization of class lines and the narrowing of opportunity conflict with the Soviet-instilled myth that mobility is unlimited. But it is questionable how far official equalitarian ideals have been adopted by the people as personal goals. There is good evidence to indicate that differences in style of living between the classes are more a source of envy than of discontent with the system.

Recent reforms in education, designed to turn out trained workers rather than white-collar and other "nonproductive" functionaries, were in part inspired by a need to neutralize peasant and worker aspirations for social advancement through nonmanual occupations. So the regime is once again engaged in a propaganda campaign to convince the people that the differential rewards are fairly and justly distributed, and that productive work is ennobling and rewarding. It has also suggested, however, that the goal of the society — "to each according to his needs" — does not mean that everyone will have the same or equal needs.

In its attempt to sweep away the institutions of the past, the regime found it had swept away many of the stabilizing forces of life formerly provided by religion, the family, and other prerevo-

lutionary institutions.

By 1936 there was a "retreat" toward social stabilization. The family was resurrected as in principle a key institution of Soviet society, divorce was made more difficult, and abortion illegal. Family loyalty was not to override loyalty to the state; on the contrary, it was to promote such loyalty as well as obedience to government directives and to the rules of Communist society.

The regime also found that religious faith had not disappeared

in the face of official ridicule or oppression. As a traditional symbol and rallying point of the Russian nation, the Orthodox Church performed yeoman service in World War II. Throughout this time of crisis the regime found that the symbols of old Russia - the land, the rivers, the Church - rather than specifically Soviet goals and accomplishments were capable of making the deepest appeal to the people. By the end of World War II the regime found it expedient to compromise - to bring the Church fully under its control instead of destroying it. The official line today allows "freedom of religion and antireligious propaganda." Although the second of these "freedoms" receives far more encouragement than the first, the "anachronistic" Church continues to exist, though closely controlled. Members of the Communist party are theoretically atheistic. Under Communism, it is held that man is to be as free from God as from other restraints on his "free" development. His freedom is to be limited only by adherence to the needs of society as a whole; when he comes to understand fully the identity of his own needs with those of society, then he will be truly free. But, in the meantime, only the chosen few understand this identity. The Communist party includes less than five percent of the people. For the rest, "vestigial, superstitious" remains of religion are tolerated so long as they do not restrict the party's main objective or become centers of power independent of the regime.

In the 1930's the regime also sought to create an image of Stalin as an infallible father comparable in the public mind to the traditional concept of the tsar. He became the accepted expert on all branches of science and social philosophy. He was all-wise, omnipotent, and if injustice were brought to his attention he would show himself benevolent and just. At the same time he was godlike in his

wrath toward all who thwarted his will,

In effect, amidst the semimystical trappings which had come to surround the "holy" dogma of the party, there had emerged, by design, a modern-day tsar who could tap to some extent the established loyalty felt toward anyone occupying such a position. This was a strength of the regime, in that the tsar had been regarded as something apart from the traditionally hated bureaucracy. When Stalin died, this traditional dichotomy between the hated bureaucracy and a benevolent all-wise leader died with him, at least temporarily. The obvious unease of those who followed Stalin is a reflection of the enormous power he wielded, not only in the government and party structure but also in terms of this appeal to tradition.

Part of the de-Stalinization campaign was an effort to finally break with this older tradition and substitute the appeal of the party itself, irrespective of any single individual. The intelligentsia, the group furthest removed from pre-Soviet traditions, do not wish to see the emergence of another Stalin, preferring to see their own power extended to the point where they are firmly entrenched. Their wish, however, is to remain in power, and if a new Stalin is necessary for their survival there will be little hesitation about recreating the symbol and resurrecting the institutions and measures associated with a Stalin.

Soviet Nationalities Policy

A distinction is necessary in any discussion of Soviet policies between those relating to the predominant Russian people and those relating to the great number of ethnic minorities within the USSR—anywhere from 80 to 150, according to various Soviet classification systems—all possessing some degree of autonomy. The formulation of a general policy toward minority nationalities by the Soviets represents a significant departure from tsarist practice. In the days of the Russian empire there was no specific "nationalities policy" and over the centuries the treatment of ethnic minorities alternated between periods of oppressive attempts at Russianization and long


periods of comparative neglect.

When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the nationalities within the former empire posed a dilemma. On the one hand, proclamation of equal rights for the minorities could be important in enlisting the sympathy and support of non-Russian groups. On the other, the Bolsheviks were dedicated to an internationalism which regarded struggles for national independence as relics of bourgeois ideology. After considerable intraparty debate, the principle of "self-determination" was proclaimed in the newborn Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic – but with the important proviso, formulated by Stalin, that autonomy should be reserved to workers and peasants, and, consequently, dominated and controlled by the Communist party which considered itself the spokesman of these groups. Stalin, whose special concern at that time was the minority problem, further prescribed that the government of the autonomous minority areas be "proletarian in content and national in form." These limitations, it soon became evident, left no possibility of political autonomy. The various autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and national okrugs were under the complete control of party members, whose absolute subservience to the Moscow line was expected. The preservation of minority cultures was encouraged, however, in such matters as language and the arts. Schools teaching in the minority languages were established, and in many cases alphabets were

created for languages that had developed no written form.

Among other things, the proclamation of autonomy served as bait for those peoples who had become separated from Russia in the course of the revolution and civil war, but Russian armed force proved a more compelling reason for the entrance of various peripheral areas into the Soviet Union. Finland and the Baltics became independent states, and other western lands were lost to Russia by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Transcaucasian nations of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, however. after a brief period as tenuously independent states were by 1922 incorporated into the Soviet Union. Military operations, diplomacy, indigenous Bolshevik movements, and a withdrawal of outside support all played a part in this return to the fold. The three Transcaucasian nations were combined in a Federated Soviet Republic – later to be divided into three separate republics – and the Ukraine and Belorussia also became constituent republics, forming, with the Russian republic, the nucleus of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After a series of military and diplomatic maneuvers, complicated by the resistance of the Basmachi, the liberal Moslem Jadidists, and other anti-Russian or anti-Soviet groups, the various peoples and states of Central Asia were finally incorporated into the Soviet Union as five constituent Soviet Socialist Republics, The Kazakh and Kirgiz territories became in 1920 the Kirgiz Autonomous Republic, which in 1924 was divided into the Kazakh and Kirgiz ASSR's. Only in 1936 were these raised to the level of constituent republics. The Uzbek SSR was created in May 1925, with the Tadzhik area included as an autonomous republic; from this latter the Tadzhik SSR was set up in December 1929. The Turkmen SSR came into being officially in 1925 (see the map Major Political

Autonomy for the constituent republics was theoretically greater than for the ethnic subdivisions of the RSFSR; but, since the same basic policy applied, any degree of true independence was impossible. Their constitutions were in all essentials modeled on that of the RSFSR, and, though their party organizations were in some cases made up chiefly of native Communists, these were quickly removed in case of any "nationalist" deviation, often to be replaced by Russians.



Throughout the period (1921–28), books printed in the minority languages included not only translations of party propaganda and other Russian and foreign works but also the traditional literature of the nationalities themselves. New writing in the minority languages was encouraged, and among many groups a flourishing body of literature developed. Native arts and crafts, music, and dancing were also promoted. Unofficially, considerable leeway was allowed to native social and religious customs.

This policy succeeded in evoking gratitude and loyalty toward the regime, but at the same time it awakened a greater degree of national consciousness than the regime had bargained for. The traditional minority literatures often recorded exploits of national heroes who had fought the encroaching Russians, and the expanding intelligentsia of some groups, even while they accepted the tenets of Marxism, sought the development of socialism within their own cultural pattern—a principle earlier stated by Lenin—and chafed under "guidance" from Moscow. Although "Great Russian chauvinism" was condemned at this time by the highest party authorities, it was inevitable that the preponderance of Russians in the party and the USSR as a whole should lead to a patronizing big brother attitude by Russians toward the minorities.

Besides allowing the growth of minority nationalism which threatened to become dangerously anti-Russian, the nationality policy in the years of NEP complicated the problem of bringing the entire population together in a disciplined, coordinated drive for

rapid industrialization and economic advance.

The minorities were chiefly rural peoples, and a major problem was expansion of agricultural production and provision of an increasing flow of foodstuffs to the rapidly growing cities. Collectivization of agriculture under the first Five Year Plan (1928–32) utterly disrupted the traditional way of life for most of the minorities. Resistance among both Russian and non-Russian peasants was desperate but ineffective, and the general attitude changed from rather tentative loyalty to apathy or resentment.

Through the 1930's, many minority leaders were purged and Russians increasingly placed in positions of power. Criticism of Great Russian chauvinism disappeared, as sovietization moved forward hand in hand with Russian hegemony. Although this did little to restore the good will of the alienated minority peoples, Communist techniques of power had developed sufficiently to pre-

vent coordinated resistance.

Soviet ethnic policy as it developed followed a definite

pattern throughout the USSR, but it was by no means rigid and unvarying for all parts of the country. In the RSFSR, industrial expansion and economic development led to a constant influx of Great Russians into the minority areas, so that in some cases they actually outnumbered the native population. As the Russians, usually concentrated in the cities, felt no need to learn the local language, Russian schools were established on a wide scale, supplementing the schools in the native language. None of the schools were segregated, and although Russians seldom if ever attended the native schools, the converse was often true. Many ambitious parents within the minority groups saw the advantages of a thorough Russian training for their children and came to place little value on preserving their own "backward" culture.

Somewhat the same situation existed in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan where the earlier colonists were joined by many additional immigrants from Great Russia and the Ukraine. Fearing the formation of concerted Turkic or Islamic resistance in Central Asia, the regime, in addition to dividing the area into five separate republics, stressed linguistic distinctions among the five and sought to give each republic a sense of separate entity. Although they went through the form of elevating local Communists to important posts, they were careful to place Russians in positions where they could exercise actual control. Russian political and economic domination plus Russian arrogance toward the technologically backward native population—and the consequent disruption of the traditional pattern of life—perpetuated and nourished resentment against the ruling group, except in the Russianized few who made common cause with the rulers.

In the Ukraine, collectivization took a heavy toll. Liquidation of the resisting well-to-do farmers removed what was regarded as a serious menace to the regime; but the central government remained constantly on the watch for signs of Ukrainian nationalist uprisings. Though Ukrainian remained the official language of the republic, any person in a responsible position using it in public was likely to be regarded with suspicion by the authorities. At the same time, there were a number of Ukrainians sufficiently identified with the regime to share with Russians the key posts in the republic. The Belorussians, among whom there was less evidence of "nationalistic deviation," did not constitute as serious a problem. Actually, the distinction between Great Russians and Belorussians was often difficult to draw, as most educated Belorussians used standard Russian as their own lan-

guage. Belorussian language and literature have been encouraged; but the results, to a large extent, are artificial and sterile.

The mountain peoples of the north Caucasus, though technically within the RSFSR, presented a separate problem. Divided into a large number of separate ethnic groups each with its own language, they did not present any coordinated threat to the regime, and their rather barren highlands were not, in general, important in over-all economic planning. But they were peculiarly ill-suited to the Soviet mold; despite—or perhaps even because of—the encouragement of their native language and literature, they were inclined to retain their animosity toward their traditional enemies, the Russians. Through the 1930's they remained largely an unsolved problem for the regime.

The three republics of the south Caucasus presented a very different picture. Azerbaijan, with its center of control in Russianized Baku, was under direct Russian domination, and many Azerbaijani, attracted from the hinterland to work in the oil fields, were themselves largely Russianized. In Georgia and Armenia native Communists were apparently considered reliable, even in key posts, and cultural and even religious autonomy were extensive. In Armenia, the relatively liberal policy of the regime was occasioned at least in part by the desire to present the Armenian SSR as a haven for Armenians the world over. In Georgia, the policy was probably influenced by the fact that Stalin was himself a Georgian. Even today the two republics have the smallest percentage of Russian population of any of the SSR's.

The German invasion of the USSR in 1941 made necessary a quick assessment of the political reliability of the ethnic minorities. Large numbers of Belorussians, Karelians, and more especially Ukrainians welcomed the invaders with open arms. Within the RSFSR it was fairly obvious that the Volga German ASSR represented a potential threat. The republic was therefore immedi-

ately liquidated, its people dispersed.

As the Nazis advanced across the Ukraine and threatened the area northeast of the Black Sea, the loyalty of various other minorities came into question. By the time the German threat had been eliminated in 1944, at least five groups living in or near the Caucasus had been dispersed and their autonomous administrative units eliminated. These groups, the Chechen, Ingush, Balkar, Karachai, and Kalmyk, were accused of passivity toward the Germans or actual collaboration. Most of these peoples were relocated in the republics of Central Asia, while some of the Kalmyk even found their

way to the United States. Khrushchev early in 1956 deplored this policy of evacuation as an example of Stalin's ruthless cruelty; since that time at least some of these peoples have been publishing newspapers and other literature in their own language in the Central Asian SSR's and their partial rehabilitation is apparently under way.

After the war many new aspects of the nationality problem presented themselves. The policies and behavior of the invading Germans had done much to convince the Ukrainians and Belorussians that there were worse fates than sovietization; but many of the Ukrainian partisans who had worked behind the lines against the Germans stayed underground rather than return to the Soviet fold. The addition of western lands to the territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia and the acquisition from Rumania of most of the territory that became the newly formed Moldavian SSR brought into the country many people who had never lived under the Soviet regime. Further north, the three Baltic countries, briefly taken over by the USSR before the war, were once more incorporated as constituent republics. The acquisition of land from Finland and the formation of the Karelo-Finnish SSR were of less significance, as most of the sparse population of the new territory moved back into Finland. In 1956 this area ceased to be a constituent republic and was attached to the RSFSR as the Karelian ASSR.

The assimilation of western Ukrainians presented a considerable problem. Although in theory they were being reunited with their own ethnic kin, they were, at the same time, being forced into the collective farm system and into schools where Russian was a required language. Perhaps worst of all from the point of view of many, their Uniate Church, which followed the Eastern Rite but acknowledged the sovereignty of Rome, was forced to renounce its allegiance to Rome and join the Russian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the idea of Ukrainian nationalism was much more highly developed in the western areas. The people considered themselves in no sense Russians, and the regime may well have felt the danger that their views might be spread to the east. After several years of sporadic uprisings, the underground appears to have been suppressed; at many points in both the Ukraine and Belorussia, the regime has apparently moved these potentially disloyal elements away from the borders of the USSR, replacing them with Great Russians. Moldavia, with a very mixed urban population and a Rumanian-speaking Orthodox peasantry, presented a separate though comparatively minor problem.

The peoples of the newly acquired Baltic states presented a

problem in some ways the most difficult of any new territory, since they occupied an exposed strategic position. Not only had these peoples come to hate the Russians in tsarist times, but also they had experienced twenty years of political independence. Their church affiliations — Catholic in Lithuania and Lutheran in the two other republics — were strong. The postwar history of this area has been one of forced collectivization of highly individualistic peasants, of mass deportations of the native peoples from many areas and their replacement by Russians, and of a deeply resented

suppression of religious and cultural freedom.

Except with regard to newly acquired territory and to peoples liquidated in connection with World War II, Soviet policy toward minorities has shown few marked changes from that of the 1930's. Russian is increasingly the over-all language and Russians continue to hold key posts all over the USSR and to spread out as settlers, engineers, and industrialists into all corners of the land. Even the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a preferred status among the religions of the USSR. Minority languages, literature, and arts are still supported and encouraged, but any minority movement that could conceivably foster separatist sentiments is quickly and ruthlessly suppressed.

Although the nationalities policy has resulted in the partial or complete absorption of many of the smaller minorities in the USSR, it has by no means succeeded in assuring the loyalty of most of the larger groups on the western and southern periphery of the country. In the Baltics, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia millions of people in their various ways feel toward the Soviet Russians and their regime a violent resentment that is held in check only by the highly developed repressive powers of that regime itself. (For more detailed information on the ethnic minorities and their lan-

guages, see the appendix.)

Result

To carry on the rapid pace of industrialization and keep itself in power, the Soviet regime has had to maintain an almost continuous sense of crisis among the people by various means — a policy that might be termed planned insecurity. Potential opposition to the regime is held in check by the diffusion of control and responsibility in a complex network of overlapping powers and by a highly efficient system of surveillance in which a huge army of informers

report on every phase of Soviet life, and each watcher is in turn watched.

Under these circumstances there has been the constant danger of destroying initiative. The Soviet press is always exhorting the people toward greater productivity. Through education, as well as through honorific and material rewards, the regime has created incentives for the development of new leaders. A young Russian, fresh from schools and from the youth organizations whose main function is indoctrination, can still see many opportunities for advancement open before him, but they are rapidly narrowing. As he enters the labor force, he finds himself caught up in a bureaucratic system that functions in a manner quite different from what he has been brought up to expect. Informal arrangements, outside the highly organized channels for social and economic relationships, and illegal, or at least extralegal, means are used to attain required goals that cannot be reached by remaining within official channels. A complex system of bargaining and mutual concealment leaves almost any official open to denunciation. Advancement is only partly the result of technical skill or administrative ability. To succeed, a man must know and loudly proclaim adherence to the latest version of the Communist party line. He must be able to identify and pay court to those who wield real power in his area. He must know whom to denounce and when, and be able to sense at any moment just how much illegal action the traffic will bear. The quest for positions of power is a subtle and dangerous game, and those who attain the top level are likely to be ruthless and cunning as well as able men. Dangers increase in almost direct proportion to advancement. Any purge takes its greatest toll at the top.

To most Russians the government is, as it has always been, something remote and inevitable; its representatives are to be appeased and avoided, although this is increasingly difficult to do. Rather than concentration of power at a point remote from the people, it is the all-pervasiveness of government, coupled with the number of areas of life in which arbitrary authority may be applied,

that comes into conflict with age-old values.

Among those who control the USSR today, there is an inextricable blend of more or less cynical struggle for power, devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideals, and delusions of infallibility as custodians of the Communist "truth." An ambivalence permeates the whole of Soviet society. The people find much that is familiar in the institutions and functioning of the government, and they value many of the

changes that have occurred such as the welfare programs and the vastly increased educational opportunities. The low standard of living has been a source of disillusionment as well as anxiety and hardship. There seems at present, however, to be a conviction, not without some foundation, that the material conditions of life are improving. As Russians, no matter how they may feel about their government, they are passionately loyal to the Russian land and proud of Russia's present position in world affairs.

The minority nationalities within the USSR, however, seldom share these patriotic sentiments. The Soviet nationalities policy has involved many inconsistencies, as well as much brutality. It has failed to produce loyal and enthusiastic support of the regime on the part of the minorities, but it has resulted in the emergence of a Russianized and sovietized elite among them. Thus the potential leaders, passing through the Soviet educational system and lured by the economic and social advantages which conformity offers, are continually siphoned off leaving the masses leaderless and their resentment inarticulate and ineffective.

The demands of industrial society for a certain order and predictability in life, as well as the emergence of an upper class with a vested interest in the system and in the maintenance of its own favored position, have pushed the regime away from punitive, terroristic, and negative controls in favor of incentives, exhortation, and powerful but orderly legal processes. This balance between rule by intimidation and more stable and legal methods is a continual problem of the regime; alternation in emphasis rather than a complete and permanent shift to one or the other is characteristic of the regime's rule today.

ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE RUSSIAN STATE

As through the centuries the Princedom of Moscow spread across the immense Eurasian plain and over the low Ural Mountains into Asia, the concentration of state power in a single ruler became, except for intermittent periods, a constant of Russian life. A belief in Russia's uniqueness, the mystical image of a land vast and holy, of a people able to encompass all peoples and manners—these also

emerged as permanent themes of Russian history.

The expansive force of Muscovy — eventually binding, through a far-flung bureaucracy, a vast conglomeration of peoples into a single nation — met reverses at the hands of Western European countries, which were technically more advanced. But each military and diplomatic reverse generated an impulse to transformation. Striving to match its Western neighbors, at once envious and distrusting of their ways, Russia borrowed and assimilated their skills and knowledge. The "modernizing" effort itself became cyclical—intense, dormant, intense—and political rule came to be characterized by alternating relaxation and tightening of control.

In time Russia became the largest of the great Eastern European empires. It did not, however, keep pace with political and social developments taking place elsewhere in Europe. The existence in fact and idea of untrammeled state power, unrestrained by defined constitutional norms and personified in one man, the tsar, remained a dominant feature of Russian history to the end of the nineteenth century. This persistence of autocratic rule and the failure of the tsarist regime to adjust willingly to changing times

produced great internal discontent.

The strains of World War I led in 1917 to a collapse of the tsarist autocracy and to revolution. In the midst of the subsequent upheaval a small, tightly knit, conspiratorial group of fanatical

Marxist revolutionaries seized political power. Russia's new rulers came to power with an ideology that promised to make a clean sweep of the established social order, that opposed the preservation of Russian national interests in favor of international Communism, and that condemned as evil all the values of the preceding tsarist system. Since then they have striven to make Russia over into something wholly new. Especially in the years after 1928, they worked gigantic internal changes. Under forced draft, industry expanded enormously. Agriculture was collectivized. The new Russian state—the Soviet Union—extended its control over civil life more exten-

sively than had any dictatorship of the past.

Despite vast social and economic changes during the Soviet period, continuities between the new Russia and the old have endured. The Soviet and the tsarist systems have shared as common characteristics: a strong, centralized state: a massive bureaucracy: the semideification of a ruler; reliance on a secret or political police; censorship and repression; imperialist expansion. Moreover, as the Soviet regime followed a course that has made it a world power now rivaled only by the United States, the Communist revolutionary heritage came to be merged with Russian nationalism. Sensitive to its dependence on the Russian population, which in numbers, achievement, and experience far outweighs all the Soviet minority groups, the Communist state presented itself as heir to all that is best in the Russian heritage. This trend reached its climax during and after World War II, when legends, traditions, and national heroes (both tsars and revolutionaries) were conjured up to inspire devotion and sacrifice.

At the same time Russia's Communist rulers viewed the defense of their country against the outside world as a defense of the revolution's heartland, therefore of all "progressive" mankind. The cause of world revolution was equated with the expansion of Soviet power and influence. Unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Communist party became the supreme obligation of all Communists and their sympathizers wherever they might be—for history, it was argued, had created only this instrument for the realization of its ultimate purpose.

History, in the hands of the Soviet rulers, has become an ideological weapon. Government policies are justified by reference to historical "acts" and "documents" and, when the policies change, history is rewritten, an operation which spills out in space — toward the American and Asian continents — and goes backward into time —

to the shadowy origins of man and the universe.

Origins of the Russian Nation

In the ninth century A.D. the forms that were to dominate political developments throughout most of Europe for the next five centuries already were emerging. But in the region between the Baltic and the Black Seas, the eastern Slavs (Great Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians), disunited and discordant, retained their ancient tribal patterns. The first lasting outside influence to reach them would be that of the Orthodox Church—the major eastern branch of the Christian church. And once having adopted the Byzantine religion, Kievan Russia would absorb much of Byzantine law and art. The Byzantine concept of government, with its stress on despotism, centralization, and the subordination of religion to the state, would permanently mark Russian development.

By the tenth century thriving trading centers had been established along the excellent north-south waterways in western Russia; most important among these were Novgorod, Smolensk, and Kiev. As the southern outpost of the trade route, Kiev attracted increasing concentrations of people and power. Aided by growing commercial, military, and political relations with the Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria, it developed into the nucleus of a Russian state, and, by the eleventh century A.D., had become a major power with dynastic ties

to Europe as well as to Byzantium.

Throughout the twelfth century, with centers of trade shifting from Byzantium to the Mediterranean lands and to Germany, the importance of Kiev declined. Its ruling house, lacking a clear principle of succession, constantly was divided against itself in disputes which brought recurring internal warfare and famine. Into this unstable state the successors of Genghis Khan, having extended their rule over much of Asia, led the Tatar hordes west to capture Kiev in 1240. Russia remained under Tatar domination for almost 250 years.

Tatar-controlled Russia enjoyed hardly any political or cultural relations with Europe or the Byzantine Empire and this isolation left a lasting imprint upon Russia's future. Economic backwardness and cultural isolation became dominant features of Russian life. Russia was isolated from the forces that shaped so much of European history — the Renaissance and the Reformation. The spiritual, artistic, and intellectual life of the people gradually centered around the Russian church; there emerged, in time, the concept of "Holy Russia" — the isolated citadel of Christianity, a solitary light in the midst of a dark outer world.

Formation of the Tsarist State

Any hope for eastern Slavic unity was crushed by the onslaught of the Tatars. The people of Kievan Russia fled along the great rivers. Those who went northeast laid the foundations for a new state along the upper reaches of the Volga and its tributaries. Here, eventually, the role once played by Kiev was assumed by the northeastern town of Moscow.

An important trade junction, relatively distant from the Tatar hordes, Moscow attracted labor and skills, and its prestige increased along with its population. In 1380, Dimitry, Prince of Muscovy, defeated the Tatars on the river Don. Mongol-Tatar domination was not yet ended, but the victory did much to rally national feeling around the Muscovite rulers as challengers of foreign oppression. More and more the princes of Moscow, allied with the Russian church, became the symbol to the Russian people of their national identity and dignity.

By the sixteenth century Muscovy's octopus-like fur trade dominion had become the center of an expanding empire: Novgorod, to the north, had been absorbed at the end of the fifteenth century; Kazan and Astrakhan, remnants of the Tatar empire in the south, in 1552 and 1556. The establishment in 1553 of a trade route from Scotland to Archangel opened free lanes to the west, enabling Russia to enter into commercial and political relations with European powers without depending on the good will of its Baltic neighbors. Penetration and colonization of Siberia, although carried on by incredibly small forces, brought this immense territory under

From the late fourteenth century on, the power of the princes of Moscow grew rapidly. Both Mongol administrative techniques (principles of taxation, postal service, transportation, military organization) and the Byzantine heritage of absolutism contributed

to a rapid development of centralized, autocratic power.

Russian domination within the next hundred years.

Ivan the Great (reign: 1462–1505), after marrying the niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1472, declared his right to many of the imperial attributes and symbols of the Byzantine Empire, which had disintegrated after Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453. He appropriated as his own the double-headed eagle used on the seal of Byzantium, gave himself the titles of "Tsar-Autocrat Chosen by God" (tsar being the Russian equivalent of Caesar) and "Sovereign of All Russia," and, by asserting the rights of the State over those of the Church, assumed supreme spiritual and worldly power.

Gradually the power of the independent princes was broken. Driven by the requirements of defense, imperial expansion, and administration, the Russian autocrats created a new military-administrative class of "service men." Granted land and wealth in return for service to the state, they became the tsarist nobility.

Under Ivan the Terrible (reign: 1533–84), the nobles enjoyed possession of their lands only so long as they served the government. The peasant, relatively free in early Russia, also was forced to serve. His right to own land was increasingly curtailed as the new landowning class claimed part of his crop and labor and increased his material dependence upon the landowner through legal checks upon migration. Land was wealth only to the extent that there was labor to work it, so, to insure cultivation of the lands given the service-nobility, and to facilitate the collection of taxes from the bulk of the population, the state gradually restricted the peasant's freedom. In time he was reduced to serfdom.

In the hands of Ivan the Terrible, a specially organized guard, the Oprichnina, became an instrument for imposing the ruler's absolute will on the people. Functioning as a superior political authority, responsible to the tsar alone, checking on government administration, the Oprichnina left a legacy of fear and hatred.

By the time of Peter the Great (reign: 1682–1725) tsarism had acquired its distinguishing characteristics: a supreme ruler who was the semisacrosanct personification of almost unlimited authority; an ideal of service to the state, together with the determination to enforce such service, in some form or other, on all groups; an exceptionally large, centralized, minutely graded bureaucracy, in which were fused legislative, administrative, and judicial functions; a concept of the state as omnicompetent but primarily concerned with the military requirements of empire. All these intensified the government's dependence on force and arbitrary police action.

There were by 1682 about nine million people within the Russian empire. The great majority were eastern Slavs who possessed a high degree of cultural homogeneity. Among those living in different regions, however, certain variations had developed, on the basis of which three groups could by this time be distinguished: the Great Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians. Each of the three had developed identifying characteristics of speech, dress, and customs. The Ukrainians and Belorussians had, in the course of time, absorbed some elements of Polish and Lithuanian cultures, but Great Russians remained foremost in numbers and influence.

Many non-Slavic ethnic groups also lived within or near the

borders of the Russian empire at the end of the seventeenth century. The Karelians, a people of Finno-Ugrian stock, lived north of Lake Ladoga, on the periphery of Russian life. In the upper and middle Volga region, the Voguls, Mordva, Cheremis, and Votyak were slowly assimilated by Russian conquerers. The Bashkir, the Kazan Tatars, the Crimean Tatars, and other ethnic groups were scattered throughout the middle and lower Volga basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the approaches to the Ural range. In large part descendants from the eastern invaders of the thirteenth century, these groups were chiefly Moslem in faith. Retaining many of their militant characteristics, they continued to harass the Russian authorities, but in later years were finally conquered through Russian colonization.

The Growth of Empire

Defeat of Russia by Sweden in 1700 was a powerful stimulus to the military ambitions of Peter the Great, who immediately acted to strengthen and modernize his country. He forcefully pushed compulsory service of the nobility in the army, navy, or government and established a national standing army, a fundamental legacy of his regime. Industries, roads, bridges, and canals were constructed. Shipbuilding was fostered. At the cost of more than twenty thousand lives, he founded in 1703 a new city in the swamps of the Gulf of Finland - St. Petersburg (Sankt Peterburg, renamed Petrograd in 1914 and Leningrad in 1924), which, except for a brief interval after Peter's death, remained the capital of Russia until 1918. when the Bolsheviks returned to Moscow, Schools for the children of the nobility were established. To stimulate technical and scientific development, foreign scientists, artisans, and doctors were imported in increasing numbers. The mounting financial burdens of the state led to the gradual confiscation of church lands and the levying of a poll tax on every male peasant, regardless of age or ability to work. Requiring constantly more money and men, Peter's innovations imposed great sacrifices, and a resulting series of popular uprisings was suppressed with great difficulty.

Peter pressed the Swedish war with energy. Victory at Poltava in 1709 gave him the initiative. At Hangö in 1714 his ships defeated the Swedish fleet. The Aaland Islands were captured and Stockholm threatened. In the Treaty of Nystadt, 1721, Sweden ceded the Baltic lands; St. Petersburg, Peter's "window to Europe," was for-

mally secured. In addition to the Byzantine title of Tsar, Peter

assumed the designation Emperor.

The tsarist government tampered little with the existing institutions of the newly acquired Baltic provinces. A small German minority (landlords, merchants, and clergy) dominated the economic and political life of the area, while the indigenous populations, which had known alternating periods of Danish, Swedish, German, Polish, and Russian control, retained in great measure their distinctive languages and cultures. Many members of the dominant class — the so-called Baltic Germans — eventually secured prominent positions in the Russian army and government. Of all the non-Russian ethnic groups in the empire, the Baltic peoples maintained the most extensive contacts with the European world. Their standard of literacy and learning was already higher than that in Russia proper, and was to remain so.

Brutal and energetic, with a thirst for knowledge and work, sparing no one, himself least, in pursuing the interests of the nation as he conceived them, Peter the Great more than any Russian ruler before him left a permanent impression on his people. Russia hence-

forth was to act as an important European power.

Although the shores of the Baltic had been reached, Russia's position as a great power remained insecure. Of its three neighbors — Sweden, Poland, and Turkey — only the first had definitely been eliminated as a powerful enemy. The territories to the west continued to be a source of contention between Russia and Poland. To the south, Peter had failed to establish Russia on the shores of the Black Sea. Under Catherine II ("the Great"; reign: 1762—96) two-thirds of Poland as well as the northern coast of the Black Sea, including the Crimea, were brought within the boundaries of the Russian empire.

The initial successes of Napoleon's 1812 invasion united the Russian people as seldom before. Under Alexander I (reign: 1801–25) Russia and its allies pressed the fight until Napoleon was driven back into France and forced from his throne. With new territories — Finland, the central region of what remained of Poland, and Bessarabia — Russia for the first time in its history could feel reasonably secure. It emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as one of

Europe's leading powers.

During the nineteenth century, in a series of colonial wars scarcely felt in the center of the empire, Russia finally conquered the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia had been slowly advancing into the Caucasus since the time of Peter the Great, in constant conflict with its native peoples as well as with Persia and the Ottoman empire. By the end of the eighteenth century the region south of the Caucasus Mountains had been penetrated. By 1829 virtually all of Transcaucasia had come into Russian possession. Except for a small section of the Pamir plateau, the Russian conquest of Central Asia was complete by 1884, adding vast lands and many non-Russian peoples to the empire. The Russian frontier met the frontiers of Persia, China, and Afghanistan and was at one point only a few miles from British India.

The tsarist state interfered little with the life of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, ruling them indirectly through existing institutions, customs, and laws. The chief ethnic groups of the area—the Kazak, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Tadzhik, and Turkmen peoples—were predominantly poor and illiterate but proud of their land of legends, the scene of some of the great world centers of Moslem culture; and memories of glory and tradition were an integral part

of the folklore and life of the people.

Throughout the nineteenth century Russian interests in the Near and Middle East and in non-Russian Asia conflicted with those of the great European powers, notably England. Russian expansive policies – from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean – threatened English commercial, colonial, and strategic interests. Attempting to gain access to the Mediterranean through control of the Turkish Straits, Russia met a coalition of Western powers unwilling to permit Russian ascendancy in the neighboring Balkan countries. The result was the Crimean War (1854–56), in which

Russia was defeated on its own territory.

In 1877 Russia went to war against Turkey and, defeating the Turks, obtained from them a large, independent Bulgarian state. Russian policymakers hoped to turn Bulgaria into a useful Balkan satellite. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, however, the pressure of other European powers forced Russia to relinquish the gains it had scored in the Russo-Turkish war. This reversal created great bitterness, particularly among certain Pan-Slav elements who desired to unite all the Slavs of eastern Europe into a federation and bring them under Russian domination. In the Far East the rising power of Japan increasingly ran counter to Russian ambitions. Another military defeat, this time by the Japanese in 1905, added to a growing sense of national humiliation.

Chastened by defeat at the hands of Japan, Russia reached an agreement with Great Britain in 1907, thus setting the final stage in

aligning the forces that fought World War I. Russian ambitions in the Balkans now conflicted most sharply with those of Austria-Hungary. Austria's formal annexation of the old Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzogovina in 1908 once more blocked Russian hopes for access to the Turkish Straits and came as a profound blow to Russian pride. When Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Russian military leaders ordered full mobilization. Austria's ally, Germany, demanded that all Russian mobilization cease. This demand was ignored, and Germany declared war on Russia on July 31.

The Internal Collapse

Russia entered World War I with an army great in numbers, but its morale had been seriously shaken by the defeat of 1905 and the entire political and military organization of the empire riddled with corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, the basic institutions of the traditional social and political order—autocracy, nobility, and serfdom—had long been subject to bitter intellectual attack and criticism and undermined by the economic and social changes that the imperial regime had halfheartedly accepted from time to time during the nineteenth century and following its humiliation at the hands of the Japanese. Whether or not the attempted reforms would have stabilized the government on a new and stronger foundation it is impossible to say since before they became firmly established the first of the twentieth century's total wars had dealt the old regime a staggering blow.

As early as the sixteenth century the Russian autocracy — guided initially by considerations of a practical nature such as strengthening the military and improving the machinery of government — had borrowed Western technical and scientific knowledge in ever increasing amounts. As Peter the Great attempted to transform Moscovite Russia into a monarchy on the European pattern, Westernization was accelerated. But in pursuing this course the autocracy

was inviting its own destruction.

In admitting the influence of Western technology into Russia, Peter the Great had no desire to change the fundamental institutions of Russian society. He was interested in Western techniques and technicians, not in art, letters, or philosophy. Inevitably, however, Russia increasingly absorbed Western cultural influences. While the majority of its people continued to view Russia—the "third Rome"—as standing alone in a sinful and heretical world, a wedge

of doubt began to enter the minds of some members of the upper classes. They began to imitate Western ways and thought. The gap between rulers and ruled widened with time. In speech, manners, dress, and outlook, the Europeanized nobility became completely divorced from the masses and Russia split into two distinct cultures.

Catherine II admired the French philosophy of the Enlightenment and expressed enthusiasm for liberal ideas. But she was convinced that autocracy was the only form of government possible in Russia, and was reinforced in that conviction by the French revolution and the peasant rebellions at home. Some of her subjects, however, drew opposite conclusions. European values and ideals—constitutional government, civil equality, personal liberty—increasingly disturbed the thinking of the educated minority, challenging the existing social and political order. A formless dissatisfaction, at first confined to a small group of nobles, grew and spread.

Trying to meet the new demands without sacrificing the base of the traditional political system, Alexander I devoted much energy to administrative reforms. Laws were codified and expanded to include some European concepts. The bureaucracy was reorganized. Alexander considered transforming the autocracy into a Westerntype monarchy and commanded that a draft constitution be prepared; he dropped the project when it became clear that a consti-

tution necessarily would limit his freedom of action.

The Napoleonic Wars brought many educated Russians into direct contact with European political thought and intensified their desire to introduce political changes at home. Alexander's death and the accession of Nicholas I (reign: 1825–55) in December 1825 was greeted by an abortive attempt at rebellion by a small, badly organized group of educated men armed with a constitution. Although speedily suppressed, the incident proved significant. The men were immortalized as the Decembrists (Dekabristy), and what had been a shapeless current of discontent crystallized into a permanent opposition. From this time on the tsarist regime and the small body of Russian intellectuals were to be separated from each other by an unbridgeable gulf of distrust and suspicion. The Decembrists became a myth to inspire future rebellions.

The thirty-year reign of Nicholas I saw censorship and repression at their highest point in pre-Soviet Russian history. A man to whom any limitation on the power of the sovereign was inconceivable, Nicholas combated the "spirit of revolution" with wholehearted

zeal, reviving the institution of a secret political police in the form of the "Third Section." But the cultural life of Russia was undergoing great changes, and these, despite repression, found expression in literature, scholarship, and political thought. The power of the autocrat was neither far-reaching nor drastic enough to check the spread of new ideas.

Defeat in the Crimean War inflamed the discontent of educated Russians. Among them, opposition to the suppression of free thought, the degradations of serfdom, police tyranny, corporal punishment, and the persistent corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy became almost universal. The government finally had to admit that

basic reforms could not be avoided.

Serfdom was the crucial issue. Since its beginnings in the sixteenth century there had been scores of peasant uprisings. Four times in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the southeastern and middle Volga peasants rose in great revolts that shook the state. All four revolts shared a simple goal: the overthrow of serfdom and oppression. They are remembered by the names of their leaders – Bolotnikov (1606–07), Stenka Razin (1670–71), who has been given a special place in folklore and song, Bulavin (1707–08), and Pugachev (1773–75), who also became part of the popular tradition. These rebellions were not, however, directed against the tsars. In the minds of the peasants, oppression was the fault of the tsars' favorites, and the landlords whose authority over their serfs was almost unlimited; in the beginning of the nineteenth century peasants could be sold, mortgaged, or given away as gifts.

At least four hundred minor peasant outbreaks occurred between 1855 and 1860. During these years, the foundations of serfdom were being undermined by the nascent Russian industrial revolution as well as by the pressure of public opinion. From the beginning of the century the autocracy periodically had considered liberation of the serfs, but had always backed away from the task, for the land settlement that would have had to accompany emancipation meant alienation of the lands of the nobility. Now, however,

emancipation no longer could be postponed.

Alexander II (reign: 1855-81), succeeding Nicholas I, attempted to persuade the landlords to take the initiative in this

reform; failing, he himself liberated the serfs in 1861.

The emancipation law provided that the landlords were to be paid for the land allotted to the ex-serfs either in money or in labor. Most serfs preferred a cash settlement. Those who lacked sufficient money to make such a settlement were aided by the state, which reimbursed the landlords and arranged for repayment by the former serfs in forty-nine yearly installments (known as "redemption dues") to the state treasury. The title to the land allotted the peasants did not pass to them individually but to their village commune (mir in Russian) — a traditional collective institution within which Russian peasant families regulated the economic and legal relationships of their villages. The responsibility for the payment of redemption dues was vested in the commune, which had in the past served as a useful fiscal and administrative device for the government. Many of the administrative and police powers that the nobles had formerly exercised were also transferred to the commune, thereby increasing its jurisdiction over its members. The internal affairs of the commune were regulated by the heads of families under the leadership of peasant elders elected from among them.

Though the evils of bondage had been removed, the emancipation did not solve the problem of peasant livelihood and resulted in the creation of a large free-peasant class unable to support itself from the product of its own land. The peasants, bitterly disillusioned with the reform, responded with thousands of small, unorganized uprisings. Land allotments were in most cases insufficient for subsistence, and the reform had come at a time when Russia was experiencing an extremely rapid population growth. Although Russian industry was beginning to make substantial progress, the factories still were unable to absorb the excess labor of the countryside. Rural overpopulation led to a prolonged agricultural crisis. With little progress in agricultural techniques, the peasants found it increasingly difficult to feed themselves. More land, they felt, was the only remedy. The burden of the redemption payments and an intense "land hunger" determined the Russian political atmosphere up to the revolution in 1917.

The abolition of serfdom was only the first of a number of serious reforms instituted by Alexander II. Local government was thoroughly reorganized. The zemstvo, in which liberated serfs sat side by side with their former masters, was established in 1864 to handle the problems of public welfare in provinces and districts. Russia's judicial system was made to compare favorably with those in other European countries. A reorganization of the army in 1874 improved conditions of service and reduced the term of service from

twenty-five to six years or less.

Alexander's reforms, however, failed to satisfy Russian intellectuals; they were stimulated to a more determined and outspoken political opposition. Industrial progress and the general intellectual

awakening had resulted in a significant increase in the number of writers, journalists, teachers, and engineers. These professional middle-class elements, enlarging the ranks of the politically minded in the educated class and acquiring a definite group consciousness,

provided the backbone of the political opposition.

The members of this peculiarly Russian intelligentsia, living in a changing world that had as yet no place for them, were bound together only by common alienation from the existing order. Their mission, as they viewed it, was to provide independent thinking and criticism. Prevented from translating thought into action, they were engrossed in disputes—abstract, theoretical debates charged with intensity—in which the most trivial issues assumed profound meaning and significance. Each man sought his particular brand of salvation in the writings of Western thinkers or in native Russian traditions, frequently blending the two, or vacillating from one to the other. Dogmas were adopted and rejected; heresies were attacked. Each was prepared to suffer for his faith of the moment and sought to refashion the world in its image.

As a group, they longed for the future, whose servants they felt they were. They dreamed first of reforms and gradual improvement, but were constantly punished or harassed for dreaming. In time their mood grew rebellious and their dreams filled with apocalyptic visions. They wrangled endlessly on the nature of the coming revolution. The men who were to make the revolution of October-November 1917 grew up in this intellectual turmoil and gained sustenance from it, fighting tsarism, capitalism, and each other. Their struggles, and the habit of struggle, were to leave a sharp

imprint on the future course of Russian history.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the intellectual opposition possessed unity of neither spirit nor aims. Conservatives favored gradual reforms; liberals sought a constitution; radicals rejected the parliamentary concept and demanded complete destruction of the existing social order. Among the extremists there was no unanimity on how the revolution should be brought about. Some believed a quiet period to organize and educate the peasantry was required. Others hoped the peasants could be stirred to action with little preparation. But the peasants held the intellectuals in suspicion, and propaganda in the countryside failed. Disillusioned with the masses the radicals gradually adopted the idea of direct frontal attack on the autocracy by a small, disciplined, and ruthless minority.

Uncompromising, intolerant of dissenters, in perpetual battle

with gradualists and liberals, the extremists insisted that all creative activity—literature, painting, music—be subordinated to civic duty; they judged all artistic and intellectual expression in terms of its "progressive" or "reactionary" character. At the height of Alexander's reform movement a small group of radicals called for a bitter struggle against the government. After many earlier attempts on his life Alexander was assassinated in 1881.

Violence had its consequences: Alexander III (reign: 1881–94) chose a course of complete political suppression, which kept social unrest largely underground during his reign. The zemstvos were placed under strict government supervision. Censorship was strengthened. The moderate demands of the constitutionalists and the radical aspirations of the revolutionaries were met with equal hostility. A deliberate policy of persecuting religious dissenters and Iews and of Russianizing non-Russian minorities was vigorously

pressed.

Under Nicholas II, the last of the Russian tsars (reign: 1894–1917), the tools of repression became increasingly unequal to the task of containing political discontent. By 1905 Russia was in the throes of revolution. When a procession of workers led by a priest trying to present their grievances to the Tsar was fired upon by government troops, all of Russia's industrial regions were ravaged by an epidemic of strikes. Land-hungry peasants rose simultaneously in many provinces, murdering landlords, looting and burning estates. The disastrous war with Japan was ending and Nicholas faced the alternatives of establishing a military dictatorship or granting a constitution. Reluctantly he chose the second course.

In October 1905 Nicholas issued a manifesto stating that the Russian people would be granted civil liberties and that a representative assembly, based on a democratic franchise, would be established. The assembly, called the State Duma, was elected in 1906 and again in 1907, only to be dissolved by a government determined to use it as a rubber stamp. An imperial decree revised the franchise, and a third Duma, controlled by a governmental

majority, was elected in 1907.

The franchise of the Duma favored the large landowners; its powers were seriously limited. But although satisfying neither liberals nor radicals, this constitutional experiment did mark a new period in Russian history: the concept of self-government was applied to the field of national administration. The Duma, despite the limitations imposed upon it, could subject the policies of the government to criticism and voice the demands of independent ele-

ments among the people. It could examine and vote upon the greater part of the budget. Under its influence, many government departments were modernized and liberalized and a scheme of universal education was introduced. Government censorship relaxed considerably, and Russian intellectual life became more diversified, found wider outlets for creative energy, and experienced a literary and artistic renaissance. Political parties were legally recognized; it appeared that the underground revolutionary might become a thing of the past. Marxists had formed the Social Democratic party, and were interested almost exclusively in urban workers. Non-Marxist radicals formed the Social Revolutionary party, which had the greatest appeal to the peasants. Moderate and liberal intellectuals also organized, calling themselves the Constitutional Democrats or Cadets.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, the government launched an agrarian program to improve the conditions of the peasantry. Redemption dues were canceled in 1906. With the financial assistance of the State Land Bank for Peasants, the rural population was able to buy considerable tracts of land. Legislation was enacted to eliminate the village commune and to encourage individual land ownership among the peasants. But with the agrarian problem barely on its way to solution, Russia plunged into World War I.

War broke out at a time when every ounce of energy was needed for internal reorganization. The constitutional experiment — like Stolypin's agrarian program — was in its infancy; a system of universal education had only just been introduced; and although Russian industrial development remained far behind that of the West, the growth of a city proletariat confronted the government for the first time with troublesome labor problems. In short, the war and the ensuing political and military crisis made impossible the completion of domestic reforms, while backwardness and disorganization on the home front fatally impeded operations against the enemy.

Nevertheless, in the early stages of World War I the tsarist government had the support of a united nation. The external threat to "Holy Russia" made all elements of the population ready to postpone domestic quarrels. The opposition in the Duma pledged its support. The government, however, failed to respond to these offers of reconciliation and cooperation. Its relations with the Duma once more gave way to mutual distrust and hostility. Corruption in the royal court and inefficiency in the army and

bureaucracy led to staggering military defeats. Discontent again became outspoken. In the prosecution of the war Nicholas II consistently neglected to consult the Duma, forced the more liberal ministers out of the government, and based his policy on the

opinions of an ever smaller group of favorites.

By 1916 the government and the Tsar's court were completely isolated by distrust; by 1917 they were no longer able to cope with the problems of war. Food shortages, lack of fuel, the breakdown of transportation, and appallingly high losses at the front undermined the morale of the nation. The bonds which had previously held the Russian people together — throne, church, tradition — had been strained to the breaking point, Late in February food riots and a revolt of reserve battalions reduced the capital to chaos. Troops were ordered to fire upon the rioters; they refused. Powerless to control the rising tide of revolution the Tsar abdicated, and a reluctant Duma took on the task of forming a provisional government pending the calling of a constituent assembly.

Establishment of the Communist State

The long process of Russia's Westernization, ever more important after Peter the Great, was overcast throughout by Russia's sensitivity to its own material and cultural backwardness, a sensitivity that influenced profoundly not only Russian attitudes toward the West but also Russian attempts to understand and establish a

national identity.

Up to the time of Peter the Great, Muscovite civilization possessed a unity of its own. The process of Westernizaton, violently intensified by Peter, meant that Russia's cultural isolation could no longer be kept intact. Peter was supported by enthusiastic admirers, but by some he was denounced as the Antichrist. As foreign influences (German, Swedish, Dutch, French, English) spread through the country in the decades after Peter, they produced alternating and conflicting reactions. Foreign patterns of dress and custom were sometimes violently rejected, often slavishly imitated, occasionally blended into a curious mixture of old and new. Under Catherine II's patronage of arts and letters, French philosophy was at the same time indiscriminately absorbed and reviled. The Napoleonic Wars intensified this dualism by providing both stimulus to national pride and increased admiration of Western values and achievements.

Within the swelling flood of mid-nineteenth-century Russian

intellectual and artistic activity, two raging currents – the Western-oriented and the Slavophile – encountered one another at all points concerning the meaning of Russian history, the spiritual basis of Russian civilization, and the nature of Russian destiny. Although some of the great Russian writers remained aloof from this conflict, it influenced much of the thinking and behavior of succeeding

generations.

To the Western-oriented, the past was a yoke holding Russia back while European civilization steadily progressed, and they called upon their nation to follow the West or face total stagnation. The Slavophiles argued that Russian civilization differed from that of Europe not only in degree but in kind. Russia, they protested, must preserve its purity and essential uniqueness—its simplicity, humility, and patience as against the West's shallow luxury, pride, and ambition. The evils of Western industrialism could and should be avoided, they insisted, and the peasant commune, thought of as a peculiarly Russian institution, made the foundation of a better society, one satisfying the demands of social justice.

Both Slavophiles and the Western-oriented opposed the autocracy in its traditional form. The former envisioned a patriarchal, even a constitutional monarchy, based on freely given popular support. Both camps valued personal liberty and sought abolition of serfdom, but there was no unity within either camp as to the means by which Russia could be shaped to their ideals. Slavophiles as well as the Western-oriented could be found throughout the political spectrum: conservative, gradual reformist, revolutionary. Individual Russian intellectuals often shared some of the views of both camps and approached the West with a considerable degree of ambivalence.

This ambivalence was particularly striking among mid-nine-teenth-century Russian Socialists for whom the West became the object of both hatred and admiration. Pre-Marxist socialism, borrowed from the West, emphasized social justice and the redistribution of wealth, but bitterly criticized Western industrialization. Critical not only of Russia's autocratic institutions but also of Western parliamentary democracy, the early Socialists shared the Slavophile conviction that it was Russia's mission to bring a new message to the world.

For many of Russia's Socialists, Marxist doctrine came as a welcome relief. Forced to recognize that justice and welfare could not be attained except through modernization but reluctant to accept what they saw as the countless sacrifices that "ruthless" industrialization would entail, they found in Marxism—"the last word in Western science"—that industrialization was inevitable and did not depend on the volition of man, but was the product of the "laws" of history. They were thus absolved of responsibility. By simultaneously glorifying the achievements of Western capitalism and prophesying its doom, Marxism satisfied their emotional ambivalence toward the West.

The Marxist historical analysis indicated that Russia would undergo a state of capitalist development before socialism, and eventually communism, could be achieved. And the Marxian world revolution, annihilating the capitalist order, was expected to occur in the most highly developed capitalist countries, not in backward Russia. Accordingly, at the turn of the century most Russian Marxists were prepared to submit to a period of evolutionary development. But by the time tsarism collapsed under the strains of World War I, discord among Russian Marxists had produced a split in the Marxist movement between the Bolshevik (majority) and Menshevik (minority) wings. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, insisted on an immediate Communist revolution to be led by an elite corps of hardened and disciplined professional revolutionaries. This would spark the world revolution abroad precisely because Russia's backwardness made her unique; capitalist imperialism, according to Lenin, should be broken at its weakest link - Russia. With this Slavophile justification, Lenin was to seize power in a Russia fallen into anarchy.

Lenin's Bolshevik party disliked the West, insisted on its own "rightness," was intolerant of compromise, called for the destruction of all competing power, and defended the principle of maintaining power by violence and terror, citing the semimyth of implacable foreign hostility. In all of this it reiterated old tendencies and attitudes, and foreshadowed the totalitarian development of the USSR.

Lenin's experience with revolutionary groups that were easily penetrated by the police reinforced his determination to build a highly centralized and disciplined organization of his own. His conversion to Marxism provided him with an organized and articulate set of beliefs that answered to his satisfaction all the great questions of right and wrong, happiness and suffering, the order of the universe—answers to be imposed upon Russian society in later years by means of force and all the techniques of modern mass communication. The exhilarating belief that he had found the truth persuaded Lenin that he alone held the key to interpreting Marxist

doctrine, and he discarded as heresy its evolutionary and democratic features. The native underground tradition that shaped the psychology and mentality of several generations of Russian revolutionaries profoundly influenced him toward contempt for gradualism, impatience with partial achievement of ideals, and faith in violence as the necessary means for achieving his—and all mankind's—aims. In the utilitarian ethics and aesthetics of the radical revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century, as well as in Marxist doctrine, Lenin found justifications for rejecting the bases of all established concepts of morality, for ascribing to all social and intellectual activity a political content, and for utilizing, with great flexibility, whatever tactics or policies his drive for power and domination dictated.

The Provisional Government of 1917 put an end to autocracy, declared Russia a republic, passed legislation on civil rights, prison reform, rights of women, universal suffrage, and religious freedom. But it hesitated to settle the two most pressing problems before it—further prosecution of the war, and partition of the land—until a constituent assembly could be elected by the people. The people, however, could no longer be prevented from expressing a discontent that had been accumulating for centuries.

Led by Socialists, the workers and soldiers of Russia organized into amorphous revolutionary councils (soviets) which increasingly harassed a government that lacked determination to suppress disorder. In March 1917 the leaders of the Petrograd (St. Petersburg) Soviet issued orders that military detachments should follow their own political policies, thereby destroying the entire organization of the army.

This loose hierarchy of soviets was easily penetrated by Lenin's small, disciplined Bolshevik party and soon fell under his control. By October (November by the present calendar) the peasants had taken matters into their own hands -- deserting the army en masse, pillaging estates, and seizing land. Riding this wave of unrest, promising the people "peace, land, and bread," Lenin executed his plan to overthrow the Provisional Government in the name of the soviets.

At the time of Lenin's coup the Provisional Government under Alexander Kerensky had already completed arrangements for elections to an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Lenin permitted the assembly to meet in 1918, hoping it would provide him with popular support. When the Bolshevik party received less than one-fourth of the thirty-six million votes cast, Lenin dissolved the

convention by force on the pretext that it was a front for antirevolutionary activity, thus ending Russia's first and last experiment in universal free suffrage. Non-Communist parties were treated as outlaws (though limited activity by certain leftwing groups was permitted until 1922) and eventually driven underground and effectively suppressed. The new Soviet government remained a one-party government.

In seizing power, Lenin played on war weariness, land hunger, and poverty — and by so doing sanctioned the forces ripping Russian society apart. By the ruthless use of police and military power the

new regime sought to hold the gains made.

A change of the party's name from Bolshevik to Communist early in 1918 symbolized the regime's desire to create as rapidly as possible a new society. Its most important decisions, however, were taken under the spur of immediate pressures. The first Soviet political police, the Cheka, was formed only a few weeks after the revolution; in the next three years it summarily executed thousands of persons charged with counterrevolution. To provide food for the cities, the peasantry was subjected to arbitrary and severe requisitioning. By mobilizing the poorer peasants against those who were better off the regime deliberately fostered class hatred and civil war in the countryside. Industry was gradually nationalized, in order that the regime might secure control and direction over the economy.

Faced with the political opposition of many inchoate, unorganized groups — Socialists, Westernized liberals, military men, former tsarist officials — as well as with the cautious, ineffective, but deeply resented intervention of foreign governments, the Communists found their claim to power tested in a disastrous civil war. Numerous local anti-Bolshevik armies were formed and, for a time, received French, British, Japanese, and American aid. Small Western forces occupied Vladivostok in the Far East, landed at the White Sea port of Archangel, and occupied various other border

areas.

The Red Army was organized under the direction of one of Lenin's ablest colleagues, Leon Trotsky, and was over three million strong by 1920. Fighting raged simultaneously on many fronts. Both sides resorted to terror on a scale no tsar had ever dared use. However, the opponents of Communist power, who were divided into at least four main groups, disagreed violently on the proper course for Russia and lacked central direction and unity. The Red Army, in contrast, though plagued by desertions possessed the advantages of

a central position and a unified and skillful command. Furthermore, the anti-Bolshevik forces did not accept the peasant division of land as permanent, thereby alienating the national minorities and losing the popular backing necessary for victory. Western intervention in Russia also enabled the Soviet regime to portray its enemies as the "hirelings" of foreigners and to pose as the national defender of the country. By 1921 the new regime had the military situation under control. The memory of foreign intervention was to remain an important element in the Soviet regime's subsequent obsession with the threat of encirclement and hostility.

A constitution for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had been adopted in 1918. Other Soviet Socialist Republics were founded as the power of the new regime extended to embrace areas lost during the war. At first each of these sister republics concluded an alliance with the RSFSR. In December 1922, however, a joint declaration of union was issued, and in 1923 the draft of a new constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

publics (USSR) was adopted.

The Soviet regime had by this time recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It had also signed a peace treaty with the new state of Poland, agreeing to a frontier which placed about 4.5 million Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Great Russians under Polish rule. The establishment of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and eastern Siberia had been completed by the end of 1922.

In the non-Russian areas the regime had to face a rising tide of nationalism. It attempted to appease various national grievances by encouraging the cultural development of the non-Russian ethnic groups. It supported local nationalism, however, only where this did not conflict with the interests of the "proletariat," and gradually sought to dislodge local nationalist leaders and replace them by trusted Communists.

The civil war led to an almost total collapse of industry and sparked revolts against the Communist leaders among workers and peasants and within the party itself. These pressures led to considerable economic decentralization, but the "commanding heights" of the economy—heavy industry, banking, transportation, foreign trade—remained under state control. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 to 1928, private trade was stimulated and the government's hold over society relaxed. But control within the party and the government was simultaneously tightened.

A bureaucratic Communist dictatorship took shape in Russia

during the 1920's. The prerevolutionary principles of Bolshevik party organization — centralized control, absolute unity in the execution of orders from above, no criticism of the basic party line — were elevated to state policy after victory had been secured. Some of Lenin's more idealistic supporters had hoped that a dilution of centralized power would now be possible. Lenin insisted, however, on maintaining dictatorial power at any price. Majority sentiment within the party remained largely impotent in the making of policy. Within the higher ranks of the party, some did not follow Lenin without deep reservations. In the end, however, their misgivings were overridden by their loyalty to the party as the only instrument created by history for the realization of its aims.

Lenin, who had suffered two strokes in 1922 and another in 1923, died in January 1924. In the last two years of his life he played an ever-diminishing role within the regime. Sharp conflicts of opinion and personality appeared among the leaders of the party. Of those conflicts, a desperate struggle for power between

Stalin and Trotsky overshadowed all the others.

Widely known at that time as a brilliant writer and powerful speaker, Trotsky was expected by many to succeed Lenin. Although Stalin was a less distinguished member of the party's high command, he possessed unusual organizational ability and early came into control of the party's bureaucratic machinery. Gradually he extended this control over the other instruments of power in the state.

During the years 1922-29 Stalin devoted his major efforts to the removal from office and influence of the major figures who initially shared power with him in the policymaking body of the party, the Politburo. Personal and doctrinal conflicts were intensified after Lenin's death. That the struggle was concerned with succession to party leadership was not openly admitted. Disagreement over fine points in the writings of Marx and Lenin—reminiscent of the Byzantine theological language of doctrinal controversy—cloaked the rivalries for domination of the machinery of the state.

As Trotsky progressively lost power, the doctrinal issues became more clearly defined. Trotsky increasingly championed the right of individual Communists to criticize the regime, denouncing Stalin's policies as "bureaucratic degeneration." He maintained that the socialist revolution in Russia could be carried to its proper conclusion only through the outbreak of revolutions in other countries. Stalin countered that "socialism in one country" was possible. He did not abandon the goal of world revolution, but he maintained

that Russia could be the center of inspiration to Communist movements elsewhere. This argument struck a responsive chord in the rank and file of Russian Communists, who desired to concentrate on domestic progress rather than foreign adventures. By stressing that Russia, not the West, would be the center of the new society, Stalin's doctrine made a strong appeal to the Russian nationalism within the party.

Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927, exiled from Moscow in 1928, and deported in 1929. (In 1940 he died at the hands of an assassin in Mexico.) By 1929 Stalin's victory was complete. He had become the chief spokesman of the party and the government and fully controlled the instruments of power within the state: the party, political police, army, and state administration. Deviation from the party line became increasingly dangerous. Other party leaders who at one time or another had opposed Stalin recanted—and temporarily obtained a new lease on life. In the end, they doomed themselves by their inability to free themselves from the faith in the party which had given meaning to their lives.

The celebration of Stalin's fiftieth birthday in 1929 was the beginning of a canonization which lasted to the end of his life. The old Russian orthodoxy was not so much replaced as modified, as Stalinist Communism more and more took on the trappings of a religion that possessed its sacred books, its heresies, and its places of pilgrimage. In his assumption of autocratic power Stalin was not unlike the tsars of the past. Increasingly he became endowed with the attributes of a living god. Despite vast changes that were to follow in Soviet life, the old Russia survived beneath the new.

The 1920's were very favorable to Soviet Russia's economic recovery, but, as Russian industry approached prewar capacity, the Soviet regime faced another crisis threatening its very survival. Capital stock was being rapidly depleted, and the small stream of consumer goods was drying up. The peasants, though unorganized, were no longer passive; with an increasing sense of self-sufficiency they began refusing to trade with the cities — whose population had increased by millions — since the high price of scarce consumer goods made it hardly worth while.

To break the impasse and inject a sizable capital investment into the industrial sector of the economy, the first Five Year Plan was formulated. This course, it was known, would aggravate the situation for a time by deflecting resources from consumer to investment goods. But Stalin apparently gambled that with widening investment his regime could hold out until new consumer goods

could appear on the market and entice the peasantry to sell its produce. The risk incurred was an open fight with the peasant.

By 1930 consumer goods still were scarce, and the regime pushed farm collectivization. The peasants were forced to pool their land, work it communally, and deliver a large share of the harvest

to the government for little or no recompense.

Resistance to collectivization engulfed the whole Russian countryside in a struggle of civil war proportions. Under the guise of eliminating the kulak – the so-called prosperous peasant – the regime deprived millions of peasants of their farms and property and sent them into exile or to forced labor, or killed them. The resulting drastic decline in crop yields and the wholesale slaughter of livestock and draft animals by the retaliating peasants were economic wounds that took a decade or more to heal.

In time, however, the whole face of Russian agriculture was changed permanently. As a concession, the peasant was permitted to own a small private garden plot, but the party's battle was won. Through large-scale compulsory deliveries to the state, food from the countryside was siphoned off to feed rapidly expanding urban centers. With the peasant subdued, the state secured a vise-like grip on the agricultural surplus and the Soviet regime for the first time possessed absolute freedom and full dictatorial power. The government no longer needed to fear the imbalance between town and country that had so nearly cost it its existence. Further five-year plans were formulated, and a high rate of capital investment became a permanent feature of the Russian economy.

Russia, once again, strained to catch up with the West. "Europe is necessary for us for a few decades, then we can turn our backs on her." These words of Peter the Great acquired a new meaning when Stalin's drive to industrialize the country as rapidly as possible was heralded with the slogan: "To overtake and outstrip the leading capitalist countries in technique and economic organization." Russian nationalism merged with Marxist doctrine in spurring the

regime toward the goal. Stalin declared in 1931:

To slacken the pace means to lag behind, and those who lag behind are beaten. We do not want to be beaten. No, we don't want to. . . . Old Russia . . . was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans, she was beaten by Swedish feudal lords, she was beaten by Polish-Lithuanian gentry, she was beaten by Anglo-French capitalists, she was beaten by Japanese barons; she was beaten by all — for her backwardness. She was beaten because to beat her was

2. Establishment of the Communist State

profitable and went unpunished. . . . We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us.

The tremendous exertion of effort to build up Soviet industrial power meant forcing the mass of people to meet the demands of a modern industrial environment. Skills, disciplines, and habits of mind that had developed over centuries in the West had to be imposed on the people in the space of a few decades. As in the past, the people were subjected to great pressure. A victim of serfdom until 1861, the peasant was once more enslaved. Labor legislation increasingly chained the industrial worker to his bench. All activities of society became legitimate only insofar as they served the state.

In adapting to the requirements of political power, the regime retreated from many of its original revolutionary ideas. The ideal of equality of rewards, which played a significant role in prerevolutionary Bolshevik thinking, was openly repudiated as the industrialization of the country demanded a system of organized social inequality - a pattern common in industrial societies elsewhere, but aggravated in the USSR by the generally low standard of living. The need for order, discipline, and social stability led to the restoration of traditional pillars of authority - family, church, nation by which the regime broadened the base of its influence and consolidated its rule. In returning to traditional and popular forms and ideas, the regime always took the lead. At no time did Stalin relax his control over all aspects of national life. In the name of Communist goals that receded day by day, the power and authority of the Soviet state grew to a new high point. Soviet ideology became many things: an occasional vision of the Utopia, the specter of capitalist encirclement, the defense of "Holy Russia."

But tradition and indoctrination by themselves were insufficient as a cementing force in Soviet society; and they were reinforced by repression and by terror. The process of Stalin's political consolidation demanded perpetual effort. The most notable examples of the use of terror as an instrument of governance were the famous purges which began in 1934 and continued until 1938. The "Great Purge" affected millions of persons believed to be connected with some form of opposition to the regime. The political police were instructed to operate on the basis of "confessions" of guilt that would implicate others in alleged conspiracies. The arrests extended in a kind of wild geometric progression. For those who were willing or forced to confess, public trials were held; others

were condemned privately. Thousands disappeared without a trace. Although the purge struck mainly at the higher levels of Soviet official life, the bulk of the population was provided with a force-

ful reminder of the regime's capabilities for terror.

A second generation of Soviet leaders emerged at the end of the 1930's and took over many of the posts vacated by the purge victims. Within the party high command, new men (Malenkov, Beria, Zhdanov, Khrushchev) joined Stalin's older associates (Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov). The beginnings of a third generation of leadership were seen in such men as Saburov, Suslov, Pervukhin, and Ponomarenko. By training, many of the newer men were bureaucrats, technicians, and industrial managers, rather than revolutionaries. They symbolized a new bureaucracy that, at least potentially, could bring about a slow erosion of executive power in the Soviet state. Stalin, however, maintained total dominance over the instruments of Soviet power until his death in 1953, and the basic policies of the regime remained remarkably constant up to that time.

World War II, as Stalin said in 1946, was a blessing as well as a curse for the Soviet state, which emerged victorious as a working system with a vast accretion in its external power, regaining territory lost after World War I and establishing control over an expanding satellite empire. Total war had brought the USSR a new unity, despite large-scale defections in the first phase of the war. While the people were unprepared to fight for the Communist regime as such, they rallied around a strictly nationalist effort to resist foreign invasion, particularly when the foreign power failed to offer a suitable alternative to the Soviet system. In particular, the Russian people, in spite of hardships and suffering, retained a profound attachment to their land and were ready to sacrifice themselves for their country. To hold the people's support in time of need, concessions were made by the regime. A general relaxation of political pressure occurred in many fields of public life. Perhaps as never before, a feeling of community was created, as the work of war caught in its net the entire population.

But as the war drew to a close the regime exhibited a growing anxiety over areas of life where control was felt wanting. During the war latent anti-Soviet hostility had caught fire among several ethnic groups within the empire. As soon as the war was over, the ruthless shifting of ethnic groups — designed to speed amalgamation and cultural assimilation — was renewed as a deliberate and systematic political policy. At the cost of further antagonizing the

minority groups, the appeals to Russian nationalism made during the war were carried over into the postwar period. From Lithuania to Kazakhstan, scores of local and national museums were purged and rebuked for failing to display objects showing the "progressive" character and influence of Russia's annexations and Great Russian culture.

At the same time, the regime reasserted its totalitarian demand for ideological conformity in all fields of intellectual endeavor. As in the past, contact with the West had once again released an intellectual fever in Soviet Russia, which Stalin viewed with evident alarm. Attacks against former allies and against Western influence were skillfully combined with the appeal to Russian national pride. A postwar hate campaign against the West was coupled with an intensification of Russian self-glorification. The nationalism genuinely rooted in the Russian people was fanned into chauvinism by propaganda stressing the innate national uniqueness and superiority of Russia's prerevolutionary culture compared to the culture of the West. As the maintenance of dictatorial Communist authority at home was once more defended by the concept of implacable "capitalist" hostility, the image of Russia in the midst of a hostile world acquired renewed sharpness.

After Stalin

Stalin died in 1953. His successors, breaking through a moment of panic and uncertainty, gradually but with growing assurance began to modify and revise some of the former dictator's policies and methods of rule. Three years after his death, Stalin was the object of bitter official vilification, his tyranny flailed as a terrible aberration.

The posthumous dethronement, while masking a prolonged crisis and struggle for power, dramatically symbolized the new regime's avowed rejection of the arbitrary, violent, and despotic patterns of Stalinist government. The break with rigid and repressive aspects of Stalin's political legacy became increasingly marked with Nikita Khrushchev's rise to pre-eminence.

In foreign affairs the Soviet union displayed fresh initiative and flexibility. Unproductive ideological positions—the thesis of inevitable capitalist economic crises and of inevitable war—were put into storage or abandoned. Contact and cultural interchange with the West were encouraged on a growing scale. Backed by striking scientific advances at home, exemplified in the penetration

of outer space, the Soviet regime launched a major "peace" offensive, emphasizing economic and ideological competition against

a backdrop of threatening thermonuclear holocaust.

Simultaneously, while exploiting Western weariness with the cold war and hopes for a final settlement, the Soviets moved to outflank the West economically and politically in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With new emphasis on political, economic, and psychological techniques of international conflict, the propaganda image of "capitalist encirclement" lost its sharpness and faded from official view, reflecting a growing Soviet sense of confidence that Communism was gaining the decisive edge in the international balance of power.

Within the Communist bloc the Soviet Union embarked upon a reorganization of the satellite system, hoping to find more subtle and diverse forms of control. Initial experimentation with loosening controls backfired in Hungary and Poland, but these events also indicated that the Stalinist policies for disciplining the Communist empire had not been permanently effective. In the meantime the growing influence of mainland China, and the dynamic momentum of its internal development, threatened the emergence of a separate Communist system of international relations, placing new

demands on Soviet policymakers.

Internally, the new leadership made a bold and vigorous effort to resolve some of the crucial tensions and difficulties that faced Soviet society. Systematized terror and the prolonged depression in living standards had left a residue of popular bitterness and resentment. The processes of social change which Stalin's rule set in motion intensified the sense of grievance. Industrialization, urbanization, and education had uprooted traditional peasant attitudes, values and patterns of living, supplanting them with the values and patterns of a rapidly changing industrial order with its insistent aspirations for material progress and well-being. The modernization of society — the growing dependence on engineers, economic managers, and other professional men, on science and research, on order and efficiency — strengthened cravings for a more rational pattern of life.

Stalin's successors recognized these discontents and moved to harness them. They reduced the application of terror to a point where political arrests affected only a small proportion of the population. Thousands of forced labor camp inmates were released. Living standards were tangibly improved. Massive changes in the structure of economic administration, entailing a large-scale de-

centralization of functions and responsibilities, reduced the enormity of controls on administrators and economic managers. The intense pressures on intellectuals were eased. Substantial concessions to the peasants were capped by revolutionary policies in agriculture that abolished the old system of compulsory deliveries of farm products to the state. Virtually every aspect of Soviet life felt the imprint of reform and change.

The changes sought to release more individual initiative in the society and to inspire more spontaneous compliance with the directives of the regime. But the retreat from Stalinist extremism did not proceed smoothly. Liberalization in the system of government created new problems of control. Emphasis on incentives, initiative, and enthusiasm required new administrative techniques and forms of organization if the party's capacity for centralized

direction was to be preserved.

There are, then, significant limits to the present regime's break with Stalinism. The supremacy of the party, its complete domination over all areas of public life, has been vigorously reasserted. Soviet management has been granted a measure of freedom from arbitrary political interference in predominantly technical decisions, but the principles of political control over the direction and ends of economic and administrative life stand unchallenged. While the regime has found coercion increasingly counterproductive, it has not relinquished its power and its readiness to use force or extralegal measures, however selective, to impose its will on the population.

In assessing the significance of post-Stalin trends, some students feel that irreversible long-term forces in Soviet society, stemming from the nature of industrial change, are beginning to work in the direction of "mellowing" the Soviet system, an "erosion" of dictatorship, a greater sharing of power, or some kind of "managerial" revolution. Closer analysis suggests that the totalitarian system established under Stalin and the industrial society that developed within that system are in great measure compatible despite serious and continuing tensions. Stalin's successors have demonstrated a striking ability to adjust the structure and dynamics of totalitarianism to contain, and to a degree satisfy, the varied pressures generated by the processes of rapid industrialization.



SOCIAL SETTING



SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

THE USSR IS AN EXPANDING, COMPLEX, industrial society in which a system of economic rewards "according to work" has predictably led to social differentiations based on major occupational groupings. In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, factors such as income, education, responsibility, productivity, and informal contacts come into play and form the basis for subdivisions within the major groups.

But the structure of Soviet society is distinctive. Its uniqueness is found in the fact that two other kinds of social differentiation cut across or merge with essentially occupational groupings. The most important of these is the unequal division of the population into party and nonparty members. The second is the distinction between Russians and non-Russians, which places Russians in the responsible positions with the highest pay, privileges, and political power in all areas of the USSR.

The development of social classes has conflicted with the regime's ideological commitment to the classless society. Thus the regime has had to twist ideology to bring it into partial accord with the realities of Soviet society. While the goal is a society guided by the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," the Soviet regime now claims that Soviet society is passing through a stage of socialism ruled by the maxim "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Since the work of various groups, such as peasants and urban workers, differs, so does their reward -i.e., style of life, responsibility, and power.

Since the regime fears the development of "class consciousness" — a Marxist term which might be more accurately rendered as interclass antagonism — it has promulgated the myth that workers and peasants, though two different classes, have common interests and a common goal. In accord with its technique of emphasizing for the general population what will be rather than what is, the regime

has glossed over the existence of a ruling class with interests that often go counter to the desires of the general population. This ruling class, the intelligentsia, is officially not a class but a "stratum" composed of the leading members of the workers and peasants, no longer engaged in manual labor but theoretically retaining the interests of the two classes from which it has sprung. The workers, the peasants, and the Soviet intelligentsia, then, are officially characterized as the "three pillars of Soviet society." Despite official pronouncements, mutual antagonisms have developed among them.

The distinction uppermost in the minds of most Russians, however, seems to be that between party and nonparty members. The overwhelming majority of Soviet defectors, for example, point to party membership as the basic criterion for social distinctions and the primary means of obtaining the greatest share of the benefits the society has to offer. Among the political elite – the upper group of the intelligentsia and the apex of Soviet society - party membership is almost universal; party and social leadership coincide. Party membership is not a right but a privilege granted the few. The relatively few peasants who are party members, however, retain their status and their way of life as peasants, while at the same time receiving economic and political privileges that somewhat set them off from other peasants. The same is true of the urban worker who belongs to the party; his membership is likely to gain him living conditions better than those of his nonmember fellow worker. Each is on the first rung of the social and occupational ladder; the party member will be considered for more responsible positions.

The continuing emphasis upon differential rewards points to a continuance of economic and social distinctions — distinctions that may in fact be essential in a large and highly industrialized state. Similarly, the prolonged concentration upon heavy industrial, nonconsumer economic development considerably postpones the prom-

ised utopia.

The revolution did, however, facilitate social mobility for a great number of people, and the drive to industrialize did create many new jobs. The people who moved up from peasant or worker origins constitute one of the supporting strengths of the regime. Yet it is questionable whether economic expansion alone can still provide enough openings in the intelligentsia, both to absorb the children of those already in it and to meet the rising aspirations of the workers, without resort to violent displacement of present members. The regime has evidenced deep concern over the increase in the number of "nonproductive" (white-collar and administrative)

workers who look down upon working with their hands. There seems to be a limit to the number who now can be accommodated in the higher status "nonmanual" occupational groups, and parents are cautioned against stimulating their children to aspire to non-

manual occupations.

Thus, despite the early cry of equalitarianism and the promised destruction of all class differences, the tsarist class structure has been replaced by a Soviet model with its own set of economic, political, educational, and prestige distinctions. At the same time, mobility between the established groups has become increasingly difficult. There is no question that it is easier for the child of a family in the intelligentsia to obtain the background of incentives that will keep him in that social class than it is for the child of peasants to enter the intelligentsia. Yet, while mobility has been curtailed and the benefits accruing to the intelligentsia make it easier for them to perpetuate themselves, there is not as yet an hereditary class in the Soviet Union. Regarding the direction of change in the social structure and especially the difficulty in making a clear-cut statement of whether position and status will be passed on from one generation to the next, it should be remembered that the Soviet regime has already initiated many policy changes and that its four decades of existence are much too short a time to allow definite conclusions about the stability of the present structure. Although social structure cannot be manipulated entirely at the whim of the regime, the reins of control are centralized and the structure is thus amenable to modification in a relatively short period of time.

Development of a Class System

On the eve of the 1917 revolution most Russian Marxists did not see in their country any of the elements that, according to Marxist ideology, would be characteristic of a society ripe for a socialist revolution. Tsarist Russia was far from being a highly industrialized nation. Roughly 74 percent of the population were peasants, most still tied to their villages by taxes and lack of alternatives. The workers represented 13 percent of the population; the ruling nobility, large landowners, and army officers, 3 percent; the rising class of merchants and industrialists, 4 percent; the intellectuals and clerics, 2 percent; the residual 4 percent included members of the armed forces, pensioners, and so forth. This was hardly the accepted Marxist pattern, where worker and capitalist, each intensely conconscious of class affiliation, could secure his goals only at the

expense of the other. The urban workers were in the minority and would have to bring the revolution to the countryside. This constituted such a departure from the prescribed laws of history that Lenin, to carry the Bolshevik forces with him, had to resort to the idea of the "peculiar" and special nature of Russian social and

political development.

Lenin succeeded, and one of the earliest acts of the new regime was a decree "abolishing" all classes and civil ranks and confiscating property held by the former upper classes. There followed a series of measures eliminating inheritance and private ownership of real estate, and proclaiming the dictatorship of workers and peasants. The doctrinal position was one of equality, both of wealth and political power, except for surviving members of the former "privileged" social classes and their families, who did not receive full citizenship rights until 1936. The concept of equality was pushed to such doctrinaire lengths that all ranks in the army were abolished and saluting was prohibited. By 1919 chaos in the army had become the norm; the customary ranks and discipline had to be re-instituted, and former tsarist officers were recalled to train a new officer corps.

This kind of experience was repeated many times over in other areas. The economy had to be kept running, but at least two-thirds of the population were illiterate, and the only people with the technical proficiency to run factories or organize and administer a government bureaucracy were former capitalists, bourgeois, and tsarist civil servants. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 recognition was given to the need to forego ideological principles and utilize "capitalist" specialists. An official party pronouncement stated

that:

... for the development of productive forces the immediate ... and full utilization of all specialists in science and technology left to us by capitalism is necessary, in spite of the fact that the majority are inevitably imbued with bourgeois ideas and habits. ... The party ... will carry on a merciless struggle against the pseudo-radical but, in reality, ignorant and conceited opinion that the working class can overcome capitalism and the bourgeois order without the aid of bourgeois specialists.

This process was carried out to such an extent that by 1932, according to an official study, fifty percent of the personnel in some sections of the bureaucracy were former tsarist officials, who,

though viewed with suspicion, were able to maintain much of their former status.

The regime continued to pursue a modified program of social equality, one dramatized by the almost monastic renunciation of worldly wealth on the part of Communist party members, who were not allowed to exceed a certain limited income. This provision of the party rules was allowed to die a quiet death in 1929, since more and more exceptions were being made to recompense highly skilled

personnel.

A drive for universal education, both to make the mass of the population more accessible to propaganda and to supply needed managerial personnel, was launched. Children of the suspect former ruling classes were refused admission to the universities or, at best, placed at the bottom of the entrance priority list. All university students had to undergo an investigation of their class purity. Worker and peasant origins carried the highest premium, and many children of the "disenfranchised" group disassociated themselves from their families to create a fictitious lower-class background.

With the establishment of a system of on-the-job training, rabfak, the regime sought to provide a channel of mobility for persons too old to take advantage of the new public school system. Workers who went through rabfak were eligible for supervisory positions and entrance into technical schools. The program was abandoned in 1924, but in the meantime it provided, among other things, a means for the ambitious member of the disenfranchised classes to work himself up to a nonmanual, supervisory position, if

he could disguise his social origin.

The expanding economy and bureaucracy demanded a large number of highly trained workers, and a broad educational program was recognized to be of paramount importance. The 1919 party congress proclaimed that one goal of education was "to destroy completely all traces of previous inequality or prejudices, especially among the backward strata of the proletariat and the peasantry." This led to a program, which has continued down to today, of "raising the cultural level" as well as the technical level of the masses.

Considering the sweep and depth of the revolution, stabilization of income inequalities came relatively early in the Soviet period. Even by 1930 the total savings in the hands of banks, as broken down by occupational groups, showed large inequalities in a pattern similar to that of capitalist societies. This pattern emerged even at a time when the government, especially trade union officals,

argued for both a general rise in wages and a lessening of wage inequalities. By 1931, however, Stalin already was condoning the continued existence of social classes and of wage inequalities; at a meeting of industrial managers in 1931 he spoke out against "equality mongering" as follows:

The cause is the wrong structure of wages, the wrong wage scales, the "leftist" practice of wage equalization. In a number of our factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor, between heavy work and light work. The consequence of wage equalization is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "sojourner" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to earn a little and then go off to "seek his fortune" elsewhere.

From this policy of stimulating productivity through economic and status differentials, an elaborate system of social distinctions emerged. Skilled and unskilled categories of labor were very minutely differentiated. A special wage-scale structure was established for technical, supervisory, and white-collar workers; it included not only wages but also special bonuses paid out of earnings of an enterprise, use of cars, increased rations, and the privilege of patronizing restricted stores. In 1930 it had been stated that:

Once and for all an end must be put to the tradition of capitalist cities where better housing is set aside for administrative and technical personnel. Such personnel must live in the selfsame houses and under the selfsame conditions as all the working population.

But, as a result of the new Stalin policy, Soviet law provided — and still provides — for more commodious and elaborate living space for military men from the rank of colonel upward, honored men of science and the arts, artists, scientific workers, specialists, graduate students, members of the Union of Soviet Writers, painters, sculptors, composers, architects, inventors, lawyers, and certain classes of invalids.

This process of social differentiation continued through World War II. Special military awards were graded according to the rank of the individual to receive them. Large cash awards and annuities were granted the widows of prominent government officials, scientists, and artists. The theaters in Moscow maintained separate cloak rooms for high-ranking government and military officials. Officials, supervisory personnel, and in some cases rank-and-file workers of the railroad, water transport, and coal industries, as well as personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the USSR Procuracy, were put into uniforms which varied according to the rank and importance of the wearer. Thus, individuals whose position demanded deference received it, not only at work but in all areas of life.

Inequality of income became more firmly established through a revision of the personal income tax and a sweeping change of the 1926 inheritance law. The income tax scale set up in 1943 applied progressive rates on income up to 1,000 rubles per month, and beyond that a single flat rate of 13 percent, thus permitting those with large incomes to retain a greater percentage of their earnings than formerly. The new inheritance tax permitted them to pass on income accumulations after payment of a registration fee not to exceed 10 percent of the estate—as contrasted to 90 percent under the old law.

Social mobility through education was restricted in 1940 by the setting of tuition fees (rescinded September 1, 1956) and by the introduction of a draft of both boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and seventeen to be trained as industrial workers. The training of these youths in the "state labor reserves" does not qualify them for entrance into universities or other institutions of higher learning. But it should be noted that, although the training restricts those who receive it to industrial work, the draft draws primarily on rural youths who would not progress as far without this assistance.

The trend toward concentration of economic and social benefits in a relatively small, well-educated, and technically trained elite is evident in the changing composition of that reservoir of political and social manipulation, the party. In the early 1930's party membership was predominantly from the working class, and the worker and peasant candidates underwent a shorter period of candidacy than did members of other groups. By 1939 the candidacy period was made officially the same for all new entrants, and the party consciously followed a policy of enlisting the new Soviet-trained intelligentsia — to such an extent that in 1955-56 there was an enormous increase in the volume of expressed official concern over the lack of representation of production workers in the party.

Contemporary Soviet Society

As stated above, there are today three officially recognized groups in the USSR — peasants, workers, and intelligentsia — which are differentiated in terms of occupation, income, way of life, and power to manipulate others and control the institutions of the society. According to Soviet references, the intelligentsia is a rather loosely defined, omnibus category: factory directors, engineers and technical personnel, scientists, teachers, artists, lawyers, military intelligentsia (evidently officers), and "others" (presumably white-collar workers). To this must be added the personnel forming the full-time apparatus of the party. According to current unofficial estimates, the intelligentsia (including white-collar workers) now represent roughly 20 percent of the population, workers 35 percent, and peasants 45 percent.

While the regime lumps together a great many occupational and status positions under the rubric "intelligentsia," the group can be subdivided on the basis of power, income, prestige, and education. The first group is the political elite: high party officials; government, economic, and military officials; and prominent scientists, artists, and writers directly involved in the formulation of basic

policy.

The next group, which can be called the general intelligentsia, includes those occupying the lesser ranks of the occupational categories listed above, plus engineers, managers of industrial enterprises, chairmen of collective farms, heads of state farms, and others in responsible administrative positions as well as those, re-

gardless of their occupation, who are well-educated.

The third of the subdivisions, much larger than the first two, is the white-collar group, which includes a range of nonmanual workers from petty bureaucrats, through accountants and book-keepers, down to ordinary clerks and salesgirls. While the regime, for internal propaganda purposes, wishes to include the white-collar group with the political elite and the general intelligentsia, to make the privileged group seem to encompass more of the population, the peasants and workers generally distinguish between the other two privileged groups and the ordinary white-collar employee.

The worker and peasant classes also can be subdivided in this fashion. The upper group of workers (including those on state farms) are those most highly skilled, who more or less consistently overproduce their quota. Members of this group receive higher pay, special awards from the regime, bonuses, special vacation leave, etc.

In terms of prestige and economic position they overlap the lower

reaches of the white-collar group.

The majority of workers are rank and file: semiskilled and earning only the average wage for industrial workers (currently estimated at 700-800 rubles per month). This large group shades off into the unskilled, a relatively unproductive group of workers estimated to make up 25 percent of the work force. Most of these are new arrivals in the urban work force and with not much more than four years' schooling. They earn a minimal wage, estimated to be below 400 rubles per month.

At least a few peasants are relatively well-to-do and form an upper group of peasantry that overlaps in income the lower reaches of the next higher social class. They rank above the low-paid unskilled workers, but not above the rank and file. Most have achieved their position through membership in a collective farm that has been exceptionally fortunate in terms of crop, fertility of land, and location. Some peasants on less favored farms may, through skill or development of "model farm practices," achieve the higher income and official recognition that will place them in this group.

Most peasants fall into an average group lower on the social scale than almost any industrial worker. Still further down the scale are most of the remaining independent peasant farmers and

the poorest collective-farm peasants.

In terms of degree of overlap between the major classes, then, the system is more fluid, or open, than that of prerevolutionary Russia. Individuals have greater opportunity to move up the social ladder on the basis of demonstrated political and technical merit. In the early days of the regime this mobility derived from the nonrecurring revolutionary situation, and was continued by expansion and growth of the industrial economy. The social mobility so provided is a great source of strength, since people now in the intelligentsia and the leading section of the working class have a stake in the support and maintenance of a system that allowed them to achieve a position inconceivable under prerevolutionary conditions. The presence of political officials, scientists, and artists of peasant and working-class background, even though their actual number is exaggerated by the regime, proves to others in the population that individual productive, political, and administrative abilities can receive recognition.

Superimposed upon the class divisions described above is the Communist party. The party functions as "gatekeeper," not only controlling the movement of individual aspirants into the party but also checking and regulating the rate of flow from one social group to another.

While party membership is the surest path to advancement, there are many currents that do not enter the main party channel yet still provide a means of mobility for some individuals. Even these, however, cannot pass without the scrutiny of the party. There are, for example, a tremendous number of "patronage" positions distributed by the party, and many do go to nonmembers who are approved by the party. Scientific workers and others of the general intelligentsia may, through various pretexts of work load and political disinterestedness, avoid membership. If their accomplishments merit it, their attitude may be overlooked and they will be allowed to advance on their own terms.

The higher the individual rises in the social structure, however, the greater the possibility that the current may suddenly reverse and permanently drag him down, possibly below where he started. There is an American saying that "the bigger they are, the harder they fall," but violent fluctuation of social position, generally due to purely economic rather than political factors, has become less common in the United States as the expansion of our economy has tended to level off. In the USSR the combination of political power and economic well-being is a predominant component of social position, but wealth is more likely to stem from political power than power from wealth.

The vulnerability of an individual — the possibility of arrest, imprisonment, or other penalty — increases directly in relation to his rise in the social structure. In their ratings of selected occupations, former Soviet citizens place the rank-and-file worker and the collective farmer high in safety but low in material rewards, whereas the factory manager, engineer, scientific worker, and officer in the armed forces are rated low in terms of safety and high in material reward.

The vulnerability associated with higher positions may actually deter some talented individuals from aspiring to them; so the party cannot act merely as a relatively passive "gatekeeper" but must actively seek out individuals with proficiency as technicians and leaders. This seeking out of potential leaders is a twofold process to reinforce the system: the capable are mobilized to serve the interests of the regime and are assured proper recognition, while those who are talented but refuse to join the party become suspect.

In the USSR no formal groups, associations, or clubs function except under the direct or indirect supervision and control of the

government or the party. Athletic clubs, service organizations, professional associations, etc., all take their place in the regime's indoctrination program. Joining or being asked to join an organization is the prime means of gaining social mobility or maintaining a position, and the time devoted to such organizations rises with the social standing of the individual. While there is little direct evidence regarding the role of friendships among the Russians in determining the upward mobility of an individual, contacts made at professional meetings and in government-sponsored organizations are undoubtedly of great importance to the individual. A party aspirant cannot be admitted to candidacy without the recommendation of three party members of at least three years' standing. Undoubtedly friendship with party members who can make such recommendation plays an important role in nomination. Similarly, the "patronage" positions that are distributed to individuals who have demonstrated political loyalty are based upon judgments formed by informal as well as formal contacts. Given the political climate and the principle of "guilt by association," however, friendships generally tend to be limited.

It should be noted that the early equalitarian philosophy of the party stressed social equality not only for men but also for women, and this does represent another avenue for mobility opened by the Communists. On the basis of occupation, working women theoretically are accorded the same position in the social structure as men. There have been some reports, however, that job ratings are often manipulated extralegally, so that professional women are paid somewhat less than men engaged in the same work. Most working women are in agriculture (women make up 60 percent of the agricultural work force), manufacturing, and other semiskilled or unskilled jobs. The major exception to this is found in medicine; the great majority of Soviet doctors are women. Whether by their own choice or by official policy, women generally are excluded from superior party posts and other positions notably high in vulnerability. Nonmanual workers among women seem to gravitate to relatively "safe" and lower-paid jobs, those which correspond to the concept "woman's work" in the United States - teaching, nursing, bookkeeping, and so on.

The Russian revolution bypassed the traditional principle of giving authority to the aged, both in the family and in the society. Many young men were catapulted into positions of great authority and responsibility, and, with the continuing shortage of technically trained personnel, it can be assumed that the average age of Soviet

personnel is considerably lower than that for similar occupational groupings in the United States. One major exception to this pattern, however, is high political position; while membership in the party and related organizations remains youthful, the top leadership has aged and is not at present being rapidly replaced.

The question of where replacements for the top leadership and others within the intelligentsia will come from still is open to conjecture. In the past, family connections have served a largely negative function, limiting the social mobility of individuals from families of "bourgeois" background or families of which a member has been declared an "enemy of the state." At the present time, family membership seems to be assuming a positive function for those in the intelligentsia. For example, military officers, one of the most privileged groups, receive preference for their children in the Suvorov school system, which was introduced in 1943. These schools, of which the naval equivalents are the Nakhimov schools, will turn out an elite officer corps whose origin lies in the military elite of today. The selectivity of even the present group is evident from the reported divorce, by officers, of wives who are too "proletarian," and from the scattered reports of defectors which indicate that wives of officers must have a secondary education and receive the approbation of a "family collective" composed of officers of the bridegroom's unit.

While family membership does not seem to play such a direct role for other intelligentsia groups, there is no question that families in the intelligentsia do give their children a cultural background and an educational motivation that places them ahead of children from other social classes. The "labor reserve schools," which are an educational and social dead end, do not draw upon the children of the intelligentsia. In the past the regime proudly released figures showing the peasant and worker origins of their university students; it is significant that few such figures have been released since 1939. There are thus marked distinctions between social classes, and there is also the possibility, if not the present actuality, of the intelligentsia transferring their status from one generation to the next.

According to Marxist ideology, each social class in a capitalist country develops a particular way of looking at the world, the government, and the social system, and each comes to feel that its needs as a class can be met only at the expense of some other class in the society. This development of "class consciousness," say the Marxists, can only lead to open conflict and the eventual fall of the

numerically small but powerful ruling class. It is considered a force for destruction of capitalist society and, by extension, of Soviet

society as well.

While it is questionable whether there is as yet class consciousness in the Marxian sense, there is an awareness of, and preoccupation with, class differences among the Soviet population. Each class has its distinguishing marks, which make it an identifiable target to others, and these visible distinctions reflect deeper differences in social viewpoint and style of life. Each class, in addition, has its own problems, and to some extent other classes in the society are seen as either creating these problems or failing to mitigate them.

Each social class is also distinguished by a unique, identifiable dialect, so much so that Shaw's Pygmalion, dependent on the relation between social class and speech pattern, has been successfully performed in Russian. Members of the intelligentsia, for example, use what workers and peasants describe as a "more literary" manner of speech. And the language conventions that control discourse between members of different social classes reinforce class differences. Generally workers address their superiors in a respectful and formal manner. Those in authority, however, use informal modes that place the subordinate on the level of a child, indicating a patronizing or paternalistic attitude. Supervisory personnel - managers, section chiefs, collective-farm chairmen - are repeatedly criticized in the Soviet press for "treating workers in a rude and insulting way." While this kind of behavior is not unique to Russian society, in the Soviet context the administrators are employees of the government, and their behavior strongly contradicts the regime's attempt to promulgate the myth that the managers of industrial and farm enterprises are "accountable to the people."

The peasant's contacts across social class lines tend to reinforce his feeling of being the low man. The new privileged class in Soviet villages includes the *kolkhoz* chairman, the chairman of the village soviet, the agronomist, and the person in charge of machinery and storage facilities on the farm. The *kolkhoz* chairman rarely has social relations with ordinary members of the *kolkhoz*; he usually confines

himself to the charmed circle of the rural elite.

Thus the peasant sees himself at the bottom of the social ladder, kept down by those above him, who benefit at his expense. He sees little chance of advancing himself or his children. If he lives away from a major urban center, as the majority of peasants do, he tends to exaggerate the well-being of even the most unskilled workers. He is less exposed to communications media than urban workers and

relies more upon informal channels of communication, such as rumor.

His collective farm chairman will most likely be a young political activist brought in from outside, often without collective farm background or specialized agricultural training and with little knowledge of local conditions - a situation which the authorities are now trying to correct. The regime uses outsiders in order to prevent informal "family relations" from developing between those in authority and the people they must control. It is likely that the peasant can recall periods of a year or two when several farm chairmen succeeded each other. Not only is it clear to him that he has almost no hope of working up to such a position, but he can see that the chairman lives appreciably better than he does on the products of peasant labor. The other contacts he has with the rural elite only serve to point up the disadvantages of his situation. Party officials rank considerably above him both in status and in economic position, while party membership or sponsorship is difficult to attain.

The peasant's traditional distrust of "nonproductive" government officials and his general devaluation of nonmanual workers also do little to alleviate his resentment of the well-being and power of those above him. In other social classes the importance and prestige of scientific, intellectual, and nonmanual labor in general has been sold by the regime, but the peasant has remained relatively unreached and untouched by such propaganda. Thus, those of his superiors who engage in no physical labor are valued low indeed.

Although we have been referring to the peasant as "he," it should be remembered that women make up close to 60 percent of the agricultural work force. This seems to be a further source of dissatisfaction. Apparently women on the farm are less satisfied with their lot than men. Women also tend to be more interested in and dependent upon such social service facilities as nurseries, child medical clinics, and good schools - and such services are especially

inadequate in the rural areas.

The inadequacy of rural schools, the demand for farm labor, and the peasant household's need for another "hand" to earn work units on the collective farm or tend the household plot all combine to keep down the rural educational level and thus the chance for social mobility of the succeeding generation. Among a sample of Soviet defectors, four times as many former rural residents as city dwellers were limited to four years of primary school. While 55 percent of those from large urban centers had completed ten years of school, this was true of only 28 percent of those from towns and

12 percent of those from villages.

The middle and lower ranks of the workers also are aware of the distinction between manual and nonmanual work, but are generally more satisfied with their positions than the peasants. They tend to exaggerate the vulnerability of positions above them, which counteracts to some extent their desire to move up. The negative attitude toward nonmanual workers is expressed in terms of contempt for factory party personnel, administrators, and trade union officials, although the factory manager, being involved in production, sometimes has higher prestige among the workers than other administrative personnel. Also, a few manual workers who consistently overproduce their quotas can achieve an economic status that places them above some of the white-collar group.

Though often not far removed from his rural background, the worker is generally contemptuous of the peasant. According to Soviet defectors, he realizes the peasant is not very well off, indeed exaggerates his own well-being in contrast to that of the peasant, and tends to lay the blame for the peasant's situation on a native backwardness and inability to get ahead. He is much more concerned than the peasant is with raising his wages and getting better housing and more to eat, and tends more to attribute success or failure in this regard to his own worth and efforts as an individual. These attitudes put tremendous strain on the working-class family, since the individual worker can actually do little to increase his pay; the gap between material aspirations and actuality is a major source

of friction between husband and wife.

Even when an individual is willing to forego the relative political safety of manual work, it is extremely difficult to shift from the working class to the intelligentsia; advanced education, entrance into the party, and informal personal contacts that will serve as recommendations for advancement are among the usual requirements. Attitudinally the social distance between worker and intelli-

gentsia seems very large.

The political elite and the general intelligentsia know themselves to be better off than others in the society and have the largest stake in a regime that has enabled them to reap the greatest share of material benefits. They justify their position by pointing to the greater responsibility of their jobs, and they place greater value on intellectual work as opposed to manual labor. At the same time, since a greater percentage of this class are both party members and party functionaries, they are much more in contact with government and Marxist propaganda, and thus are more apt to see the basic paradox of their favored position in a society that is to become classless. Soviet defectors from the intelligentsia, probably because of their ideological background and their larger perspective on Russian society as a whole, seem to manifest a great many guilt feelings regarding the poor situation of other social classes. The ambivalence of their feelings, as they alternately blame themselves and seek to justify their position, appears to be manifested in swings between an expressed ruthlessness toward workers and peasants and great concern for their welfare.

At the same time, the intelligentsia have their own problems. Technicians and managers of large plants, for example, are especially interested in obtaining more freedom to run their plants and to do their jobs more efficiently in their own way. The frustrations engendered by bureaucratic red tape are felt most strongly by this group and lead to activities such as *blat* (the use of "pull" or "influence") as well as efforts to change policy — but not to wholesale rejection of the government or its leaders. The intelligentsia are also concerned about the great amount of time they spend at their

jobs, away from their families.

Occupying positions that are the most vulnerable politically, the intelligentsia have been subject to tremendous strain and tension. While the general population suffered under the Stalinist terror, the group hardest hit was the intelligentsia. Thus the present relative relaxation in terror as a method of control, the reputed return to "Leninist party democracy," and the increase in initiative and action permitted to artists and top-level administrators all are indications that the intelligentsia are giving voice to their special needs in Soviet society. As a group, however, these people have a vested interest in the system and are moving toward the creation of a stable situation that will, by limiting change to changes within the system, keep them on top and give them a maximum of security.

Minority Groups

With the view that non-Russian upper-class persons are enemies of the Soviet state, the regime has ruthlessly wiped out the upper classes of all the minority groups incorporated into the USSR. It has then imposed its own system, usually by sending Russians to colonize and form the upper class of the new sovietized society. To the extent that minority group members learn Russian and accommodate themselves to the Russians, join the party, and obtain a "modern" education, they are eventually more or less accepted into the intelli-

gentsia in their own areas.

Generally, Russians look down upon other ethnic groups as being somewhat backward. The minority group member who wishes to join the mainstream of Soviet life must become as Russian as possible or he will always occupy a niche lower than that of a Russian in a comparable occupation. There is in Central Asia and other minority areas a growing practice of taking Russian family names that indicates the identification necessary if a minority group member is to rise in the social structure. While the indigenous social structure of the minority groups has been swept away, however, some of the values it reflected remain as sources of tension.

In Central Asia, among the predominantly Turkic and Mongol peoples, the basis of the prerevolutionary social structure was a recognition of greatly extended kinship relationships, combined with a religious system that placed the wealthier religious officials on a par with the nobility. In addition, the nobility on both the state and local level were also the wealthiest owners of land or herds. The actual origin of the aristocracy, with the khan at its head, is lost in the myths and shadows of history. The khanates seem to have been established, however, as the result of successful local wars in which the head of the winning clan would assume supremacy over the losing clan or confederation of clans. The established leader would pass on his political position to his first-born son, and all the leader's immediate relatives and their descendants formed the aristocracy. This hereditary aristocracy was known in most areas as the "White Bones" while the commoners were the "Black Bones." The khans apportioned part of their lands or herds among the aristocracy and the mosques with their associated religious schools. The khans and their lesser officials were attended by religious officials who were, in effect, court ministers. The wealthy landowners, or beys, usually members of the aristocracy, were held by the Soviet regime to be primarily responsible for the exploitation of the people and became the central target of official propaganda. In all the Central Asian constitutions the origin of the republic is ascribed among other things to the overthrow of the beys.

The imposition of the Soviet pattern on Central Asia did not come without a great deal of bloodshed. The period 1918–19 was described by a contemporary Soviet observer as "feudal exploitation of the broad masses of the native population by the Russian Red Army man, colonist and official." Among the Uzbek and the Tadzhik

the regime had to contend with the partisan activities of the Basmachi, and among the Kazak with a similar group of loosely organized armed bands, the Alash Orda. These groups were liquidated in the early 1920's and with them were swept away the remaining members of the aristocracy, including most of the religious leaders. The enforcement of collectivization at the end of the 1920's, accompanied by a great influx of Russians, established the basic pattern of Soviet society in Central Asia.

But some of the bases of the old structure remained. With the early establishment of collective farms, the traditional lineage leaders were elected to farm chairmanships. This quickly pinpointed the potential indigenous leaders for the Soviets, who blamed the malfunctioning of the farms on them and replaced them with Russians. Yet family ties remain strong, and there is still respect for older persons and much resentment of the Russians in command, not only because they are Russians but also because of their youth.

The largely Russianized aristocracy in the Caucasus was also swept away by the Soviet regime, and the Soviet classes of collectivized peasants, workers, and intelligentsia, with the Russians predominating, were established. In the Baltics the same process has taken place. Political and social leaders, as well as industrial owners and many independent farmers, were shot or sent to forced labor camps. There has, however, been very great resistance to the Soviet class system by the large group of independent farmers with an individualistic tradition, who in prestige and income ranked with the middle class. Even today Russians still predominate in the intelligentsia and the upper ranks of the workers. Native Balts who qualify for positions which would place them in these social groups are sent to work in the Soviet Union rather than being employed within their own republics.

Trends

Despite abolition of certain status distinctions, and other superficial changes that might increase social mobility, social distinctions have since the revolution become as marked as those in prerevolutionary society. Furthermore, while there is not as yet a hereditary class system in the Soviet Union, the potential for development of such a system is now present. To the extent the regime can give the impression that it is attempting to distribute rewards fairly and mitigate class grievances, however, it strengthens its political position.

The class system has functioned both as a source of strength by enlisting support for the regime from those who have advanced up the social ladder, and as a source of weakness by generating dissatisfaction among workers and, more especially, peasants. Currently the regime seems, for purposes of more efficient labor distribution and production incentives, to be lessening a few of the inequalities by raising the economic position of the lowest groups in the society, while at the same time cutting salaries of the lower groups in the intelligentsia, thus bringing them closer to the workers. This is being done, however, without basically changing the privi-

leged position of the intelligentsia.

Relatively little is being done to provide opportunities for mobility; indeed, it would seem that the last thing the regime wants is an increase in the size of the intelligentsia. The present glorification of "practical work" in the Soviet press serves the purpose of blurring class distinctions and at the same time is one of a number of incentives to make the working class a stable group with economic and social satisfactions sufficient to keep down their aspirations. This program is especially crucial at the present time, because of the need for semiskilled workers, skilled workers, and lower-echelon technical personnel. But it is also designed to help head off an unprecedented rise in the aspirations of workers and their families as a result of the relaxation of arbitrary exercise of police power and the consequent reduction in the political vulnerability of responsible administrative positions.

While the peasants and workers have benefited from the post-Stalin program, it is the intelligentsia that has best maintained and improved its position. They have requested and obtained more administrative freedom. This, coupled with production incentives to workers and peasants, has resulted in greater political stability and,

consequently, greater personal security.

FAMILY

In its attempt to introduce a new set of values and family structure, the regime has often received aid, among the minority nationalities as well as the Russians, from those who were in rebellion against traditional family forms and parental control. The present Soviet family closely resembles that found in industrialized West European countries, with the exception that it is thoroughly subordi-

nated to and closely circumscribed by the state.

There are significant variations in the relative value attached to the family as an institution by the various peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as variations in the effect of family relationships on the other institutions of society. The Central Asian family, for example, with its respect for religious sanctions, emphasis upon the perpetuation of the male lineage, and extension of family relationships into political and economic life, presents a sharp contrast to the modern Soviet family — in which, as in the families of other Western countries, family ties have been attenuated and family influence has become negligible. Between these extremes lies a spectrum of transitional family situations found in Belorussia, the Baltics, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia, and the Far East.

The regime is following a nationwide policy of making the family over into the Soviet model, the primary allegiance of whose members is to be to the state rather than to each other. With this objective the regime is using all the forces at its command, including legislation, police control, education, and propaganda. The process of urbanization, whenever industry has entered, has tended to accomplish the same end, drawing the youth out of the family at an early age, reducing family size, and splitting the family structure into its smallest possible unit, the nuclear family. Intermarriage of members of the various nationalities with the Russians who have migrated in large numbers into their areas may become another

influence for change, but indications are that at present marriages between Russians and members of minority groups are the exception in most areas.

The central government reserves for itself the "determination of the principles of legislation concerning marriage and the family." There is no USSR family code, however, just as there is no USSR criminal code—the RSFSR code is applied on a nationwide scale. Changes that have occurred in the family of the RSFSR are occurring in the rest of the country at differing rates and in the face of varying resistance.

The Bolshevik Family Program

The Bolshevik revolutionary program of 1917 sought much more than a political and economic transformation of the government and society; it aimed at drastic changes in such basic social institutions as the family, and at the elimination of others such as religion. The revolutionaries were to discover, however, that like the church the family was an indispensable instrument for the preservation and inculcation of controls essential to the orderly functioning of Russian society, and that too drastic changes in the family would jeopardize all their goals by threatening the basic stability of that society. Consequently, they had to modify the initial destructive assault, seeking instead to shape the family into an instrument of Communist influence and control.

In Russia, the tradition of government interference with the family dates back as far as the sixteenth century, when the counselor and confessor of Ivan the Terrible compiled the *Domostroy*, a code of family ethics and behavior. Unlike the tsarist government, the Communists initially were interested in destroying the family as the basic social unit and foundation of society, not in strengthening it.

The importance attached to family legislation by the regime is reflected in the fact that decrees altering the marriage and divorce codes were issued even before the Bolsheviks were firmly established, and preceded the official separation of church and state, establishment of provisional soviet organizations, statements as to the rights and duties of local soviets, and many other measures which might have been deemed more important to a new government struggling for survival.

Engels had written that "the relations of the sexes will become a private matter which will concern only the interested parties and with which society will not interfere," and this became the basic principle underlying the early decrees of the period of War Communism (1918-21). In 1926 it was embodied in the "Code of Laws on Marriage and Divorce, the Family, and Guardianship," which remained the law of the land until 1936. Under this law control of marriage and divorce was taken away from the family and the church and a simple registry procedure in the Government Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) was substituted. Without benefit of clergy or consent of their parents, minors of eighteen (and in some special cases girls of seventeen) could go to the ZAGS office and obtain a marriage certificate. Special provisions in the family code were directed against the practice of child betrothal and marriage common in Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus, other provisions struck at the priesthood, both Orthodox and Moslem, Although the law stated that "the celebration of marriage according to religious rites has no legal effect," penalties were prescribed for priests who married minors and mullahs who performed polygynous marriages. The Orthodox Church had been loath to grant divorce; now simple notification by mail to the ZAGS office of the change in family status was sufficient in the eves of the law. This led to a rash of what were literally "postcard divorces" in European Russia.

Those who wished to omit even the minimum formality of registry marriage could do so with no official censure and could legalize the relationship retroactively at any time they chose. Children born out of wedlock were granted the same rights as others, and the same duties were required toward them. Legal resources were provided to the mother or guardian of the child to establish paternity and force the father to contribute to the child's support. Abortion, formerly prohibited, was legalized and could be obtained

free of charge at government hospitals.

The ruling on abortion was hailed, both by many groups within the USSR and among various radical circles throughout the world, as a major step in the emancipation of women, freeing them from the "slavery" of bearing and raising unwanted children. When the abortion law was reversed in 1936, however, the regime sought to explain the earlier law as a response to crowded urban living conditions and the difficulties of supporting large families. In 1926 the law was publicized as part of a general propaganda appeal on women's rights—an appeal which included equal educational and employment opportunities for women, maternity leave, payment to mothers, criminal penalties for wife-beating, and the appointment of women to political positions. The right of a wife to a joint interest in property accumulated during married life was introduced for the

first time in the USSR by the 1926 family code. Court decisions in the RSFSR during this period carried the liberalization of relations between the sexes even further, tacitly recognizing bigamy in commonlaw marriages by awarding part of the estate of a deceased husband to both wives.

The registry office allowed a bride the choice of maintaining her family surname, using a combination of her surname and that of her husband, or following the traditional form and adopting the surname of her husband.

The regime justified its assault on the traditional family pattern with basic Marxist-Engels precepts. The family was to "wither away." Other institutions such as schools and nurseries would take over the function of rearing children. But the regime was in no position to accomplish a transfer of functions from the family to the state within months of assuming power; why did it rush this particular program into law?

The Russian Family

The answer lies in the authoritarian structure of the traditional family, and in the fact that it was accurately seen by the regime as "a formidable stronghold of all the turpitudes of the old regime." The Great Russian family was ruled by the eldest male member, the bol'shak or family patriarch. This extended family in its fullest development consisted of the eldest male, his wife, his unmarried daughters, his sons, their wives and children, the widow of any deceased male member and her descendants, and others who might have been adopted.

A number of proverbs succinctly illustrate the nature of the relationships in the family. "As God is to the people, so is a father to his children." The head of the household was all-powerful, ruling with birch rod or horsewhip and the power inherent in the accepted belief that the withholding of his blessing from any family member was a curse that inevitably would be followed by misfortune. Even if a misdeed went unnoticed by the head of the family, the "sinner" would feel a guilt that could only be erased by confession to him or by some personal misfortune interpreted as punishment for sinful, disobedient behavior.

But although the patriarch—father or grandfather—held all the authority in the household, he did not exercise it in any consistent fashion. He intervened in whatever specific family issue interested him. The mother acted as intercessor between child and father. She was not a disciplinarian. The basic distinction of attitude toward the mother and the father is illustrated by the adage, "Fear your father and respect your mother." The familiar theme of a nurturing, protecting, permissive mother is especially strong in Russian literature and thought; such expressions as Mother Russia, Mother Volga, Mother Moscow, Mother Earth, and the designations Mother Wednesday and Mother Friday for specially consecrated days of the week are frequent in Russian folklore and verse.

The Russian child's identification with his mother was facilitated by her position in the family, represented by the Biblical admonition, "Christ is the head of the Church, the husband that of his wife." This tended to place the wife in the same relation to the father as the children, as illustrated in the old folk saving, "Consider

your father as God, and your mother as your equal."

Although women were considered inferior to men and were submissive to the father, a woman often tyrannized over any daughter-in-law brought into her home; and in households where the father had died or had failed in his responsibilities the mother sometimes assumed the masculine role. In general, however, two models for behavior were learned early in a family — that of the authoritarian, at times capricious father, "thrashing those whom he loves," and that of the loving, nurturing mother who lacked authority. The father was expected to look after the welfare of the household members, but loyalty and obedience were due him whether he met or shirked this responsibility.

In rural communities the family also functioned as a unit of broader social control. The household, rather than the individual. was the significant unit in the mir. When an individual's behavior disturbed others in the community, the village elder or others in the mir would bring this to the attention of the head of the household in which he resided. Plots of land were awarded - as on the collective farms today - not to individuals but to families. If a member was expelled by the family patriarch, he could not obtain land on his own and had to migrate to the city or some remote community. Those leaving voluntarily were bound to send back part of their wages to share the tax burden of the household. The patriarch held the power of economic life and death over the members of the family. The father relationship was extended to include all authorities within and beyond the village, the landlord, the priest, and the tsar - who was also addressed as batyushka, a diminutive form of the word for father.

The family pattern of the urban, educated classes differed some-

what from that of the majority of the population. The mother, following the general European pattern, tended to be idealized by both husband and children and exerted considerable authority in the family. The father was very detached from family life, spending time in his study and his club. One upper-class Russian summed up the position of his father by saying that he "reigned, but did not govern." The Orthodox Church, especially the higher clergy, exerted a very strong influence on upper-class families through the women, who were generally more devout than their husbands and would often have a particular priest as a family adviser and confidant.

The Assault on the Family

It was the power of the family patriarch and his generally conservative influence, then, that the Soviet regime felt it must immediately overcome if members of the new generation were to become loyal supporters of the Communist system, and if family-bound rural workers were to be fed into the developing, labor-hungry urban industries. The rapid introduction of decrees concerning the family and the emancipation of women was intended to attract and hold the support of the rebellious youth who constituted a large part of early Bolshevik strength. The favorite refrain of revolutionary speeches was: "We are not children any more, we have grown up, we don't want any guardianship."

By the 1930's, however, it became evident that the regime's success in weakening family ties had had a number of detrimental and unforeseen effects, reflected in a falling birth rate, a rising divorce rate, widespread juvenile delinquency, and disrespect for all authority on the part of the young. Former exponents of the free, unbound "socialist family" were denounced as "left deviationists," and the ideal of a disciplined, stable family was resurrected.

In 1936 heavy criminal penalties were set for mothers undergoing abortion, for doctors who performed the operation, and for those who encouraged it, except in cases where the health of the mother was in danger or where the mother was suffering from a highly infectious disease. Popular feeling favoring abortion was strong, however, and illegal abortions remained a major problem. The prohibition was finally repealed in 1955, making all abortions performed in hospitals legal, but outlawing those performed elsewhere. Thus the authorities retained control since all Soviet hospitals are operated by the government.

Divorce fees also were established in 1936, ranging from 50

rubles for the first divorce to 300 rubles for the third, instead of the former nominal fee of 15 rubles for registration of either a marriage or a divorce. Marriage was declared to be a solemn affair; the registry offices were made more attractive and the manufacture of wedding rings was revived. If an individual has been divorced, that fact now is entered on his internal passport. Penalties up to two years' imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony were instituted.

The divorce law of July 8, 1944, still in effect, introduced even greater stringency. Divorce no longer can be obtained by simple registration; court action is necessary. Both parties must appear; if either one fails to appear, without good cause, the case is suspended. The first court to hear the case (the people's court) is empowered only to attempt a reconciliation. If it fails, the case goes to the next higher court. The 1944 law does not specify legal grounds for divorce beyond stating that the family must have broken up and that there must be proof of the impossibility of restoring it. If a divorce is obtained, the parties must pay expensive court costs, in themselves a deterrent.

The 1944 laws affecting the family reversed another policy of the government — equal treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children. The child born out of wedlock no longer is entitled to inherit on equal terms with children of a registered marriage. To substitute for the former support given such a child, the government supplies minimal assistance to the unmarried mother until the child is twelve years old. A mother wishing to prove the paternity of such a child is denied the use of the courts. The child may use neither

the father's family name nor the patronymic.

Judging from the letters that have appeared in the Soviet press, there is a widespread desire for relaxation of this rigid position in regard to illegitimate children. Apparently there have been many children born out of wedlock whose parents subsequently married, but whose birth certificates show them to be illegitimate. To avoid the stigma of illegitimacy, the parents have requested the government to permit re-registration of such children. This situation may also be an indirect reflection of the present difficult and expensive divorce procedure, which leads separated couples into commonlaw marriages with other partners without benefit of divorce and remarriage.

From 1944 on, the regime has also expanded its financial and social aids to the family, at the same time penalizing the childless,

whether married or not, by taxation.

With the birth of the third child, a family receives a lump-sum

payment; monthly allowances begin with the fourth child. Employed mothers receive liberal maternity-leave allowances and a special stipend from the place of employment. Mothers of large families are honored with medals and orders glorifying motherhood; for example, the "Motherhood Medal" (First and Second Class) is given to mothers who have borne five or six children. There are corresponding rewards for mothers of larger families.

According to 1944 laws, a person may be prosecuted in court for "insulting and debasing the dignity of woman and mother." Leading a "loose" moral life and shirking family responsibility have become

grounds for expulsion from the Communist party.

The Contemporary Soviet Family

The family today is once again firmly imbedded in the legal and functional structure of the government—a protected social institution which the government, unable to eliminate, now seeks to use for its own ends. According to a recent statement in the official press:

Bringing up children in the family is not a private affair. Parents are responsible to the people and to the state for the destiny of our country's future citizens. The family and the school must mutually support and strengthen one another's authority.

Emphasis upon turning out disciplined, obedient citizens pervades all Soviet pedagogical literature; in some cases there is a direct echo of the precepts of the sixteenth-century *Domostroy*:

From early years we must educate children so that a state of discipline will remain as their permanent possession. This discipline must be firm, that is, unquestioned obedience and submission to the leader, the teacher, or the organizer.

Officially a parent's mandate to govern his children comes not from the fact that he is the progenitor but from the government, which assigns him a portion of the responsibility for preparing citizens bound to that government, not to himself or to the family. The regime, through its representatives in the party, trade unions, or schools, may intervene in the rearing of the child. If a child misbehaves, does not do well in school, or makes deviationist statements, the parents, under the Soviet system as within the traditional mir, are held responsible by the authorities. The regime intervenes even in the area of choosing a marriage partner; a party member

may have to choose between a career and a politically unsuitable wife. While some restrictions on the independence of the family exist in most modern states, Soviet controls in this regard represent

an extreme unparalleled in other systems.

The official program for the emancipation of women and their employment outside the home has contributed to the development of a greater degree of equality between husband and wife. The system of intimidation has also played a part in this development. The family as an area of safety and relaxation is reduced to husband and wife. Parents are responsible for the acts and thoughts of their children; if a child is to advance in the Soviet system he must not be hampered by divergent feelings his parents may have toward the regime; and there must be no danger that a child will repeat a derogatory remark overheard at home. A man's wife becomes the only refuge left to him for a relatively free expression of ideas, a sharing and evaluation of daily experiences. Of necessity, the partnership becomes closer.

Besides laws and decrees directly aimed at the family, other social processes have had indirect but important effects on the family. Wherever industrialization has taken hold in the world there has been a decline in the urban birth rate. This has been especially marked in European Russia, where the economic base was drastically altered by the Communists, and where a large family had never been a major desideratum in the culture, though children were loved and accepted when they came. It is not surprising, then, that the present urban family tends to be considerably smaller than the pre-1900 family, averaging three to four children in

contrast to the six or more of pre-1900.

The number of children in contemporary Soviet families appears to vary inversely with the family's place in the social structure, a pattern that until recently characterized the United States as well. Families better off economically tend to restrict the number of children and use their resources to maintain a high standard of

living.

But despite fewer children, the more prosperous families in Russia generally have larger households, since there is more likelihood of three generations of such a family being alive. A grand-mother or older aunt will often live with the family and care for the children while both parents work, and this older relative tends to be a channel for the communication to the children of traditional values and prerevolutionary experiences. Former Soviet citizens have reported that their first acquaintance with religious beliefs and prac-

tice, as well as with life as lived before the Soviet period, came from a grandmother or aunt living in their home. Their parents, in fact, would berate these elders for "filling the child full of nonsense" which might stand in the way of his success in Soviet society.

With forced industrialization, women entered the work force in great numbers. Both parents being away from home much of the day, their influence on the intellectual and moral development of the children is proportionately slight. This difficulty of finding time to spend with the children is a constant complaint among Soviet citizens, especially the elite. The children themselves are very early enmeshed in school, Pioneer, and Komsomol youth groups, all of which cut into the time spent at home under the influence of parents. It must be remembered that normal domestic activities - shopping, for example, or cooking, which involves taking turns at the apartment house communal stove - are time-consuming operations, especially when both parents are working. This is true for all families. The intelligentsia are better off in this regard, but they have proportionately greater political and professional demands on their time. As an individual rises in the Soviet occupational hierarchy, he is expected to spend more time on the job and at party meetings.

Shifts in Values

The legal, social, and economic forces described above have resulted in important modifications of the values traditionally propagated by the family. Both the urban and, to a lesser extent, the rural family have been affected.

In rearing a child, the parents, instead of stressing religious principles and the virtues of thrift and application, are more inclined to inculcate a set of ethics divorced from religion, a caution in social relations and actions, and a sensitivity to those elements which make for a successful career and consequent material reward under the present regime — technical ability, ideological flexibility, and political conformity or prudence. Such ethical values as honesty, sincerity, justice, and mercy are still taught in the family and the school. Officially, however, they have been deprived of their religious context and modified by the principle that, in the preservation and furtherance of Communism, the end justifies the means.

There has been an emphasis on learning, both as a value in itself and as a steppingstone to jobs that will bring material reward and personal satisfaction. Material ambition, even when not explicitly taught the child, is apt to be picked up, since a major source

of conflict in many homes is the difficulty of making ends meet. The high points of traditional Russian family life were the observances of religious holidays, baptisms, christenings, name days, and marriages; now they center on the educational achievements of the children, the acquisition of material possessions, civil marriage, a promotion, and long-planned vacations children and parents can take together.

Blind obedience to authority, which the regime would like to see instilled by the parents, has not become an objective of family training. Instead, the parent teaches the child how to adjust to the system, get along with the regime, and stay out of trouble. In positive terms the child is encouraged to get good marks in school, lead an "exemplary" life, and join government-sanctioned social groups. Political teaching is generally avoided in the home, as is open expression of dissatisfaction with conditions or with policies of

the regime.

Former Soviet citizens have reported that very often children will come home from a Pioneer or Komsomol meeting and berate the grandmother or other older relatives as "superstitious," "bourgeois," etc., then proceed to laud the "all-wise" political leadership of the regime. The temptation to correct the child as to historical fact or present reality must, in some cases, be very great, but is usually stifled. Still, the child is bound to sense some disparity of feeling. This type of conflict between generations is the result of an older, not thoroughly indoctrinated, generation in the home. Also the Soviet citizen, much like the American, Englishman, or Frenchman going out into the business world, finds that what he has been taught, with approval implied in the home, does not always jibe with the realities of life and what he must do to get ahead. The resentment of the disillusioned adolescent at the "lies" he feels have been told him by his teachers and his elders, combined with the "idealism" of the young versus the "realism" of the parent, is another source of chronic intergenerational conflict. This conflict has and probably will continue to exist within the family. Though his disillusionment may affect the adolescent's attitude toward the regime in general, it is unlikely in itself to be a major source of political disaffection.

Official propaganda has constantly insisted that parents must be strict in rearing their children but Soviet parents seem to have intensified their emotional relation with their children as their authority over them has been weakened. When the parents are together and have their children about them, there is a tendency

to be affectionate rather than disciplinary. This permissiveness was the traditional role of the mother; with the breakdown of the authoritarian family, the father also seems to have assumed this role. The children very often are seen as the hope of the future; if there is suffering and sacrifice now — well, the children will have a better life. It is not uncommon to see very poorly dressed Soviet parents accompanied by exceedingly well-dressed children.

The traditional authority of the Russian father has been taken over by officials in the schools and the party. Parents no longer seem to expect or hope for the obedience and the solidarity that traditionally characterized the Russian family. Strong emotional ties, however, are present and enduring, although it is expected now that children will leave the family at an early age, probably being sent to work or study far from home before they are out of their teens. This early departure, also quite common in the United States, tends to put further emphasis on the husband-wife relationship as the supporting, constant one.

The Non-Russian Family

In Western USSR

The Belorussians and Ukrainians are of the same ethnic and cultural origin as the Great Russians themselves. Through the centuries, however, there has been some divergence, which is reflected in differences in family relations and values. The mir and serfdom did not penetrate very far into these areas, and the family, in contrast to the Russian family, has been a more independent social unit. But in spite of these historical differences the Belorussian and Ukrainian family is basically closer to the Russian than is the Central Asian family.

Because of the general anti-Russian prejudice of Belorussian and Ukrainian defectors it is difficult to sort out fact from attitude regarding the strength of the family in these areas. It is, however, significant that these people almost universally state that family ties are much stronger among themselves than among the Russians.

The Belorussian family, like the Russian family, was up until fifty years ago predominantly an extended family. Even before the impact of collectivization and Soviet family laws, however, the extended family had begun to break down under the pressures of land shortage, bad crops, and general economic upheaval. The Belorussian family was never imbedded in a communal structure like the mir, which could act as a buffer and give support in difficult

times. The family was much more on its own than was the traditional Russian family.

Today the family is a small independent unit consisting of five or six members in rural areas and three to four in the urban centers. As a rule the oldest son and his wife remain with his father and mother, while the other married sons and daughters establish their own households. Formerly the father in the family followed the Russian pattern of being clearly superior to the mother and in effect a patriarch, but, as among the Great Russians, his power and authority have considerably diminished, especially in the urban family.

Despite the parallel changes that have occurred in the Belorussian and Russian family, there is some evidence that family ties and loyalty are somewhat stronger today among the Belorussians than among the Russians. The Belorussians venerate their deceased ancestors and perform a number of ceremonies connected with their traditional belief that deceased members return. These observances tend to draw even widely dispersed family members together. Following the Orthodox Church funeral ceremony in the cemetery. there is a lavish feast which, with some regional variation, is repeated after three, nine, thirty-nine, and forty days. In addition, general memorial services for the dead are held four times during the year. Again, these are family observances; they also include a great feast during which three spoonfuls or three servings from the contents of each dish are laid on the table for the dead ancestors and left there until the following morning.

The Belorussian family traditionally was much more flexible in extending a family relationship to those who were not actually related by blood or marriage; this flexibility still remains, considerably extending the importance of family ties. In the past, strangers would be invited into the family to contribute their labor, and would be given the status of a younger brother. This practice has died out, but that of godparenthood, which also extends family ties, is evidently still strong, though among Great Russians it is disappearing. The Belorussians feel that the relation of godparenthood entails real rights and duties. The godparents receive the respect and aid accorded to older family members, and they in turn are as responsible as the parents for the well-being and upbringing of their godchildren. If the parents die, the godparents are responsible

for the care of the child.

Other evidences of greater family stability can be deduced from the statements of defectors that traditional sexual morality in the countryside as well as in the cities is stricter and more generally observed than among the Great Russians. It is still the general practice to exhibit the nightgown of the bride after the wedding night as proof of her virginity. There have been some reports from both the Ukraine and Belorussia of the smearing of tar on the houses of those women who violate sexual propriety. In this connection, it is interesting to note that if the wife of an absent soldier remains on good behavior she is referred to as soldatka, while if she misbehaves she is called moskovka. This word, meaning "Muscovite," might be interpreted as showing an anti-Russian bias; but more probably it reflects rural feeling concerning the "immorality" of urban life.

The Ukrainian family, although it resembles the contemporary Belorussian family, is not the product of a comparatively recent process of changing from a large extended family. Historical and contemporary evidence indicates that the Ukrainian family has for at least a thousand years been a relatively small unit, with the children leaving upon marriage to establish their own residence. The care lavished on the small family house is cited by Ukrainians as symbolic of the high importance of the family in their culture. Travelers from the sixth century on have noted the contrast between the neat, well-cared-for Ukrainian houses and the rather slovenly Russian dwellings. Although the family is small, just as in Belorussia, family loyalties have remained strong. The "cult of the ancestor" here also serves to emphasize the importance of generational continuity.

In other respects, especially regarding the position of women, the family comes close to the general West European type. Traditionally, and today, the woman participates, to a greater extent than in the Russian family, in the making of decisions. Among the Russians, when a young couple returned home after the marriage ceremony, the bride would kneel and take off her husband's shoes, while he would strike her on the back with a knotted piece of string. This was symbolic of her inferior position before her husband within the family. This custom was completely absent in the Ukraine. According to a Ukrainian proverb: "The husband is the head, but the wife is the neck, and the head has to follow the neck in every movement."

Traditionally the Ukrainian family is less strictly authoritarian than the Russian. This is not to say that respect is lacking between children and elders. Indeed, Ukrainians remark with disdain that Russian children more frequently than Ukrainian children use the familiar form of address in speaking to their elders. The Ukrainian type of family organization evidently promoted greater emphasis upon individuality and allowed for more expression of individual responsibility, independence, and voluntary loyalty on the part of family members. The Ukrainian family, being more flexible has found it easier than families in other parts of the Soviet Union to weather the shocks and withstand the pressures by which the present regime has sought to weaken family ties.

Information regarding the Moldavian family is very sparse. What little is available seems to indicate that it has gone through much the same processes as the Belorussian family and today is also a small nuclear family, but with loyalties that extend beyond

the immediate family.

Material currently available on the family in the three Baltic republics is also fragmentary. In all these countries the extended, patrilineal, patriarchal family had already begun to break up. Under Soviet influence and growing urbanization, the process has been accelerated. In all three republics, despite the fragmentation, family ties are still strong and the ability to trace any kind of family relationship immediately places the individual within a circle of friendship and mutual support. Except in Lithuania, which has been greatly influenced by Polish Catholic patterns, the woman in the Baltic family, as in other Protestant nations of northern Europe, has traditionally had more respect and more nearly the position of an equal than the woman in the traditional Russian family.

In general, the family organization of the other peoples of European Russia is increasingly approaching that of the Soviet model. The various Finnic-speaking peoples are among the groups that seem to have shifted from the extended family to the contemporary pattern of the nuclear family. The Volga Tatar had earlier undergone extensive Russianization. Other peoples, such as the Bashkir, primarily Moslem, and the Chuvash, had an all-pervasive family-clan system, similar to that found in Central Asia. Little recent information is available regarding the family life of these peoples, but there has been a very heavy influx of Russians into these areas and consequently strong Russian influence.

In Central Asia

The typical Central Asian family presents a strong contrast to the small, only slightly extended family structure common to the people of the European part of the USSR. The traditional large, extended family persists in many places today in Central Asia. It generally includes a patriarch, his wife, and his married sons with their wives

and children, as well as unmarried sons and daughters. In the past, if a man was wealthy his household also included a large number of distant relatives, hangers-on, and servants. In theory, the family is polygynous and was so even before the entrance of Islam, which sanctions the taking of as many as four wives. However, only those who have prospered under the new regime can afford to support more than one wife, just as in the past polygyny was largely confined

to wealthy members of the "aristocracy."

Generally the extended family lived in a settled community, aul, or in a smaller nomadic group, kishlak, together with other extended families all part of the same lineage, uru, tracing descent through the male line back to the same ancestor. This apparently is still true today, for according to one Soviet source most members of a collective farm have the same family name or lineage. Well into the nineteenth century a number of lineages, all able to trace real or mythical descent from a common ancestor, would form a clan, which functioned as a unit for purposes of mutual defense and assistance. The clans were further organized into larger units or "hordes" or orda. While the horde and clan have long ceased to play a significant role in Central Asian society, a number of sources report that young people as well as the older generations are still aware of their clan names, though they do not form an integral part of the name of an individual.

In most of Central Asia the lineage still functions as the unit of primary allegiance outside the extended family itself; this has raised a considerable problem of "nepotism" for the Soviet regime in its use of native officials. The smallest segment of the lineage is that comprising the first seven ascending generations traced through the male line. Individuals who can trace relationship back to a common ancestor within seven generations are considered to be too closely related for marriage. Those Kazak, Kirgiz, Turkmen, and Uzbek who have been most influenced by Russian culture, primarily in the cities, reckon no more than three or four generations. The major exceptions in Central Asia to the practice of marrying outside an extended lineage, which in effect also means marrying outside the village, are the Uigur and the Mountain Tadzhik, strongly Islamic peoples with Iranian affiliations, who follow what are essentially Persian marriage customs. Among these groups marriage between certain cousins is the preferred form.

Emphasis upon perpetuation of the family and lineage provides encouragement for having a large number of children. The still current Central Asian proverb, "A home with children is like a bazaar, and a childless home is like a tomb (mazar)," contrasts with the traditional Russian attitude toward a new child as "another mouth to feed." Male children especially are desired, since both the extended family and the lineage are perpetuated through the male line. The attitudes and practices concerning marriage are part of this larger framework of family, lineage, and clan. Marriage is viewed as a contract between the family line of the husband and another line for the services of a woman to supply a male heir to the husband's family. Marriage is thus a contract between two extended families, and beyond them, between the extensive lineages to which each holds allegiance. The sentiments of the couple involved are not the major consideration, though according to custom, reinforced by Moslem law, the bride at some time must signify her consent. Traditionally, however, marriage was arranged long before the maturity of the children when they could offer little resistance.

The marriage is usually arranged through a marriage broker, though it is not uncommon for the families, or the couple, to know each other either directly or through friends and relatives. Since lineage has a territorial base and marriage must take place outside the lineage, the woman is thus brought into the family and lineage from the outside, often from a considerable distance. Once the genealogies of the prospective bride and groom have been traced and it has been established that they can marry, discussion is centered around the amount of the kalum or bride-price to be paid by the groom's family. As in most European countries, including European Russia, a dowry is also given to the bride to take with her and retain as her property. Both the dowry and the bride-price consist of livestock; the dowry also includes clothing for the woman. If both families are wealthy they try to outdo each other in the payment of the dowry and bride-price, as well as in the feasting associated with the marriage. If the families are poor the kalym may consist of labor donated by the groom and his relatives to the bride's family, and the dowry will be negligible. The kalum, however, usually is several times the value of the dowry.

As part of its campaign to "emancipate" the women of Central Asia, the Soviet government has bitterly fought, by law and propaganda, the custom of paying bride-price. Article 196 of the Criminal Code states that paying kalym "entails correctional labor for a period up to one year" for both the donor and the recipient. The basis for Soviet opposition to the custom is the Russian misconception of the role of the bride-price in Central Asian marriage and, indeed, a lack of understanding of the nature of the marriage agreement, which

theoretically bypasses not only the bride but the groom as well. From the Russian point of view, the payment of bride-price means that the woman is being sold as a chattel or slave to the family of the groom. To Russians and other Europeans, this practice is debasing to the woman and, together with other Central Asian practices that separate women from public life, is considered among the "feudal survivals and old customs degrading to women." To the Central Asian, the bride-price is payment to the bride's family for having raised a girl who will leave the family when still young to supply an heir to the groom's family. It also protects the woman, since her family can retain the bride-price if she returns to them because of mistreatment by her husband. Bride-price is still paid today, but because of its prohibition by law and the collectivization of livestock herds, it is little more than a symbolic payment in most areas, or a hidden "gift" to the bride's family.

The members of a Central Asian family occupy carefully graded positions according to age and sex. As in the traditional Russian family, the father is the unquestioned patriarch and ruler of all in the extended family. He is stern and expects and receives obedience and respect. The mother rules her part of the household as the father rules his, though she is subject to the commands of her husband. Similarly, older brothers demand respect from their

younger siblings.

It is understood by all that the daughter will leave the family when she marries, and training of the daughter in obedience to men and in household activities begins early. Among all Central Asian peoples great value is placed upon a girl's virginity. An unmarried girl who loses her virginity or who may be presumed to have done so, no matter what the circumstances, is considered no better than a prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent and she is a disgrace to the whole family. In prerevolutionary days she would have been in danger of death at the hands of her outraged family and even today will probably flee to some urban center where she is not known. Judging from reports of defectors and from notices in the official press, family control is still strong enough in Central Asia to prevent the growth of the sexual promiscuity that has developed in the European part of the USSR.

Among the more conservative Uigur and Mountain Tadzhik, and to some extent among the Uzbek, the intensity of feeling about virginity is supplemented by the value placed on the woman's remaining veiled and covered by the traditional woman's wrap-around, the *paranja*, when in public. Many of the women in these areas who

heeded Communist propaganda to throw off the veil were murdered by their relatives to wipe out the shame to the family.

Expressions of love between mother and child are not a striking feature of Central Asian family life. Tenderness and love is found between brother and sister, and as such is a common theme of Central Asian poetry. Relations between brothers, on the other hand, are somewhat strained because of more rigid observance of age-respect distinctions. Before collectivization, brothers were also potential rivals for the control of the family property, which was often extensive. With the disappearance of large private holdings of livestock and land, inheritance has been eliminated as a principal source of tension between brothers, though some feeling still surrounds the questions of the assignment of the family plot of grazing lands and the distribution of the small livestock holdings of the family. There is usually an attempt to distribute the property more or less equally among the sons, the daughters having received their share of the estate in the form of a dowry. In the past the oldest son inherited the social position of his father and the few remaining mullahs and shamans generally pass on their skills, knowledge, and position to their oldest son. The youngest son remains with the father and inherits physical possession of the paternal hearth, while the older sons set up separate tents or apartments close to the father's dwelling. There is some variation in this basic pattern of inheritance. Among the agricultural Tadzhik, for example, a married son sets up his own household with a few head of stock from his father, but the tillable land is held by the father.

The practice of levirate marriage (marriage of the woman to her deceased husband's brother) is part of the pattern of family life which emphasizes continuance of the family and lineage through the male line. This custom is followed upon death of the husband, even though the brother may have a wife of his own. It need not apply if the woman has borne a son, since in that case she assumes and controls her husband's property and prerogatives, which she

keeps for her son.

For all groups, including those strongly influenced by Islam, divorce of a childless wife is a relatively simple procedure and was fairly common in the past. Divorce is usually initiated by the man, and if it is a matter of his caprice the woman will go back to her family, which will retain the bride-price paid by the groom. This procedure bypasses both the civil registry office and the official Soviet divorce law. But with the birth of a son, a woman has considerably more status, and the husband's family and lineage are

concerned about the heir. Family pressure is brought to bear, and in these cases divorce is inconceivable unless the woman is guilty

of some grave offense such as adultery.

The Central Asian family embraces a much larger number of people than does the European type of family, and its members will act to preserve and perpetuate it. As a social institution commanding the primary loyalty of its members, it was interlocked with the political, religious, and economic systems of the area. More deeply woven into the fabric of Central Asian society than was the Russian family in its milieu, it has more effectively withstood Soviet efforts to restrict its function and influence to that of a biosocial machine for the production of loyal Soviet citizens. In response to Soviet pressures there have been resistance, defiance, and in some cases

persistence of old customs in new forms.

Since the Central Asian family traditionally has been so much a part of the economic, religious, and political system it is difficult to separate the regime's family policy in this area from its economic policy, goals of political control, and war on "religious superstition." Certainly the influence of the family has been circumscribed through collectivization, which put most of the property and the economic functions of the family in the hands of the state. The political influence exerted through the family has been further narrowed by the simple expedient of appointing Russians, rather than Central Asians, to positions of political influence and power. The regime has considerably weakened religious observance, but this has not had any appreciable effect on family unity, paternal authority, and family custom.

The Central Asian family has not changed as rapidly or as markedly as the European family. Its initial stability and strength kept the Central Asians from partaking in the youthful rebellion which swept Russia into a period of promiscuity, postcard divorce, abortion, delinquency, and a general rejection of traditional authority and control. As we have noted, the Soviet regime has had to make an about-face to measures strengthening and stabilizing the family as an institution in order to inculcate some discipline and sense of civic pride and responsibility into its younger citizens. Thus, Soviet family policy in Central Asia is aimed, not at destroying the family, but rather at bringing it closer to the contemporary Soviet model. It has already curtailed the influence exerted by family ties in Central Asian society; all that remains now is the elimination of certain attitudes and practices officially regarded as "backward," "feudal," and "destructive of production." Since the regime is at-

tempting to walk a fine line between combating specific practices enforced by the older generation and supporting that generation's authority over the children, it faces an almost impossible task.

On occasion the very law passed to force a change in custom is used by the older generation to reinforce parental control. According to traditional Asian custom, a suitor was not completely helpless if the girl's family did not wish to permit the marriage. With the support of his kinsmen – and generally with the concurrence of the girl herself - he could ride into the girl's village and abduct her. Unless there was bitter enmity between the families involved, a reconciliation usually was worked out, since the girl was already compromised. Under Soviet law, however, "kidnaping for the purpose of marriage entails deprivation of liberty for a period of two vears," with additional penalties in case of rape. Thus, the aggrieved family now has recourse to Soviet courts to support its authority: there are frequent accounts of such proceedings in the local press, with the appended note that the culprit had attempted to settle with the family out of court. In one case the abductor shot the bride's parents when they insisted on pressing charges. A Soviet ethnographer has noted that often the "reconciliation" involves payment of a valuable "gift" to the parents of the abducted girl. Typical of many local press accounts is one in a Kazakhstan newspaper which reported that the kidnaping of girls for marriage still persists even among party members. The paper cited several cases of high school teachers kidnaping their pupils and told of a local party secretary who was a guest of honor at such a "feudal" wedding.

The regime is aware that the greatest possibility of change lies in getting women out of the family and into the schools and other outside activities. To this end, in the constitution of each of the Asiatic republics (Kazakh, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Uzbek) a paragraph dealing with women's rights includes the caution that "resistance to . . . the drawing of women into study, into agricultural or industrial production, into the governing of the state or into social or political activities is punishable by law." The authorities, however, are having little success in drawing women into the schools and keeping them there once they reach marriageable age (fourteen and up). There is a notable lack of Central Asian women in public life,

especially in positions that require education.

The position of women in Central Asia has an important bearing on prospects of cultural change. While the males are certainly influenced by Russian culture through the schools and by activity in productive work, little of this will pass to the children, and the process of education must be repeated for the males of each generation. The women have thus become the reservoir for the traditional values of the culture. Even those men who have demonstrated sufficient loyalty and adherence to Soviet principle to become members of the party are reported to lapse into "feudal" customs. Local Communists have been excluded from the party for "humiliating" their wives or for practicing polygyny, reportedly not uncommon throughout Central Asia. It is not surprising that party members are the people who practice polygyny, since they are in a better position financially to support more than one wife.

The regime reports progress in encouraging women to participate in *kolkhoz* meetings and similar public activities. However, concession to tradition has evidently been made, since it is officially reported that at meetings, plays, and films, the women sit apart from the men. Similarly, there is a separate women's section in the local soviet, to which women elect representatives of their own sex to supervise the activities of women. This may be the first step toward involving women in public life, but basic custom is still being main-

tained.

Since many collective farms are made up of one clan subdivision or lineage, Central Asians are apparently tending to identify themselves with a *kolkhoz* rather than a kin group. Exogamy (marriage outside the group) now applies to the *kolkhoz* rather than the clan. One Soviet source reports that *kolkhoz* exogamy is something of a production problem, since the unmarried girls who make up a large part of the labor force look on their residence in the *kolkhoz* as temporary, until they marry, and therefore do not feel any incentive to produce or make improvements for the farm they will soon leave.

Another potential source of change in the family, and in Central Asian culture generally, is the tremendous influx of Russians into Central Asia. There is, however, very little intermarriage between Russians and Central Asians. Even today a girl who married a Russian would probably be killed by her family. The few marriages between Russians and the Central Asians that do occur evidently take place between Asian men and Russian women. Thus some of the most "sovietized" men are in effect removed from the culture and associate only with Russians. The well-educated, Russian-oriented male has great difficulty finding a Central Asian girl of similar background. Unless he is willing to isolate himself completely

from his culture, the Russian-educated Central Asian will marry a woman with traditional views, and is then likely to be reabsorbed into the old culture.

There is some sketchy evidence to indicate that Central Asians who migrate to the cities to work tend to loosen family ties and adopt some Russian customs. Their families are smaller and closer to the European pattern, and many of the women must, as a result of circumstances, go out to work. Even in the cities, however, there is little contact between Russians and Central Asians, as the two groups live in separate sections. Family tradition remains strong in Central Asia, and the regime will evidently have to wait upon the very slow process of education and urbanization before Central Asia produces its version of the Soviet family.

In the Caucasus

Little is known of the contemporary family situation in the Caucasus, and the historical material deals primarily with the mountain peoples rather than with the peoples of the lowlands. Despite some local variations, however, there seem to be certain systemic features common to almost all areas of the Caucasus. Soviet family policy has been applied here, as it has in Central Asia, but, since the mountain areas are especially isolated, less change has probably occurred here than in Central Asia or the urban areas of Georgia and Armenia.

Generally, the family is a patriarchal extended family comprising under one roof or in several adjacent houses three or more generations of sons, their wives, and children, and unmarried daughters. Such a family unit would embrace as many as thirty to forty people, all related through the male line. Among the mountaineers as well as the Armenians, the extended family might also include those adopted as "milk relatives" — a relationship established by sucking or biting the breast of one of the mothers in the family. Among the western mountaineers, the Cherkess for example, the family was also extended through the practice of foster parentage, whereby a family of high economic and social standing would arrange for a "lower-class" family to rear its child. The child, through the milk relationship, became a full member of both families, and the two families were privileged to call upon each other in times of need.

Family relationships were further widened, as in Central Asia, through clan organizations. Among the western mountaineers and the Turkic lowlanders, marriage within the clan was forbidden. In Dagestan, in the east, the clans were endogamous. The clans and the

extended family were tending to break down in lowland Georgia as early as 1917, but kinship ties are still very strong. Among the Armenians, clans do not seem to be present, but marriage within the seventh degree of relationship through the male line is prohibited, as it is in Central Asia. The Kurds, on the other hand, like the Iranian peoples of Central Asia, prefer marriages between the children of brothers. Today, as in parts of Central Asia, entire collective farms are made up of people who belong to the same clan. Traditionally, in many areas the clan and the village were coterminous social units.

Among the mountaineers, kinship was also extended through an oath of brotherhood taken by the populations of two villages or by two persons from the same or different villages. Individuals bound by such an oath were considered to be clan members, supported each other in marriage and vengeance, and could not marry each other's women. The major exceptions to the system of extended family and greatly extended family ties are the lowland Georgians and the Khevsurs.

Among the other peoples of the Caucasus, the family hearth was the sacred symbol of the family and in some groups the newly born were consecrated to their ancestors at the hearth. Each family also prayed to its patrilineal ancestors. Generally, both within the family and throughout the Caucasus, respect was paid to age. Children deferred not only to their parents but to their elder brothers as well. Respect for elders, especially males, cut across all class lines and was extended to nonkinsmen.

While the open expression of love and fondness between adult family members was generally frowned upon, the children were expected to show great love and filial devotion. This is a common theme of folk tales. The avoidance and detachment common to relationships within the family were also part of the marriage pattern. In many highland areas, except in Dagestan, the bride did not enter her husband's household for a period of anywhere from a few days to a year. The young wife lived with her own family or with a family not related to her, and during this time her husband would visit her "secretly."

Since the family was part of a larger kin unit, the clan, marriage was not simply an arrangement between two nuclear families. The marriage was arranged by the elders of the family, though informally, and the desires of the couple would be taken into account. As in Central Asia, a dowry was given by the bride's family, and a brideprice paid by that of the groom. The bride-price was related to the

social standing not only of the groom's family but of his whole clan, and all clan members would make a contribution to it.

In spite of the laws against payment of bride-price, it has probably been maintained as a custom throughout the mountaineer region. The authorities have also inveighed, though it is not known how effectively, against the custom of child marriages and polygyny, both traditional throughout the mountain region. Though permitted in pre-Soviet times, polygyny was relatively rare and occurred generally when a man would take his brother's widow as an additional wife. The children of such a marriage were considered the dead brother's.

The clans also functioned to avenge adultery or other injury done to any member of the clan. In the past this practice resulted in local wars of blood revenge, which ended with either the payment of blood money by the offending clan or the annihilation of a whole family line. Evidently this practice has not died out; there are occasional references in the Soviet press to wholesale family "murders" in the Caucasus.

As in the patrilineal society of Central Asia, Caucasian women were traditionally of decidedly inferior status. Though not generally kept in strict seclusion like the women of the strongly Moslem areas of Central Asia, they were not permitted to take part in large public gatherings. This pattern, of course, conflicts with the Soviet program for the "emancipation" of women. Little is known of the effects of this program, though local newspapers may still report such items as the following: "In some Georgian villages, women are still forbidden to take part in any cultural activities; this includes public dancing and singing. In amateur theatricals, women's roles are played by men." As a measure of the continuing strength of family relationships in the Caucasus, there have also been frequent references in the Soviet press to nepotism.

In Siberia and the Arctic

In the Soviet Far East, the Buryat Mongols had patriarchal clan organizations which in the seventeenth century were united into three tribes that fought Russian encroachments. There is little remaining today of the larger tribal organization and allegiance, but extended families and clans are still common, especially among the seminomads, who have not yet gone through the collectivization process. The clan, or male lineage, operates in much the same way as the Central Asian clan; those within a seven-generation circle of kinship form an exogamous marriage group. There is little con-

4. The Non-Russian Family

temporary information available, but, since the family type and the problems faced are much like those in Central Asia, it can be assumed that much the same changes have occurred here as in Central Asia.

The northern herding, hunting, and fishing groups have remained relatively untouched except in those places where there has been a heavy influx of Russians. In the southern areas inhabited by these groups, collective farms, principally raising livestock, and collective fishing cooperatives have been formed. The people so settled have, under collectivization, lost many of their clan and extended family ties. For the peoples in the Arctic, however, the family, somewhat extended through the male line, is still the economic and basic social unit. Several related families will travel and live together in one settlement, though there are no hard and fast rules concerning the makeup of the household and settlement. Among some groups, such as the Tungus, Yakut, and Gilyak, there was some extension of the family relationship to a clan organization occupying specific territory, but this type of unit was evidently breaking down long before the revolution. Most of the nationalities of the north are of minor importance to the regime, and little effort has been expended to change their culture, except when it seems economically advantageous to the regime to do so.

EDUCATION

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE USSR is more tightly controlled and more consciously designed and directed to perform its social role than any other known today. Its principal function is to condition and train citizens in those attitudes, beliefs, skills, and specialties that the regime has defined as necessary to the achievement of national goals. Education for its own sake or for individual fulfillment is a concept alien to this system. The RSFSR Minister of Education, addressing a group of American educators in 1958, expressed the official attitude: "Each pupil should be useful to the state. We do not want young people who are good for nothing."

In the Soviet system of education two goals are of primary importance: to fashion a citizenry with the attitudes and characteristics of the "new Soviet man," and to fully mobilize the nation's human resources by developing and controlling the skilled and semiskilled

manpower required for industrial and scientific advance.

Education is an integral part of the all-pervasive Communist propaganda apparatus. Communist ideology is central to the entire educational program and is taught at all schools levels — indirectly in the primary grades, even in the nurseries and kindergartens, and as required courses in the secondary schools and institutions of higher education. Among the values and behavior patterns considered proper for Soviet citizens is the concept of labor as a matter of honor and duty, performed not for individual benefit but as a service to society. "Communist morality," also stressed, includes allegiance to the principles of Communism and faith in the infallibility of the Communist party. The Communist society is constantly presented as the most dynamic and "progressive" of all possible societies. Capitalism in all its aspects is characterized as retrogressive and caught in a system of inherent contradictions.

Rapid conversion of an overwhelmingly agrarian nation into a modern industrial society demanded that the educational system concentrate upon technical training. Such polytechnic training remains central today. Heavy emphasis on the natural sciences at all school levels is combined with practical work and training in specific occupational skills. In universities and specialized institutes of higher education programs for the development of rigorously trained scientific and science-teaching cadres receive virtually unlimited support. But relatively few graduates of Soviet secondary schools are fortunate enough to get into institutions of higher education. Most are expected to go to work in industry or in agriculture, and great stress is placed on their optimum development as workers useful to the state. In addition to alternating courses of study with actual work experience, the regime annually conscripts (through so-called "labor reserve schools") up to one million youngsters, aged fourteen and upward, for specialized training in productive enterprises, removing them in effect from the regular educational system.

Soviet education is characterized by both notable successes and grave deficiencies. Illiteracy has been greatly reduced, though official claims that it has been wiped out appear considerably exaggerated. Well-trained technicians, economic administrators, professional scientists, and engineers, produced in large numbers, have registered significant achievements in science and technology. Yet much Soviet technical and vocational training is very narrow: a person may be trained in the special skill of making grease cups or led to master one repetitive function in the operation of a lathe. Specialization, pushed to extremes at all levels of the system, has hampered the development of individual competence in many

different spheres.

Those with obvious mental ability, talents, and stamina are provided every inducement to improve their knowledge and skills. Yet little effort is made to test the aptitudes and cultivate the potentialities of ordinary students. Modern testing methods for the identification, placement, and guidance of individual pupils are

not used in the Soviet system.

Methods of teaching are founded on the assumption that there is just one "correct" way to do anything in the classroom. Examinations are based primarily on the ability to remember how specific questions should be answered rather than on the ability to solve problems or think them through. This emphasis on mechanical performance rather than intelligent understanding has had a disastrous influence in the humanities and the social sciences. Theoretical

work here is either poor and insular or nonexistent. The Soviet failure to train the mind in general critical thinking may in the long run prove to be a decisive weakness, but for the moment the purposes of the regime are being served.

The Soviet people display a striking zeal for education. Keen competition for higher education assures the state substantial control over the brainpower at its disposal. Yet the popular passion for

education also has produced serious problems.

A great many graduates of Soviet secondary schools are extremely disdainful of manual labor — a characteristic the regime has been unable to eradicate. For the mass of the people, education holds the promise of material and social advancement and release from the drudgery of "menial" work. More important from the point of view of the regime, aspirations for higher education have far out-

stripped the growth of opportunities for such education.

This gap has contributed to social and economic tensions which the regime now finds increasingly intolerable. Given the shortage of skilled technicians on the level just below engineer and scientist (the effect of population losses during and after World War II), Soviet lower schools have been producing insufficient graduates in this area. Yet, according to Soviet sources, they have been graduating four times as many qualified university applicants as the universities are able to properly accommodate. Many of these partly trained students are unwilling to work in factories, plants, or collective and state farms. In the words of Khrushchev: "Some even consider that [the offer of such work] is an insult to them."

In response to these problems, the regime launched in 1958 a major educational reform designed to: provide more skilled manpower not requiring university training; develop more intensively "wholesome" attitudes toward work; and neutralize general aspirations for higher education and social advancement. The reform, while couched in startling revolutionary terms, is being implemented gradually and on an experimental basis. Its most immediate effect has been to strengthen the industrial-arts-vocational orientation of the basic educational program, with increased emphasis on

combining work and classroom study.

In the long run, however, the reform envisions a substantial dismantling of the general educational structure built up through 1956. Soviet educational goals, as spelled out in 1956, included ten years of compulsory general secondary education for all eligible youths. This goal has been abandoned; there now will be eight years of required secondary schooling, and most youths of fifteen and

sixteen will be diverted into the labor force. Continued secondary education will be available to these young workers on a part-time basis (through evening and correspondence courses) and will require another three years to complete. In essence, the reform lengthens the time required to complete a secondary education from ten to eleven years, and drastically limits uninterrupted education to a select few considered qualified for university-level training.

The regime expects to work out the necessary curricular and methodological changes by 1963. It has tried to win popular support for its program by emphasizing that all youth — irrespective of class affiliation — will start with the same opportunities. In propagating this line Khrushchev has stressed the social inequities of present admission procedures employed by institutions of higher learning, pointing out that the majority of university students today are

children of the intelligentsia.

It is questionable, however, whether the contemplated educational reorganization will win genuine wide support. Parents' fears that their children will not be able to advance fast and far enough are likely to be intensified. Educational plans for the future, moreover, include a provision for the rapid development of boarding schools that would take children out of their families in order to better prepare "well-educated citizens for practical work." These schools have been emphasized since 1956. Their enrollment in 1958 stood at a little over 100,000 pupils and thus far seems to have been limited to children with little or no means. Their goal now has been set at 2.5 million pupils by 1965; conceivably this may reflect the beginning of a new official effort to erode the influence of the family in the USSR.

All these projected changes in the educational system have already aroused anxiety and concern, and the regime has seen fit to proceed cautiously. Yet popular dissatisfactions notwithstanding, control over the educational machinery gives the state a pliable lever with which to manipulate the careers and lives of its citizens. Given time, the Soviet Union may well succeed in strengthening the educational process as a means of developing and mobilizing the nation's human resources for national policy purposes.

Pre-Soviet Education

Though the curricula of the Soviet educational system have been fashioned to the needs of the present regime, the system's structure, roots, and many of its problems lie in prerevolutionary conditions.

The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the beginnings of rapid expansion of public education in the Slavic areas of Russia. In 1864 new statutes on education placed the responsibility for elementary schools in the hands of the zemstvos (organizations for local self-government), with funds from the state and requirements that neither class nor religion would bar the entry of qualified students to the secondary schools and universities. The universities (nine in number at the end of the century) were freed from outside control over courses, administration, and selection of faculty. Private and parochial schools were allowed. But in spite of the rapid growth only some ten percent of the total number of children between five and fifteen years of age were attending school by the end of the century. Though girls were admitted, by far the majority of the students were boys. Relatively few of those in the elementary schools received sufficient training to pass the entrance examinations to higher schools. By 1914, however, there were plans for budget and facility expansion promising universal education by 1922.

Schools were organized upon the German pattern of elementary schools and "gymnasia," each with a rigorous course of study. Though the local zemstvos had a certain freedom and direct responsibility for their schools, general policy regulations and standards were centrally controlled under the Ministry of Education, which had an inspectorate to supervise local activities. All teachers were civil servants. Service to the state, then as well as now, was the main channel for economic and social advancement. It was upon the base provided by this system, together with its concepts of centralized public control and universality of primary education, and with its European or German organization of the curricula,

that the Soviet developed its present system.

In the non-Slavic areas, however, conditions were quite different. The *zemstvo* charter did not at first include Siberia, Central Asia, or the Caucasus. Some progress in education was made in later years, but in general there was far less educational opportunity than in the Slavic area.

In Central Asia the traditional system of education was Islamic, and limited to the sons of the elite. Practically no education was available for the masses or for women of any class. Teaching concentrated upon imparting a mastery of religious doctrine and ritual. Though Bukhara and Samarkand were centers of Moslem education and culture, there was nothing comparable to the education of the West among the native peoples.

What education was available in the Caucasus was largely church-dominated — in Azerbaijan by the Moslem tradition, and in Armenia and Georgia by their respective Christian churches. In Georgia, classes were conducted in the Russian language. The ruling elite of Georgia had been Russianized for several centuries and were educated in the same manner as their Russian counterparts. Many of the elementary schools were operated by the church; most schools were located in the cities and catered to the Russian or Russianized population rather than the native peoples. The situation among the many other ethnic groups in the Caucasus was even worse—in 1917, seventy percent of them had no alphabet.

Under tsarist control education in Bessarabia (which since 1945 has been re-annexed as part of the Moldavian SSR) was almost completely Russianized and restricted to the upper classes; the Germans, Poles, and other ethnic minorities were granted permission to operate their own schools. But for the largely peasant Rumanian population, about eighty percent of the total, there was practically no educational opportunity at all. After 1917, however, the Bessarabian people began to organize elementary schools in which instruction was in their native language; rapid strides were made in providing schools to which both girls and boys were admitted, and by 1930 roughly half the population was literate. Secondary schools, too, were established, but those students who were able to take higher training had to go to Bucharest or other capitals.

A somewhat similar situation existed in the western provinces which are now part of the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's, though general education had not progressed quite as rapidly under Polish control as in Bessarabia under Rumanian control. Lvov (now in the Ukraine) with its old university was the center of intellectual activity.

The educational pattern in the Baltic states was entirely different from that of any other area now in the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century the population was almost entirely literate. During their years of independence (1918–41) each state established a compulsory grammar-school educational system under state control. Predominantly Lutheran, Latvia and Estonia required religious training in the schools but allowed such training to be in the faith of the students. Technical schools were established. Universities, such as those of Riga and Tartu, were centers of intellectual and scientific development. Chairs of religion

and philosophy were influential and popular, and a large degree of academic freedom and local autonomy was allowed at all levels of the school system.

Such then was the context in which the Soviet educational system developed and the conditions that it was required to meet as it was imposed upon the various cultures which today make up the USSR

The Soviet Educational System

Although a large number of government agencies are concerned with operation and administration of the schools, ultimate control of the educational system of the Soviet Union rests with the Central Committee of the Communist party. Through the Section on School Affairs of the Central Committee's Agitprop, policy is made which is binding upon school administrative agencies in all parts of the USSR and at all educational levels from nursery through postgraduate training.

Party control is also exercised through a number of indirect channels, just as in all other government activities. The higher and more responsible the school administrative positions, the greater the probability that the incumbents will be party members of proved reliability. To a somewhat lesser degree and with some variations between subject fields, a similar pattern appears among the teachers. In school organizations there is always a hard core of party or Komsomol members. Many students are members of party affiliates — Komsomol, Pioneers, and Octobrists. Party influence is also brought to bear through parents' associations and through all the controlled mass media of communication.

In addition, in all the universities and institutes, and probably in the larger secondary schools, the internal security agencies have representatives whose sole duty is to check on the political and ideological "reliability" of the faculty, staff, and students. Thus the party not only makes the policy but by direct and indirect means has the power to enforce its decisions and ensure conformity to them.

The highest administrative agency is the USSR Ministry of Higher Education; in addition to governing higher education it maintains indirect control over the lower schools in two ways: by establishing the entrance requirements and examinations necessary for admission to all institutions of higher education — universities as well as specialized institutes operated by other ministries or organizations — it sets the academic standards for the ten-year general

schools and the specialized schools; influences general educational policy and practice throughout the USSR. Only one republic, the Ukraine, has its own Ministry of Higher Education and it is a sub-

sidiary of the USSR Ministry.

The highest administrative agency for primary and secondary education is the Ministry of Education of each of the fifteen constituent republics. These ministries issue to oblast, rayon, and local school administrative bodies under their jurisdiction specific regulations implementing the general directives from the USSR Council of Ministers on methods of instruction, curricula, texts, and general school administration. They supervise the allocation of funds and the repair and construction of buildings, handle the appointment and training of teachers, and, through an inspectorship system, make irregular but relatively frequent checks on the quality of instruction and adherence to regulations.

Of these republic ministries the RSFSR Ministry of Education plays a central role in primary and secondary school administration throughout the USSR. It generally is the first republic ministry to work out details of administration in accordance with central di-

rectives and laws.

Primary and secondary general schools in the USSR are assigned a uniform course of study developed in detail in the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR. The curriculum is precise and detailed, giving not only courses to be taught but number of hours per week to be spent on each. The local administrations and the teachers have relatively little freedom to adapt courses, content, supplementary reading, or even the amount of homework to local conditions. There are no electives; all students take the same courses except in those schools conducted in minority languages, where the Russian language is required in addition to the regular curriculum. A similar standardization occurs in the various special schools and in the universities and institutes, although in the latter the only courses required of all students are those in Marxism-Leninism.

All schools use uniform textbooks, approved by, and in most cases produced under the auspices of, the Section on Instruction and Methodology of the RSFSR Ministry of Education. Master copies are published in Russian by the State Publishing House in Moscow; the State Publishing Houses of the various republics translate them, if necessary, into the local languages and make limited changes to suit local conditions. Ministries of the republics have, however, developed texts for teaching their own languages and for teaching

Russian.

A number of specialized schools are operated by various ministries and other organizations. For example, engineering training is given in institutes operated by appropriate technical ministries, and conservatories of music, schools of ballet and of graphic arts come under the direction of the Ministry of Culture. All specialized schools, however, come under the general supervision of the Ministry of Education of the respective republic or of the Ministry of Higher Education, depending upon the level of training offered.

The Soviet regime claims that all national minorities may attend schools in which instruction is in the native language. Actually, only the primary grades are conducted in the native languages in a large proportion of the schools, and Russian language and literature is required in all. The majority of higher educational establishments

and secondary schools give instruction in Russian only.


Organized in the European tradition, training in Soviet schools is considerably more rigorous than in the average American public school. It is highly technical in its emphasis, especially in the upper grades; for example, analytical geometry and calculus are required, as well as six years of biology, five of physics, and four of chemistry, along with six years of a foreign language. In the schools conducted in minority languages Russian is required, beginning in the third grade, but is not a substitute for a foreign language. Required social science courses include Russian and world history and the USSR Constitution. Marxist-Leninist theory, which the regime defines as social science, not only permeates all courses but is taught, directly or indirectly, in all grades. Russian literature also is required. Physical training, including a quantity of military drill exercise, is emphasized.

The General School

Though there are many types of schools in the USSR the so-called general school is still the basic organization of the Soviet educational system (see the plate, Structure of the Soviet Educational System, Compared with the American). There are three divisions: the elementary (grades one through four), the junior or incomplete secondary (grades five through seven), and the senior-secondary (grades eight through ten). Individual schools may include only the first division, the first and second, or the complete ten years of study.

Until the beginning of the 1956–57 school year promotion from grade to grade was by rigorous examination, but at that time examinations were dropped in all grades except four, seven, and ten and their scope and detail reduced. Passage of the examinations entitles

STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, COMPARED WITH THE AMERICAN



Source: Adapted from De Witt, Nicholas, Soviet Professional Manpower, p. 6.

Indicates the origin of the applicants. Completion of course does not qualify for admission to higher education. Acceptances on the basis of competitive entrance requirements. the student to the "certificate of maturity," which makes him eligible to sit for entrance examinations to one of the institutions of higher education. If he has received gold medals for performance in the senior-secondary schools and — or has received grades meeting the requirements set by the universities and institutes, he may be admitted without fulfilling the formal entrance requirements. While the usual pattern in the general schools is that of the day school, in sparsely settled and rural areas, dormitories or barracks are set up for students who live at too great a distance to travel to and from school each day.

Special Schools

A number of special schools serve as alternatives to the general school at various levels. The technicums are designed to train what are called "middle-grade specialists," such as nurses, librarians, electricians, and automobile mechanics. The course runs from three to five years, depending upon the specialty, and includes the regular senior-secondary school curriculum as well as special training. Successful completion of seven years in a general school, together with examinations in Russian language, literature, and the USSR Constitution are required for admission. Most graduates spend three years doing assigned work in their specialty. Those with outstanding ratings may be admitted to higher institutions — generally institutes in the same field of concentration — without taking entrance examinations.

In 1940 the State Labor Reserves Schools were established to cope with wartime shortages of skilled labor for industry, transport, and, a few years later, for operation of agricultural equipment. They are of two types: two-year courses to train skilled workers, and sixmonth factory-plant schools to train semiskilled workers. In both, ideological indoctrination is included and specialized courses in Russian language and literature, history, geography, and the USSR Constitution are required. The two-year course, then, is partially comparable to the secondary level of the general schools, but graduates are not qualified for entrance to higher educational institutions.

Boys between the ages of fourteen and seventeen and girls from fifteen to sixteen who have had at least four years of schooling may be admitted to the two-year course. Boys between the ages of sixteen and nineteen and girls from sixteen to eighteen without regard to educational background are eligible for the six-month schools. Admission to the Labor Reserves Schools is by "voluntary" application to fill quotas set by the Council of Ministers of the

USSR. All expenses of training, board, and clothing are borne by

the government.

In December 1943 the Suvorov (army) and the Nakhimov (navy) schools were established to prepare boys for the commissioned officer ranks and entrance into higher military schools. Boys are accepted at the age of eight. The course lasts nine years and includes both general and military training. In the beginning students were accepted from many social groups; today these schools have become prestige institutions and their students are almost all children of officers.

Artistically gifted children are trained in schools that combine the regular curriculum with special courses. The schools of ballet, drama, and music are particularly popular, and competition for admission is keen; the arts are held in high esteem by the Russian people and individual artists hold a favored position in Soviet society. After the first seven or ten years of training in these schools, students who do not live up to their original promise are employed in administrative and supporting managerial jobs within their specialty, while the more gifted are given further training.

There are also a number of special schools for mentally and

physically handicapped children.

Most if not all of the special schools are boarding schools. Facilities range from the rough barracks of the Labor Reserves Schools to the generally excellent quarters and equipment of the military and arts schools.

Higher Education

Higher education in all fields is given in universities, institutes, academies, and conservatories (VUZ). Although some official encouragement is being given currently to the humanities in higher education, by far the majority of students are studying the sciences; all may be classed as professionals-in-training, for at this level there is no liberal arts or general education as such in the USSR.

In theory, all persons between the ages of seventeen and thirty who have passed the matriculation examinations from a secondary school are qualified to take the entrance examinations for admittance to any institution of higher education. There are, however, far

more applicants than can be accommodated.

"Gold medalists" from the general schools and technicums and veterans with awards and medals from their secondary schools and certificates of proficiency from their military service may be admitted to the institutions of their choice without entrance examinations. But when the number of such honor students exceeds the number of vacancies in a given institution both written and oral examinations are required. Among the students who pass the entrance examinations, priority for admission is given to veterans who pass with no grades less than "good" in their chosen fields and to students "who have passed the stage of practical work of not less than two years." Additional priority is given among this group to those whose applications for admission are in the same field as their practical work. Heretofore, students who passed the entrance examinations in the popular institutions but could not be admitted because of a lack of vacancies had been allowed to transfer to other schools: now such redistribution is not allowed except for students having awards from technicums. They are given the right to transfer, prior to the end of July of the preceding summer, to another institution if there is a vacancy in their field of specialty. Along with these priorities has come a general stiffening of entrance examinations, with particular attention being given to the demonstration of facility in the use of a foreign language.

In universities and institutes only courses in Marxism-Leninism, economics, dialectical materialism (which accounts for six to eight percent of attendance time), and one foreign language are required of all students. The remainder of each student's time is devoted to

general and specific requirements of his specialty.

Successful completion of the university or institute course does not lead to a formal degree, such as the B.A., but to a certificate. Degrees are granted, as in some other European countries, only upon the completion of postgraduate work and a thesis. Postgraduate students are of two types: the Aspirant preparing for the degree of Kandidat, and the Kandidat studying for the degree of Doktor. The requirements for Kandidat are lower than those for a Ph. D. in America, but higher than for an M. A. The degree of Doktor is awarded only for research normally requiring up to four years of work. Applicants for both of these degrees must be under forty and must have demonstrated pedagogical or scientific research ability. The universities and many of the institutes offer the training and research facilities for these degrees, but the degree itself is awarded by the Supreme Attestation Commission (VAK) of the Ministry of Higher Education after recommendation of the institution in which the work was done and a review of the record of the student. VAK also supervises appointment of degree holders and all other applicants to academic and research positions.

It is estimated that at least eighty percent of the students in the institutions of higher education receive stipends from the government. The amount varies with their subject field and their level of progress. Students in aeronautical engineering and nuclear physics, for example, receive larger stipends than those in medicine, and Aspirants and Kandidats are given more than first-year students. Maintenane of high academic ratings is a prerequisite for continuation of the stipend.

Extension and Correspondence Training

Soon after it assumed power the Soviet regime inaugurated special schools for the education of adults in order to reduce illiteracy, train technicians, and indoctrinate the older generation in Communist ideology. In more recent years night schools and correspondence courses have been maintained, not just for adults, but for the youth who were unable to continue their studies in the regular schools. Since World War II literally thousands of students have been enrolled in these courses, which have been offered on all levels of general education, from the senior-secondary through university, and in technical subjects. Such training is considered equal to that offered in the regular school system, though in general the quality of training has been inferior.

Numerous refresher courses and special training sessions are held for teachers, propagandists, technical workers, and the like by trade unions and party and government organizations. There are also special party schools for promising members, where two or three years of training are given in personnel management and problems of party operation as well as theory. Special industrial and managerial academies train outstanding workers in agriculture and industry for managerial positions. Advanced military and military-political schools offer specialized training.

Extracurricular Activities

The influence of the government and the party is brought to bear not only in the formal educational system but also in the organized after-school and extracurricular activities of the children and youth. There are many hobby clubs, largely of a technical nature, such as model airplane clubs, clubs for young naturalists, and electrical and radio clubs. All of these activities are given strong ideological overtones.

Of greatest importance, however, are the three organizations

which are adjuncts of the Communist party itself - the Octobrists (ages seven to nine), the Pioneers (ages nine to fifteen), and the Komsomol or Young Communist League (ages sixteen to twentysix). They provide many activities for their members - for example, hikes, games, and summer camps - together with such advantages as special rates for motion pictures, plays, and other attractions. The directness of ideological indoctrination increases with the age of the members, but all three organizations emphasize "combating of ideological neutrality" and "instilling into all youth Soviet patriotism, Soviet national pride, and the aspiration to make our Soviet State even stronger." In addition to training in discipline and ideology, Komsomol members have duties in the leadership of the younger organizations and generally are expected to play a leading role in the development of the "socialist society." Though many of the members do not join the Communist party, the organization is increasingly a steppingstone to it.

A standard school organization is the "student committee" of seven to fifteen members, elected by the students of grades five through ten. Its function is, in conjunction with the Komsomol and Pioneer organizations, to help the school officials maintain discipline, inculcate the proper socialist attitudes toward labor and property, and supervise performance of work assigned to the children. Discipline centers on adherence to the official "Rules for School Children," which incorporate all the virtues of diligence in study, punctuality, personal neatness, orderly behavior, politeness toward teachers and fellow students, respect for elders, unquestioning obedience to those in authority, and dedication and service to

society.

Parents' Associations

Through parents' associations the fathers and mothers of school children are drawn into participation in the administration of the schools and involved in the problems of both teachers and students. They may concern themselves with such questions as maintenance of school attendance, physical equipment of the school, scholastic problems of individuals and groups, and discipline—concerns not unlike those of the PTA in the United States. These organizations also provide a platform from which parents may be indoctrinated in the educational aims of the regime, not only in school policy itself but also in the proper direction of out-of-school activities of the children.

Evaluation

Evaluating the quality of an educational system is a difficult if not impossible task, for there are few absolute criteria. There are some elements that can be examined and compared to standards that have been generally accepted – for example, pupil-teacher ratios, textbooks, and availability of physical equipment – but in most cases all that is possible is to describe conditions as they exist, in contrast with other systems. Whether these conditions are "good" or "bad" must be determined in the context of the goals of the society in which they exist, for the success or failure of a system depends upon the degree to which those goals are accomplished. That the Soviet educational system is producing well-qualified scientific and technical personnel is amply demonstrated. In the achievement of the second and less specific of its goals – the creation of the "new Soviet man" – it has been far less successful.

Recognizing that a literate population was necessary as the base of an industrial economy and that the printed word was an effective medium for propaganda, the Soviet regime began immediately to expand the public school system for youth and adults. Definition of literacy is difficult, and even when it is defined as the ability to "read or write," as it was in the 1939 Soviet census, such questions as the level of comprehension of material read or the language involved remain unanswered. In Soviet figures it may be assumed that literacy generally means the ability to read or write the native language.

At the end of the nineteenth century, according to an official Russian census, approximately three-fourths of the population was illiterate. Official Soviet censuses show a literacy rate for the USSR as a whole of 51.1 percent in 1926 and of 81.2 percent in 1939. It is now claimed that illiteracy has been entirely eliminated. There is good reason to believe that the Soviet figures are exaggerated, but outside evidence at least confirms the contention that literacy has

advanced very rapidly.

Means and Facilities

Though no detailed statistics are available, the distribution of schools varies widely between urban and rural areas not only in numbers but in the grades included. Complete secondary education has been largely limited to the bigger urban areas. Smaller towns and larger collective farms might have a seven-year system, but many rural areas have offered four years of training at best.

Buildings and equipment are a continuing problem for the Soviet school system, but here again there is marked variation. While some urban schools have excellent buildings and equipment, others in rural areas or in less favored urban areas lack adequate space, heating plants, etc., and operate with little or no laboratory equipment. On the university level some institutions—the University of Moscow, for example—are show places, while others lack many of the essentials.

Plant, equipment, and quality of teaching in the engineering schools are directly related to the priorities given the industries for which they train personnel. Facilities are excellent in schools training for such key industries as aviation (including rocketry), communications, and electronics and for certain aspects of mechanical, civil, and chemical engineering. In areas with lower industrial priorities, such as agricultural machinery and light industry, school

facilities are considerably inferior.

Textbooks for the primary and secondary schools vary in quality and quantity. Many for mathematics, physics, chemistry, and grammar have not been revised for many years; others, such as those in biology and history, are revised so frequently to conform to the latest policy shift that supply is irregular and little continuity is possible. In general, distortion in science texts is at a minimum, while social science texts are strongly slanted to instill the "world view" of Marxism-Leninism in its current interpretation.

On the university level, textbooks for engineering are good in quality and quantity but for the social sciences are likely to be in short supply, again as a result of continual revisions required by shifts of policy. Texts in general science usually avoid the theoretical and, even in this field, the controversial; foreign works are used, however, to fill some of the gaps in the social sciences.

Methods of instruction in the primary and secondary schools vary from subject to subject, but all stress drill and rote learning of textual materials. The teacher is allowed practically no deviation

from the prescribed texts.

In general, the same techniques of teaching — lecture, seminar, laboratory, etc. — found in the United States are used in Soviet higher institutions, but in the USSR greater stress is placed upon specific assignments, both in regular courses and in "independent" study, the latter of which usually consists of assigned topics or problems and does not lead to the development of truly independent inquiry or to original research. Even if original work were encouraged, the extremely heavy study load carried by students would

severely limit the time that could be devoted to it. The somewhat facetious statement by a renowned Russian professor that the Soviet schools taught many useful facts but did not teach students to think contains a considerable degree of truth. Recent Soviet developments such as those in nuclear physics, however, show that such a charge must be made with reservations.

Content of Education

The most direct impact of the aims of the Soviet educational system is apparent in what is taught in the schools. The overwhelming technical emphasis in the curriculum is a response to the need for professionals and a technically trained labor force to serve the expanding industrial economy, a need that is increasing with ever greater rapidity. In general, the training in the sciences is good, though it is handicapped by the lack of laboratories and equipment and to a degree by the methods of teaching; ideological bias in this area is comparatively slight, though even arithmetic problems often have anticapitalist implications. It is undeniably true that the fundamentals of science are learned by the students; their ability to apply them to practical problems is, however, inadequate. The regime recognizes this situation and has been attempting to broaden the theoretical base of the training and at the same time to increase the amount of practical work experience of the students. This limitation is particularly true of the secondary school training; it is less applicable to that of the universities and institutes, though even there it restricts the quality of training to some degree and in some fields. There is no doubt among Western scientists, however, that the technical scientific work being done today by Soviet specialists and much of the theoretical research are on a par with those to be found anywhere in the world.

It is in the teaching of the social sciences that there is the greatest disparity between Western and Soviet practice. The success of the educational system in achieving the goal of a completely loyal, devoted, and indoctrinated citizenry has certain limitations. The Soviet definition of social science, in essence, is applied Marxist-Leninist theory and its current interpretations — in law, economics, history, and the other areas. The forcing of all data into this mold results in distortions and misrepresentations according to Western standards, but in "correctness" according to the Communist regime.

The controls and restrictions of Soviet social science at all levels of the school system are epitomized in the effects of the February 1956 demotion of Stalin and the attacks upon the "cult of the individual." History had been rewritten many times during the Stalin regime; sometimes the changes were gradual, sometimes sudden and drastic. The result was, however, an official version which had become relatively stable and presented Stalin as the embodiment of all Soviet virtues. Khrushchev's midnight speech made all texts and courses of study in history and related fields not only obsolete but "incorrect" by the morning. In addition it posed the problem of re-educating not just the students but the whole population in the new version of history.

Though this change and its related problems are considerably more dramatic and far-reaching than those that occurred before, comparable situations have always existed in the teaching of Soviet social science, and these alone would tend to produce uncertainties that would reduce the quality of teaching and research. Punishment for "deviationism" was such that rote learning methods would probably be employed to a greater extent than in the physical sciences, and original thinking and research stultified. The present regime has announced a relaxation in the restrictions on research and has been calling for greater "objectivity" in the evaluation of data. But it can be assumed that there will be restrictions; the definition of objectivity has yet to be clarified. Until at least a semblance of stability is regained, the quality of social science teaching will be low even by Soviet standards; whether it improves by Western standards remains to be seen.

Qualifications of Teachers

To a considerable degree, the quality of education anywhere depends upon the ability of the profession to attract able teachers. A number of factors are involved—financial remuneration, job security, working conditions, and status, as well as intangible personal satisfactions. On the whole, teaching is considerably less attractive for the Soviet citizen than a career in engineering, science, or medicine, but it ranks above skilled and unskilled labor and clerical work. Leading professors of the universities and institutes are members of the political elite. Despite the official emphasis upon education and the demands for improvement in the quality of teaching, however, the official status of the rank-and-file teacher is rather low. It is openly stated policy to assign outstanding university students to research, the less proficient to teaching. In the eyes of the people, however, the teacher generally holds an honored posi-

tion, particularly in rural areas where he is often regarded as a leader and adviser.

Official claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the average teacher in the elementary and secondary schools—generally a woman—receives less pay than many skilled workers, in many instances having to augment her salary with extra teaching or other jobs. Urban teachers receive higher salaries than those in rural areas, though the latter are entitled to free housing with heat and light—an emolument not always obtainable. The work load is heavy. In general, teaching is a relatively "safe" profession—that is, the teacher is secure from arrest. All teachers are, however, under constant supervision by school administrators, student organizations, and inspectors from outside the school whose primary function is to check up on the adherence to the course of study and the prospectus. Teachers in the social sciences are under closer surveillance than those in the natural sciences.

The largest proportion of Soviet teachers are trained in pedagogical institutes, though recent announcements indicate that a certain proportion of the students in the universities and technical institutes will be assigned to teaching their specialties in the senior-secondary schools. About twenty percent of the time in the curriculum of the pedagogical institutes is spent on political indoctrination—considerably more than in other educational institutions. Along with instruction in general subjects and in students' specialties are long, detailed courses in teaching methods—the use of textbooks, types of home assignments, and so on. Altogether, the training is considerably more rigid than that in other institutions of higher learning. Though the quality of teacher training is improving, it is not high.

Selective Factors in Educational Achievement

There are various factors that combine to make the completion of secondary school for special training relatively easier for urban, upper-income youth. The most important of these are availability of schools and economic conditions. As pointed out earlier, many rural areas do not provide more than four or at best seven years of training. Moreover, the distance from home to school and the lack of adequate transportation often stand in the way of attendance at rural schools. Children who desire training greater than that provided are forced to board away from home. This in itself is a financial strain on many rural families; but often they cannot even

afford to forego the labor and wages of any able-bodied member. The difficulties are not so great in towns and urban areas, but school expenses — books, supplies, uniforms (not generally required in rural areas) — constitute a considerable drain on the lower-income working classes, especially in the higher grades where the potential income of the youth would be a considerable asset. In higher education the cost is an even greater factor in selection. Though it is estimated that some eighty percent of all students in these institutions receive stipends or scholarships, in most cases these are not enough to cover all expenses. Despite the abolition of tuition in 1956, it is still necessary for advanced students to receive supplementary funds from their families. The heavy course load makes it rather difficult for students to work and carry the full curricular requirement.

Many students from rural areas have been inadequately prepared for entrance into the advanced grades of the ten-year school, so that, even though they are financially able to attend, they cannot pass the requisite examinations or maintain their performance. This is particularly true of the minority-language schools. A thorough knowledge of the Russian language is essential since there are relatively few senior-secondary schools and no higher schools that use any other language for instruction. The requirement of demonstrated foreign-language facility, in addition to Russian, also works a hardship upon the children of minority groups, particularly those in Central Asia and Siberia, for example, where the learning of Rus-

sian is itself a difficult undertaking.

It has already been pointed out that the Labor Reserve Draft is selective, taking first those young people who are repeating a grade or who are not in school or employed. These priorities, in conjunction with the limitations of availability of schools and of the economic factors mentioned above, make it inevitable that the majority of those drafted come from rural areas and from the lower economic groups in the cities and towns. Though quality of training given in these schools does not compare with that given in the general and special schools, it is probable that many of those who are drafted into the two-year course receive more training than would in any other way be available to them.

The military draft also is selective; students in higher education generally are deferred annually to the point of exemption, and students in certain specific technicums and institutes are exempt entirely—certainly an incentive for study in higher educational

institutions.

As the stringency of the academic requirements increases, other pressures are brought into action. Teachers in the secondary schools are said to be under considerable pressure to give preferential grades or even medals to the Komsomol aktiv. The Soviet press is increasingly critical of the use of political power and connections of parents to gain special privileges for their children in the secondary schools and institutions of higher education, though part of the criticism concerns the failure of these "gilded youth" to enter productive work upon completion of their training. Just how extensive this favoritism is cannot be determined, though the rather high rate of failures during the first years in the universities and institutes suggests that it is not unusual.

Charges of discrimination against ethnic minorities in admission to higher education are frequently made by outside observers. These are difficult to document or to disprove since they are often based upon refugee reports that the proportion of members of specific groups was very low in a certain university or institute. Unless detailed statistics are available on the proportion of that group in the total population, in the urban population, or among those eligible to take the entrance examinations, the charge cannot be evaluated short of an official statement of quotas in effect. The existence of separate schools for minority groups is not in itself discrimination, since non-Russians may enter the Russian schools if

they have the requisite language facility.

There is no doubt, however, that applicants for entrance to any of the institutions of higher education must pass through a rigorous screening in which their political and ideological purity is assessed. Komsomol activities would certainly be an asset, though not necessarily a prerequisite. Since higher education is designed to produce the elite of Communist society, it is unlikely that individuals or groups of doubtful lovalty would be accepted. It would thus be expected that it would be more difficult for individuals from ethnic groups that have resisted the Soviet regime, the Baltics for example, to demonstrate their reliability. It would also be expected that there would be differences among the various fields of training. Dedication to Marxist-Leninist principles is definitely of less importance in the case of a student with demonstrated abilities in physics or chemistry than to a specialist in the social sciences or an applicant for admission to the foreign-service institute or advanced internal-security schools. This type of selectivity or discrimination is basic to the Soviet system of education, though social origin is no longer an official criterion for admission.

Within the limits posed by such a policy and by the selective factors outlined above, ability is the prime requisite for the attainment of advanced training.

Attitudes toward the System

Eagerness for education among Soviet citizens is demonstrated not only in the increasingly large numbers who attend school and apply for admission to the universities and institutes, but also in the amount of reading done on subways, buses, and trains and in the various available libraries and reading huts. The demand for reading material is apparently insatiable. An important reason for this eagerness is the fact that education is the main avenue through which economic and social status can be improved. Within the limits set by requirements of ideological conformity, the greater the education, the more responsible the position and the greater the remuneration. To a considerable degree the Soviet educational system satisfies the desire for education, and rewards are given those who achieve it.

Among the minority peoples, however, educational achievement, particularly on the university level, is almost synonymous with Russification. Russian language, literature, and history are required courses in the elementary schools, and on the university level the instruction is almost all in Russian, even in the institutions of higher education in the various republics. The result is conflict between, on one hand, family loyalties and cultural tradition, and, on the other, economic and status advantages, plus other inducements offered by the Russian regime. It is also true that Russians are generally placed in the positions of greater power and authority in spite of the nominal equality offered by the regime. This, in effect, blocks the way for full realization of educational achievement for minority peoples.

It is probably that resentment over this fact is greater in those republics that were most advanced in modern education at the time they came under the control of the Soviet regime. Thus, although there may be dissatisfaction with the rewards of the educational system in Central Asia, the net gain that Central Asian peoples have experienced during some three decades under the Soviet regime would be greater than that of the Baltic peoples, who had an educational system of their own equal or superior to the Russian and who have lived under Soviet control for little over a decade. There

are, however, no adequate data to evaluate the discontent that exists as a result of this situation.

There is little evidence on which to assess general student attitude toward inequalities in educational opportunity in the USSR. It may be that the absolute increase in opportunity among many rural and non-Russian students outweighs any dissatisfaction they may feel concerning the greater difficulties and limitations they encounter. On the other hand, in areas such as the Baltics and possibly Moldavia, where opportunity has been restricted rather than enhanced or has at least shifted in orientation, dissatisfactions might be expected to be greater. Though favoritism toward the children of the elite may in general be shrugged off as one of the facts of life, in minority regions where such privilege is awarded to an unpopular elite made up of Russians or native Communists reactions may be strong. In those areas where the Komsomol organization itself is widely resented - as it is in the Baltics, for example there is likely to be greater resentment toward the preference given to Komsomol activists. But neither the extent nor the intensity of this resentment, if it does exist, can be determined.

The Soviet regime is undoubtedly well aware of the dangers inherent in educating its people, particularly in developing in them a facility for critical evaluation of information and theory. Constant ideological training is one method of combating this threat.

Yet there is some evidence suggesting that the very persistence and all-pervasiveness of indoctrination limits to some degree its effectiveness. Boredom appears to be the most common reaction to it, among students as well as the general population. Among advanced students there is an additional factor: they resent the time taken up by the required courses in Marxism-Leninism and dialectical materialism. With a very heavy work load, many object to attending classes and lectures and doing reading that they feel will be of no use to them in their professions.

Outside of the time required for these courses, students in the sciences and engineering generally are not restricted in their studies and investigations by the "line." By and large, the regime has operated pragmatically in the sciences, ignoring the ideological precepts when they did not jibe with actual experience in operation. In the social sciences and the creative arts, however, rigid conformity to the official position has been required, not only to the general theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but to the particular interpretation of the moment. To the more original and the more critical this con-

striction and the necessity for change in position to adhere to the current interpretation probably has been at least a source of annoyance.

No information is available with regard to possible desires of the student bodies for courses that are not offered, or for expansion of subject fields such as the social sciences to include various aspects studied in the West. Russian students may not generally be even aware of any lack, since such courses have never been offered. It is known, however, that the closing of departments of religion and philosophy in the Baltic universities heightened the resentment over the restrictions of academic freedom and expression that came with the Soviet system. Apparently the removal of religious instruction from the lower schools and the substitution of antireligious propaganda constitute a definite source of disapproval among the Baltic peoples, who find the school indoctrination system doubly objectionable because it was imposed through force by an unpopular power. A somewhat similar situation may exist in the other European border provinces that were incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II.

There are two other important points on which the impact of the Soviet educational system varies among the republics — nationalism and the education of women. Since the whole force of the system is directed toward Russification, groups that value their own history and tradition may well object to the tradition being subordinated to the Soviet educational pattern. And the policy of education of women is in direct conflict with the whole of the Moslem tradition. Though the regime has had some success in combating the educational and social subjugation of women, strong opposition still exists. In general, the girls in the Moslem areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia still receive far less training than their brothers.

It is impossible to assess the degree to which these sources of annoyance and irritation are converted into actual hostility toward the Communist system. It seems likely that, along with other circumstances, they have generated among the Baltic peoples anti-Soviet attitudes that have not been eradicated in the years that their countries have been under Soviet control. But the controls available to the regime are such that these sentiments, if they do exist, would be difficult if not impossible to translate into action. In other areas of the Soviet Union the young have never known any regime or political theory but the Communist. And it should be remembered that the regime has always encouraged criticism of the manner in

5. Attitudes toward the System

which policy was implemented, though never the basic policy. It may be, then, that much dissatisfaction with Soviet education is channeled into criticism of the way the system is working, not of the system itself.

RELIGION

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY WAS BORN OF THE industrial revolution and the accompanying wave of nineteenth-century rationalist scientific philosophy. Part of what has become the Communist faith is the belief that total reality is entirely susceptible to rational under-

standing and eventual scientific control.

As the dominant ideology of a totalitarian state, Communism must be inculcated in the minds of its citizens as "the only correct, scientific world outlook" through which all natural, political, and social phenomena can be understood without resort to God or any other nonmaterial force. The totalitarian Soviet state demands not only that the citizen view the world in its terms but that he look on the state as the living embodiment of the dogma. The state is conceived as the psychological refuge of the individual and the prime external object of his emotional commitment and devotion. In other societies these functions are identified more with religious institutions than with governments.

According to the Marxist view of history and the development of social institutions, religion is an instrument used by a ruling class to stimulate a positive allegiance of the masses to the rulers; it then serves as an "opiate of the people" leading them to accept the ruling order and the harsh realities of life, with promise of improvement only after death. After the overthrow of the tsarist government, the Russian Orthodox Church was viewed as a potential center of power

or allegiance independent of the Soviet government.

The Church had indeed become fully identified with the tsarist government, justifying and perpetuating the aristocracy and in the early days of the revolution openly calling for resistance to the Bolsheviks. But the Church had performed several other roles in the lives and development of the Russian people. It had helped to create, then expressed, the concept of a unified Russian "nation."

It had provided a link with the rest of Christendom. And it had provided an ethic controlling individual behavior. The assault upon the Russian Orthodox Church involved for the regime the same dilemma created by its initial assault upon the family: how to destroy an institution without also destroying the social stability traditionally maintained and reinforced by that institution.

Nevertheless, the Church was disestablished, and the institution and its adherents were subjected to a violent series of attacks which destroyed its officials and resources and intimidated its believers. A similar program was carried out in Central Asia, where Islam was part of an essentially theocratic prerevolutionary govern-

ment and a postrevolutionary independence movement.

By the beginning of World War II the regime had satisfied itself that organized religion, in contrast to religious ideology, was not a source of potential subversion. That it ever could become one is questionable. The Russian Orthodox Church, in contrast to the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, never sought equal authority with or dominance over the civil power. Sometimes a subordinated ally of the government, sometimes its servant, the Orthodox Church in Russia never became a rallying point against the tsarist or Soviet governments. This relationship was not true of some of the Islamic groups in Central Asia, however, nor of the Catholic and Protestant churches in the Baltic republics.

The regime, having destroyed what it considered the Russian Orthodox Church's threat to its political power, found it expedient during World War II to capitalize on the role of the Church as the historical symbol of a unified Russia and as an agent of social stability. Following the war the Russian Orthodox Church was allowed considerably more scope, and other religious groups also gained some concessions, but religious activity today is still a far cry from

what it was in the prerevolutionary period.

The tsarist government had maintained control over the Church, but, unlike the present regime, it also subscribed to its tenets. In contrast, the religions officially recognized in the USSR today constitute a useful, if unwilling, tool of contemporary Soviet policy. They present a façade of religious freedom to the world and, through their spokesmen, appeal for the allegiance of those in the outside world who have coreligionists in the Soviet Union. Internally, the extent of religious activity serves the regime as a useful barometer of the success (or failure) of its indoctrination and antireligious work. The more liberal policy toward religion also makes possible the formation of clandestine religious groups.

The Orthodox Church has by far the largest number of adherents of any faith in the Soviet Union. As the largest church of the dominant nationality group it receives more material benefits from the government than do other religious groups and is permitted more privileges. The second largest religious community is that of the Moslems, concentrated primarily in Central Asia. Protestants are a small but growing minority in the USSR as a whole and a majority in Estonia and Latvia. Roman Catholics are the dominant religious group in Lithuania. In various areas there are small numbers of Jews, Buddhists, and members of assorted Christian sects. Shamanistic practices are common among certain nationality groups in the north and are combined with Christian and Islamic practices in other areas in and outside European Russia.

The treatment of each of these religious groupings has varied somewhat, but the over-all pattern has been one of near-destruction, followed by a policy of controlled coexistence benefiting the regime. Although the intensity of antireligious propaganda and pressure varies, reflecting the government's tactical purposes, the schools, the press, the party, and the police continue to be ranged against any widespread revival of religion. Also on the side of the regime is the process of industrialization and urbanization. In the West, industrialization has until recently been accompanied by growing secularization and a corresponding decline in the importance of religious doctrine and observances to the individual. The same long-range

process seems to be at work in the Soviet Union.

At the present time the regime is caught in a dilemma of its own making. It is waging a campaign to wipe religion out of the minds of the people. At the same time it is permitting, for propaganda purposes, the performance of religious ceremonies, and this has led to the diffusion of religious knowledge and to the widespread observance in the countryside of religious holidays and festivals. The regime cannot take direct action against such activities without violating its much publicized principle of "freedom of religious worship" and perhaps even threatening the good will it has built up through relaxation of terrorist practices. The regime has not been successful in its efforts to take over some of the functions of religion - the injection of physical beauty and of meaning into life and the provision of an ideology which supplies a psychological cushion against the caprices of nature, disease, personal misfortune. and death. Most important, religion ultimately is a faith, and, for the believer, nothing can supplant it.

The Russian Orthodox Church

Adherence to the Russian Orthodox faith traditionally has been virtually equated with "being a Russian." The Church itself became an integral element not only of the concept "nation" but also of that nation's system of government. Inevitably, then, it enjoyed the most favored position in relation to other faiths.

The Church and the Tsarist State

The emperors of Byzantium had been "Defenders of the Church," duty-bound to combat heresy and spread the Orthodox faith throughout the world. As the "anointed of God," absolute obedience was due them, not only from the common people, but from all church officials as well. This position was adopted by the tsars of Russia.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the tsars had established a Patriarch of Moscow whose authority paralleled that of Constantinople. The supremacy of the government over the Church, however, was not confirmed in Russia without conflict, for the Church contained champions of the view that, as a vehicle of culture and an agent of moral control, it should be the ally and not the servant of

the government.

By 1665, Russian Orthodox practice had gradually been modified. In themselves the changes seem rather unimportant—such matters as making the sign of the cross with three fingers instead of two, correcting the Russian spelling of "Jesus," and banning shaving—but they were interpreted as evidence of the Western European influences to which the government was susceptible and were emotionally and fanatically fought by those who insisted that Russia alone was maintaining the true faith and must resist all corrupting influence from the outside. Patriarch Nikon, who gave the changes official sanction, stood fast, and the opposition broke with the Church to form the Old Believers sect, which condemned the involvement of the Church with the government. Remnants of the Old Believers still exist today, principally in western Ukraine and western Belorussia.

Fresh from his victory, Nikon sought to challenge the power of the tsar over the Church. He surrounded himself with Greek bishops loyal to himself. But the Russian clergy, seeing themselves displaced, supported Tsar Alexis who did not want his power threatened. Although Nikon was finally deposed, his reforms were preserved, though they were modest in comparison with the reforming effort made by the Roman Catholic Church under the

challenge of Protestantism in Western Europe.

With Nikon's threat in mind, Peter the Great consolidated the government's power over the Church by eliminating the Patriarchate: upon the death of the Patriarch Adrian in 1702, no one was appointed to replace him. In 1721 Peter created a Church Council or Holy Synod, appointing the members directly and requiring of them this oath: "I recognize and confirm with my oath that the supreme judge of this Holy Synod is the Emperor of all the Russias."

While the Church had had a somewhat independent administrative organization, including its own courts, it could now do nothing in this area without the prior approval of the tsar or his over-procurator, a layman who acted as intermediary between the Synod and the tsar. All acts of the Synod were promulgated in the name of the tsar. This subordination of the Church to the monarch

continued up to the 1917 revolution.

Encouraged by the government, the Church had accumulated vast tracts of land and many serfs. As Church wealth grew, most of it was siphoned off by the upper clergy. The village clergy were usually poverty-stricken, almost completely dependent for food upon what they could grow themselves and upon offerings from the peasants. From 1783 on, the only privileges they enjoyed were exemption from the poll tax and military service and use of a tax-free

plot of ground.

The division into superior and inferior clergy was an integral part of the ecclesiastical organization. The highest ranks were staffed with Black (robed) priests, those who had taken a vow of celibacy; they were originally recruited from all classes in the population. In the lower ranks were the White (robed) priests, who were required to marry before ordination, which prohibited their advancement to the Black priesthood. In rare instances a widowed White priest was permitted to enter the Black priesthood, According to ecclesiastical law, however, White priests were allowed to marry only priests' daughters, and, of their issue, the elder sons were committed to the priesthood; therefore, entry even into the lower ranks of the clergy became extremely difficult for those not born into families of priests. The White priests tended to have large families, for which they received a bounty from the state, but most of the younger sons had to turn to professions other than the crowded priesthood.

The White priest was the official record-keeper for his village;

he not only registered births, deaths, and marriages but also issued to each man conscripted for the army the required certification of birth date, parentage, and religious orthodoxy. From time to time he was required by the government to make special reports on such matters as the number of midwives in the village or the number of non-Orthodox persons; he also was asked to report on people or activities the government might consider suspicious. The role of official record-keeper placed the priest in a unique position to know about the comings and goings of individuals in his parish. The government made use of this knowledge by requiring him to report not only specific acts and intents against the government but also the general allegiance or disaffection of the people. Not even the confessional was excepted from this intrusion of the government into religion. Priests were ordered to inform against persons confessing evil intent against the government of the tsar, if they had not repented. (While it is very unlikely that a person plotting against or unsympathetic to the government would under such circumstances confess his feelings and acts to the priest, the permitted violation of the confessional does point up both the hold of the government on the Church and the type of activity on which the priest was expected to report.) If the priest found sectarian teachers - especially Old Believers - or self-styled holy men or dissident monks attracting a following within his parish he was to have them seized and sent to the diocesan authorities.

A bishop was in nominal charge of diocesan administration and had as aides a consistory of four or five priests and a number of lay officials. The lay officials dominated the consistory; its secretary was appointed by the Synod on the nomination of the over-procurator and was thus a direct appointee of the government. He was obliged to make periodic reports to the over-procurator on diocesan affairs and so functioned as a channel of information and a control agent.

Religious instruction was mandatory in both public and parish schools, on both the elementary and secondary levels. Generally, religious instruction was given by Orthodox priests or others approved by the diocesan authorities. In regions such as the Polish and Baltic provinces, the Crimea, and the Caucasus, where the inhabitants were neither Russian nor Russian-Orthodox, the teaching of the indigenous religion in the schools was permitted. Within Russia itself a few Jewish schools were permitted when warranted by the size of the population, and in the urban centers, generally, instruction of non-Orthodox children in their own faith was permitted upon request. No such provision applied in the rural areas, however. There all

religious instruction was under the supervision of Orthodox bishops. Formal religious instruction included the Christian precepts of humility, honesty, and justice, but much of the teaching was de-

signed to instill loyalty and obedience to the tsar.

As the Russian Orthodox Church was completely bound to the government and interested in maintaining the status quo, change, either in religious or secular affairs, was not to be countenanced. Although the Church had been the refuge of a few intellectuals of the fourteenth century, it later lost its attraction for the intelligentsia because of such tactics as enjoining students in the theological academies to write theses on noncontroversial subjects. Despite the aesthetic appeal of its service, its architecture, and its icons, the Russian Church never gave rise to great artistic or philosophic traditions. It was never seriously challenged by other religious views and never underwent the kind of self-analysis and reform such challenges engendered in the Christian religion elsewhere.

Religion and the People

The Russian Orthodox faith was superimposed on a "pagan" religion which had grown out of a basically agrarian society dependent upon the fortuities of its natural environment. This indigenous Slavic religion was pantheistic, based upon the worship of gods personifying natural forces — thunder, the sun, the earth, etc.; the worship also included dragons and wood nymphs, who must be placated through magic-religious rites. Vladimir the Great, ruling at Kiev, had the statue of Perun, the god of thunder, thrown into the Dnieper and forcefully converted his "heathen" subjects.

The Orthodox service is a dramatic and colorful ritual, and, according to legend, it was these elements which attracted Vladimir to Christianity. He had sent out messengers to bring back reports on the religions of neighboring countries; only those who visited Constantinople (the seat of the Greek Church), returned enthusiastic.

saying, according to a chronicler:

Then we went on to Greece, and the Greeks led us to the edifices where they worship their God, and we knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth. For on earth, there is no such splendor or such beauty, and we are at a loss how to describe it. We only know that God dwells there among men, and their service is fairer than the ceremonies of other nations. For we cannot forget that beauty. Every man, after tasting something sweet, is afterward unwilling to accept that which is bitter, and therefore we cannot dwell longer here.

The service of the Orthodox Church provides little participation by the congregation, but even in many of the small parishes a well-trained choir was the pride of the village and churchgoing itself provided rare beauty in an otherwise drab and bleak life. For the peasant, the ritual was that part of the faith of which he was, initially, most conscious. Even a dissolute priest could be excused if he was able to perform the ritual without a mistake. Indeed, the training of a White priest consisted largely of mastering by rote the complex litany in Church Slavic.

Much of the older pattern of magical practices was equated with the practices of the Orthodox ritual. The use of holy water for prophylactic purposes achieved wide acceptance among the people. Relics were especially revered, and the preservation of the body after death was taken as evidence of the incorruptibility of spirit (preservation of the bodies of Lenin and Stalin in a Red Square shrine visited by 200,000 pilgrims each month seems to be a Soviet

response to this tradition).

Many monasteries possessed "miraculous" icons (stylized half-length portraits or figures of Jesus, Mary, or a saint) said to have healing or other magical properties. Such icons had often been "discovered" either buried or hanging on a tree by a monk who had received instructions in a dream. News of the discovery would travel far and bring many pilgrims to the monastery. One such icon, the Smolensk Madonna, was carried by the army in its campaign against Napoleon in 1812.

The ancient belief in the "evil eye" and the ability of some persons to put a "hex" on others (still prevalent, according to reports in the Soviet press) also was equated with Orthodox belief—the evil power became that of Satan, with holy water and the cross as the effective means of exorcism. Certain rivers, lakes, and trees were visited and worshiped because an icon "not cut by human"

hands" had been found in or near them.

Religion became an integral part of peasant family life. Icons were placed in a corner of the home facing the door, and anyone entering bowed and made the sign of the cross. Before and after meals a similar ceremony was performed. On special feast days a small votive lamp was lit before the icon. After the revolution the icon was taken down and a picture of Lenin hung in its place; later a picture of Stalin was added, and often the icon was hung between the two portraits. Former Soviet citizens report that it is not uncommon today in peasant households for an icon to be hung in the traditional corner, but under drapery or other camouflage.

Religion permeated the life of urban middle-class families as well. A curtain was drawn down over the icon when a couple intended to have intercourse, and sexual abstinence was practiced on the nights of Tuesdays (eve of Wednesday, which was dedicated to the Holy Virgin), Thursdays, and Saturdays, as well as on the eves of all holy days during Lent. Among both urban and rural people the icon was covered during intrafamily quarrels, or the participants were asked to go outside the house.

Birth was celebrated by the rite of chrismation (eight days after the birth of the child), which combined baptism and confirmation. Relatives or neighbors served as godparents, and the mother was forbidden to attend the ceremony, though she could join in the festivities following the church service. The godparents did not assume a special responsibility for the child, but they usually maintained close ties with its parents. At chrismation the child received a name, usually derived from the name of an Orthodox saint, and the religious holiday dedicated to that particular saint became the name day of the child. In the past, the name day was given more importance than the actual birthday; today, the regime prefers that the birthday, because of its lack of religious overtones, be emphasized but the traditional name day observances continue, especially in rural areas.

Church holidays were tied in with ancient agricultural feasts. The most important of the religious holidays were and seem still to be: Christmas (December 25); St. Basil (January 1); the Epiphany (January 6); Shrovetide; Easter; St. Thomas' Week; Trinity Sunday (the fiftieth day after Easter); St. George the Bringer of Victory (April 23); St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker (May 9); St. John the Baptist (June 24); Elijah the Prophet (July 20); the Intercession of the Mother of God (October 1); and Saints Cosmo and

Damianus (November 1).

In addition to these, there were many local holidays in honor of particular patron saints or of miraculous events held to have occurred in or near certain villages. In traveling from one end of Russia to the other it was possible to join in a religious holiday at some village on each day of the journey. In some areas this is still true; a sergeant of militia detailed to keep order in Kirov was quoted by *Pravda* as follows:

Believe me, I haven't slept for four days. . . . We are on duty to prevent disorders. They had just finished celebrating "Immersion Day" on Kikoye State Farm when "St. John's Day" came. Now it's "The Holy Virgin of Tikhon," and then they will

probably go to Dulepovo to celebrate "St. Peter's Day." Then will come "The Holy Mother of Kazan" and after that the "Feast of the Assumption."

The religious holidays were (and seem still to be) much-anticipated interruptions of a monotonous, difficult existence. Preparation for the more important holidays would begin weeks ahead of time: home-brew was made, special foods were purchased and prepared, the church was cleaned, and so on. On the holiday, visitors streamed into the village, for here was an opportunity for distant relatives to get together and for those who had left the village for work in the cities to return and renew their ties.

Once the mass and other rituals were over, feasting and drinking followed. The holiday from work extended over several days — often ending only when all the liquor in the village was gone. In the towns traveling gypsy shows or small circuses enhanced the carnival atmosphere. The recreational aspects of church holidays were as important to the people as the religious rituals, and today, in those areas where the ritual holidays no longer are observed, the old festive activities have been transferred to the celebrations of such events as the arrival of tractors or the completion of some important agricultural task. The regime is consciously promoting this transfer, so as to rob all celebrations of their religious connotations.

Since very little money trickled down through the hierarchy to the village priest, money and food were collected by the village to pay the priest who officiated at the holidays. Holidays aside, the priest constantly was forced to haggle with the peasants over rates for christenings, marriages, and other religious offices. If he was allotted land in the communal holdings or given some by a local landlord, he would have to induce the peasants with drink or some incentive other than money to work it for him. The circumstances under which he lived gave rise to the expression, "Am I a priest to eat two dinners?" and to others of a similar character. "Having a priest's eye" was a common characterization for a covetous person.

Not all priests, however, fell into disrepute; there are many stories of village priests who were much revered and considered saints by the peasants in their charge. And even when the attitude toward the local clergy was not entirely favorable, it was not, in the great majority of cases, carried over to the Church itself, or to the tsar.

It is easy to exaggerate the significance of a partially dissolute priesthood. The Russian peasant could ill afford to become disillusioned with the one institution that gave meaning and color to his life. His concern with the church service was with ritual, not didactics or personalities. His church offered him beauty, God's support in his trials, the example of the saints in his humble and difficult road in life, the solace of confession, and the promise of everlasting life after death. The Orthodox faith allowed the peasant to see both the hardships of his lot and the temptation to stray from the virtues of humility, love, and justice (held up to him since birth) as provocations of the Evil One seeking to deprive him of his birthright, salvation.

Orthodoxy also was seen as an essential part of being Russian. Anathema was declared on unrepentant Russian political and religious deviants, for the Orthodox dichotomy between the forces of good and evil was a strict one, allowing no compromises; but, in contrast to the Communist position, the Church did accept those who had "strayed" and repented. The pre-Christian religious tradition which had personalized natural forces gave special strength to the Orthodox personalization of the forces of good and evil: the Russian Orthodox version of a line in the Lord's Prayer is "And lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from the Evil One."

The Church also became integrated with the social system in which land was held by the community (the mir) and allotted to families as they needed it, and in which high value was placed on allowing others what they needed to live. The Church built on this communal principle, teaching a concept of group responsibility as well as the Christian principle of individual equality before God. Thus it came to be understood as an expression of the unity of all its members, all being responsible to each other and to God. This concept of group responsibility or sobornost' placed the priest, all other church officials, and the landlord on an equal plane with the peasant in the eyes of God. The priest was there to aid his congregation in its union with God rather than to act as an intermediary between the members and God.

Confession in the Orthodox Church differs from the Roman Catholic practice, being far less personal: the priest, not the penitent, names the sins; the penitent kneels and simply responds, "Yes, Father, I have sinned and repent." The emotional catharsis and relief provided by confession is indicated by the proverb, "If you do not sin you cannot repent," while the concept of sobornost' tended to make sin communal so that for any individual there was always something to repent. Today, with relatively few churches open, it is reported that this ritualistic confession is administered on a mass basis, the priest naming the sins and the congregation as a whole

giving the appropriate response.

The doctrine of unity and collective responsibility closely paralleled and supported the communal orientation of the mir, and reflections of this orientation can be found in contemporary Soviet life; for some the "iron laws of history" and the party replace God and the Church as symbols and expressions of group responsibility. Similarly, the traditional value of ritualistic confession has been made an integral part of the political system of the regime. The regime has also attempted to capitalize on the Church tradition that Russia possessed the true faith, destined to spread throughout the world; it has sought to make the Russian Church the center of the Orthodox world, as an adjunct to its major effort of instilling belief in the inevitable spread and victory of Communism throughout the world, with Russia as the center.

The Assault upon the Church

As an institution, then, the Russian Orthodox Church was integrated into the control mechanism of the tsarist government. It strengthened allegiance to the tsar and made holy the devotion of the Russian to his motherland. It reinforced the concepts of family and community responsibility, unquestioned obedience to authority, and a world split into forces of darkness and light. It asserted the existence of a single and absolute truth. Its emphasis on submission to authority and conduct that accorded with the Christian ethic worked for social stability. But its structure was swept away by the revolution, leaving the new regime the task of finding a substitute for the Church's ethically and psychologically stabilizing function.

The legal and economic base of the Church was hit first. On December 31, 1917, registration of births, marriages, and deaths was assigned to local government agencies. In January the Gregorian calendar was made official—replacing the Julian calendar of the Church. More significant to the status of the Church, on February 5, 1918, the separation of Church and State was officially declared. From that date on, no church or religious society could own property or inherit under a will, and the "compulsory collection of payments and assessments for the benefit of church or religious societies" was expressly forbidden. Religious instruction for laymen also was forbidden in all public and private educational institutions, and restricted to the family.

Church property was nationalized (actually the peasants had

already taken over the church lands); monasteries and nunneries were dissolved; taper factories, which had provided an alternate source of church income, were nationalized; the government refused in principle to exempt priests from military service. A program of

antireligious propaganda was instituted.

In 1929 the Constitution of 1924 was amended to provide solely for "freedom of religious conviction and antireligious propaganda." The activities and financial base of the Church were further restricted, and church attendance was made sufficient grounds for dismissal from the Communist party. In 1930 and 1931 the antireligious campaign was intensified and many members of the clergy were condemned along with other "enemies of the state."

In 1936, as part of a general program to strengthen the family and restore some of the discarded social controls on conduct, there was some slackening of restrictions. The Constitution of that year gave the clergy the franchise and various privileges already accorded to citizens generally. It essentially carried forward the 1929 constitutional amendment which allowed freedom of worship but accorded the right to propagandize only to antireligious groups.

The government assault was renewed during 1937 and 1938, the last few years of the "Great Purge," then pressure was again relaxed; by 1939 local workshops were permitted to manufacture religious articles. In 1940 the seven-day week, with Sunday as a day

of rest in name at least, was officially restored.

Coexistence

World War II forced the regime to exploit every possible resource at its command for victory. The authorities evidently decided that despite government assaults the Church still remained a unifying national symbol. The Church called on all citizens and believers to defend Russia; the regime reciprocated by appealing to all "Godloving inhabitants of the occupied countries" to rise in defense of religious freedom and against the Germans, who, it said, menaced the very existence of Christianity. The regime's Society of Militant Godless, established to combat the Church on dogmatic grounds, was disbanded. God had been called on by the regime in the name of "Mother Russia." Acting Patriarch Aleksey called Stalin "the divinely appointed leader of our military and cultural forces." The Church collected over 300 million rubles to aid in prosecution of the war and did much relief work, especially in caring for orphans. On occasion, entire divisions of the army received a religious blessing.

At the war's end a cleric was appointed to the Extraordinary

Commission for Investigation of War Crimes — the first appointment of a priest to a Soviet government post. All who had cooperated with the Germans were excommunicated by the Church. In 1942 a Council of Russian Orthodox Affairs was created to act for the government in its relations with the Orthodox Church (a separate council was established in 1944 to handle relations with non-Orthodox groups). The council is reminiscent of the Over-Procuracy established by Peter the Great to maintain tsarist control over the Synod.

Little information is available on the activities of the Council, but it does maintain political and financial control over the Church. It is rumored in Orthodox Church circles in the United States that the Council is composed largely of former police officials and former officers of the prewar Society of Militant Godless. Many defectors have reported that they and their acquaintances believe that frequently the officiating priest at a church is a member of the political police. This belief has also been reported in the Baltics regarding the affiliation of some of the remaining Catholic and Protestant clergy.

In 1945 the Church was authorized to acquire, build, or rent church buildings, and local administrative units were obliged to assist in repairing and improving such buildings. Church taxes were lowered, and the tolling of church bells was permitted. Two theological academies had been opened by 1943, and there are now eight seminaries. Publication of religious books was resumed, and a monthly periodical, the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, with a circulation of ten thousand copies, appeared. In the summer of 1956 a new

Russian Bible was published, the first since the revolution.

Such concessions have been extended almost exclusively to the Orthodox Church, which, as in prerevolutionary days, stands in a favored position in relation to other religious groups in the USSR. Officially the regime has given no reason for this. But the power of the Orthodox Church also has been useful to the regime in its relations with Balkan and Near East countries that have branches of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The regime has sponsored visits by church officials to Jerusalem, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.

While consistently fighting against religion, ideologically, politically, and economically, the regime has also taken the trouble to bring into the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church some of the religious groups it is attempting to destroy. For example, the Georgian Church — personnel, doctrine, and ritual (except for some local variations in ritual in the Georgian highlands, where St.

George is revered with Christ) — has been reincorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. In the western Ukraine and western Belorussia, the Uniate Church, which was Eastern Church in rite but recognized the supremacy of Rome, was forcibly brought under the domination of the Moscow Patriarch. Since the Uniate Church in these areas was also identified with nationalistic movements, the destruction of it as a separate entity has been the source of much bitterness against the regime.

The Orthodox Church, with government support, has thus moved to establish itself as the center of the Orthodox world—a "Third Rome" in competition with Constantinople and, especially, with Rome. Through such activities the regime seeks to appeal to the Orthodox faithful in many lands and to gain, among other things, a "Church voice" with which to counter the anti-Communist position

of the Roman Catholic Pope.

Other Christian Groups

The Roman Catholic Church

Roman Catholics constitute a majority in the Lithuanian SSR and in that part of the Latvian SSR which, like Lithuania, was under long Polish rule. Most Poles who have remained in the western parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia are also Catholic. The number of Roman Catholics in Russia proper is unknown, but is undoubtedly very low. The Roman Catholic Church has been severely attacked and suppressed by the Soviet regime because of a number of factors, among them the allegiance of Catholics to an outside power, the Pope in Rome; the Church's international opposition to Communism; and the very influential program of Catholic Action carried out in Lithuania prior to Soviet annexation.

In its treatment of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania the Soviet regime followed the basic pattern established toward the Russian Orthodox Church, and with greater justification by its own lights, since the Catholic Church was a potential source of subversion of the regime. The extensive holdings of the Church were confiscated; Church organizations were suppressed and forced to pledge that they would desist from teaching religion both publicly and privately. Although the local population did not turn against the churches and priests, as had happened in many other localities in the USSR, Russian troops and officials brutally murdered a number of priests and vandalized churches. The series of mass deportations

to remote areas of the Soviet Union, which took place in all the Baltic countries, stripped these countries of religious as well as political leadership. According to unofficial reports, only one priest out of every five former clergy remains in Lithuania (there were approximately 1,600 Catholic priests in 1939), while only one

seminary, at Kaunas, is still open and training priests.

In addition to measures of repression and outright violence, the regime is conducting its standard atheistic propaganda campaign through the press, schools, party, and the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Party members, teachers, and others holding responsible positions are forbidden to attend or take part in religious observances. Nevertheless, a religion that was so imbedded in cultural tradition will not die rapidly. Recent reports in the local press indicate, for example, that members of kolkhozes take time to participate in religious pilgrimages and celebrations, often with the concurrence of the kolkhoz chairman. Komsomolskaya Pravda has reported:

. . . there is not a single district Komsomol committee in the republic [Lithuania] that has not investigated the personal affairs of Komsomol members who attend church. But except on rare occasions the Komsomol officials fail to see the forest for the trees — they do not detect, behind the personal affairs of Komsomol members, the weakness of their own atheistic propaganda among young people.

The article goes on to note that "the power by which the priest attracts young people to church derives from time-hallowed traditions: the solemnity of the marriage ceremony, the stern magnificence of the Mass, the brilliance of the festivals"—all elements for which the regime is unable to supply substitutes at the present time.

There is no question that Communist policy toward the Roman Catholic Church is one of a number of policies and actions that are deeply resented by the people. This is especially true in the rural areas. But the Church as an organized, effective institution has been destroyed. Individual priests may still be rallying points for at least passive resistance to the Russians, a role also played by the priests in the preceding century, but lack of information makes this largely a matter for speculation.

In line with Soviet foreign-policy interest in maintaining a semblance of religious activity for the outside world to view, there have been, since 1948, Soviet references to a National Lithuanian Catholic Church. This organization is evidently sponsored by the Soviet re-

gime, and from time to time an official of the Church is quoted to the effect that there is religious freedom under the Communist regime. Nothing is known of the number of adherents the new organization has attracted, or of its relations with the priests remaining in the country.

Protestantism

Protestantism has exhibited greater growth in recent years than any other religious group. The Lutheran Protestants in Latvia and Estonia represent a significant majority of the population in these areas. Prior to sovietization, the Lutheran Church in these Baltic republics engaged in wide political and educational as well as religious activity, though not to the degree that the Catholic Church did in Lithuania. In both Estonia and Latvia the Protestant churches worked through the Christian-Democratic party. In Estonia, during the early period of independence, religious instruction was made both free and compulsory. Although the Church was officially disestablished in 1926, it retained its own courts, whose decisions were upheld in the lay courts. In Latvia the Church received small state subsidies, and in both countries the Protestant churches established a tremendous volume of literature — approximately twenty percent of all books published.

The Protestant churches in these countries, like the Catholic Church in Lithuania, being identified with nationalistic political movements, were subjected to the same cycle of repression, violence, and "re-education." By 1954 it was reported that in Estonia only thirty of the previous two hundred and fifty Lutheran clergymen were still serving the church. The figures for Latvia spell out much

the same picture.

The other major Protestant sects represented in the USSR are the Evangelical Christian Baptists, directed by an All-Union Council, and the Seventh Day Adventists. The Evangelical Baptists officially claimed four million adherents (1952) and three thousand churches throughout the USSR. In a recent criticism of the quality of the antireligious activities carried out by various party organizations, the regime cited the Evangelical Baptists as a religious group that has had a remarkable growth in the number of adherents, especially among young people.

The number of Seventh Day Adventists is unknown, but there is some indication from scattered Soviet press reports that its demands on its adherents, including abstinence from life's smaller luxuries and a ban on radio listening and attendance at public "en-

tertainments," serves to isolate its members from the larger society. In effect it cuts them off from much of the regime's propaganda, but does not substitute any ideology which might impel open hostility or action against the regime. It may well be that this group tends to attract individuals whose personal reaction to the economic, social, and political pressure of the Soviet system is to withdraw from a painful situation.

The Armenian (Gregorian) Church

There are approximately one and a quarter million Armenian inhabitants in Soviet Armenia, but it is impossible to learn the number of practicing or ideological adherents to the Church. Historically, however, the Armenian Church has been the symbol of Armenian nationalism and group identification for Armenians throughout the world, and remains so today.

Traditionally, Christianity was supposed to have been introduced into Armenia as early as the second century and was made the state religion in 301 a.d., considerably before the introduction of Christianity into Russia proper. Being Apostolic in origin, the religion was introduced without the intervention of any organized church, and the Armenians thus have maintained an autonomy from the other Christian churches. Historically, other Christian groups, notably Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics, have claimed supremacy, but this is repudiated by orthodox Armenians. Outside the USSR there is a schismatic Armenian Church which observes the Eastern rite but also recognizes the supremacy of Rome.

The Armenian Church has been conservative in its doctrine, recognizing none of the dogmas promulgated by Ecumenical Councils since 432 A.D. It does not limit eternal salvation to its own members but extends it to members of other Christian Churches who also recognize the dogmas established by the Ecumenical Councils prior to 432 A.D. Although this is true of certain other Christian Churches in principle, the Armenians feel their Church has main-

tained an unusually tolerant attitude.

Organizationally the Church has two principal Catholicates; one at Echmiadzin in Soviet Armenia, the other, formerly in Cilicia but since World War I at Antelias, near Beirut, Lebanon. While neither Catholicos is subordinate to the other, the Catholicate of Echmiadzin has traditionally been the spiritual center of the Church; the Soviet regime, in its desire to influence the faithful throughout the world, has encouraged this claim on the part of the Echmiadzin hierarchy. There are also several patriarchates in vari-

ous parts of the Near and Middle East. Like the Russian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Church has two groups of clergy, a higher, celibate group, and a lower, married clergy. The higher offices of the Church can be held only by the celibate clergy. Except for a few brief periods, the Armenian Church never abandoned the democratic tradition that was once also part of the Russian Orthodox Church. Church offices are elective, the priest by the congregation, the bishop by the priests, and so on. The Catholicos is elected by an assembly to which each diocese elects one priest and one lay member. Under the tsars the assembly elected two candidates and submitted their names to the tsar, who confirmed one as Catholicos.

Prior to the revolution the Church built up enormous holdings from individual contributions and provided the only school system for Armenians. The Soviet regime, following its usual pattern, confiscated all Church property and separated the Church from the State. Officials were persecuted and the regime attempted to establish a "free church" to compete with the Armenian Church. By World War II, however, the regime decided it was advantageous to make use of the Armenian Church, and it has maintained, at least in form, the traditional democratic election of Church officials.

Islam

According to official Soviet claims, the Moslems constitute the second largest religious group in the USSR, with thirty million adherents and twenty-five thousand mosques. Unofficially, the number of adherents is estimated as fifteen to twenty million, the majority of whom live in Central Asia – the Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tadzhik SSR's. In addition, there are a substantial number of Islamic peoples in the Caucasus. For purposes of religious administration the regime has followed the tsarist practice of dividing the Moslems into four geographic groups, the largest of these being the Moslem Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan with headquarters at Tashkent. Other divisions are the Moslem Board of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia (center in Ufa. Bashkir ASSR); the Moslem Board for North Caucasus (center in Buynaksk, Dagestan ASSR). Each of these boards is headed by a mufti "elected" at a Congress of Moslems. The manner of choosing delegates to these congresses or the qualifications of the muftis appointed are not known. Inevitably, however, the congresses close with a series of pro-regime, antiwestern resolutions which are broadcast by the regime to the Moslem world.

There is also a Grand Mufti at Ufa. Traditionally the center at Baku has been and still is allotted to the Shia sect of Moslems. The schism between the Shiites and Sunnites dates from a conflict in the seventh century A.D. over the successor of Mohammed. The Shiites, or "partisans of Ali," hold that Ali (cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed and male next of kin), chosen as spiritual and temporal leader of Islam, was murdered by Sunnites. The Shiites refuse to recognize his successors, who are revered by the Sunnites. They believe that the Imam, a divinely appointed leader, will arise as a successor to the prophet Mohammed. This Imam will be infallible and his word will be sacred. There have been twelve Imams, the last dving several centuries ago but still considered by the Shiites to be the Imam of this age. The Sunnites do not share this belief, and there is traditional enmity between the two sects. In contrast to Persia, the majority of Moslems in the Soviet Union are Sunnites. Some of the Iranian-speaking mountain peoples in Central Asia are Shiite, as are the majority of Moslems in Azerbaijan; Shiites are also found among the Kurds.

Also represented as a Moslem sect in Central Asia are the Ismailites. This group is a subdivision of the Shiites, differing from the main body of Shiites in that they recognize only the first seven Imams. The Ismailites recognize the Aga Khan as their spiritual

leader.

Despite doctrinal differences, the community life of Shiite and Sunnite people is basically the same. All Moslem sects subscribe to the five major duties or tenets of Islam; verbalization of faith, prayer, the giving of alms, fasting, and the making of pilgrimages. Prayer takes place five times each day: before dawn, at noon, in midafternoon (when a stick casts a shadow its own length), after sunset, and after dark. While the carrying out of the predawn and postsunset prayers are possible within the privacy of the house, under Soviet conditions it is especially difficult for the daylight prayers to be performed. The regime has maintained its antireligious policy against Islam, and those who stop work to pray are subject to charges of sabotage for stopping the flow of production or interfering with agricultural activities.

The giving of alms was one of the sources of economic support for Islam before the Soviet regime took over Central Asia and the Caucasus. Many wealthy people had made donations of land to the mosques, which rented out the land for a fee or a share of the crop. Prior to the revolution, religious organizations were the largest landed proprietors after the state itself. The mosques also provided education through schools attached to them —the *maktab*, the primary school, and the *madrasah*, the intermediate school — supported by the revenue from land owned by the mosque. Soviet sources have estimated that twenty-five percent of the children of

Central Asia attended the maktab prior to the revolution.

With the separation of religion from the state under the Soviet regime and the ensuing collectivization, the mosques lost their land and have since been dependent upon small donations from individuals and direct financial or service aid from the state. Most mosques and all religious schools were closed. It is not known how many mosques have been reopened since the end of World War II. Prior to the war former Soviet citizens reported that local religious leaders or mullahs were almost unknown and that the few remaining were working as peasants on collective farms, ministering to their followers in their spare time only.

The duty of fasting is also difficult for believers to carry out today. The major period for fasting is Ramadan (ninth month of the Moslem lunar year). During this entire month adherents must abstain from all food and water during daylight hours. The believer is allowed to eat after sundown, however, at which time there is much feasting, overeating, and visiting between families. During Ramadan the regime usually intensifies its antireligious activity. Typical of the material in this connection that appears in the local press is the emphasis upon the economic destructiveness of fasting:

As a rule, the fasting period coincides with the period of intensive agricultural work. Of what use can a collective farmer worn out by fasting be in the field?

The regime does not limit its activities to the publication of propaganda. Often during this period meetings are held with employees of state institutions, who must demonstrate under the watchful eye of party officials their freedom from religious "bias" by partaking of the tea, cake, and cigarettes offered them. On occasion children in the schools have been offered food during this fast period, and tremendous social pressure is brought to bear on them and their parents to break their fast.

As a force, a guide for action and belief in the community and in the family, Islam in the USSR seems to have been strongest among those people with a traditional sedentary agriculture. Thus, in the Caucasus and among the Uigur, Uzbek, and Tadzhik the antireligious activities of the regime are a source of real resentment.

Among the peoples who were primarily nomadic, Islam was a relatively recent acquisition and was never more than an overlay on pre-Islamic customs. These peoples, the Turkmen, Kazak, Kirgiz, and Kara-Kalpak, never were strict Moslems and evidently do not feel as strongly about Soviet restrictions on religious practice; however, their entire fabric of life was disrupted when they were forced to give up their nomadic life.

As part of their religious duty, all Moslems who can afford to do so are required to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Given Soviet restrictions on travel, this is clearly impossible for most Moslems in the Soviet Union. The rank-and-file believers substitute a trip to one of the many local holy places, usually tombs, scattered throughout Central Asia. Underlying Moslem practice throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus are remnants of a cult of ancestor worship, apart from the Moslem celebrations, as well as the practice of shamanism.

Islam is not only a body of religious belief and ritual; associated with it is a set of cultural practices and beliefs. It is toward Islam as a culture which "militates against modern progress" that the Soviet regime has been most hostile. While not all groups have veiled their women, all have had some practice, such as bride price, veneration of the family line and clan, or child marriage, against which the regime has inveighed, and many of these cultural practices survive. The Five Pillars of Islam - faith, prayers, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage – are crumbling. Obstacles are put in the way of prayer. Religious leadership and schools have been destroyed, so that few of the new generation can even learn the prayers. Fasting is extremely difficult under the harsh work schedule imposed by the regime. The giving of alms seems also to have died, there being little to give. Pilgrimages must now remain primarily local. Thus, religious ritual seems to have diminished considerably; but the cultural tradition of Islam still remains. To the extent that faith may be equated here with the observance of some cultural tradition or can be said to survive simply through nominal identity of the individual with a religion, then faith seems to remain, but it has certainly diminished in intensity.

The regime somewhat mistrusts Islam, feeling that culturally, and to some extent politically, the Moslem peoples of the USSR are bound up with their coreligionists in the outside world. Yet there is little to indicate that the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic sentiments for which the regime is ever on the watch are an important element

in Central Asia today. Despite its professed fear of such movements, the regime is willing to use their appeal externally to strengthen its position in the Middle East.

Judaism

It is difficult to separate the regime's treatment of Jews as a religious group from consideration of them as a "nationality." Prior to the revolution the Jews were by law confined to a "Pale of Settlement" which ranged from the annexed Polish territories, such as the western areas of Belorussia and the Ukraine, to the Crimea. Even in these areas they were generally forced out of the rural areas into the towns and cities. They were kept out of public office and denied access to Russian schools, though in many places they were allowed to form their own schools. Thus, over a period of time the Jews came to be looked upon as a distinct ethnic group, and now, with the establishment of Israel, they are even more suspect in the eyes of the regime because of their "international Zionist allegiance."

Unlike other religious groups in the USSR, the Jewish community does not have a titular head or ruling council, a fact reflecting both its traditional lack of unified organization and the scattering of Jews throughout the country. The rabbi of the Moscow Central Synagogue, however, has acted as spokesman for the Russian Jewish community and has been so recognized by the Soviet regime. Some concentration of Jewish believers is found in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Georgian republics, and in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Judaism, like other minority religions, has been subjected to continuing suppression and adverse propaganda, though there has been some relaxation in recent years. The number of adherents in the USSR today is unofficially estimated as three million; actually, this figure appears very high, even for the total number of citizens who are considered to be Jews regardless of whether or not they still follow their traditional religion.

The Russian Orthodox Church officially upheld the position of the tsarist government in its treatment of the Jews, on the ground that Judaism was a religion whose adherents had caused the crucifixion of Christ—a prejudicial reasoning still to be found among many Russians. There is also a persistence of the belief, especially in the rural areas, that Jewish ritual periodically calls for human sacrifice. While the Church maintained its stand on religious rather than racial grounds and did accept Jews who were converted to the

Orthodox Church, the mass of the population, as well as the clergy, were generally anti-Semitic and participated in periodic pogroms against the Jews. From time to time the Soviet regime has made use of this underlying prejudice to divert attention from itself, a notable example occurring in 1953 when it exposed what it termed

a plot of Jewish doctors against the life of Stalin.

The regime seems to have relented somewhat in its policy of suppression and reportedly has given permission for the opening of the first seminary since the revolution for the training of rabbis. In addition to the lack of training facilities, the viability of the Jewish religion in the Soviet Union has been severely threatened by the shortage of prayer books and a prohibition on the teaching of Hebrew, both essential to religious service and maintenance of tradition. American rabbis who have been in Russia recently have reported seeing proofs of a photocopy edition of a new prayer book. Despite this liberalization, Jews who refuse to work on religious holidays are, like others, severely penalized.

Generally most congregations are Orthodox, as compared to the great variety of Conservative and Reformed groups in the United States. Such traditional practices as circumcision, use of kosher food, and celebration of a boy's coming of age have been banned—or are impossible to carry out because of the group's difficult economic situation. The interest of the younger generation

in Judaism seems to have decreased significantly.

Buddhism

Only two of the many ethnic groups in the Soviet Union are or were Buddhist—the now liquidated or transplanted Kalmyks, and the Buryat Mongols in the Baykal region. The Kalmyks fought against the Bolsheviks in the civil war and were dealt with harshly after the Bolshevik victory in the lower Volga area. The usual antireligious campaign was carried out; monasteries were closed; and church leaders were arrested, exiled, or executed. When, according to Khrushchev, "at the end of December 1943 . . . the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic" was deported "from the lands on which they lived," the religious leadership had been destroyed for at least ten years. Nothing is known as to how much of the faith and practice had been retained.

The Buddhist of Buryat Mongolia did not undergo such harsh treatment. Prior to the revolution the lamaseries were in a sense maintained by the indigenous people, since almost every family had a relative whom it supported in one of them. The lamaseries were centers of learning, arts, and education, and served as medical and trade centers as well. The regime, concerned as it was with wooing the Buddhists of Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and India, moved very cautiously against Buddhism in Buryat Mongolia. Lamaseries continued to function and the head lama retained his position, though not without making some concessions to the new regime and giving it at least his nominal blessing.

In 1930, however, the regime instituted a campaign against the "relics of feudalism," placed many lamas on trial, and began to close the lamaseries. This repressive policy was continued up to the beginning of World War II, when the regime relented in its policy toward all religious groups, finding them useful in mobilizing the loyalty of the population. Following the war a Buddhist Religious Board was created, functioning under the government-controlled Council on Cults.

The Buryat Buddhists are members of the Yellow Hat sect and owe allegiance to the Panchen Lama. Information regarding the number of nominal or practicing adherents or the number of remaining religious centers is not available. It should be noted that for most of these people Buddhism was an extremely thin veneer overlying shamanism.

Shamanism

Shamanism as a religion is quite different in character from all the other religious groupings discussed here in that there is no organized doctrine, ritual, or priesthood. It is essentially a tribal religion centered around ritualistic propitiation of spirits who control illness, weather, the fertility of the soil and of the herds, and the plenty of the sea. The shaman is a religious leader who while in a state of trance or ecstasy is "possessed" by one of a number of possible spirits who inhabit the world. He learns a body of magico-religious rites from the spirit or from some other shaman who has received the "call." These rites consist usually of songs which are sung to the accompaniment of a drum or tambourine and which force the spirits to do his bidding. He may go into a trance during the ceremony. Since the spirits may be called upon to work for good or evil, the shaman is both respected and feared and his influence in the community extends beyond "religious" matters.

Shamanism is practiced by a large number of small herding and fishing tribal groups in Siberia and the Arctic regions. It is found side by side with Buddhism among the Buryat and is also present among Islamic groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus. There are local variations in the appellation of the shaman as well as in the ritual he performs, but the basic characteristics described above are

always present.

Since shamanism is not an organized religion in the usual sense and does not have any international connections, the regime has not waged any program specifically against it. Russians tend to look on it as an extremely "primitive" belief, which will eventually be wiped out through increased education. On occasion the regime has acted against specific shamans who opposed the introduction of modern medical practices.

The Clash of Dogmas

Although useful to the regime as a force for social stability and a propaganda and diplomatic front to the outside world, the religions extant in the USSR represent faiths which compete with the Marxist-Leninist dogma. Recognizing that this conflict of dogmas could not be eliminated simply by destruction of churches and mosques, execution or exile of religious leaders, the closing of religious schools, or the persecution of adherents, the regime in 1925 founded the Society of Militant Godless. This was a mass-participation organization whose function was to educate the people, especially the youth, away from the "superstitions" of religion. It was first composed of youth groups organized in factories and schools and eventually spread to the youth on the growing number of collective and state farms throughout the Soviet Union.

In addition to publishing an enormous number of antireligious tracts, the Society supplied lecturers to all official meetings in factory and fields, organized mock religious processions, especially on religious holidays, and opened antireligious museums depicting the "falsity" and "cruelty" of the Orthodox Church. Similar exhibits directed against Islam were organized in Central Asia. The demonstrations were especially exciting activities for young Russians, representing a rebellion against tradition within a carnival atmosphere reminiscent of old religious celebrations in the Russian villages. They were not, however, so readily accepted in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Linked with the antireligious campaigns was a propaganda program tailored to meet local "needs." In Central Asia, for example, an appeal was made to the women to escape from religious restrictions. The "greed" of the mullahs and other religious officials was stressed, as was the close relationship between religion and prerevolutionary ruling groups. Among the northern peoples, however, religious forms were utilized to spread the "Word," and Stalin was introduced as a kind of "super shaman" who would exterminate all the evil spirits. In Russia proper early efforts of the Society to re-educate the proletariat through open debate with the priests were quickly stopped because the priests' arguments and ability to quote Scripture too often left their young antagonists on the losing side. To educate their propagandists, the executive bureau of the Society of Militant Godless organized correspondence schools and workers' antireligious universities. Paralleling the former organization for religious training of the Orthodox Church – seminaries to train village priests and theological academies to prepare the upper clergy - the correspondence schools were for the "lay" members of the Godless Society, while the universities offered scholarships and trained an elite of full-time Godless professionals.

The efficacy of this program is very questionable. In 1937, for example, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* published the following letter from someone who had taken the entire course of antireligious propa-

ganda:

We repudiate the writings about God and we assert that there was not and there is not any such person. This fact has been established on the basis of scientific data concerning the origin of man as well as the origin of the universe. But what interests me is another thing: Do sorcerers and conjurers really exist and what is the power they possess by which they corrupt people and transform them into swine, dogs, etc? You may perhaps deny this, but these are facts.

When the Society was disbanded at the beginning of World War II, its head, Yemelyan Yaroslavsky, summed up the unsuccessful outcome of his work when he commented, "It is impossible to build up Communism in a society half of which believes in God and the other half is afraid of the Devil."

As the quotations above make clear, the regime lumps together religion and "superstition," especially for propaganda purposes. But it implicitly recognizes the tenacity of "superstition" in the "line" taken toward religion by the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, organized in 1950. While the Godless Society was a mass-participation organization, counting at one time six million members, the new Society has a smaller base

of approximately 327,000 members, more than half of whom reside in the RSFSR. The All-Union Society stages no "Godless parades" but works through the schools, the party, and party publications—its approach being essentially didactic. The Society does not confine itself to the subject of religion. It not only must destroy religious belief and superstition but is now required to offer a positive replacement: general education and the doctrines of Communism.

The clearest indication of a changed approach is to be found in the treatment of religious officials. Before World War II, priests were regularly characterized as "enemies," potentially disloyal to the regime and the Russian people, even though the party had cautioned since 1932 that "it is necessary carefully to avoid giving offense to the religious sentiments of believers, which only leads to the strengthening of religious fanaticism." This caution was seldom observed; the Central Committee of the party felt it necessary to decree after the war:

All the more is it stupid and harmful to cast political doubt on Soviet citizens because of their religious convictions. . . . The majority of clergymen, as the facts testify, now take a loyal stand with respect to the Soviet regime. Therefore, the struggle against religious beliefs should be regarded now as an ideological struggle of the scientific, materialist world outlook against an antiscientific, religious world outlook. . . . The Communist party, which bases itself on the only correct, scientific world outlook — Marxism-Leninism — and its theoretical foundation, dialectical materialism, cannot adopt an apathetic neutral attitude toward religion, an ideology which has nothing in common with science.

Where the autocratic tsars justified their power through the concept "the annointed of God," the Communist leaders legitimize theirs through a series of complex ideological postulates. Power and policy are justified as being "in step with history." The only method for analyzing the direction of history is the dialectic; a correct interpretation of history can only, then, come from the high priests of Communism.

As the regime apparently sees it, the "superstitious" population will not be convinced of the utter "correctness" of the party if the people do not acquire some understanding of the "rational scientific methods" used to prove this correctness. There is, then, an emphasis on "scientific education" of the masses. Technical workers, such as agronomists, are expected to give antireligious talks as part of their regular duties in the countryside. An agronomist is told that he can

refute belief in the existence of God by lecturing on the scientific principles of plant biology; he usually finds himself unequal to the task and is forced to request a special instructor in such matters—

usually to the party's displeasure.

The regime faces a number of such difficulties. Since it often shifts policy to meet the exigencies of the moment, its theme of being in step with the inevitable movement of history is sometimes hard to maintain. But since the masses have not been "sufficiently educated" to understand the dialectic, they must take its basic truth on faith. When fully internalized, this faith, like any other, should provide an emotional cushion against the often harsh realities of living under the Soviet regime. Such a faith, however, is extremely difficult to proselytize, since its rewards, to be obtained in this life, often do not appear and it offers no solution to the emotional problem of death. The emphasis of a material paradise on this earth neglects the psychological and aesthetic appeal of religion. The regime is not blind to this aspect and has pushed its local youth groups to organize colorful competitive festivals on religious holidays. In Lithuania, for example, it has "suggested" that the folk festivals from which many religious holidays derive be celebrated, and that the marriage ceremony itself be performed with appropriate songs and dances but without the religious element.

This playing with a tradition associated with religion creates other difficulties, since even leaders in the Godless movement seem to develop extremely ambivalent feelings about religion in the area of aesthetics. In commenting upon one such professional lecture,

Komsomolskaya Pravda reported:

They also deliver a lecture called "The Truth about the Great (Kursk) Icon." This goes into great detail about how and where the miracle-working icon appeared, according to legend, and about its history. But when the lecture turns to the present day, stereotyped sentences begin to follow one another in unvarying order. . . . There is no passionate conviction, no convincing explanation of how costly to the collective farms are those days when believers spend fieldwork time walking behind the icon.

Similarly, in a published interview the director of Leningrad's Museum of Religion and Atheism waxed more enthusiastic about "the remarkable collections of Chinese religious images . . . rich displays of Russian icon paintings" than about the propaganda purposes and effects of the exhibit.

Thus, the mastery of the intellectual complexities of Marxism-

Leninism results for a few in an emotional experience equivalent to faith; but for most of the people the result is simply ambivalence. The Russian peasant both before and after the coming of Christianity made pilgrimages to sacred lakes in order to insure better crops; today, according to the Soviet press, students from universities and secondary schools make similar pilgrimages in the hope of obtaining better grades which will enable them to become engineers or scientific workers. Such practices, down to the level of patronage of fortunetellers and palmists, indicate a view of reality quite different from the official one.

The regime also runs into difficulty by condemning religion while trying to preserve the ethical code espoused and taught through religion for centuries. With the possible exception of shamanism, all religions in the Soviet Union teach a kind of ethic which is necessary if there is to be stability in the society. The regime has sought to teach much the same codes (bereft of supernatural sanction) at the same time that it condemns as a "force of darkness" the institution identified with them. The party works — as did the Orthodox Church — to instill obedience to authority and also "is striving to make schools teach children lofty moral qualities: discipline, honor, justice, love of work, a striving for knowledge, a careful attitude toward public property." This now is "Communist morality."

Within a culture, relations between adult individuals do not usually need to be carefully and laboriously spelled out since knowledge and general adherence to the accepted code is assumed, once the individual is "trained" during childhood. The rulers of Soviet society, however, very often feel it necessary to completely technicalize social relationships — through a maze of laws, decrees and regulations — far beyond the point represented by the civil and criminal laws in other societies. This, perhaps even more than evidences of survival of religious faith, provides a significant measure of the failure of Communist doctrine and exhortation to recreate the individual in the Soviet image.

ART, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE

Despite transfer censorship and repression, Russian intellectual life in the second half of the nineteenth century experienced a remarkable upsurge. Though the conditions for an advance in science were less favorable in Russia than in the West, a scientific tradition which emphasized quality of scholarship had begun to evolve. Under the aegis of a flourishing Academy of Science (founded in 1725) many branches of learning made noteworthy strides. Numerous Russian scholars in the natural and social sciences won worldwide recognition. This period also witnessed a unique artistic—particularly literary—flowering. The works of nineteenth-century Russian poets, novelists, and playwrights, ranking with the greatest of all time, possess unparalleled beauty and vigor. The Soviet regime, then, inherited a relatively young but vibrant intellectual and artistic tradition.

Tsarist censorship had been negative in the sense that it attempted to prevent intellectuals from saying certain things but did not positively prescribe what they had to say, thereby permitting a margin of personal freedom. In contrast, censorship during most of the Soviet period has been positive; under the Communists there are a number of things that must be done, said, and thought—and with at least some show of enthusiasm.

The Communist party regards itself as the custodian and interpreter of ultimate truth. As related to science or any other aspect of life, truth in the Soviet Union has become what the party decides; and, while the party must theoretically derive its decisions from the writings of Marx and Engels as interpreted and modified by Lenin, the party leadership is subject to no check on further interpretation. "Truth," as revised in party pronouncements, fluctuates, and one of the tasks of the Soviet scholar is to "corroborate" the "truth" of any given moment.

The artist has a similar obligation. In the words of a Soviet critic, "Artistic truth is the ability to tell everything necessary, but to tell it correctly, that is, from a definite Bolshevik point of view." In the eyes of the regime, art is a weapon, an instrument for molding the minds of men. The concept of "art for art's sake" is alien to official thinking. And what the party demands from art goes far beyond mere conformity; art should not simply follow the "line," but should be an effective exponent of Communist ideas.

The impact of ideological controls on Soviet science and scholarship has not been the same in all fields. The physical and mathematical sciences have been least affected by political interference. A conflict between Marxist ideas and certain concepts of modern science (the quantum theory of physics, Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy) has not hampered actual research. Progress in such fields as physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology is maintained at an accelerating pace. The regime has given generous support to the development of the physical sciences and poured immense grants into laboratories and experimental equipment. Although the principle of practical usefulness is an important criterion in appraising scientific research, the emphasis is not entirely on practicality. Soviet mathematicians and physicists, for example, have made outstanding theoretical contributions in their fields. The physical and mathematical sciences have absorbed the best scientifically inclined minds in the Soviet Union; Soviet accomplishments in these disciplines have been of the first rank.

The biological sciences, however, and especially genetics, have suffered greater damage from the ideological aims of the regime. Here, political authorities have been more concerned with the applicability of Marxist-Leninist theories and have exercised greater control over actual research. Lacking the technical training to distinguish between scientists and impostors, they have sometimes permitted charlatans to dominate a field. In particular, Soviet geneticists, at least until recently, were not free to expose quackery in their discipline. Even so, resourceful scientists in the biological fields have found ways of masking independent research. They have, in some cases, made formal obeisance to Marxism-Leninism, superficially complied with the programmatic aims of the regime, and produced results on their own. The contributions of Soviet scientists in certain biological disciplines other than genetics have been substantial.

The social sciences have been harder hit by party controls and are more suffused with ideological doctrine and the myths of Soviet

society. Nevertheless, as compilers of scientifically pertinent data, Soviet social scientists have done important work. Historical documentary material has been systematically and voluminously published. The study of material culture has been enriched by large-scale and fruitful archaeological excavations. Valuable information on the impact of industrialization and urbanization on non-Russian national and tribal groups in the Soviet Union has been collected by ethnographers. Similar contributions have been made by other social scientists in their respective fields. Much of this, however, is little more than a collection of raw data. It is extremely difficult for the Soviet social scientist to discuss any general theoretical conclusions that might conflict with ideological postulates.

The arts have suffered most under Soviet political controls. Here, perhaps more than in any other field of endeavor, survival has depended upon the individual's ability to keep in touch with, and stay ahead of, the changing pulse of the party line. Scores of figures, including some of great distinction, have disappeared from the Soviet artistic scene for failing or refusing to conform to chang-

ing political dictates.

The party has attempted to deny the creative artist the freedom to select his own subject and treat it as he desires, and has restricted the area of human experience that he can reflect in his work. In spite of these constraints, individual artists have in some cases succeeded in producing works of originality and value within the formal limits of political restrictions. On occasion, some have been able to concern themselves with purely artistic problems within the framework of a political or social theme. This kind of compromise is difficult for the artist, and there is evidence that he frequently feels hemmed in by the suffocating atmosphere of enforced conformity.

The best works in Soviet arts and letters were produced in the years when intellectual activity was relatively free from political regimentation, during the 1920's and again during World War II. Much of the remaining part in the vast volume of Soviet artistic and literary work, produced in the spirit of official demands, is of little literary merit. Those responsible for the bulk of Soviet "literature" are the craftsmen and skilled journalists chiefly concerned with making a livelihood out of writing, rather than the literary artists. Their work is mediocre and dull — a judgment which is made by Soviet citizens themselves. Russians, in particular, are quite sensitive to the contrast between prerevolutionary and Soviet artistic achievements. They exhibit a pronounced preference for their nineteenth-century classics (which consistently outsell current products) and

for the works of foreign authors. Apparently, a great many Russian citizens look to their nineteenth-century heritage for aesthetic satisfaction as well as for a humane, sensitive, and personal concern for

the problems, suffering, and dignity of man.

The artistic and intellectual life of non-Russian nationalities in the USSR is governed by the regime's nationality policy, which requires that their cultural activity be "national in form" but "socialist in content." Non-Russian ethnic groups are permitted to retain their national symbols and forms; their energies, however, must be directed toward Soviet objectives. Accordingly, the larger part of contemporary artistic expression in the minority republics conforms to standard Soviet patterns. The local color may vary, but the themes glorifying Soviet life and achievements are the same throughout the USSR.

The survival of national symbols and traditions among many ethnic minorities has, however, helped to preserve their sense of national identity and continuity with an indigenous cultural past. The regime faces the constant danger that these national sentiments may take anti-Russian forms. It attempts to make the national heritage of non-Russian groups serve its own purposes by continually reinterpreting and distorting local historical traditions and cultural achievements so as to support the vision of a multinational Soviet society held together by indestructible, fraternal ties of friendship and brotherhood. But the Soviet press frequently considers it necessary to denounce non-Russian Soviet writers who, turning to native traditions for inspiration, have invoked national

loyalties the regime finds politically disturbing.

Many Soviet artists and intellectuals deeply resented the enforced cultural isolation of the Stalin era and his death in 1953 revived hope that their work at last would be subject to less rigid political demands. A considerable relaxation of controls has, in fact, occurred. For the first time since the 1920's, notable figures in contemporary Soviet arts and letters have spoken out in the name of artistic freedom and autonomy. Directly or by implication, Soviet writers have made known their desire for less political interference in their work, for at least a partial abandonment of compulsory ideological norms, and for greater contact with Western ideas, authors, and modes of artistic expression. The limits of the present relaxation have not as yet been defined, and the artist or scholar today does not quite know how far he can go in expressing what he wants to say in his own way before he offends political sensibilities. The uncertainty of the present was caught in a satirical

scene, printed in *Izvestia* in which the manager of a theatrical establishment complains that local political critics now tend to reserve their judgment on the production of new plays:

Remember how it used to be? They'd arrive. They'd watch the performance. During the intermission they'd start telling us what to change, what to cut out, whom to replace. At least you knew where you stood. Now you don't know where to look for directions.

Ideological Control of the Humanities and Sciences

The imposition of ideological controls on Soviet intellectual activity was a gradual affair. In the 1920's there was much ideological controversy within the party itself, and comparatively few general precepts on the "proper" approach to science and scholarship were established. During the first ten years of the regime, governmental and party authorities offered little direct interference in the work of Soviet scholars. Nevertheless, many scholars, primarily in the humanities, were faced with a militant Marxist philosophy which denied any value to many of their previous contributions and

challenged some of their basic ideas.

With the beginning of the first Five Year Plan and mass collectivization (1929), Soviet science and scholarship were more closely integrated with the aims of the regime. Many fields became subject to strict political discipline. During the 1930's a network of research agencies, scientific organizations, and institutes were organized around an expanding Soviet Academy of Sciences, which, in time, came to embrace all fields of intellectual endeavor within its scientific horizon. An elaborate and unprecedented system of coordinated and centralized research in the natural sciences, technology, and the humanities was created. Social scientists were vigilantly watched; many were accused of deviation from the official Stalinist orthodoxy. Entrenched within the Academy, party agents busied themselves with the gargantuan problems of ideological control.

A relaxation of party controls over intellectual life took place after the outbreak of World War II. At the same time, the war also placed new tasks before many Soviet scholars. With the official revival of nationalism, scholars rediscovered heroes of the past and reconstructed history to justify new myths that would reinforce social unity and the Soviet political system. The scholar also was encouraged to study the cultural tradition and scientific achieve-

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ments of the Western allies, and many interpreted Russian history as an integral part of Western civilization and popularized the theme of cultural cooperation in the past as well as the present.

Tight ideological direction over intellectual activity was reinstalled after the end of hostilities. In 1946 a series of party decrees on ideological matters unleashed a fiery campaign to subordinate intellectual expression completely to political needs. The spirit of the Grand Alliance had released an intellectual fever in the Soviet Union which Stalin apparently considered politically intolerable. Individual scholars had openly expressed doubt as to the adequacy of ideological orthodoxy in dealing with reality, and thereby touched

upon the very foundations of the Soviet regime.

The former tendency to treat Soviet science within an international framework was denounced. Western intellectual achievements were condemned. The scientific heritage at the disposal of the Soviet scholar was acclaimed as the result of indigenous Russian development; there followed a mounting list of Russian "firsts." The scholar was faced with the task of repenting old mistakes while carrying on his research. Many were attacked for keeping aloof from the party's ideological dicta, for succumbing to "bourgeois influences," and for "cosmopolitanism" — recognition of the international character of science and the arts. The attacks concentrated on one field at a time. Philosophy was the initial target. Economics was next in line. Then, successively, the attacks fell on law, biology, physiology, physics, and linguistics. Scholars and scientists, in addition to pursuing their normal studies and research, were expected to help sustain the Soviet social order and its myths.

After Stalin's death a loosening of constraint again became visible. In the general climate of greater security and relaxation, Soviet intellectuals at times have exhibited an increasing sense of personal independence. But there have been vacillations, as in the various stages of the Pasternak affair, in the new policy. Under Khrushchev, the party continues to insist upon its right to hand down the "line" on intellectual and artistic questions. Although criticism is at times permitted and past excesses denounced, Soviet intellectuals are constantly reminded of the limits of their freedom.

Philosophy

Held within the bounds of dialectical materialism, the study of philosophy in the USSR is probably more stultified than any other branch of learning. Since for the Communist all important truths concerning the universe, logic, and human conduct, were established by Marx, Engels and Lenin, there is little left for the Soviet philosopher of today but a scholastic discussion of the minutiae. The Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is made up largely of diamatchiki (purveyors of dialectical materialism), while the journal Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) is given over largely to such nonphilosophical questions as the existence of vegetation on Mars or "Military Questions in the Works of N. G. Chernyshevski."

Soviet authorities themselves have been aware of the barrenness of philosophical study. There have been recurrent attacks on "scholasticism," on dissertations that take refuge in quoting Leninist scripture, and on nonphilosophical writing under the rubric of philosophy. But, at the same time, Soviet specialists in philosophy are urged to be active in instilling Soviet patriotism among the masses, and to engage in other activities that could scarcely be

called philosophical.

In later years of the Stalin regime, when the Institute of Philosophy was headed by G. Aleksandrov, certain deviations from orthodox Leninism began to appear, with apparent approval of the authorities. There were studies of formal (as opposed to dialectical) logic; and the question was raised as to whether the "superstructure" of a society — which, by Marxian definition, includes those phenomena which result from the economic "base" — cannot reciprocally influence the base itself. Such discussion gained considerable currency between 1950 and 1954, but in the latter year these deviations were denounced and Aleksandrov himself was demoted.

A more encouraging trend is indicated by the fact that the study of foreign, non-Marxist philosophy has recently been promoted in the press. Bacon, Montaigne, Locke, Montesquieu, Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel are being published in the USSR, many of them for the first time. It is still too early to say what form the new studies will take, but even if treatment is limited to refutation the move certainly represents a broadening of interests. Up to the present, however, it can be said that theoretical physicists and mathematicians in the USSR have come nearer to making philosophical contributions than have the "philosophers" themselves.

Historiography

Professor M. N. Pokrovsky, a rabid foe of the spirit of Russian nationalism, was the chief exponent of the determinist theory of history taught and upheld during the early years of the USSR. By 1929 he was absolute dictator of Soviet historical writing, and even

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as late as the time of his death in 1932 he was given the highest honors.

Determinist history found itself at odds with the new attitude accompanying the first Five Year Plan. Determinism could not explain the kind of initiative necessary to establish socialism in a backward agrarian country. So, in 1936, the dead Pokrovsky was denounced as a "vulgar determinist." Historians, led by Stalin in his Short History of the Communist Party (1938), brought back to history the role of individual will. Thus they have been able to glorify as history-makers the heroes of Russia's past.

As a by-product of Stalin's posthumous demotion, there has appeared a shift of emphasis on the "role of the masses" in history. The chief editor of *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), Anna Pankratova, who once hailed Stalin for having "extended the limits of Soviet history by fifteen hundred to two thousand years," took the lead in demanding a "truthful" anti-Stalinist approach in historiography. Stalin's *Short History*, publicly criticized by party leaders,

is now being revised.

Historians have recently been castigated for "ignoring the influence of progressive Western European thought on the development of historiography in Russia." Scholars have been given freer access to materials in archives. The insistence on Russian priorities in inventions has been dropped. At the same time the tsarist past is being reassessed — and will probably undergo several rewritings. The concept of two Russias, one "progressive," the other "reactionary," is being popularized. Readers are being reminded that traditional heroes such as Alexander Nevsky or Peter the Great, though contributing much to Russian development, were also servants of their "class" and stifled popular uprisings. Tsarist imperial annexations are still considered "progressive," but native resistance to this imperialism is not in all cases viewed as "reactionary."

As a result of these changes many Soviet historians do not quite know where they stand. It is clear that the regime is not asking for dispassionate history but is rewriting the past to bolster its own status. The outlines of this operation, however, are not yet clear. Nevertheless, individual historians have voiced a demand for more honest scholarship, and some have already been rebuked for

excessive zeal.

Economics

Soviet economic thinking and teaching, as might be expected, have been subject to rigid controls. Nevertheless, American economists who have recently visited the USSR were impressed with the caliber of some of the research economists at the Institutes of Economics. They also commented that professors in the financial-economic institutes (corresponding to American business schools) are realistic and informed on practical problems concerning Soviet industry and agriculture. Economic departments in the universities, however, were found to be staffed with inferior teachers and most of the students are mediocre. A great deal of the work of Soviet economists is confined to the compilation of economic data.

Party authorities acknowledge this weakness and recurrently accuse the economist of shunning theoretical studies. The Soviet press repeatedly complains that economists have as yet not produced (1) a theoretical study on economic planning, (2) a theoretically significant study of the development of the Soviet economic system, (3) an adequate, systematic treatise in political economy, or (4) a methodical study of present-day capitalist economy. Official criticism places great emphasis on "theory" and "theoretical work." When the economist is criticized for "the low theoretical level" of his research, however, he is actually accused of failing to adhere to official ideological stereotypes and maxims.

Despite political restrictions, there is evidence that individual economists do attempt to explore their field creatively. A notable example of this is the case of E. S. Varga, a leading Soviet economist, whose book *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War* (published soon after the war) was denounced in 1948 for a "bourgeois-reformist" approach. Varga's basic thesis was that postwar capitalism had been fundamentally altered as a result of the war, and he asserted that capitalist governments had the power to postpone or mitigate economic crises. This position conflicted with the then current Stalinist view that economic disaster in the West was imminent.

In a series of debates on Soviet economics, which took place in 1948, Varga was called to task for certain heresies. He countered with a remarkable defense of his position:

Of course, it is painful that I, a party member, should be berated, in my old age, in the organs of the press. . . . I cannot follow advice and admit all the criticism of my work to be correct. This would mean that I am deceiving the party, hypocritically stating, "I am in agreement with criticism," when I am not in agreement with it. . . . I will honestly admit much of what I am criticized for, but there are things I cannot admit.

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Varga then questioned the adequacy of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in explaining contemporary economic reality. "The world changes," he declared, "and the content of our work must change also." He admitted that he accepted the general truths binding on all Marxists, but added, "All these things, comrades, can be carried to absurdity if they are simplified too much."

Eventually, Varga recanted in full. Admitting that his "prolonged delay in admitting mistakes" had been harmful, he officially embraced in 1949 the then orthodox thesis that the downfall of capitalism was imminent and inevitable. Recently, however, the party line retreated from that extreme position. Soviet theoreticians now maintain that a new economic crisis in the West will not destroy

the capitalist system.

A great deal of factual material which had hitherto been analyzed outside the scholarly world "in secret" has been placed at the disposal of economic experts. Translation of foreign works on aspects of the Soviet economy is being encouraged. Soviet economists have been told to avoid "the old quotations, formulas, and principles." The Communist party's Central Committee has even announced that the official edition of *Das Kapital* by Karl Marx contained "serious faults" and would be revised.

Psychology

Psychological theory in the USSR is a matter of high public policy, and reflects those underlying values of society the regime is interested in maintaining. Changes in the Soviet study of psychology accompanied important shifts in the character of Soviet education and in the official conception of the individual, the society, and the state.

Soviet psychology developed after the revolution along deterministic Marxist lines. Man was viewed as primarily the product of his material environment acting on his biological heredity. As a result of this materialistic emphasis, the psychologists relied greatly on physiology, a field in which distinguished work had been done in Russia before the revolution, notably by Pavlov. The doctrines of the postrevolutionary generation of Soviet psychologists closely resembled those that were concurrently developed in the West. In the Soviet view, the new "socialist" environment would in itself educate citizens properly without elaborate institutional intervention.

A radical revision of deterministic notions in Soviet psychologi-

cal theory took place in the early stages of the first Five Year Plan. Soviet leaders had found it necessary to forcefully alter the economic foundations of society and by intervention from above make a major change in the environment of its citizens. A new role was needed for consciousness and will, and Soviet psychological writing gradually supplied it, producing a new conception of Soviet man. At the same time Soviet psychological theory stressed the need and responsibility of men consciously to control their actions in conformity with the higher purposes of the state. All men were to be held accountable for their acts. The duty of the Soviet citizen was to identify himself with the needs of society as seen by the party. Soviet psychology was given a fundamental responsibility for helping to develop this "new Soviet man," and today is much concerned with pedology, the science of child education.

Linguistics

The linguistic theories of Professor N. Marr, evolved before the revolution and accepted in the 1920's as standard Marxist linguistics, depended on the principle that language is part of the "superstructure" of society - that, in other words, it is a product of the economic "base." From this it follows that languages can be graded and their relationships discussed in terms of the economic level of the people who speak them. The theory was considered absurd by most linguists outside the USSR. Some valuable work in the field reportedly was accomplished through the familiar process of paying only lip service to the official theory, but not until 1950 was the theory rejected - and then by Stalin, who suddenly became arbiter of the truth in this field. Stalin attacked the theory by saying that language was independent of the economic stage, and could be considered neither as superstructure nor as part of the base. There is some evidence that his attack was occasioned by the fact that the Marr theory conflicted with Russian chauvinism and the hegemony of the Russian language in the USSR.

Genetics

Until recently the study of genetics in the Soviet Union was based on the doctrines of prerevolutionary biologist Michurin as developed by Soviet biologist Lysenko. The theory of genetics formulated by Lysenko rejects the principles of Mendel and others whose work is basic to Western geneticists in favor of the theory that certain environmental factors play an important part in evolution. Lysenko's theory is not remarkable for its originality; there are geneticists out-

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side the USSR who do not reject it out of hand. What is remarkable is that for many years Lysenko managed to make his concept the official truth to which Soviet geneticists had to bow. He convinced Stalin that his approach was consistent with the official dogma behind the Five Year Plan in that, more than any other theory, it ascribed to man the power to control biological evolution. With Stalin's backing, Lysenko set himself up as the unchallenged dictator in the field. This fact, perhaps reinforced by the demonstrable unworkability of the theory, eventually brought about Lysenko's downfall.

Physics

Many concepts of modern physics cannot be comprehended in terms of Soviet ideological postulates. Modern physicists admit areas of unpredictability and turn to mathematical calculation of probabilities based on the frequency of phenomena rather than on direct cause-effect relations. Such admissions of unpredictability become particularly characteristic of investigation of atomic motion, in the

vitally important field of nuclear physics.

All this conflicts with Marxist-Leninist dogma, which holds that all phenomena can be explained on the basis of predictable physical laws. Soviet ideologists have alternately attacked some of the theories of modern physics and attempted to reconcile them with Marxism-Leninism. Discussions are held at a highly metaphysical level, reminiscent of endless earlier discussions in the West when the question of reconciling science with religious dogma was pressing. But this has had little effect on the actual study of physics in the USSR.

Soviet physicists have achieved an obvious competence in the area of their research. At the same time that Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy was attacked in *Voprosy Filosofii* and censured for the benefit of the nonscientific intellectual public, the concept itself was discussed in technical textbooks and used by physicists as a

necessary operating principle.

Russian physicists have devoted a great deal of attention to atomic theory ever since the discovery of radioactivity upset prevailing theories at the turn of the century. Soviet nuclear research was hampered for several years by the turnoil produced by war and revolution. Research in the field picked up in the early 1920's. While some Soviet scientists went abroad to study, others developed nuclear research at home. By the end of the 1930's a well-trained and very able corps of nuclear physicists worked in laboratories equipped

with tools, including cyclotrons, which equaled or rivaled those available outside the USSR. On the whole, the progress of Soviet research was on a par with that of the West. Several of the early, more fundamental contributions to the understanding of the nuclear process were made by Soviet physicists. The recent spectacular achievements in missiles and rocketry point to a lead over the West in at least some aspects of this field.

Position of the Scientist

The Soviet scientist is the most favored intellectual in the Soviet Union today. At the higher levels he is very well paid and enjoys various comforts and privileges not available to the great majority of Soviet citizens. Certain scientists working in sensitive fields have been kept in a kind of luxurious imprisonment, given very little chance to associate with anyone even within the USSR. A classic example is the physicist, P. Kapitsa: he left Cambridge University to visit his native land and vanished completely as far as the outside world was concerned, only reappearing in recent years.

While the scientist may be disturbed by the regime's ideological campaigns, he has been least affected by them. Particularly in the physical sciences, he evidently derives considerable satisfaction from his work. This satisfaction is tempered, however, by the knowledge that one can be subjected to ideological attack, if political authorities are so inclined. For many scientists at the lower levels, moreover, the tendency on the part of the regime to demand evidence of the practical validity of their work is a source of intermittent tension and frustration. Despite such constraints, Soviet scientists and technicians aspire to do creditable work and should not be viewed as the helpless victims of stifling controls.

Over the long run, the achievements of Soviet scientists and technicians have been equal to those of scientists in the rest of the world. The regime has concentrated enormous amounts of money and talent to achieve goals considered desirable from the standpoint of propaganda and global strategy. The Western world was surprised when Russia launched the first successful man-made satellite. It is probable that Soviet scientists will bring forward further tech-

nological surprises in areas allotted top priority.

Ideological Control in Art and Literature

In the years immediately following 1917 many artists and writers who had chafed under the restrictions of the old regime saw the

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Bolshevik revolution as a liberation. Experimentation in art was rampant in Russia (as also in the West), and many artists hailed this "new order" as the dawn of an era in which artistic revolution would go hand in hand with political revolution. During the 1920's, Soviet literature, painting, cinema, music, theater, and other arts were subject to little political discipline and enjoyed a productive and lively existence. The Soviet novelist Pilnyak expressed some of the spirit of this period by declaring:

I believe that a writer must care only about his manuscripts, about their being *good*, and the honesty and validity of his party-school-social membership card is his own personal business which has nothing to do with literature.

At first this attitude was quite acceptable to the authorities; but gradually it became apparent that such an attitude would not of itself make the arts an active arm of the state. Most experimental art could not reach and "infect" the masses.

The first Five Year Plan was accompanied by a new conception of the artist's role in society. Soviet artists were hailed as "engineers of the soul." Their duty was to promote the policies of the Soviet state, and to sing the glories of the "Soviet man." This theory led, in 1932, to the birth of "socialist realism," which has ever since been the official "school" for all Soviet artists.

Socialist realism contained many criteria for artistic expression. Art should have mass appeal, so the artist had to avoid the ivory tower and familiarize himself with factory and kolkhoz, with worker and director and party official. Style should be easily comprehensible to the masses; experiment in form became well-nigh impossible. Since he was to picture life "as it is becoming," he should not dwell on the weaknesses and contradictions in the current scene, with its "remnants of capitalism," except to show how they could be corrected by Soviet man. Art, in short, should be inspirational, not merely descriptive. Like all else, art should serve what the regime defined as "truth."

No sooner had these principles been established than the authorities perceived a need for another new element in Soviet art. The rise of Hitler and growing international tension demanded promotion of "Soviet patriotism": a glorification of the Russian past, a fusion of that past with the present regime, and the stimulation of dedication to both. Heroes of prerevolutionary history, not only peasant rebels but also those tsars and generals who had built up the Russian empire, were resurrected and carefully redecorated.

Love of the fatherland was equated with support of its present rulers.

World War II brought some relaxation of control. The hard fact of Nazi invasion did more to stimulate patriotism than any prodding could. There was also some contact and sympathy with the Western Allies, and the Soviet artists had reason to hope that the

war's end might still bring greater freedom.

Such hopes were short-lived. The summer of 1946 brought the first attacks on "subjective, Westernized" art. A campaign rapidly developed against "cosmopolitanism" and "kowtowing to the West." Stricter party consciousness (partiynost') was demanded, and the line was even more narrowly defined than before the war, until the death of Stalin once again brought a slackening of the reins. Although there have been vacillations in policy, the post-Stalin thaw has persisted under Khrushchev.

Literature

Russian literature, after abandoning in the eighteenth century its ecclesiastical cast, reached its finest flowering in the nineteenth, when it shared with the rest of European literature a preoccupation with moral and social problems. More restricted in the direct expression of political opinion than most Europeans, Russian nineteenth-century novelists, dramatists, and even poets often provided such expression in their art. Some works were little more than political tracts, but there were strong political implications even in such works as the novels of Dostoevski and Tolstoy, and, although the nonrealist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century tended to obscure or avoid a preoccupation with social problems, most writers, along with the rest of the intelligentsia, remained politically and socially conscious, with a sense of responsibility for the ills of their time. For many, disgust with the old regime led to an idealization of the new.

It would be inaccurate, however, to see social problems as the sole preoccupation of nineteenth-century Russian writers. In such an achievement as theirs there are many currents, making all generalizations dangerous. The stereotype of Russian literature as gloomy and rather incoherent — a stereotype drawn, perhaps, from a casual reading of Dostoevski — must be taken with several grains of salt. To the Russian, Pushkin is the supreme type of Russian writer, and

Pushkin is crystal-clear.

Russian writers did, nevertheless, share a rich tradition which gave their diverse work some common denominators. They were

acutely aware of the immensity of their land, the special character of their religion, and other national features that set them off from Western Europeans. They looked upon the industrial revolution and the growth of middle-class society in the West with a mixture of envy and disapproval. The Russian intelligentsia tended to divide into two camps: the Western-oriented, who sought to arouse their country from its "lethargy" of centuries, and Slavophiles, who had a messianic faith in their people and their own church and felt that the purity and "breadth" of the unspoiled Russian could be an inspiration to the "corrupt" West. The division was by no means clear-cut, and the ambivalence resulting from a mingling of the two views is evident in the work of many of the greatest Russian writers.

Other conflicts, which Russians shared with the rest of Europe, also cut across the Slavophile-Western line, for many Russians were deeply preoccupied with the reconciliation of reason and religion, with the problem of evil, and with the eternal question of man's relation to the universe and to God.

Part of the greatness of nineteenth-century Russian literature lay in the breadth of its appeal. The best writers of that era, whether of verse or prose, were known and loved — and still are — by almost every literate Russian. Small wonder, then, that Lenin and other revolutionaries should regard literature as a vitally important means of mass communication.

The period of War Communism was one of real enthusiasm among many Soviet writers. The symbolist poets Blok and Belyy wove visions of Christ at the head of the Bolshevik masses. Prose writers painted, brutally and rather incoherently, the portrait of humanity uprooted. The strident, staccato cries of Mayakovsky and other futurists, urging the people forward, echoed from wall posters and in workers' gatherings.

But in the NEP years the original vision became obscured. Blok was dead; his followers turned away from politics. The shouts of Mayakovsky continued, but a more striking characteristic of the period was the revival of the novel. Serious appraisals of the human significance of the new order appeared; there was also satire, but only in a few cases did it become bold enough to incur the wrath of the regime. During these years supporters of the regime could, without much exaggeration, speak of freedom of literature in the USSR.

Under the first Five Year Plan, when the whole population was enlisted in support of rapid industrialization, satirists and serious

writers alike were called into action, under dictation of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), to write inspirational novels about industry. Although RAPP was dissolved in 1932 and its chief disgraced, its general working principles were included in the formulation of socialist realism. Satire became rare, other "schools" were banned, and the Union of Soviet Writers became the official center for the control of literature.

The Union of Soviet Writers today has almost four thousand members. Although membership is voluntary, most writers find it expedient to join. More than half the members belong to the Communist party. Theoretically an independent body, the Union is effectively controlled by the party through such familiar devices as nomination for the elective board of directors. This board chooses a presidium and a secretariat, which generally include the most famous and highly approved writers of the USSR. It is their duty to see that the current party line is followed in literature, to train and encourage young writers, and to arrange for suitable working conditions for members, including comforts and conveniences for their families.

The Union is financed by dues, by receipts of various enterprises in which it is engaged, by a percentage of the income of publishing houses and theaters, and by various other contributions. Its own enterprises include a publishing house, a newspaper, and six monthly magazines, as well as a writer's training school, the Gorky Literary Institute.

Through its various departments the Union exercises its control in a series of prepublication criticisms — centered on ideology — of the writings of its members. Works are subject to further review by publishers, who are almost invariably party members, and at any point official party organs may step in and reverse critical decisions. The Union is thus the central, but not necessarily the final, arbiter on literary "correctness."

The great weakness of this system — the weakness which has plagued both writers and authorities — is that such highly controlled literature makes dull reading. Hero and villain alike become stereotyped, varied only by party directives on who should be glorified or attacked. Prescribed optimism and the happy ending virtually eliminate genuine conflict. Style itself has to be maintained at the level of easy reading. Only in the upsurge of patriotism immediately before and during the years of World War II was there any sign of spontaneity.

The restiveness of Soviet writers under these controls has been

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fairly obvious. Not only must they demonstrate strict adherence to the line when submitting anything for publication but after a work has appeared it is closely scanned for deviation. Time lag and change of official policy often make deviants of even the most orthodox. Men who see themselves as the spiritual heirs of such giants as Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Dostoevski, and Tolstoy find themselves writing potboilers in which boy wins girl by overfulfilling his quota, the local party secretary is a *deus ex machina* who can solve all problems, and the only possible villain is a foreign spy or saboteur. The authorities themselves call for a "higher literary level," but at the same time quash all efforts to portray any fundamental problems of man in Soviet society.

The literary past is not forgotten in Russia. Nineteenth-century writings have frequently been republished and are read much more avidly than Soviet works. They are taught in schools, where interpretations of them are carefully rationalized to present needs. In the theaters, prerevolutionary dramas draw by far the best audiences. Theatrical managers, with their eye on the budget (and perhaps with an appreciation of real dramatic merit), have to be constantly

reminded to put more Soviet plays into their repertory.

Even foreign literature and drama draw much attention in the USSR. Not only current leftist writers but also a wide variety of works from the European and American past are frequently translated and republished. Shakespeare is almost always on the stage; Mark Twain is as well known in the USSR as in the United States, and Walt Whitman, James Fenimore Cooper, and Jack London are probably more familiar to Russians than to Americans today.

Literary scholarship of a very high order existed in Russia well before the revolution. The formalist school especially, which sought to analyze literary works from a purely literary point of view—as opposed to the historical, psychological, biographical, or moral approach—found in Russia some of its ablest exponents; they exerted great influence on literary criticism in both Western Europe and America.

At the same time there were many Russian critics whose approach to literature was purely moral and sociological. These today are revered in the USSR as the fathers of Soviet criticism, while formalism has undergone continual attack. Despite such attacks, however, elements of formalism have continued to enrich Soviet literary scholarship and much valuable work has been done in this field, especially in the analysis of prerevolutionary authors.

Soviet authors frequently have been called on to rewrite or

modify their works, historical novels especially, since they depend heavily on the current party line. But non-Soviet literature, when it is published at all, is not generally tampered with. Liberties have been taken in recording in literary form the oral literature of minority peoples, but written classics appear to be inviolate except for interpretation by footnote. Even those works which Soviet authorities refuse to publish on the ground that they are ideologically unsound or dangerous often are available in old editions.

The extent of the reading public is impossible to assess, as there are many more books in libraries than in private homes. Undoubtedly many workers and peasants find little time for reading; but observation in trains, waiting rooms, and other public places indicates that much reading is done by those who can find leisure for it, and that foreign and pre-Soviet works are by far the most popular. Familiarity with Russian classics, especially Pushkin, extends to a far lower social level than does acquaintance with English and American classics by Americans. One reason for this may be the lack in the USSR of certain kinds of reading matter such as the comic strip and the pulp magazine; there are, however, occasional mystery stories, and science fiction is achieving wide popularity.

The course of literature under Communism is roughly paralleled by the other arts. The same early burgeoning of experimental forms, the same stultification under increasing official control are observable in painting and sculpture, the difference being largely one of

degree.

The Fine Arts

The museums of Moscow and Leningrad and to a lesser extent those of other cities of the USSR preserve for the Russians of today a good sampling of their own and foreign arts through the centuries. Until the eighteenth century, Russian art was largely ecclesiastical. The icon, a religious painting traditionally maintained as a shrine in almost every Russian Orthodox home, provided early Russian painters with a constant market. A severe style, based on the Byzantine, it developed its own traditions and attained a high degree of strength and originality.

With the development of secular art after 1700, Russian painting allied itself to Western movements. But while Russian writers were in the very first rank of nineteenth-century European literature, Russian painters and sculptors lagged behind, following, as did many others, the lead of Paris. Through most of the century in Russia, painting was romantic and representational. Of the many

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paintings that are still widely reproduced and remain with the people, most are valued for their subject matter and dramatic appeal rather than for any originality of execution. Historical scenes and "picturesque" landscapes predominate. Experimental forms appeared around the turn of the century, only to disappear again in the 1920's. Officially sanctioned and publicly exhibited Soviet painting is still subject to political control and is dominated by poster-like representations of happy collective farmers, busy factories, and eager students. In a recent - and sharply attacked novel by Ilya Ehrenburg, a cynical painter remarks that Raphael could never have won the Stalin Prize; the speaker himself has found it most profitable to paint white chickens for the greater glory of Soviet agriculture. Statues of Stalin, Lenin, and idealized Soviet athletes deck a thousand village squares and Parks of Culture and Rest all over the USSR. They are undistinguished, as has been most of Russian sculpture.

Recent reports indicate that the "cult of the individual," symbolized by these Lenin-Stalin portraits and statues, is now being deplored. Moreover the regime is again opening the door to Western movements in art as illustrated by recent references to Kandinsky, one of the most influential pioneers of abstract art (although his early Russian canvases are still not displayed in the USSR), and the "unauthorized" exhibition in France in 1959 of the paintings of a young Soviet artist whose work was a startling departure from conventional socialist realism. Among the younger artists growing rebellion against official academic art is currently manifested in a secret output of abstract and experimental works. Their creators, meanwhile, continue to belong to the Union of Soviet Artists, making

their living on officially sponsored art projects.

Since painting and sculpture depend less directly than literature on popular taste, party control is more easily applied. The Union of Soviet Artists is permeated by the party, which also exercises control over these arts directly through its Department of Agitation and Propaganda and indirectly through the Ministry of Culture. The Soviet Academy of Arts, a heritage from prerevolutionary days, is chiefly concerned with teaching and with the education of public taste through museums and temporary exhibitions.

In the USSR, as in all countries, there is a large gap between the actual architectural scene and the current trends. The Soviet citizen of today is confronted with the legacy of Russia's architectural past. Log huts and the onion domes of churches still dominate much of the Russian countryside; and in Moscow itself the venerable walls and spires of the Kremlin are still more of a landmark than the skyscraper university that has recently risen in the outskirts. The hodgepodge of Moscow architecture, mixing the tastes of the old aristocracy and of opulent merchants of the late nineteenth century with the various phases of Soviet building, stands in sharp contrast to the neoclassic uniformity of Leningrad or the grandiose character of those cities that have developed or been rebuilt since World War II.

Architecture in the Soviet period began on principles of severe and colorless functionalism. Lack of skills, materials, and maintenance in these buildings of the early 1920's is responsible for their likeness to shabby gray boxes, and the taste of that time is currently deplored. By the 1930's architects were being encouraged to make buildings more worthy of the new regime. The handsome if somewhat overdecorated Moscow subway is a triumph of this period. From that time onward a trend toward "gigantism" has been evident. Highly experimental forms have been avoided. Size as well as ornateness have until recently been stressed in public buildings and apartment houses, as Russia apparently has attempted to "overtake and surpass" the skyscrapers of American cities.

There has been little parallel development in the building of individual dwelling houses. Village huts, in European Russia at least, are still built of logs, with ornate carving at doors and windows.

Recent statements indicate that the more grandiose and ornate efforts of Soviet architects are now frowned upon. Khrushchev has stated that "architects are more concerned with silhouettes than with living quarters" and has accused them of "aesthetic admiration of form divorced from content." Present plans for building construction, involving broad standardization and prefabrication of parts, lend force to his words. There is little room left for the architect to develop any style of his own.

Music

The excellence of Russian music has long been established. Joining the great European tradition in the early nineteenth century, Russian composers such as Glinka, Borodin, Moussorgsky, Rimski-Korsakov, and Tchaikovsky were able to draw themes from a rich heritage of folk music; and the age-long folk association of music and dance was perhaps one source of the supreme development of Russian ballet, an art form in which Russians have been paramount.

With less precise intellectual "meaning" than the other arts, music is less easily brought to heel by the concept of socialist real-

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ism, although Soviet composers do pay lip service to its dogmas. In music the Communist party has endeavored to discourage experimental forms and has encouraged the use of Russian folk themes. In 1948, during the "tightening-up" after World War II, the USSR's three most famous composers — Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and Khachaturian — were sharply criticized for "remoteness from life." The unconventional music of Shostakovich was attacked with special vehemence (as it had been in 1936), and the composer, apologizing abjectly for his "formalism," produced several more conventional pieces in honor of Stalin. His output has continued high, although some Western musicians feel his development as an artist has suffered from the political restrictions, and recently he toured the musical centers of the United States with a group of leading Soviet composers as part of a "cultural exchange."

Today the controls on music, as on the other arts, appear to have been somewhat loosened, and Soviet composers are able to plead for greater individualism—always, of course, within the bounds of socialist realism. Despite all restrictions, however, the Russians still rank in musical accomplishment with any people in the

world.

The Interpretive Arts

Ballet companies exist in all fifteen constituent republics of the USSR, but those in Moscow and Leningrad are by far the most important. With highly trained dancers and a tradition of excellence long antedating the revolution, the quality and popularity of ballet in Russia is easy to understand. A ballet performance at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow is considered, by Russians and foreigners alike, the very summit of entertainment in Russia. Here, during intermission, the elite of the new regime — as well as the collective farmer who has overfulfilled his quota — can pace the same foyer where the nobility paraded in the time of the tsars. Soviet ballet is generously supported by the regime, and the names of such outstanding ballerinas as Ulanova and Lepeshinskaya are as widely known to Russians as those of leading motion picture actors are to Americans.

The legitimate theater probably is more accessible and more popular in the USSR than in any other country. In Moscow there are about twenty-five theaters, several sponsored by such organizations as the Soviet Army, the Komsomol, and various labor unions. Each has a repertory of about a dozen plays per year, and these are given more or less in rotation from day to day. Most other cities

have at least one theater, operating in the same manner; there are

traveling and semiprofessional groups all over the country.

The Moscow Art Theater, where Stanislavski achieved world-wide fame as a pioneer in theatrical presentation both before and after the revolution, has remained at the peak of the Russian theatrical world, although it no longer is the scene of experiments. There the plays of Chekhov have been in the repertory since the turn of the century and the actors move from role to role as they grow older. Many other non-Soviet plays, including Shakespeare's, also are presented along with the required sprinkling of the products of socialist realism.

The party's attempt to use current materials as a direct inspiration to Soviet workers and peasants appears, to a large extent, self-defeating. The members of an average Russian audience, after a day's heavy work in field or factory, go to the theater or the motion pictures for relief and escape. The man who spends all day on his tractor has no desire to be confronted by more tractors at nightfall. Given the choice, he is happier in the company of Ivan the Terrible or Cinderella.

A Russian film industry existed before the revolution, and Lenin saw it as potentially "one of the most powerful means of educating the masses." Nationalization, however, when it was attempted in 1919, met with heavy resistance from this industry, and shortages of electrical power further hampered development. Under NEP, both government and private agencies had a hand in production and projection, and many foreign films were imported. In 1923 the party declared that films had become "an instrument for bourgeois influence and the corruption of the toiling masses." A policy of censorship and increased government control brought motion pictures more into line with over-all policy.

Under the genius of directors like Sergey Eisenstein, films such as *The Battleship Potemkin*, *Earth*, and *Storm over Asia*, of striking force and originality, were produced. But such originality proved unsatisfactory to the regime. In 1928 producers were accused of "formalism," and the party demanded that films be presented in a

form "that can be understood by millions."

From that time until the late 1950's the history of Soviet motion pictures roughly paralleled that of literature and the drama. Beginning in 1956 and 1957 there appears to have been a partial repudiation of "the notion," as the film critic of the *New York Times* puts it, "that young people mate for no other evident reason than to pro-

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vide future collective farmers and builders of hydroelectric plants." In those years several films won awards for their "human qualities," and in 1958 *The Cranes are Flying* (Zletyat Shuravly) won the grand prize at the Cannes Film Festival. Described as having a "beautifully tender, almost lyric feeling for romantic love," it is the

story of two lovers parted by war.

In the last twenty years several historical and biographical films have been internationally recognized as of high quality. Some of these, however, have required radical revision after production, to fit party demands. Success also has been attained in the area of folk tales and fairy stories; notable here is *The Stone Flower*, which won prizes in international competitions. Although appearing in considerable quantities, documentaries and films on contemporary subjects have been less successful. Sovkino, the organization in charge of the Soviet film industry, has produced several historical and documentary films in and for the satellite countries.

Limited production of projectors and lack of electrical facilities have hindered distribution, and motion pictures have not yet replaced legitimate drama either in the major cities or in the country

at large.

Instrumental and choral concerts are maintained at a very high level in the USSR. A number of individual musicians, among them pianist Emil Gilels and violinist David Oistrakh, have achieved worldwide fame, as has the Red Army Chorus. Grand opera, lavishly staged, alternates with ballet at the Bolshoi and many other theaters. Operettas also enjoy some popularity. The Moscow circus is famous at home and abroad. Russian folk-dance troupes perform often in Moscow and have gone on tour abroad. Puppet theaters are highly developed and much enjoyed. Recitation and monologue also are favorite forms of entertainment. The very popular Music-Hall Concerts, which in summer are given out of doors, combine many of these forms.

There is little satire or criticism of the current scene in Russian entertainment today. Two notable exceptions are the puppet theater, whose production, "An Ordinary Concert," was suppressed a few years ago for making fun of various local institutions, and the circus, where the famous clown Karandash hovers constantly on the outer edge of permissible satire. A few humorous speakers have on occasion gone quite far in implied criticism of contemporary affairs, but this is a dangerous game for any public entertainer. One device that remains for the clever writer or artist is to produce enter-

tainment that ostensibly follows the correct line but is susceptible of another interpretation. Such a work is the famous play *Klop* written by Mayakovsky in 1928, banned for many years during the Stalin era, and recently revived in Moscow with an excellent cast. Another example of a device for circumventing official policy in the entertainment field is that frequently used to allow the playing of jazz music. Seriously frowned upon by the authorities but immensely popular with the Soviet audience excellent jazz is played while the puppets or actors indicate that they find it horrible and decadent. In this way the audience enjoys the music and the censors are satisfied. Despite the official attitude many of the larger hotels have maintained jazz orchestras and visits by a few American jazz musicians have proved immensely popular in Russian cities.

Folk and Popular Art

Many folk arts survive and are encouraged in the USSR, but encouragement often has been accompanied by sovietization. The folklore of the peoples of the USSR has been the basis for much of their literature, painting, and music, and it was the subject of scholarly research long before the revolution. An extreme example of the regime's attitude toward folklore was the demand of some years ago that Soviet folklorists find more "folklore about Stalin" in remote districts. Despite such pressures, folklore provides a sense of the continuity of culture for many of the peoples of the USSR.

What is true of folklore is in varying degrees also true of other folk arts. Embroidery of national costumes and ornate carvings of door and window frames continue in the prerevolutionary tradition of the decorative arts; but in the more representational work of ceramics, ivory carving, and lacquer work, handed down for generations in many areas, portraits of Soviet leaders have been

interspersed with the traditional material.

Folk dancing, little subject to sovietization, maintains a high level of popularity and acclaim. Children learn folk dances in the public squares of Moscow and other cities, while in the villages almost any celebration is likely to include singing and dancing to the accompaniment of a balalaika or an accordion. Soviet songs have been successfully popularized and now intersperse the traditional ballads. Georgian and Caucasian dancers are popular among the Russians, while Gypsy music and dancing has had a considerable influence on Russian forms.

A traditional popular form of song in Russia has been the chastushka, which consists of short verses, generally with topical

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allusions and often ribald. The verses frequently are sung alternately by a man and a woman. The form was much used, especially by Mayakovsky, for propaganda purposes in the years of War Communism.

Position of the Artist

Creative artists are among the most highly paid citizens, and considerable effort is made to give them satisfactory working conditions. What they lack is the freedom to write, paint, or compose as they please. All the work of writers is subject to scrutiny and control by the Union of Soviet Writers, and changes in party policy keep even the most obedient writer in a state of anxiety. In recent years, however, punishment of erring writers has been somewhat less drastic than in the 1920's and 1930's.

Interpretive artists are less subject to ideological harassment than are creative artists, and also have more reason to be satisfied with life than most Soviet citizens. Ballerinas and solo musicians receive the highest acclaim, and, though films and drama are not centered around special stars to the extent they are in the West, leading actors often achieve great fame. There are special awards for actors, which are listed after the actor's name in theater programs.

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Controls pervade the artistic and intellectual life of the entire USSR. Except for differences in local color, contemporary Russian, Estonian, or Armenian writings are full of the same stereotypes and are practically indistinguishable from each other. Among the more important non-Russian ethnic groups, however, the memory of native cultural achievements and the survival of local folklore, traditions, and customs serve to keep alive a sense of national consciousness and a desire for national recognition.

The Baltic States

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania possess a modern literary and artistic tradition which has its roots in a common nineteenth-century awakening. The spread of literacy and the impact of the European Romantic movement on these countries gave impetus, as elsewhere, to a nationalist revival and clarified the desire of the Baltic peoples for self-expression. An immense number of folk tales, songs, poems, legends, and epics, suffused with nationalist sentiments, were collected and published. Native customs, dances, and crafts (wood

carving, ceramics, weaving, embroidery) enjoyed a popular revival. Each of the three Baltic peoples exhibited a particular love of lyric poetry and song. They had a strong penchant for group singing; hundreds of town and country choirs assembled periodically to participate in national singing festivals, which became one of the

principal expressions of national solidarity.

At the beginning of the twentieth century all three Baltic states experienced a growth in native literature, music, and drama — arts which enjoyed the most popularity. Heavy emphasis was placed on the national language and on the development of the national spirit. During the period of their independence (1918-40) each of the countries produced, in addition to poets, novelists, dramatists, and musicians, a prized generation of scholars and scientists. The University of Tartu, the Polytechnical Institute of Riga, and other schools became important centers of learning, and their excellence was internationally acknowledged.

Under Soviet domination, literature, theater, music, and the fine arts in the Baltic states were placed, as elsewhere in the USSR, in the service of Soviet propaganda. These countries have produced no outstanding literary or artistic work since the Soviet occupation. Apparently as a form of passive resistance, many native writers have chosen translation as their major occupation. At times some are upbraided in the local press for writing lyrical poems or stories about spring, nature, their own childhood, and other internal feel-

ings, while neglecting "contemporary social problems."

The regime has also sought to harness the popular arts for the promotion of Soviet objectives. Periodic national art festivals, replete with folk songs and dances, are staged to revolve around such themes as life on the collective farm and the brotherhood of Soviet nations. By manipulating national forms and symbols, the regime seeks to transform local loyalty into loyalty to the larger Soviet

society.

While much in the content of native cultural life in the Baltic countries has been emasculated, the native folklore and song that have been preserved in the memory of the people continue to provide a focus for the national feelings that the regime has been unable to eradicate. These peoples have known many centuries of subjugation, and, despite their language differences, there is a basic similarity in the character of their traditions and sentiments. Much in their folklore conveys a sense of lyric melancholy and preoccupation with personal emotions. This melancholy, however, is

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tempered with a strain of humor. Irony, often used in popular fables and jokes, has been a favorite weapon against oppressors, and Soviet officials today have succeeded feudal landlords and tsarist bureaucrats as the victims of a mocking folk-humor.

Belorussia

Belorussia possesses no outstanding national artistic and intellectual tradition. The use of the Belorussian native idiom in schools, radio, press, and in the literary productions of the area is to some extent artificially fostered by the Soviet regime. Whatever faint indigenous historical and literary traditions there were have been destroyed or subordinated to Russian history and tradition.

Belorussian folklore never became a force for rallying national sentiments. Folk tales are usually concerned with specific events in specific localities and convey no sense of social or ethnic cohesion. Folk songs are full of social lament and a spirit of melancholy defeat but display no sense of defiance or national resistance. Primarily concerned with the general lot of man, Belorussian folklore has pro-

duced no concept of nation.

A vague nationalist movement began to emerge in Belorussia late in the nineteenth century, when a few native writers chose to use the Belorussian language as their literary medium. Centered around a thin layer of educated gentry, these literary activities met with practically no response from the masses. Belorussian literature grew in volume, however, at the turn of the century. A new generation of writers, some of them representing the lower strata of the people, attempted to foster a national revival by creating myths about the Belorussian past. The works of Yanka Kupala and Yakub Kolas are considered "classics" by Belorussian literary historians.

During the 1920's and 1930's artistic and intellectual expression in western Belorussia (under Polish rule after 1921) had to contend with Polish censorship and repression and devoted itself to the themes of civic lament and loyalty to the native land. In eastern Belorussia, which had fallen under Soviet rule, the leadership of the national movement was destroyed and replaced by Communist-oriented personnel. Native literary, theatrical, and musical activities were encouraged but given a new direction. Anything which emphasized the unique destiny of the Belorussian people was quickly stifled.

Belorussian literature and scholarship since the war have been directed "to discern in Belorussian national tradition a closer and

more organic relation both to the classic Russian literature and to the multinational literature of the Soviet Union." The works of Belorussian writers and scholars today are distinguished only by their slight local coloring.

The Ukraine

As in the Baltic states, nineteenth-century European Romanticism produced a national awakening in the Ukraine, where it was characterized by an idealization of the Ukrainian past and the elevation of the Ukrainian idiom to the status of a literary language. Ukrainian poets and writers drew on a rich folk literature for much of their inspiration and were largely preoccupied with the problems of social justice and national freedom. Taras Shevchenko (1814-61), the greatest Ukrainian poet and a distinguished painter, became the leading symbol of the nationalist movement.

Writing poems much in the manner of Ukrainian folk songs, Shevchenko raised his voice in protest against national and social oppression. Pointing back to the glorious and heroic past of Cossack Ukraine, he called his countrymen to rise and throw away the chains of Russian tsardom. His vision of the Ukraine "without a serf and without a master" in the family of free nations, his belief that "Ukraine will rise and disperse the darkness of slavery" and "light will shine" again, and his appeals to national unity presented to Ukrainians a basic political testament. But this national revival. unlike that in the Baltic states, appears to have been restricted to a relatively narrow stratum of educated society. Some Ukrainian writers, Gogol among them, chose Russian as their literary medium, and their works have become part of the Russian classics.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ukraine had produced a number of prominent poets, novelists, and dramatists. Kiev gradually assumed the role of an all-Ukrainian cultural center. A series of newly established literary journals attracted leading literary talents and facilitated contacts with literary trends of the West. After 1921, however, literature in the Soviet Ukraine, following a short-lived period of concessions, was deprived of its best talents and made a tool of the regime. In western Ukraine, until its occupation by the Soviet, Ukrainian writers continued to struggle for the preservation and development of their national and cultural

distinctiveness.

During the 1930's many leading Soviet Ukrainian writers, scholars, and scientists were silenced or liquidated. By the end of the decade about a hundred Ukrainian writers had disappeared, their names and works being completely eliminated from libraries and textbooks. At the same time, those aspects of the native tradition that could be profitably used for propaganda purposes were preserved and cultivated. As elsewhere in the USSR, World War II brought a short period of relative relaxation in the arts, only to be followed by a reimposition of rigid controls. Contemporary Ukrainian arts show little vitality and originality and do not attract many new talents. The more noted Ukrainian writers today, such as Korneychuk, generally write in Russian and figure prominently as "Soviet" authors.

The Caucasus

The distinctive feature of Caucasian artistic expression is a rich oral literature which has preserved the memory of a magnificent past; the peoples of the Caucasus have produced a wealth of epics, songs, tales, and legends dealing with mythical traditions and former glories. While each of the numerous groups and tribes that inhabit this region has its own distinctive folklore and oral tradition and is proud of its own language and individuality, they all share the

same sense of intimacy with antiquity.

Under the Soviet regime, much of this oral tradition has become part of written literature. Many of the native tales and epics have been translated into Russian—for example, *The Man in the Tiger's Skin* by the Georgian poet Rustaveli. At the same time a revival of national consciousness among Caucasian intellectuals has stimulated the creation of new works in prose and verse. Despite official demands that Caucasian authors concentrate on standard Soviet topics, many apparently can find inspiration only in the past and so continually search for historical themes.

Soviet authorities seem to be constantly plagued by this prob-

lem. An article in the Georgian press complained:

The situation in our literature became completely intolerable when some writers, instead of marching in step with reality and helping the Soviet people to live and create, dwelt on and idealized the distant past—were fascinated by the biographies of kings and princes. . . . It is clear that the writing of such "historical" novels has nothing to do with the methods of socialist realism, with the objectives the party and people have set for our literature.

This type of criticism is typical and persistent, perhaps testifying to the vitality of indigenous cultural traditions.

These indigenous traditions, however, are being undermined in a variety of ways. Native writers are pressured to substitute typical Soviet symbols — tractors, airplanes, collective farms — for native heroes and bandits of the hills. Traditional literature that expresses too much local nationalism is suppressed. For example, the works of Raffi, one of Armenia's greatest novelists, were not circulated in Soviet Armenia until 1940, when they were republished as a concession to local patriotic sentiments during World War II; they were withdrawn from circulation again after the war.

The regime has encouraged the development of Russian and European art forms in the Caucasus—theater, opera, ballet, symphonic music, and cinema. Painting, sculpture, and architecture are also given generous support, but have developed along typically Soviet lines. As a result, the contemporary artistic life of the Caucasian peoples is losing much of its indigenous national character.

Prominent Caucasian writers, composers, painters, sculptors, and architects have achieved recognition primarily as Soviet rather than strictly national artists. Some of them possess considerable talent. The Armenian composer Khachaturian, for example, won official acclaim for writing such works as a symphony which concerned itself with the struggle against Hitlerism and a ballet about a patriotic collective farm woman. At the same time, he has also produced compositions of originality and has exhibited great skill in adapting the folk music of his people in his work.

Central Asia

The peoples of Central Asia, like those of the Caucasus, possess an ancient heritage. This area experienced a great artistic and intellectual flowering at the end of the first millennium A.D. Another such peak was reached in the fifteenth century. As in the Caucasus, the literary and artistic traditions were preserved chiefly by word of mouth and the regional literature prior to the revolution was primarily oral, though a number of writers and poets emerged during the nineteenth century.

The highest traditional artistic achievements of the peoples of Central Asia were in the epic, which had not only an important place in the literary life of the peoples, but also significant social functions. Usually concerned with some great popular hero's defense of his country, the epic and heroic poem served as repositories of the patriotic sentiments as well as of the group loyalties and bonds of the kinship system of the Uzbek, the Kazak, the Kirgiz, the Turk-

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men, the Kara-Kalpak, and the other peoples of central and northern Asia.

All these peoples had a special group of bards who created the epics and perpetuated them. The bard tradition still exists, and sung or recited poetry is taken down in thousands of lines. The folk singer and his songs are part and parcel of Central Asian culture. They help to hold the society together, asserting and defending its ideals and values.

The Soviet regime has attempted to use this tradition for its own ends. The most notable example of this has been the Kazakh poet, Dzhambul Dzhabaev. An unlettered man who acquired fame prior to the October Revolution, he was nearly one hundred years old when he died in 1945. The Soviet regime gave him prominence as a folk poet because he agreed to compose poems in honor of Stalin and his entourage. For his services he was greatly honored; an oblast in the southern part of Kazakhstan and its capital city were named for him.

The epic traditions of the Turkic and Iranian peoples of Central Asia have received considerable attention during the Soviet period. The Kirgiz epic Manas, the Alpamysh cycle of the Uzbek, the Kyrk Kyz of the Kara-Kalpak, and fragments of a Kazakh epic have been edited and translated into Russian. The patriotic fervor of the epic has been carefully directed by the Soviet regime against foreign powers, for antagonists may never be Russians — even tsarist Russians.

These epics, however, have been difficult matters for Soviet ideologists to handle. They glorify old times and old leaders. They refer to a world of acts and words shared by the Turkic peoples both within and beyond Soviet borders. In the eyes of official cultural arbiters, there is a danger that these traditions may foster Pan-Turkic sentiments.

The Soviet regime has repeatedly exhibited a fear of foreign political contacts among the Central Asian peoples. It has been particularly afraid that Central Asian intellectuals — writers and scholars — might support local Pan-Islamic, Pan-Turkic, and Pan-Iranian movements. Supporters of the local political movements of nationalism and independence from the beginning of this century through 1930 — the Basmachis and Jadidists — were accused of being Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic. Whether these movements have retained their vigor today is not known. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders and ideologists continue to view them as dangerous.

During the Soviet period most of the traditional Central Asian art forms have been refashioned to fit Soviet patterns and Russian tastes. Native inspiration is used only for embellishment. In architecture (once a magnificent Central Asian art) local variation is allowed in ornamental design, in woodwork, mosaic, or brick tile. Thus the building which houses the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Soviet is a massive pile with two wings, each faced with brick tile to show an adaptation to local ornamental design. The fundamental building design, however, is no different from that of similar buildings in Moscow or Omsk or Kiev. The ballet and opera — Russian art forms imposed upon the minority peoples of Central Asia — conform to standard Soviet style with ornamentation by local motifs in song and dance.

The traditional mode of literary expression — poetry — is being replaced by the novel. The influence of Russian models in current literary productions is stressed in Central Asian criticism by today's indigenous writers. In large part the Central Asian novels are indistinguishable in theme from novels written anywhere in the Soviet Union. There is some local color — for example, the village is called kishlak or aul, the village headman is an aksakal. But the cast of characters, the sentiments they utter, the situations they deal with, could have been produced by a novelist living in Moscow, Omsk, Tiflis, or Kiev. The themes are all standardized: the victory of the Bolsheviks, the creative work of the 1930's, the fighting of World War II, the reconstruction after the war.

Many of the novels are poor, with the exception of those that have themes of the distant past. Authors of these latter have been severely criticized for their perfunctory attention to current political doctrine. Among the more talented of such authors are the Kazakh novelist Auezov and the Uzbek poet and prose writer Aibek.

The regime attempts to destroy the roots of indigenous Central Asian national sentiments by reinterpreting the past. Stressed today is Lenin's doctrine of two trends in the history of every people: one "conservative" or "reactionary," one "revolutionary." The first is condemned by Soviet writers and historians, the second praised and identified with Soviet aims and ideals. Part of the indigenous history and part of Russian history are woven into a unitary picture, the rest is subject to attack. Some folk heroes are denounced, others celebrated. On occasion Soviet critics make a tortuous effort to assess the "progressive" and "reactionary" qualities of a single historic figure.

By this reshaping of the past, the unity of the Soviet view of

history is developed at the expense of the indigenous cultural unity. The doctrine of two tendencies in every nation has received particular attention in the Central Asian press since Stalin's death, and will probably be extended in an effort to undermine the cultural

traditions of other minority republics in the USSR.

Contemporary Central Asia literature, as developed under the Soviet regime, tells the reader what the correct and proper attitude should be to politics, problems of life, nature, and other men. Like most of Soviet literature, it plays a moral-didactic part for the reader. But it performs none of the functions for the Central Asian that his literature, written or oral, performed in the past. The older literature, however, still exists, and plays a lively role in arousing sentiments of pride in the Central Asian cultural tradition, loyalty to the group, and a sense of identity with its cultural values as a whole.

Trends

As in many other aspects of Soviet policy, official attitudes toward artistic and intellectual activity in the seven years since Stalin's death have been full of contradictions. So knowledgeable an observer of the USSR as George Kennan has hazarded the guess that the top leadership in this as in other respects is divided between those who still think in terms of the Stalinist era and those who genuinely wish

to pursue a less repressive policy.

Relaxation of political controls has fostered ferment among creative artists. Shostakovich and Khachaturian have expressed the opinion that adherence to a strict view of the party's commandments in art harms artistic creativity. The former president of the Soviet Academy of Arts, A. Gerasimov (a noted painter), has called for greater consideration of the "artist's right to seek what is new." Critics on occasion have openly deplored the fact that Soviet artists were sometimes put in the "position of students carrying out assigned lessons." One of the Soviet Union's best-known writers, Ilya Ehrenburg, declared: "I consider . . . that an artist not only has the right to search but that searches for new things are inherent in art." The novelist K. Simonov gave voice to another theme: "It is the artist's right to decide whether the criticism of his works is justified or not."

The restive and critical spirit among the younger intellectuals that was so notable a part of the events in Poland and Hungary after the death of Stalin and before 1956 has had its counterpart among the younger writers of the Soviet Union. Although these writ-

ers have continued to be hounded by the vacillations of official tolerance up to the present, the examples of their work that have found their way to the West and been published here are evidence that imagination and independent thought have in some degree survived the dreary years of Soviet control and regimentation.

The most widely publicized example of such survival is that of the great writer of the older generation. Boris Pasternak, whose novel Doctor Zhivago is felt by some critics to equal the best Russian fiction of the nineteenth century. Denied publication in the USSR, Doctor Zhivago was published in Italy, England, and the United States, and, in 1958, awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. Official denunciation of Pasternak followed and for a time he was threatened with exile. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that an important sector of the Soviet leadership, possibly including Khrushchev, later regretted the handling of the episode, if only because of the unfavorable comment abroad. Supporting this view is the sudden eclipse of Andrei Surkov a few months after the Pasternak affair. For many years head of the Union of Soviet Writers, in which role he was thoroughly disliked by the writers he dominated, Surkov presided over the Writers' Congress in May 1959 as scheduled. A few days after the conclusion of the Congress, however, his replacement was quietly announced in Pravda. Since Surkov had led the attack on Pasternak, many saw in his removal from official position a typical instance of the fate of a Soviet bureaucrat when the line changes. A speech by Khrushchev at the Congress was also interpreted as giving encouragement to the advocates of greater freedom for Soviet artists and writers.

Another indication of a liberalized trend is illustrated in the treatment of the work of Leonid Leonov, a writer who, although ranking well below Pasternak, shares with him and Sholokhov the distinction of being among the three best novelists of the Soviet era. Recently his early novel, *The Thief* (Vor), long out of print because of its religious bias, has been republished as part of his collected works.

Although not to be compared with *Doctor Zhivago* in literary importance or distinction, two pieces of writing that have found publication in the West since the Pasternak novel are far more startling in their open repudiation of official Soviet literary doctrine. An extraordinary critique of socialist realism has appeared anonymously in translation in the French review *L'Esprit* and in the *Soviet Survey* in Britain. Equally remarkable for its bitter satirical handling

of all the most sacred tenets of Soviet dogma is a short story, "The Trial Begins . . ." published in the January 1960 issue of the British magazine *Encounter*. The author's pseudonym, Abram Terty, apparently conceals the identity of one of the younger generation of Soviet writers.

An interesting analysis of three generations of Soviet intellectuals has been suggested by a Western observer, Leopold H. Haimson, writing in the January 1959 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Surviving members of the older generation — those who reached maturity before 1930 — have regained, says Haimson, much of their former voice in affairs. Apparently many of them were able to preserve a surprising degree of intellectual independence. Ties with the pre-Soviet past made possible a certain kind of respect for truth despite the imposition of totalitarian controls over intellectual life and output. Although their public utterances were controlled, their ideas and writings often received wide circulation in manuscript form. Their vigor and courage have won them both respect and veneration in intellectual circles.

The middle-aged intellectuals — those who spent all their adult life under Stalin's rule — appear the most engulfed by their contemporary environment. Party hacks of the press, literature, and the arts, administrators in universities and institutions, and official keepers of orthodoxy, they exercise considerable authority. But the ideological "thaw" has greatly weakened their sense of historic destiny and their intellectual frame of reference. They appear emotionally poverty-stricken, and their influence on the contemporary scene is limited. Indeed, most of the intellectual leadership that the middle generation has to offer today comes from those who survived Stalin's repression and who have returned from exile or imprisonment remarkably unbroken and assured.

Those who grew up in the Stalin era — now between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five — have begun to play a role on the intellectual scene. On the surface they appear to accept the conceptual framework and language of their elders, but official ideology is neither the center of their world nor a reliable guide to their thoughts. They are turning inward in a search not so much for new intellectual horizons as for richer, more complex, and more personal meanings and aesthetic forms. Which is not to say that they are not sometimes devastatingly political. Many of their works are unpublished and the manuscripts, like the experimental paintings of the young artists, circulate privately. Actors, dancers, and the

occasional writers who are permitted to go abroad bring back Western books and reproductions of paintings which are eagerly

seized upon by this avant garde.

The regime, however, still regards the arts and sciences as servants of the state. Party controls, though not well-defined at present, probably will continue to set rough limits to creativity. Taken as a group Soviet intellectuals have not attacked the basic principles of authoritarian control but only the extent of this control.

ECONOMIC SETTING



CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMY

CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER in the hands of government, total mobilization of human and material resources to further political-military objectives, and a high tempo of industrial development are the distinguishing characteristics of the Soviet economy.

Although based on Marxist ideology, the present system represents a continuation of a pre-Soviet pattern: government ownership or direct control of economic institutions was greater in imperial Russia than in any other contemporary European country. In the USSR today the government owns all land and natural resources; owns and operates all industry, communications media, transport, banks and financial institutions, and municipal utilities; owns and operates most urban retail and wholesale distribution facilities and most housing; and directly operates a small but important portion of all farms.

The only significant means of production and distribution not owned outright by the state are the three types of government-controlled cooperatives: collective farms, industrial cooperatives, and consumer cooperatives. Of these the most important are the collective farms, which work approximately eighty-five percent of the cultivated land. Collective farm households communally till land owned by the government, make communal deliveries of produce to the government, and distribute among themselves whatever is left. The households are allotted private garden plots and may keep or dispose of the produce of these. Industrial cooperatives figure importantly in the production of consumer goods and as suppliers of miscellaneous services such as shoe repairing and restaurant operation, and consumer cooperative organizations dominate wholesale and retail markets in the countryside.

Under Soviet law, government property and cooperative property are considered different forms of socialist property. Purely pri-

vate property is limited to clothing, books, household utensils, and other personal possessions, a restricted bank account, some livestock, and perhaps a house, but not the land on which the house stands.

Centralization of ownership and control has enabled the Soviet regime to force rapid and sustained economic growth and, more significant, to restrict most of this growth to metallurgy, machine building, electric power, chemicals, and other sectors essential to the buildup of national power. In terms of total production, the Soviet Union still lags well behind the United States (less than half the gross national product). But the composition of Soviet production and the purposes for which that production is mobilized have won for the USSR military equality with the United States and at least temporary superiority in outer space exploration.

Although a swift or sudden change in the basic pattern of Soviet economic growth is unlikely, the structure and procedures of the economic system have some flexibility and are currently undergoing a transformation. Since Stalin's death, particularly since the ascendancy of Khrushchev, the regime has been experimenting with a variety of institutional and other changes in the system in a major effort to exploit possibilities for greater productivity and operational efficiency. These changes represent a striking break with habits of thought developed during the early years of Soviet industrialization.

The Soviet leaders are now diverting more resources to consumer goods, agriculture, housing, transportation, and other relatively neglected fields. Incentive systems are being strengthened. With a continued high rate of economic growth, the regime may well make additional improvements in the standard of living of the people without basically weakening the primary emphasis on heavy industry, armaments, and science. Such improvements probably will be maintained at a rate adequate to prevent serious political discontent and to enlist popular effort in behalf of national programs and objectives.

The regime is also testing and developing new methods for improving the operation of the economy. Modern mathematical and data-processing techniques, such as linear programming, are being used on a growing scale to help solve highly complex industrial and logistical problems. Rigidity in the planning process and in economic administration is giving way to flexible and decentralized forms of control.

Recent reorganizations in industry and agriculture are marked by a shift from vertical to horizontal management. Cumbersome

central economic ministries have been abolished. Many of their

responsibilities and powers have been consolidated and delegated to lower units of administration — primarily the local republics and newly established sovnarkhozy (regional economic councils). A major purpose of this shift was to stimulate initiative, cooperation, and a sense of responsibility at local levels of the economy. The sovnarkhozy are rapidly becoming the keystone of the new system. They have been given broad responsibilities for the operation and development of industry, and in large parts of the USSR their powers are being expanded to include jurisdiction over agricultural programming.

Decentralization of economic management has entailed difficulties in that it has increased the ability of local administrators to resist central guidance and direction by the party. The regime is focusing much of its current attention on this problem, but seems assured of effective lateral access to vital sectors of the economy. The sovnarkhozy have materially strengthened the government's ability to coordinate the activities of vast and widely dispersed economic complexes. While the decentralization program has still to run its full course, the end result may well be to render individual economic units in the society more responsive to the demands of the state.

The Shaping of Soviet Economic Policy

Soviet economic policy has consisted of a mix of Communist ideology, prerevolutionary patterns, and responses to the political and

economic exigencies of the moment.

When Lenin came to power he faced a number of problems that the regime still has not completely solved: how to marshall the resources necessary for accelerated industrial development; how to divert industrial resources to military requirements without utterly starving the consumer goods sector; how to increase agricultural production to feed a growing industrial and urban population without investing in agriculture so heavily as to jeopardize planned industrial expansion and efficiency; and how to contain the mounting inflation inevitably resulting from a shortage of consumer goods in a rapidly expanding economy.

Classical Marxist thought did not offer any systematic or useful prescription for quickly establishing a viable socialist economy in a situation such as faced the Bolsheviks in 1917. Springing from a historical analysis of the processes of industrialization in the West, Marxism-Leninism was primarily concerned with the organization

of industrial workers (the proletariat) as the key class in the transition to socialism. But at least three-quarters of the population in prerevolutionary Russia were engaged in agriculture. The peasantry wanted land and a full share of the harvests. The long-range Communist program called for making the peasant a wage earner, a worker on state-owned land, but the immediate and much more pressing problem was to feed the urban proletariat. This required peasant cooperation: in order to obtain it, the regime carried the revolution to the countryside under the slogan, "All Land to the Peasants." Large estates were broken up and parceled out to peasant families. Ideally the new landowners should have bartered their produce for consumer goods turned out by the urban industrial workers. But as a result of war and revolution there were few manufactured goods for which to barter and what could be found was priced out of reach of the rural consumer. Exchange between town and country ceased. To assure a flow of food to the cities, the government requisitioned all crops, allocating only a bare minimum for the peasant. The peasants responded by hiding their surpluses and by cutting down on the amount of land planted; the regime retaliated with terror.

Soviet policy for industry was limited during this period to keeping the wheels turning. The only available technicians, those who had worked under the old regime, were suspect. To minimize the danger of sabotage, the government nationalized major industrial enterprises. Workers' councils were established to check on management but their tendency to expand their functions to the point of virtually managing the enterprises and disrupting the regime's plans soon led to their abolishment. Centralized administration of industry was assigned to the Supreme Economic Council and the Council of Defense. Smaller plants, which fed into the larger enterprises, were also nationalized and placed under the control of these two bodies. The prerevolutionary State Bank was given control of all other banks, creating a government monopoly of the banking and credit structure. In addition to the railroad system, which had been nationalized under the old regime, the state took over all trade and trading facilities. A State Commission for Re-electrification was established to draw up long-range plans for a nationwide network of power stations.

Nevertheless, early efforts to impose order on the economy by centralized control failed: by 1921 inflation was completely out of hand; the civil war continued; and many people were starving. The Soviet government had counted on Communist revolutions in Western countries to provide industrial goods and services and speed up the recovery of Soviet economy. There were no revolutions.

To build up industry had become an urgent necessity.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1921. In agriculture, a system of taxes in kind replaced requisition of grain, and the farmer was allowed to sell a large proportion of his crop on the open market. For a time food supplies increased and, again permitted to lease machinery and to hire farm labor, the more successful peasants broke loose from the communal peasant villages and became independent farmers. Private trade began to flourish. Within two years, 75 percent of the total volume of retail trade was being handled by private merchants, 15 percent by the state, and 10 percent by state-controlled cooperatives. In order to provide an incentive for the farmer to increase the flow of food to cities, industry was directed to expand production of consumer goods. This was the so-called "Golden Age of NEP."

But while trade and agriculture were given free rein, centralization and direct government control of industry were intensified. as the necessary basis for economic planning. In February 1921 the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was established as the central planning agency. Starting with a staff of forty, Gosplan expanded rapidly; in 1923 it had a staff of three hundred. Shortly thereafter branch offices covered the USSR. During the next four years Gosplan developed its procedures by small-scale planning exercises. The government used it as an intermediary between various departments engaged in running the industrial machine. By 1928, Gosplan was able to draw up the first detailed and comprehensive plan for developing the economy. By this time, although Soviet economic growth had been spasmodic, alternating between periods of rapid advance and stagnation, a kind of equilibrium had been reached. Agriculture and industry regained lost ground and total production slightly exceeded the prewar level.

A controversy developed within the top Soviet leadership and among the economists as to the tempo of future industrialization. Those favoring a more relaxed pace argued that prerevolutionary capital, with which the economy had been operating up to 1928, was now exhausted; machinery and plant had deteriorated and no provision had been made for their replacement; there had been little new investment since 1914 and no major source of capital funds was available. If industrialization was to proceed rapidly, new methods of financing would have to be found and the emphasis placed strongly upon producer as against consumer goods. But deprived of

manufactured goods in exchange for his produce the peasant would almost certainly revert to earlier tactics, withholding grain from the market when nothing was offered in exchange. This could only lead to another crisis.

Against this line of argument a group of economists and party theoreticians urged that slower industrialization would dangerously weaken the position of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the capitalist West. Without basic modern industry the economic and military strength necessary to meet any outside threat was impossible; highest priorities must be given to producer goods, regardless of peasant discontent. The whole economy would have to be put on a quasi-wartime footing of austerity and maximum effort and the peasantry must be forced to accept the role assigned to them by the regime.

The second group won. The first Five Year Plan, put into operation in late 1928, called for heavy capital investment and increased socialization of the major areas of the economy. Private trading was curbed by means of progressive taxes designed to eliminate middlemen. Control over industrial enterprises was centralized once more. Under the plan, Soviet industry actually became even more dependent on agriculture than before, since the government planned to make extensive foreign purchases of heavy industrial equipment, to be financed by export of grain. Soviet economic development seemed to be at the mercy of the recalcitrant peasantry. Only by forcing the peasants into collective farms and thereby controlling each stage of the agricultural process could the economic planners hope to obtain sufficient quantities of grain at prices that would enable them to feed the urban population and at the same time increase exports.

According to the original plan, collectivization was to be gradual with less than 25 percent of all peasant households collectivized by 1933. But as grain collections encountered increasing difficulty, proving inadequate for domestic and export needs, the decision was made to accelerate the program of complete collectivization. Twenty-five thousand Communist party members were mobilized in November 1929 and sent to rural areas to spur the campaign. Government propaganda sought to divide the opposition by playing on the traditional enmity between the poorer and the well-to-do peasants. Pressures became increasingly ruthless as many who resisted were shot or sent to prison camps. Within a month after the campaign was launched the number of collective farms rose from 59,400 to 110,200; by July 1931 half of all peasant households had been collec-

tivized; and by 1936 the figure had risen to 90 percent. The inde-

pendent peasant had virtually ceased to exist.

Forced collectivization cost the Soviet government at least as much as it won. Those who resisted the regime and those afraid that jealous neighbors might denounce them as "kulaks" killed their livestock and wrecked their farm equipment. Over half of all Russian livestock, including draft animals, were destroyed during this period. Poor harvests, which contributed to the famines of 1931–32, heightened peasant resistance and general disruption in the first years of collectivization. There was built up in the countryside an animosity which, in the form of peasant inertia and passive resistance, persists to this day.

One concession was made to the farmers: a garden plot was permitted each collective farm household. But the regime had won a victory over the independent peasantry. From 1931 on, it completely controlled the economy, and this control has not been openly challenged since.

Soviet Economic Planning

The five-year plans that followed (composed of separate annual plans), like the regime that produced them, were essentially authoritarian. Consumer demands were given lowest priority except when the regime deemed it politically expedient to do otherwise. Each plan stressed certain objectives as being most important or "leading links"; all other objectives became "supporting links." Thus, during the first Five Year Plan (1928–32), the leading links were output of machinery and electricity; during the second Five Year Plan, they were iron and steel and railroad development, and so on. While one portion of the plan may be overfulfilled, another portion may fall far below expectations. The practice of "storming an objective" and the high priority given to heavy industries have resulted in very uneven development in the economy.

Planning for a large and complex economy is at best a difficult and often an inexact procedure. The difficulties are compounded in the USSR where planning must serve political and propaganda goals as well. In planning future output of a plant, for example, the resources necessary to fulfill the planned output, including raw materials, sufficient and qualified labor, adequately functioning machinery, etc., must be assigned to the plant. The optimum conditions for efficient operation are rarely present in any plant — in the

USSR or elsewhere; but the planners disregard this fact and set operating costs and output quotas for each plant on the basis of a theoretical maximum capacity, apparently arbitrarily determined. Until 1953, production norms for agricultural crops also were based on theoretical yields; the present method of computation is somewhat more realistic.

In general, production targets and norms for most sectors of the economy tend to be set above practical possibilities. The enormous pressure to meet these targets put on managers and collective farm chairmen often causes reductions in quality in order to fulfill output demands. The penalties for not fulfilling output targets are severe enough to force responsible officials to resort to extralegal practices (such as obtaining materials from irregular sources). Thus there is a great deal of economic activity that is not officially approved but that by providing a measure of flexibility keeps the system from breaking down.

While the annual plans serve to integrate the parts of a vast economy, they also have an underlying political function that should not be underestimated. In a letter to the head of the State Commission for Re-electrification. Lenin in 1920 stated the political needs which have motivated the formulation and promulgation of such plans ever since:

Couldn't you produce a plan (not a technical but a political scheme) which would be understood by the proletariat? . . . We need such a plan at once to give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to work for . . . it is necessary to rouse the workers by a grand program for the next ten or twenty years.

The plans have attempted, and with some success, to capture the imagination of the Russian people. One consistent method has been to highlight very large projects. The regime wants it known that the Soviet Union builds the world's largest dams and generating plants; their relative efficiency is not relevant to their political function. Similarly, large-scale state farms are established and subsidized for propaganda purposes, though they are in many ways inefficient. This "gigantomania," though providing no more consumer goods for the Soviet citizen, does feed his national pride. From time to time gigantomania has been subject to official criticism by representatives of the regime, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, but here, as in other areas of Soviet life, political needs are overriding. The mere existence of a plan seems to provide a feeling of security and, according to official propaganda, is itself sufficient evidence that the regime has everything under control.

A great deal of propaganda, both internal and external, utilizes the statistics of economic progress to justify and glorify the accomplishments of the present regime. At the same time, the population must be stimulated to greater productivity; hence the setting of extremely high output goals. These propaganda needs indicate that statistics, like the arts, are considered weapons in the ideologicalstruggle. Official Soviet statistics and indices of production tend to exaggerate the accomplishments of the regime. The index of the gross value of production, for example, is constructed in such a way as to include inflationary biases so that the values obtained for various years are much higher than if adjustments had been made. Similarly, measures of agricultural output have been inflated by failure to take full account of harvest losses. The difficulty of assessing Soviet economic development has been increased by a general prohibition since 1939 on the release of more than scattered statistics. This policy, reversed in April 1956 when a fairly comprehensive volume of general statistics was published, was the result not only of Soviet unwillingness to give full information to the outside world on the status of the economy but also of the propaganda use made of such statistics. For home consumption, the annual plans stress percentage increases in production, which are easier for the general population to understand, but the exact statistical basis of the computations is rarely given.

Soviet Economic Development

Despite many statistical pitfalls, there is little question that since 1928 the USSR has experienced accelerated economic growth at a sustained rate unequalled by any other country (see the map, Major

Industrial Areas and Power Resources of the USSR).

The basis for this rapid development, aside from the large but far-flung resources of the country, has been the ability of the regime to force the population to increase output without any substantial rise in living standards. An undisciplined labor force with predominantly rural background was given technical training and subjected to severe discipline. While labor productivity has been raised, the regime now seems to feel that a limit has been reached in the use of coercion. Other methods are being tried, such as relaxation of the laws enforcing labor discipline, greater emphasis on monetary incentives, and wider use of public shame and censure.

Productivity in Soviet agriculture remains fairly low. Even with its great industrial machine, the USSR employs over forty percent of its labor force in agriculture. Greater incentives for peasants as well as more investment in agriculture will be needed if the industrial labor force is to expand further and those remaining on the

farms are to feed the urban population.

Soviet economic development has been uneven. The regime has borrowed and readily adapted some of the most advanced equipment and techniques — high pressure blast furnaces, increased automation of basic industrial processes, for example — from the West. But side by side with the most modern machinery there still exists obsolete equipment: in coal mining, for example, actual production is mechanized, but subsidiary operations such as loading continue to be done largely by hand.

While development of the Soviet economy could not have taken place without wholesale borrowing of Western technology, Soviet industry has made advances on its own. And even in fields where large-scale "borrowing" has occurred, there is ample indication that Soviet industry has made significant independent progress.


A gradual decline in the rate of Soviet economic growth can be expected, but a sudden or sharp change is not likely. The high tempo of Soviet development, coupled with the growing economic strength of the total Communist bloc, provides the USSR with a formidable potential for the future.

Industry

The speed and character of Soviet industrial development has been determined by late industrialization and by the decisions of the government as set forth in the economic plans. The basic elements of this development have included a borrowing of modern techniques from more experienced industrial nations, a large-scale shift in the population from the farms to industrial centers, and a high rate of investment in plant and equipment.

The stated objective of Soviet industrial planning is to equal or surpass in economic power any country of the West, particularly the United States. This aim, long a preoccupation of Russia's rulers now finds expression in concentrated efforts to outdo the United States in a selected list of products basic to the further development of the economy, such as steel, electric power, oil, coal, milk, butter,

and sugar.




The corollary to the Soviet quest for economic and military power inferior to none has been a drive for economic self-sufficiency. Today the Soviet Union is generally self-sufficient in natural resources and, with the assets of the satellites added to its own, is to a great extent independent of the West (see the map, Major Mineral Resources of the USSR). Yet certain shortages of strategic materials do exist, notably nickel and alloys for special steel; production of synthetic fuels and materials is inadequate; and the needs of accelerating production have forced the Soviets to import not only specialized machinery but entire plants and industrial processes, especially in the chemical field.

These deficiencies are essentially functions of the rapid pace of industrial development. A slower and more balanced growth could remedy a great many of the shortages. The Soviet leaders, however, are reluctant to retard the present rate of industrial growth any more than is necessary and have begun pressing for an expansion of economic relations with the non-Communist world. Soviet foreign economic contacts are increasing in volume and diversity. While this activity is focused primarily on the less developed and politically uncommitted nations of the world, it includes a vigorous effort to

expand trade with the industrial nations of the West.

The growing Sino-Soviet role in international commodity trade and credit is motivated by both economic and political considerations. A desire to obtain foreign exchange, to dispose of a surplus, or to import commodities that at present it would be impractical or impossible to produce domestically inspires much Soviet foreign economic activity. At the same time, the Soviet leaders use their economic capacities to back up their foreign policy, especially in the vulnerable less developed areas of the world. The fact that Soviet economic and political interests coincide in many foreign economic undertakings lends flexibility to Soviet policies abroad and adds to the political significance of the USSR's growing industrial potential.

The Soviet Union has a larger labor force than the United States but suffers from a shortage of skilled workers. Over-all industrial production can be raised either by physical expansion of industry or by the increased mechanization of existing industry. For any major physical expansion of industry, workers would have to be drawn from the farms, but unless Soviet farming is far more mechanized than it is today such a withdrawal would cause a drop in badly needed agricultural production. Because labor is so much



cheaper than in the United States and investment capital is in relatively short supply, many labor-consuming processes in both agriculture and industry have not been mechanized. Application of advanced technology is now being pressed, with priority given to such industries as machine building and motor vehicle, airplane, and armaments manufacture. Mechanization of agriculture is proceeding at a comparatively slower rate.

As stated, all Soviet industries except industrial cooperatives are owned and directed by the government. At the peak of the industrial structure is the USSR Council of Ministers, whose policy-making body is the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist party. Reporting directly to the Council of Ministers are various planning and control agencies such as the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the State Control Commission (formerly Ministry of State Control), the Committee on State Security, and

the Ministry of Finance.

It has been indicated that the present organization of Soviet industry is in a state of transition stemming from recent administrative reforms. Prior to these reforms, the Council of Ministers included not only certain high party officials and the heads of various noneconomic ministries (such as Foreign Affairs) but also numerous economic or production ministries. Each of these directed a segment of the manufacturing sector of the economy, setting policy and supervising operation. Jurisdiction was denoted in the titles of the ministries, e.g., Ministry of Construction Machinery and Road Machine-Building, Ministry of Heavy Machine-Building.

In addition to a number of technical departments such as finance, sales, and supply, each operating ministry had certain subdivisions known as chief administrations, glavki. A chief administration had control of a number of plants in a given area or, if the ministry controlled production of a number of major products, each chief administration was responsible for a particular product. A chief administration sometimes also supervised a number of trusts or

combines.

Many central economic ministries were abolished or reorganized into republic ministries as part of the decentralization program. The coordinating functions of the *glavki* are now in large measure performed by the regional economic councils, *sovnarkhozy*. The *sovnarkhoz*, while an extension of governmental administration at the republic level, continues to take general direction from central control agencies such as the State Planning Commission.

At the bottom of the administrative hierarchy is the industrial

plant, a legal entity with a charter and a fixed amount of capital. Each plant prepares its own balance sheet and keeps an account at the State Bank. Though the enterprise is government-owned, the government is not responsible for the plant's liabilities. Legal action can be taken, and often is, against a plant, either by other plants or occasionally by individuals. According to the principle of "one-man control" now in force, the plant director bears the ultimate responsibility for the operations of the plant. Often he is also responsible for worker housing, the plant newspaper, child nurseries, the workers' cafeteria, and, in the more isolated areas, consumer stores. Various government agencies and departments converge upon the plant director, controlling and curtailing his area of operations.

Controls on the Industrial Plant

The State Planning Commission acts as the central planning agency for the whole Soviet economy, establishing norms and targets for each particular industry. The targets consist of production quotas given in terms of so many units or tons; norms are ratios of output to fuel, labor, and material to be used. The State Planning Commission

has numerous local offices that check on actual production.

Setting targets involves negotiation between the planning agency and various operating levels of the economic administration. The broad targets of the plan are based on national policy and information supplied by the Central Statistical Administration. These general requirements are broken down into plant targets and forwarded to the plant for "counter-planning." The plant manager with the advice of his staff then prepares a "draft plan" for the year's operation. This plan, generally a compromise, undergoes constant revision as it is passed on up the line to the State Planning Commission where eventually it is "confirmed" as the official final plan.

The State Planning Commission, concerned with increasing production, always attempts to set maximum targets. The plant director, on the other hand, though also interested in keeping production at a high level faces penalties ranging from loss of substantial bonuses to fines or imprisonment for failure to meet or surpass targets and will therefore try to present a draft plan incorporating a "safety factor" in his favor, that is, a lower output target.

A number of devices may be used to that effect. Production potential of the plant may be understated, machinery and equipment falsely reported as being beyond repair, the time required for new production processes exaggerated, or the supply of raw material, stocks, and labor intentionally underestimated. If higher

officials abet the plant director's quest for "safety," they will pass along the draft plan without change to the Commission for confirmation. Norms and targets, however, will almost never be set lower than those achieved in the preceding period, and thus there is constant upward revision. But the give and take in the planning process, designed to increase industrial efficiency by ensuring an orderly flow of supplies, sometimes involves a whole series of non-economic and wasteful revisions. Extralegal manipulation of targets and "draft plans" nevertheless helps in setting more realistic output targets and on balance may be a factor in lowering real costs of production.

Once the targets are established the State Planning Commission becomes responsible for their enforcement, with the power in unusual circumstances to send its own inspectors into a plant and to examine the accounts. Generally, however, the planning agency works through local district planning agencies, who have to serve two masters—the central government and the government of the republic or oblast involved. The local planning officials are more likely to favor the latter and to become involved in the extralegal schemes of the local plant management. Inspectors from the central office on the other hand are not involved in local "family relations," as they are known, and as outsiders find it difficult to uncover irregularities. The lack of qualified planning personnel at the rayon and oblast level probably remains a continuing hindrance to efficient operation and control of Soviet industry.

Antagonism between plant directors and other operating personnel on the one hand and planning or nonoperating personnel on the other is known to exist. The attitude of plant personnel seems to be somewhat like that of an American businessman toward federal or state inspectors, who are likely to be regarded as "meddlers" not understanding the first thing about the difficulties and

intricacies of running a business.

The Ministry of Finance also exercises supervisory functions at the plant level, directly through the State Bank and indirectly through the finance offices of the republics. The Ministry's offices at the republic level collect the profit and sales taxes (see below) for the government and receive monthly returns from the enterprise to ensure that tax payments are being made according to plan. Since these offices are primarily interested in the enterprise for tax purposes, their supervision does not ordinarily extend to other aspects of plant operation such as actual production costs, quality control, and so forth. And because they also have to administer the

budget of the republic, they can spend only a limited amount of

time on strictly industrial matters.

By contrast, the State Bank has continuous contact with the enterprise: all commercial transactions of the enterprise go through its account with the local State Bank branch. In addition the enterprise twice a month withdraws cash from the bank for its payroll. The bank generally has a detailed copy of the wage and production norms of the enterprise against which withdrawals may be checked before they are honored. If the enterprise exceeds its planned wage expenditure by a certain margin the bank is authorized to close the account. The bank also grants short-term loans to the enterprise on the basis of planned sales and production.

The bank is not directly concerned with the fulfillment of production targets. This is the chief responsibility of the operating personnel, which will act in an extralegal manner if necessary to

protect their interest in the enterprise's continued success.

The State Control Commission acts in close cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and when the latter uncovers irregularities may send agents to the plant to conduct a special audit. These agents are feared as outsiders and can do much to disrupt operations. The State Control Commission may issue reprimands, impose fines, order the removal of personnel, or go so far as to prosecute managerial

personnel in the courts.

Other agencies which function in relation to the plant at various times include the Procuracy, which may be called in by a supervisory authority or may initiate an investigation on the basis of either information appearing in the press or a direct complaint; the Central Statistical Administration, which collects production data from the enterprises and which from time to time may send inspectors into the plant to verify reports submitted; the State Arbitration Commission, which handles disputes between enterprises; and a number of safety inspectorates.

Although enjoying broad powers, the agencies described above do not enter into the day-to-day operations of the industrial plant.

Controls within the Enterprise

There are also control organizations whose representatives are regular employees of the enterprise and who are responsible for surveillance and supervision within the plant. All plants of key industries such as iron and steel and aircraft have attached to them a member of the political police. Theoretically, this agent, as an employee of the plant, is subordinate to the plant manager; in practice, however,

he is independent of him. Little is known about his duties except that he watches over operations to see that there is no subversive activity, sabotage, and so on. If machinery breaks down, if there is a fire in the plant, or if some other emergency interrupts production, he will be the one to undertake the required formal investigation. He also collects information and keeps a file on all key employees. The political police agent reportedly works alone and keeps himself at a distance from the managerial personnel.

The party secretary—in plants that have such an official—superintends plan fulfillment and accurate record-keeping by the management. He is moreover responsible for inspiring workers to greater production efforts, not only by arranging factory meetings and delivering pep talks but also by assisting in strict maintenance

of labor discipline.

The labor union chairman also is concerned with the enforcement of labor discipline and with increasing the productivity of the workers, as well as with certain aspects of their welfare. The plant manager, the party secretary, and the union chairman are linked in common responsibility for the successful operation of the plant, though the union chairman is reported to be the least powerful in this triumvirate. By virtue of this close bond many of the extralegal acts likely to be perpetrated in the course of fulfilling the plan are effectively concealed from higher authorities.

Another source of internal control is the practice of voicing criticism in letters to the official press. Workers may take it upon themselves to report extralegal acts, evidence of inadequate supervision and control, and other irregularities to local and national newspapers. Publication of such a letter immediately alerts the many control organizations, and if the charge is serious enough or if many such letters criticize the same shortcomings the agencies will move in

to investigate and take appropriate action.

Personnel

The internal organization of a Soviet industrial enterprise, except for the control-agency representatives within the plant, is essentially similar to that found in American industry. Depending upon the size and complexity of the plant, the plant director will control, in addition to his workers, a number of such functional departments as finance, office management, design, personnel, supply and sales, mechanical maintenance, and quality control. The plant also comprises a number of workshops or departments, each of which has a chief, an assistant chief, and a foreman.

Since industrial labor, especially in the skilled brackets, has been a relatively scarce commodity in the Soviet Union for some time, the plant will make every effort to obtain needed personnel, bypassing if need be the official machinery for manpower direction and control. Every worker must have a workbook containing his "service record" and, until recently, before he could change jobs, had to get a formal release from his previous employer. But plants desperate for additional workers often have overlooked this and other legal requirements. Plants also have been known to "stockpile" labor power.

Prices, Profits, and Supply

The individual enterprise has to operate according to a plan based on the amount of resources allotted to it in the form of labor, machinery, and capital. The plan sets out, in detail, output, prices, and profits for the period. In the course of implementing the plan, the plant will contract with other government-owned enterprises for the requisite raw materials and semifinished goods. The contracts specify both quantity and price of materials to be delivered, and payment is arranged through the State Bank. For accounting purposes the plant is considered an independent entity, and its performance can be measured in terms of quantity and quality of output and by the degree to which it can stay within or lower the planned cost of production and achieve or exceed planned profit. The wholesale price of the commodity produced by the enterprise includes cost of all materials, wages, and depreciation, as well as turnover tax and planned profit.

Most of the planned profit is taxed away by the government and is treated as part of the nation's budgetary revenue. From one to five percent of the planned profits goes into the Enterprise Fund (formerly called the Director's Fund). Of this fund, half goes to expand production, by adding to the planned capital investment of the enterprise and by providing housing for workers; the other half is spent for improving services to workers. The most important feature of the fund, however, is that it enables a plant director to maintain an incentive system to increase the productivity of his workers. He awards bonuses which may take the form of cash, paid vacations,

luxury items, or scarce foods.

By cutting its planned costs or overfulfilling its output target the plant can show a profit beyond what is called for in the plan for the period. A larger share of this unplanned profit is left in the Enterprise Fund. In attempting to build up his plant's unplanned profit, the director is restricted in a number of ways. He cannot raise the selling price of his commodity, even if costs are unexpectedly high and he is selling at a loss; neither is he allowed to sell any of the capital equipment of his plant, although this is known to have been done. He is not supposed to increase production of a low-cost, high-profit commodity at the expense of a low-profit product called for by his plan, but he may attempt to do just this, provided staff and control officials acquiesce in the scheme.

The difficulty of finding the supplies needed to meet production targets has been the gravest source of disturbance to Soviet industrial plant managers and has most often led them to bypass officially designated channels. Purchases of many basic materials needed in a given industry, at least until recently, were subject to a pattern of strict central allocation. Greater autonomy in purchasing appears to have been the trend since the decentralization of economic administration, indicating the regime's realization of the seriousness of this

problem.

Blat and Other Extralegal Activities

Blat, a Russian word in common use, can be translated as "pull," "influence." or "sharp practice" used to meet the production demands of the government. The conditions giving rise to such practices are somewhat like those that accompanied the material shortages in the United States during World War II when government agencies were allocating strategic materials and controlling prices: many companies maintained representatives in Washington with a view to securing more favorable treatment from production authorities. There also existed a "gray market" in steel and scarce products; in many cases one scarce item was bartered for another, to the reciprocal benefit of the parties involved. In the USSR scarcity of industrial materials, semifinished goods, and parts is much more frequent and the complexity of the bureaucracy controlling industry is much greater than in wartime America; not only are the extralegal activities intricate and pervasive but they constitute an integral though unofficial part of Soviet industrial organization and economic life.

Blat is sometimes carried out through an expediter, tolkach, who may be the purchasing agent of the plant or the plant manager himself. He travels widely, has an expense account, and will be in a position to know what plants, over a wide area, have excess supplies of what is short in his plant.

The expediter is usually concerned with items that are only

marginal in terms of the total volume of supplies used by his plant but often vitally important in meeting certain targets. In the process of planning operations of as large and complex an economy as that of the USSR, errors of every dimension are inevitable and the size and complexity of the individual sectors make it impossible to correct errors without a great deal of delay. Most industrial supply requirements are, nevertheless, met through official procurement channels.

The funds to finance an expediter's operations are derived from any number of semilegal sources. Most nearly legal is the Enterprise Fund, from which withdrawals ostensibly for purposes such as "research for improvement of production" may be made, then diverted to the expediter. The plant may obtain allocations of "extra" supplies through proper channels, then barter them for more necessary items. Certain goods may be reported as "spoiled," sold as perfect at the regular price - the sale being recorded at a much lower "reject" price - and the difference made available to the expediter. Obviously such complicated activities involve a number of individuals and collusion that reaches up to the higher levels of the hierarchy. Other devices used to ensure fulfillment of the plant's target, such as "padding" the plan to provide a safety factor for the plant's operation, have already been noted. A plant also may add defective goods into the production output figures, or fail to provide the assortment of goods called for by the plan.

When a plant needs a steady supply of certain small items such as grinding wheels or oil cans — that it is incapable of obtaining either from plan sources or through blat, it will proceed to manufacture the item in its own workshops. This is bound to be wasteful. because workers and equipment so used must be withdrawn from primary production or, as often happens, from the research or development departments of the enterprise. Once production of a commodity outside the plan has started, other plants in the area will want to purchase or barter for the needed part, and what began as a peripheral activity becomes a profitable undertaking, absorbing an increasing portion of the plant's resources. Only a short step separates this phase from wholesale diversion of "scrap" materials to "spare-time" manufacture of highly prized consumer goods. Typically, the press will then report that a plant manufacturing airplane parts has also been turning out pots and pans and selling them on the open market.

Instances of officials making substantial personal profit from these extralegal activities seem to be the exception. Interviews with former Soviet citizens indicate that *blat* and other evasions of bureaucratic controls are primarily designed to insure fulfillment of government production demands. These maneuvers, paradoxically, are sometimes a source of strength for the Soviet economy in the sense that they impart to the formal structure of Soviet planned industry a certain amount of flexibility and resilience without which industry might function much less effectively. Practices such as *blat* unquestionably allow some rubles to be diverted to the participants; the evasions when uncovered are prosecuted, but except in rare cases it is assumed that the individual did not seek direct personal gain.

Triggering the Control Forces

That informal and extralegal arrangements are directed toward fulfilling the production plan explains their continuance despite the many external and internal controls on the plant. So long as they help the plant in meeting its commitments, there is little likelihood that control officials will interfere, even if complaints appear in the official press. But if the plant consistently underfulfills its norm it may trigger a chain reaction, in the course of which one, then all, of the control agencies descend upon it. Because someone has to be the scapegoat for production stoppages or failures, the control forces will lose no time placing the blame squarely on the plant director and his representatives.

Unprecedented production successes carry their own danger, though many agencies, being themselves in a manner responsible for production, will condone extralegal activities in such cases to avoid its disruption. But if month after month the plant overfulfills its norm, questions may be raised as to whether the norm was set too low, or whether irregularities may be behind such protracted production success. As a consequence, it appears to have become common practice for plant managers to report underfulfillment of monthly plans several times a year, even if they have maintained production. The "extra" goods are held back to provide a safety factor; if some month's production falls very low these products can then be included in the report.

The plant director and other managerial personnel, being constantly aware of possible denunciation, operate in an atmosphere of strain and tension. They are forced to use *blat* and can get away with it if it prevents production shortages; if such tactics fail to

work, however, their downfall is accelerated.

Incentives and Plant Loyalty

While *blat* is not generally engaged in for direct personal profit, indirect profits, especially to top management, evidently do result. If the plan is fulfilled, plant personnel are entitled to large bonuses in the form of percentage increases in salaries. The director of a large machine-building enterprise may by fulfilling the monthly plan add as much as 37 percent to his basic salary; if he can overfulfill by 4 percent he gets a 50 percent increase. Hence a difference of one tenth of one percent in plan fulfillment, from 99.9 to 100 percent, will mean a sizable boost in salary for the month. To a lesser degree, other managerial personnel also benefit, as do production-line workers in a more reduced form. *Blat* therefore is tempting, not only as a way to avoid punishment, but also as a means of acquiring substantial economic and social rewards.

Overfulfillment of the plan also results in a large accumulation of money in the Enterprise Fund, part of which is used in the personal bonus system controlled by the plant director. The most productive shop unit in the plant for each month receives the Red Banner and a bonus from the fund. The bonus system contributes to frantic end-of-the-month rushes to meet the norm. Officials have constantly deplored this situation in the press, calling for balanced production progress, but with seemingly little success. In these rush periods machines are operated to the limit of capacity and often

break down.

There is also a system of personal awards for the most productive workers and for workers with long seniority in the same plant. In addition to providing economic benefits, the incentive system exploits the social prestige accruing to the recipient of such an award: his name and picture are posted on the plant bulletin board, he may be feted at a special plant party, he may be asked to address production rallies at other plants, and a large lapel pin will make known his achievement to all who see him. According to former Soviet citizens, the general feeling toward those so rewarded is similar to the attitude of American workers toward "rate busters." To the extent that the winner of an award is conspicuous, he detracts from the achievements of his fellow workers and may even cause production norms to be raised. Former award winners have stated that they were conscious of the resentment of their co-workers and that they disliked being singled out. Just as the factory management does not like to call attention to itself, individual workers generally try to stay out of the limelight. Unvaried outstanding achievement brings responsibility and places a man in a position where his security is threatened both from above and from below.

Plant directors, however, take pride in their job and the achievements of their workers. Plant loyalty among workers is fostered by the party secretary as part of his efforts to stimulate mass participation in the goals of the regime. In addition, managerial personnel attempt to maintain personal relations with workers by listening to complaints and giving advice. Those plant directors who do not find time for personal contact with workers are criticized in the press for "bureaucratic insensitivity." While such devices have had a degree of success in developing a feeling of worker loyalty to the plant, high labor turnover remains a major industrial problem.

Agriculture

Despite a great expansion of the industrial base during the past thirty years and a consequent growth in the urban work force, close to half of the USSR's population still earns its livelihood from the land. The urban population, however, has been increasing at a more rapid annual rate than the nation as a whole. Consequently, a smaller agricultural population whose productivity has advanced very slowly must meet constantly increasing food needs, as well as the requirements of a regime that seeks to convert agricultural surpluses into industrial investment, with overriding emphasis on heavy industry and relatively little regard for consumer goods and incentives.

The Soviet regime has been committed to an urban-industrial program which allows only a very low level of investment in agriculture; at the same time it has endeavored to drain every possible ruble out of agriculture. In consequence the per capita level of food production attained in the USSR in 1928 has not since been equaled for most foodstuffs and has been only slightly surpassed in others. In seeking, without major capital investments, to keep the available food supply from falling below requirements the Soviet regime faces two major obstacles: a recalcitrant peasantry and relatively limited agricultural resources.

The Peasant

In 1917 the victorious Communists faced a peasantry which demanded land and a full share of the crops produced, a demand which the regime had to meet even at the cost of contradicting its ideological principles. After trying to increase agricultural production by force and to collect a large share of it for itself and the

urban population, the new regime was forced to relax controls during the NEP (1921–28). That program, among other things, allowed the continued development of a group of comparatively prosperous peasants—the kulaks (literally, "fists")—that had

emerged after the 1905-10 reforms of Premier Stolypin.

Gradually the agricultural disruption caused by World War I and by the civil war was overcome, until by 1928 agricultural production had reached the 1913 level. But the regime still had to contend with a recalcitrant and uncontrolled peasantry. It was unable to enforce collection of large in-kind tax payments from individual peasant households, and the peasant had already shown, in and during the NEP period, that he had the power to stifle industrial development and cause an economic and political crisis by withholding his produce from the market.

The peasant on the collective farm has been the most exploited individual in Soviet society. He has been taxed more heavily than anyone else. Unlike the urban worker, he still does not get his share of either the various social services the regime provides or the available educational facilities. He also generally is the first to suffer from any reduction in the always inadequate supply of consumer

goods.

Forced collectivization after 1929 in effect restored many features of the serf agriculture existing prior to the 1861 emancipation; the collective farmer today, like the serf, is practically tied to the land, theoretically unable to leave without the express permission of the state. Also, by reintroducing communal tillage and communal obligations to the government the regime obscured the relation between individual daily labor and individual reward.

The peasants' response has followed an equally old tradition. As members of the mir they had been accustomed to oppressive demands by the government and to meeting them with lip service and evasion. When the regime threatened collectivization, many did not hesitate to slaughter their livestock and destroy the equipment that was to be taken from them. Once the collective farms were established, the old tactics of passive resistance were again employed.

Today the regime demands that the collective farmer devote most of his effort to farming collective land; he performs this required labor halfheartedly and at the first opportunity leaves for his household plot, the produce of which he himself can dispose of.

So, despite the USSR's increased agricultural requirements, its peasants remain in varying degrees discontented and uncooperative. Generally they have been able to express their distaste for the collective farm only through evasion and procrastination; but during World War II the German invaders of the Ukraine were actually welcomed because the peasants believed collective farms would be abolished. While the Soviet regime attempts to increase agricultural production through mechanization, improved technology, and extension of the cultivated land area, the peasant remains the most hostile and inflexible component of the program.

The Land

Traditionally in Russia, extension of the cultivated area has been the most important method of increasing agricultural production. Today, extension has reached the point where increased capital

expenditures for expansion bring very low returns.

While the USSR contains one-sixth of the surface of the earth, almost all of it lies north of the forty-second parallel (the line through Chicago). The northerly location of this great land mass and the remoteness of most of it from the climatic influence of oceans severely limit the area that can be cultivated. The arable land of the Soviet Union (including fallow and orchard) comprises only about one-tenth (or 556 million acres) of its total territory. The United States, by comparison, has about 437 million acres, almost a quarter of its entire area, classed as arable land.

The northern part of the USSR, from European Russia to eastern Siberia — more than ten percent of the total area — is an untillable arctic plain (tundra). South of this, a forest zone which is poorly adapted to farming covers nearly forty percent more of the

country.

Approximately ninety percent of Russia's good farming land lies within a triangular area—its base a line running from Leningrad to Odessa, its sides irregular and tapering to a point at Lake Baykal in southern Siberia (see the plate, Latitude and Comparative Size of the Agricultural Areas of the USSR and of the United States and Canada). Within this zone (which also includes most of the cities, industries, and transportation of the USSR) some 368 million acres actually were under cultivation in 1955. The United States cultivates 321 million acres. The USSR has 2.2 acres of cultivated land per capita, the United States 2.7 acres of generally more productive land per capita.

The arable triangle is far from the Atlantic Ocean, from which the prevailing winds bring moisture to Europe. Except for some few western regions and the high mountain areas, most of this land receives less than 20 inches of rain per year — about as much as dryfarming areas in the United States. Inferior podsolic soils cover about half the area, but elsewhere the soil is good and the average temperatures keep down evaporation sufficiently to permit dry farming. However, the low average annual rainfall, associated with great variation in the growing season from year to year, causes

harvests to be extremely unpredictable.

Since 1953 the regime has pushed the development of "virgin lands" to the north and east of the fertile triangle. This is an area where the average frost-free period is less than 105 days per year and where there is the danger of serious frost during the growing season. The area's climatic conditions approximate those of the dry areas of Montana and eastern Wyoming, with less than 15 inches rainfall but a mean July temperature of about 70 degrees Fahrenheit. It is estimated that eighty million new acres were plowed and planted in 1956. Khrushchev has claimed that the cost of producing grain in the new land is less than in many other grain-producing sections of the country.

Although in the past young, unmarried people have been sent out to live an extremely rugged life in the "virgin lands," recent plans call for creation of "good living conditions" there to attract permanent settlers also – a fact which should lead to considerably higher investment in the area. In these semiarid lands effective methods of plowing and of soil and moisture conservation are critically important. In the past, early breakdown in soil structure permitted only a short cycle of cultivation every two or three decades. Whether the Soviet regime can solve this problem remains to be seen.

Semiarid land is preponderant in the Central Asian republics except in a few river valleys. While irrigation projects have turned part of this desert into a rich cotton-producing area, much larger investments must be made to maintain and expand production. The climate here too is capricious, and droughts occur frequently.

Dryness plagues even the most productive areas of the USSR. On the whole, the climatic and soil limitations on expansion of Soviet agriculture are such that increased production must be sought through intensive cultivation of existing land, increased mechanization, increased incentives, and other measures of rationalization.

Crops

The variety of climate and of soil in the USSR permits cultivation of crops ranging from coarse grains in the north to tea and citrus



LATTITUDE AND COMPARATIVE SIZE OF THE AGRICULTURAL AREAS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES



MAJOR AGRICULTURAL AREAS

1:25,000,000

fruits on the northern Caucasus coast as well as in parts of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Wheat is the leading crop, accounting for over 30 percent of total crop acreage, less than 10 percent in the western regions, more than 50 percent east of the Urals. Rye, oats, and barley together have accounted for another 40 percent in recent years, with rye constituting about one-fourth of the total crop of principal grains.

Grain output since 1909–13 has increased a little over 20 percent compared with some 50 percent increase in total population. But the supply of grain has been more or less adequate for the people primarily because grain exports, of paramount importance in tsarist times, have dwindled and because more grain is consumed directly

as food by the people.

Current plans call for a sharp increase in grain production; in part this is to be accomplished through large-scale sowing of corn. Until 1953 corn was a minor crop concentrated largely in southern European Russia and the Caucasus and varying between 9 and 12 million acres. In 1955 more than 40 million acres were put under corn; in 1956, 58 million; in 1957–58, 50 million. The emphasis now is on raising yields per acre through more intensive cultivation rather than on bringing more land under the plow. Much of the corn is to be harvested before fully ripened and used as concentrated fodder for *kolkhoz* herds.

There is no large area in the USSR comparable to the American "corn belt," where climate and soil both favor this crop, and a higher input of labor — especially at harvest time — is required by corn than by the crops it is supplanting in the USSR. Under conditions currently prevailing in the Soviet Union, labor requirements because of increased corn planting may rise three to six times for a given yield. Add technical problems such as lack of specialized corn machinery, the scarcity of hybrid seed, commercial fertilizer, and know-how, and the large element of risk in Soviet plans for greatly increased grain production in the near future becomes clear.

Although the pattern of Russian grain utilization has been changed, with more retained for domestic consumption and less diverted to export, the grain needs of the economy are not being met. This has forced the regime to institute a number of organizational changes in agriculture and to offer additional incentives to peasants for increased production. The problem now facing the regime is not so much to increase food grain production (wheat production has risen by some 50 percent since 1952) as to produce

more feed grain and other fodder in order to increase meat and

dairy output.

Soviet agriculture produces a number of industrial crops, many of which were also grown before the revolution. The major industrial crops are cotton, sugar beets, flax, hemp, sunflower seed, and rubber-producing plants such as koksagyz. Generally, each of these is concentrated in a certain area. The Uzbek SSR accounts for more than 60 percent of the total Soviet cotton production. Sugar beets, which yield almost all of the country's sugar, are concentrated in the Ukraine and adjacent areas. Sunflower seed, a major source of vegetable oil used for food, for soap, and in industry are grown in the Ukraine and the northern Caucasus. According to recent decisions by the Soviet government, the acreage and production of industrial crops will be increased.

Livestock

In economies that are geared to satisfying consumer needs and raising the standard of living, much of the grain supply is diverted to feeding cattle, hogs, and poultry; the grain in effect reaches the human consumer as animal protein and fats. This roundabout way of "processing" grain provides a richer and more varied diet. Direct human consumption of grain is, however, more "efficient" than consumption of meat and dairy products in the sense that a given amount of grain directly consumed can keep more people alive and working. And direct grain consumption is one of the factors enabling the Soviet regime to feed a growing population despite a falling per capita grain production.

Despite mechanization and utilization of chemical fertilizers and scientific breeding techniques, the overriding Soviet policy of keeping investment in agriculture to a minimum has prevented any real increases in either quantity or quality of livestock, and livestock production remains the weakest aspect of Soviet agriculture.

In prerevolutionary Russia, as in many other peasant societies, livestock served a fivefold purpose — providing draft power, fertilizer, milk, a minimum of meat and fat for the diet, and an insurance against the threat of crop failure or famine. There has been little change in peasant practice. Complaints by the Central Committee of the Communist party reveal that peasants on collective farms not infrequently have slaughtered their livestock when government grain collectors left them with little else, or have sold it on the open market to obtain grain to meet government demands.

Livestock collection quotas are often fulfilled through delivery of unfattened cattle, a practice which results in more cattle being slaughtered than required by plan and a consequent failure to fulfill

the plan for increasing communal herds.

After the wholesale killing of livestock by individual peasants in their hostility to forced collectivization, the losses were not fully restored before World War II wiped out intervening gains. Recovery since the war has been slow. Except for a few years in the middle 1930's, when private livestock breeding was encouraged, the Soviet regime until mid-1953 followed a policy designed to cut down the livestock holdings of individual peasants.

A fall in livestock production resulted in a reversal of policy; local party, soviet, and farm agencies were told to "end the wrong practice of infringing upon the personally owned livestock of the collective farmers . . . the existence of livestock individually owned by collective farm families is not a hindrance but an aid to the communal livestock." Continuing emphasis in this area seems to indicate that the regime intends to push livestock improvement to the benefit of the consumer and the peasant.

Organization of Agriculture

The Soviet regime has organized agriculture around two basic production units. In order of economic importance to the government, these units are the *kolkhoz* or collective farm (which until recently was serviced by machine tractor stations, MTS's) and the *sovkhoz* or state farm.

Although no longer in service, the MTS's will be considered first, since they performed several unique and important functions which cast light on the changes in the Soviet agricultural system today. Prior to collectivization there was little progress toward mechanization in Russian farming; primitive wooden implements were still common. Investment in agriculture after the revolution went to mechanize planting and harvesting operations by means of tractors and combines. The Soviet peasant, however, was unaccustomed to machinery, and Soviet authorities decided, in 1930, that the most efficient method of introducing and using machines on the farm would be to set up central tractor stations which would serve a number of collective farms. These stations would provide trained personnel to operate and maintain the equipment. But other than technological reasons also entered into the establishment of these tractor stations: the regime needed official control outposts in the countryside. The MTS could protect equipment from sabotage

by the disgruntled peasantry; its complement could control the peasants, organize them into collectives, and collect the government's share of the crops. Since an MTS would harvest for the collectives, it would be able to verify at first hand how much the farm could deliver to the government. In the early days MTS personnel were armed for their protection in carrying out their functions as political agents, assuring compliance with government decrees, and supplying plowing and harvesting machinery to collectives regardless of whether the peasants wanted them or not.

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the MTS was given a decisive role in the collective farm economy. According to an editorial

in Pravda:

The MTS is not a contractor or a hiring agency. It is a leader and organizer in collective farm production, guiding the development of collective farm economy and ensuring the fulfillment of state plans for furthering agriculture.

The decision to make the MTS the principal control and leadership unit in the collectivized countryside was implemented by a number of measures increasing its powers. The rayon departments of agriculture were abolished, leaving the MTS as the sole agency operating directly with the *kolkhoz* at the local level. Previously a rayon department of agriculture operated locally side by side with an MTS, with a resultant overlapping of authority and responsibility characteristic of Soviet organizational structure. The MTS remained responsible to the oblast department of agriculture, or, where there was no oblast to the republic department.

The MTS also was made the base for party control of the *kolkhoz*. The rayon committee (*raykom*) had a party secretary living at each MTS in the rayon, and party organizations on the collective farms reported directly to him. Each of these secretaries had under him a group of "instructors" responsible for party affairs on the collective farms and in towns within the zone served by the MTS.

In March 1955 the regime announced a new procedure for agricultural planning, bringing it more closely in line with industrial planning practice. The procedure provided for more local option and gave the MTS a central position in the local planning process. Central planning authorities instructed the Ministry of Agriculture as to the total levels of procurement required and the volume of tractor operations to be performed by all MTS's. This information was broken down by the Ministry and transmitted to the republic and oblast departments, which in turn passed it on to the rayon

executive committees. Details on amount and kinds of crops to be sown and the composition of the livestock herds on the various collective farms were worked out by direct consultation between *kolkhoz* and MTS. After the MTS agreed on the details of the plan and made up its own schedule of operation, the plan was reviewed by the rayon executive committee before being returned through channels to the planning authorities in Moscow. To aid and control the planning operation, 120,000 agricultural specialists were transferred from urban administrative offices to MTS's and collective farms in 1955–56. The MTS network was also strengthened through the assignment of more than 52,000 engineers and technicians.

The MTS's were subject to a great deal of labor turnover. *Pravda* reported in 1953 that "30 to 35 percent of the tractor drivers leave brigades every year, and the complement of helpers . . . changes several times in the course of a year." The large turnover was partly due to low minimum wages and high production quotas. While MTS workers could increase their earnings by overfulfilling quotas, the oblast agricultural office often set excessively high yield goals for the better farms in the area, thus depriving the MTS

workers of such bonuses.

Another result of low pay and high quotas was that the MTS worker resorted to various kinds of subterfuge to fulfill and overfulfill quotas, neglecting difficult and time-consuming tasks in order to exceed the norm on easier work or carrying out assignments in a slipshod manner. A worker, for example, who was anxious to fill his norm for plowing a certain number of hectares per day would try to do so by plowing shallow furrows. A director would try to conceal the actual number of working tractors at his station, hoping his norm would be lowered, or he could resort to illegal barter in order to obtain fuel or parts necessary for meeting or exceeding that norm.

The MTS had to meet specific production norms and quotas and, like the industrial enterprises, often could not meet them without cutting corners. Knowledge of these illegal activities provided the *kolkhoz* chairman with a lever against the MTS director who was supposed to check on him. For example, the *kolkhoz* chairman could complain to the *raykom* and the Ministry of Agriculture about fields poorly prepared and not sown or plowed on time. The MTS director, on the other hand, could report the chairman as incompetent in failing to fulfill delivery quotas. But the control system often tended to break down when two officials or agencies supposed to

check on each other joined in a systematized "cover-up" in an effort to protect themselves from the penalties for nonfulfillment of norms.

The MTS took payments in kind for their services and maintained control figures of production on each contracting farm—figures which formed the basis of the Ministry of Procurement's collections from that farm. Procurements also were handled by agents for both the Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Products Industry and the Ministry of the Food Products Industry, as well as by local consumer cooperatives.

In 1953 and again in February 1956, Khrushchev called for the extension of MTS functions in the area of procurement. He proposed that "the day-to-day direction of procurements should be entrusted to the MTS, and hundreds of thousands of procurement agents should be used in production work." In May 1956 the All-Union Ministry of Procurement was reorganized into a less centralized Union-Republic Ministry of Grain Products, with a view to making agricultural planning more flexible and procurement more efficient.

An important change in MTS functions also took place with the 1956 introduction of industry-type cost accounting in the MTS. Conversion into monetary units of payments in kind for MTS services, a prerequisite for cost accounting, was not only a step in the direction of making agriculture more like industry but also a "control through the ruble" which forced MTS's to operate more efficiently because their activities were made more susceptible to outside audit. But the new rules also intensified tensions between the kolkhozes and the MTS's, which had to work more closely with the farmers and concentrate on activities (livestock care, efficient use of peasant labor) with which it did not have to concern itself in the past.

Khrushchev made a dramatic and abrupt about-face in 1958. The expansion of agricultural production had become an increasingly critical problem, for despite advances Soviet agriculture was failing to meet the growing food and fiber requirements of the population. As part of a general reform to increase agricultural efficiency and production, the MTS's were liquidated—in Khrushchev's words, to eliminate the existence of "two bosses on the

land."

The MTS's were rapidly converted into mere service and supply centers, so-called repair-technical stations (RTS's). Most of their machinery, except highly specialized equipment, was sold to collective farms for cash or credit. By July 1959 close to 95 percent

of all collectives had participated in the purchase from the MTS's of 512,000 tractors, 221,000 grain combines, and large quantities of other machinery. About 100,000 new tractors, over 25,000 grain combines and other new machinery were also bought. The machinery cost the collectives a total of 21.7 billion rubles.

Though divesting the MTS of vital farm operating functions, this radical reorganization, coupled with other reforms, actually tightened the grip of state rule over collective agriculture while providing more incentives for farm efficiency. The political control function of the MTS was absorbed by a greatly strengthened party apparatus in the countryside. Simultaneously, the regime was able to attack some of the major weaknesses flowing from the MTS structure: confusion of responsibility for managing production, complicated cost accounting, waste in the care of machinery.

Elimination of dual farm management made it possible to pinpoint managerial responsibility and accountability. Simplification of a cumbersome procurement and price system greatly enhanced the position of the *kolkhoz* vis-à-vis the private plot of the peasant, who now had more to gain from working diligently on the large collective farm. These changes were preceded by a rise in prices for farm products that brought the total cash income of all collectives to a record high (130 billion rubles) in 1958. Thus the sale of MTS machinery also served the deflationary purpose of channeling the increased income of the *kolkhoz* into capital investment.

The reform created many new problems of adjustment, and the situation in agriculture, as in other spheres of Soviet life, is still in a state of flux. Questions to be worked out include the adequacy of repair facilities, the nature of relations with repair-technical stations, and the proper supply of machinery and spare parts. Complaints in the Soviet press have accused repair-technical stations of selling defective machinery and being generally unhelpful with repairs. In the long run, however, the change is expected to contribute to more efficient management and to have a beneficial effect on agricultural production.

The Kolkhoz

A kolkhoz averages 4,200 acres of land worked communally by its members, though it varies considerably in size from region to region. A small portion of the total acreage is divided into "household plots" cultivated by the separate families for their own use. The kolkhoz has operated under a model charter incorporated into the 1936 USSR Constitution. All the land is owned by the government,

but the charter grants the *kolkhoz* a "free" use-right in perpetuity. Actually, this use-right has been paid for many times over by obligatory deliveries of produce to the government. Reforms in 1958 nominally abolished the compulsory deliveries, but the *kolkhoz* is

still required to meet a system of quotas per unit of land.

Under the charter, the *kolkhoz* members elect a chairman and governing board from among themselves. The chairman and the board administer the farm; they are responsible to the "highest governing body of the farm, the general meeting of the members," and to the government agencies which draw up and administer the agricultural plan. This is the official version of *kolkhoz* organization; in actual fact, the collective farm members have very little influence on the election, decisions, or actions of the chairman.

Membership in the collective farm is assigned on an individual basis. A member's work obligation cannot be transferred to another member of his family or household. From his seventeenth year on, each member is required to devote a minimum annual number of "work-day units" (trudoden') to the kolkhoz; the number of work-day units varies with the zone in which the farm is located. In mid-1954, collective farms were given the right to set their own unit minimums, subject to approval of rayon executive committees; the minimums established are required to be higher than those of the preceding year. Households with an able-bodied member not fulfilling his work obligation to the farm are subject to a 50 percent increase in the agricultural tax levied on the income from their household plot, and the individual is forced to work for the kolkhoz for six months at reduced pay.

Work-day units are used to compute the *kolkhoz* worker's share of the farm's production after other obligations are met. There is a nine-point scale for crediting work-day units, ranging, per actual day worked, from one-half work-day for unskilled work to two and one-half for the most skilled, difficult, or responsible work. An individual earning the highest rate is thus credited with five units for

each two days of actual labor.

Although membership and communal work obligations are on an individual basis, household plots, which are not subject to a compulsory delivery quota, are allotted only to groups of related individuals. These plots were not included in the original collectivization order; they were introduced later to coat the pill and to provide an added production incentive. The size of such plots depends on the quality of soil, ranging in size from six-tenths of an acre to a little over one acre. The plot is part of the *kolkhoz* and cannot be

alienated. Each household also may own a specified number of sheep, goats, cattle, and beehives, plus an unlimited number of fowls and rabbits. The actual number of cattle allowed members varies with the location and specialization of the *kolkhoz*. The household-owned animals and the produce from the plots may be sold on the open market; the income from such sales is subject only to a small agricultural tax.

The economic importance of these garden plots must not be underestimated. They have in some years accounted for 15 to 20 percent of total gross agricultural production in the entire USSR. Prior to World War II, 65 percent of all cows and calves in the nation and well over half the pigs and sheep were owned by

peasant households.

The family holdings have two essential functions. They provide a substantial amount of the agricultural produce for the urban market, and, since the share of the *kolkhoz* production received by the peasant is generally below his minimum income needs, it often is the household plot that enables him to exist. To the regime, however, the household plot is a source of many problems. There are innumerable reports in the Soviet press of the difficulties encountered by *kolkhoz* chairman and other officials in their efforts to make peasants work the communal land instead of their own gardens. Work-day minimums were imposed to deal with this problem. Yet recurrent criticism indicates that the peasant continues to save his best effort and as much time as he can for the plot of land which profits him directly. Foreign observers have noted the slipshod care given communal fields in contrast to the careful, intensive cultivation of household plots.

The problems raised by these private holdings also have an ideological aspect that seems a source of profound concern to the regime. Initially the household plot was an expedient to pacify a peasantry that had actively fought collectivization. Yet the Communist goal for agriculture is a system in which the peasants will derive their entire living from communally worked land. The household plot, thus, is seen as a perpetual political menace, recalling Lenin's warning on small business: "Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeois, constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions." Further, the great importance the peasant attaches to his own individual production is evidence that he distrusts the socialized sector of the collective

farm economy as a source of adequate support.

Since 1931 the Soviet regime has had first claim on the produce of the kolkhoz-a claim which at various times has been called the "sacred obligation" and the "first commandment." The most common collection method was a system of "obligatory deliveries" of produce at prices which until recent years were far below those prevailing in the open market. Obligatory deliveries to the government accounted for approximately 15 to 20 percent of the farm harvest.

Collective farms also made "above-quota sales" to the government at prices higher than those paid for obligatory deliveries. These prices were set as percentage increases over the base obligatory price. But although above-quota sales presumably were voluntary transactions between the *kolkhoz* and the government, the prices were still lower than market price and the farm had little choice but to sell the government all it demanded.

The kolkhoz also contracted to make in-kind payments to the MTS servicing it. The payment varied according to geographic area. In general, payments to the MTS could run as high as 20 percent or more of the given crop, while the total share going to the government, including obligatory deliveries and above-quota sales,

was likely to be as much again.

Collective farms producing industrial crops such as cotton, flax, hemp, and sugar beets generally were far better off financially than ordinary *kolkhozes*. Deliveries of these crops, like deliveries of industrial goods, were based on contract. The MTS collected its in-kind payments for services rendered, but the prices paid by the government for deliveries of these crops were considerably higher than those for grain and other produce.

To stimulate the interest and cooperation of the peasant in expanding the production of food and feed, the post-Stalin leadership set in motion a policy of increased economic incentives. The very low prices paid by the state for farm products were substantially raised. Between 1952 and 1956–57, the total cash income of

kolkhozes increased from 43 billion to 95 billion rubles.

In 1958 a single system of state purchases, with single instead of multiple prices, replaced the different types of procurements formerly employed and compulsory deliveries, as such, were abolished. The *kolkhozes*, however, were still required to set delivery quotas for farm products to meet national goals and drives. The new procurement and price system was tailored to benefit the average collective farms but placed pressure on the more pros-

perous collectives which had received preferential price treatment to seek higher incomes by lowering production costs and increasing

output.

These changes accompanied a new emphasis on regional agricultural specialization. Greater efforts were made to concentrate procurements in areas of most economical production. A potentially significant innovation in Soviet agriculture, this policy stressed the need for effective cost studies. Up to now, the regime had been preoccupied almost exclusively with the fulfillment of physical targets. The new cost consciousness represented a new phenomenon in agricultural management.

The regime also made efforts to simplify the cumbersome system of payment to individual collective farmers. The work-day unit continued to serve as a basis for a multiple distribution of various types of produce and cash at the end of the year. But there emerged a tendency to make payments more regularly by means of advances on estimated annual income, to substitute cash for payments in kind, and to dispense with the work-day units.

Given all the deductions from gross farm income, the amount of cash the average collective farmer currently receives per workday unit is still low, despite the substantial increases of recent years. Since the average *kolkhoz* member accumulates 350 to 450 work-day units annually, he may receive 2,000 to 3,000 rubles for the year. This does not include receipts from private sales on the free market. (The average yearly wage for urban workers is about 9,600 rubles.) It should be remembered, however, that payments in kind still represent the most important component of the peasant's income.

The kolkhoz leaders are in an economically privileged position. The chairman receives a guaranteed cash salary plus a guaranteed number of work-day credits per month, the amounts depending on the size and nature of the farm and on the chairman's seniority. If the kolkhoz overfulfills its quota, the chairman receives a bonus: from 10 to 25 percent more work-day units, from 15 to 40 percent more cash. If the kolkhoz fails to fill its quota, the chairman may be fined up to 25 percent of his annual income and dismissed.

Rewards and penalties of the subordinate managerial positions follow the same basic pattern. The vice-chairman is paid at a rate equal to 80 or 90 percent, and the bookkeeper 68 to 80 percent, of the chairman's salary. Brigadiers (in charge of 50 to 100 kolkhoz members) are credited with from 30 to 60 work-day units per month. These guaranteed minimum wages for administrative personnel have favored the creation on many farms of a huge bureaucratic over-

head. Judging by Soviet press complaints, these bulges of administrative personnel and the padded payrolls that go with them are a

perennial problem.

While the chairman is the summit of authority and control within the kolkhoz, he is the lowest rung of several external administrative hierarchies. He represents both the kolkhoz and the government, two interests often in diametric opposition, since the kolkhoz members strive to retain for their own use as much as possible of collective and individual production while the government presses for increased deliveries to itself.

One indication of the chairman's precarious position is the continuing high rate of turnover in this job. On November 27, 1955 it was reported that 5,986 collective farm chairmen in the Ukraine had been replaced. Replacements cannot be trained fast enough, and the professional level of kolkhoz chairmen tends to be low. In late 1953, Khrushchev reported that only 16,000, or about onesixth of all collective farm chairmen, had completed university or secondary specialized training. Current press complaints continue to stress the difficulty of finding trained and reliable kolkhoz chairmen.

General meetings of kolkhoz membership are held infrequently; the Soviet press reports cases where they have not been held even once a year. According to former Soviet citizens, discussion and criticism at these meetings is "played by ear." There will be a general hubbub of complaint, loud enough to keep individual complaints anonymous; if the chairman - or the party official has been instructed to be receptive to some particular complaint, he will indicate that he has heard it, then someone (usually an older peasant impervious to risk of reprisal) will stand up and

serve as spokesman.

Just as the kolkhoz worker must probe his chairman's readiness to listen, so the chairman must watch his step in his relations with outside officials as well as with the farmers themselves. He is always vulnerable to attack by higher authority. Less obvious, but no less real, is his vulnerability in relationships within the kolkhoz. Kolkhoz farmers readily engage in passive resistance; if, short of overt sabotage, they prevent the chairman from meeting the collective's delivery quota, he is the one who must bear the brunt of punishment. Often the chairman will shut his eyes to extension of household plots onto communal land or to thefts by members from the fields, but at harvest time a portion of collective farm labor may be put on guard duty.

The chairman will also work out "deals" with his bookkeeper or an expediter, to obtain supplies or concessions from outside agencies. For example, there may be a shortage of gasoline when plowing time arrives; the expediter will sell one of the farm's pigs on the open market, the bookkeeper will record it as a sale to the government, and the difference between the two prices will be used to buy gasoline from an illegal source. Occasionally, entire plants for producing consumer goods are covertly set up on a kolkhoz and use farm labor and materials.

The Soviet government frowns on and tries to eradicate the mutual connivance and purposeful inattention involved in these "family relations," since they indicate a breakdown in the system of government controls. The high rate of turnover of *kolkhoz* chairmen may be interpreted as part of an official drive for systematic disruption of "family relations." But the ability of the *kolkhoz* to meet its delivery quota may hinge on these illegal activities. As in the industrial sector, such manipulations, albeit illegal, in fact grease the tracks of the rigid system and keep it functioning.

Most closely conforming to Communist ideology, the state farm (sovkhoz) is the type of agricultural production unit most favored by the regime. The government owns and operates the farm and receives its entire net production. Workers on state farms receive piece-rate wages, as do industrial workers. Initially, sovkhoz workers were not allowed garden plots, but in an attempt to stimulate greater productivity and to stabilize the labor force, each worker has been allotted approximately one acre for his own use. Workers also sometimes have the privilege of buying consumer goods at reduced prices.

State farms were first established in 1918–19 to prevent parceling out of the larger "advanced" private estates that were taken over at that time; they also were made adjuncts of industrial plants, to supply food to the workers and raw materials to the factory. They were meant to serve eventually as operating models of efficiency for the collective farms. But many state farms were located along the border of severe drought zones, and most of them were too large, had managerial difficulties, lacked adequate capital, and ran into labor shortages in the peak seasons. All of these matters kept the state farms from serving their intended function. By 1938 their number had shrunk considerably and they cultivated only 9.1 percent of the total sown area.

In recent years, however, the number of state farms has increased – from 4,742 in 1953 to 5,905 at the beginning of 1958, with

an average of more than twenty thousand acres under crops per farm. The long-range agricultural policy of the Soviet regime is to make the peasant a wage earner like the worker in the factory. The sovkhoz is one approach to this ideal, and its dominant characteristics are a wage-labor working force, large size, and mechanization.

An ambitious program suggested in early 1950 was the establishment of the agrogorod, or farm city, containing approximately five thousand people each. One major objective of this plan appeared to be the breaking up of the kolkhoz family unit; members of consolidated kolkhozes were to be moved into central apartment buildings from which they would commute to work. Household plots were to be eliminated or reduced in size and concentrated in one large area, so that the coming and going of members working them would be more conspicuous and more easily controlled. The new communities were visualized as self-sufficient units, providing members with consumer goods produced on the spot.

The agrogorods were rejected, at least temporarily. The Soviet regime apparently felt that this was not the time for coercion of the peasantry. It also may have been unable or unwilling to meet the increased capital requirements for such "nonproductive" investment in agriculture as housing and utilities, for which it has hitherto consistently refused to provide even essential capital. Another deterrent may have been fear of tensions developing within the agrogorods; farmers would have lived cheek by jowl with industrial workers, and would have more readily made invidious comparisons between urban and rural earnings and standards of living, thereby

increasing discontent.

For the present the regime's immediate concern is to increase agricultural production within the framework of the kolkhoz system. Besides expanding the cultivated area - to which there are fairly precise limits - it has attempted to stimulate more intensive cultivation through increased incentives. Payments for deliveries to the government have never been higher, and the peasant may be able to live better if this program is maintained. But there is still the question of who will pay for improving the situation of the peasant. The government now seems to be experimenting with higher procurement prices to see if this expenditure will raise individual peasant productivity over and above the level obtained if capital investment in agriculture were increased by a comparable amount. At the same time, however, the peasant is forced to pay for a substantial part of this increase in investment by being obliged to make capital improvements on the kolkhoz entirely from kolkhoz funds.

Domestic Trade

Soviet domestic trade suffers from the fact that in its economic plans the regime still gives relatively low priority to the production of consumer goods. Little attention is paid to improving the distribution system, although Soviet consumers are intensely dissatisfied with the inadequate planning and red tape of retail trade. While stores may be stocked with goods in one area, in another there may be a complete lack of the most basic commodities, such as matches, soap, or salt. One rayon may be supplied with enough dried fish for two years — while in the one next to it there may be no fish at all. Stores in the Buryat-Mongol ASSR may get all the straw hats they want but no clothing fit for east Siberian temperatures. Complaints about poor quality of shoes and clothing, shortages, poor service, long waiting-lines at the stores, etc. are common. Sales clerks are found cheating customers outright, overcharging them, and sequestering scarce merchandise for resale on the black market.

Enjoying in many cases a monopolistic or semimonopolistic position in relation to their customers, Soviet wholesale and retail organizations do not have the spur to improvement that is usually provided by sharp competition in capitalist countries.

As a result of continued emphasis on accelerated industrial development, moreover, the mechanical requirements for an efficient distribution system are largely absent. The caliber of personnel assigned or attracted to this sector of the economy is also low.

In their public utterances Soviet leaders continually admit inadequacies in the people's living standards and stress their determination to improve them. In Khrushchev's words:

We do not yet have an adequate quantity of consumer goods, there is a shortage of housing, and many of the important problems connected with raising the people's living standards have not yet been solved.

Production of many important foodstuffs and manufactured goods still lags behind growing demands. Some towns and communities are still insufficiently supplied with such items as milk, butter, and fruit. There are even cases where supplies of potatoes and other vegetables are irregular. There are also difficulties in supplying the population with certain high-grade manufactured goods.

Although the present leadership has promised to "extend considerably the production of consumer goods," it continues to insist on

the "future priority in the rate of development of heavy industry." As long as this priority is maintained, all the promises made to Soviet consumers are not likely to be fulfilled, though gradual and steady improvement can be expected.

The Soviet distribution system is made up of three separate sectors: the state trading network, the cooperative trading network, and the open farm markets. From time to time rationing of the goods in the first two sectors has been general throughout the USSR, but nonrationed distribution has prevailed since the end of 1947.

Geared to the annual economic plan, the state and cooperative sales networks are considered part of "socialist" trade. Prices in state stores and to a lesser degree in cooperative stores are fixed by the government. In the open farm markets, however, prices are not controlled, and collective farms and farmers may sell whatever produce is left after government deliveries are met. These kolkhoz markets usually are located in cities or at railroad stations. Prices in these open farm-markets, since they are determined by supply and demand, are sometimes much higher than those in state and cooperative stores.

Official Soviet statements have asserted that the volume of retail trade in the USSR has grown more than eightfold since 1926. There is at present no way to check such claims, but with rapid industrialization and the penetration of urban wants into part of the rural countryside the actual volume of Soviet retail trade undoubtedly has grown greatly. This does not necessarily imply, however, an equivalent rise in the standard of living. The Soviet citizen today buys many more of his daily needs, and himself produces far

fewer of them, than did his parents twenty-five years ago.

The main retail sales unit in the USSR is the *torg*, an organization which has subordinate to it a chain of stores selling a specified group of products in a particular city or locality. The officials of a *torg* are appointed at the republic level of government. Staff departments of the *torg* have charge of wholesale purchasing, manage retail stores, plan finance, and so forth. A few of the larger stores, with better and more diversified merchandise, cater to the demands of the higher-income groups. The greatest variety of goods is generally found in the large *univermag*, or department store, in each of the major cities. The State Department Store (GUM) in Moscow was reintroduced in 1953 as a kind of showpiece of Soviet merchandising at its best. The Ministry of Health operates drugstores. A mail-order merchandising organization, the Soyuzposyltorg, has been in operation since 1949. The Voyentorg, the equivalent of the

American Post Exchange, serves military personnel. In key industries, Departments of Worker Supply (ORS) are attached to different factories and enterprises; these sell scarce consumer goods to workers, operate factory restaurants, and often obtain food supplies by running their own farms.

The volume of goods to be made available to the population and the prices to be charged in state stores are determined each year by the government's economic plan. An effort is made to link the volume of goods and services that will be available with the

expected purchasing power of the population.

Wholesale distribution of industrial goods centers around a system of warehouses, the *prombazy*, which, receiving goods from factories, delivers them to large stores directly or to state and co-

operative retail trading organizations.

Consumer cooperatives, cooperative stores maintained by industry, and cooperatives of invalids constitute Soviet cooperative trade. The consumer cooperative distributive apparatus concentrates solely upon serving rural areas. Subject to the national economic plan, the cooperatives are supervised in terms of "model statutes" enacted by the government. Nominally, Soviet cooperatives are democratic organizations. In all essential matters, however, the Communist party and the government control and direct the activities of the cooperative apparatus.

The farm-markets, where peasants come to sell produce they have raised themselves or have received as their share of the collective farm surplus, are termed "unorganized" by Soviet economists because their prices are set by supply and demand rather than by the government. These prices are a revealing barometer of infla-

tionary pressures in the Soviet economy.

Collective farms and farmers near urban centers or railroad stations can sell an appreciable amount of their produce for prices higher than those paid by the government. Collective farms, not so fortunately located, however, sell their produce to consumer cooperatives which buy surplus food and agricultural raw materials at the prices prevailing in the rural areas, prices that are sometimes well below those in urban markets.

The price paid by Soviet consumers for any particular product, then, depends upon whether it is bought in a state store, a cooperative store, or on the open farm-market. Prices in these different outlets are sometimes the same, sometimes widely divergent. Recently prices have also varied, in Moscow and other metropolitan centers, according to the region where a given type of consumer commodity has been manufactured. This is the result of passing down price-making authority on about forty-five percent of all consumer goods to the republic and local level. In late 1959 an effort was being directed toward a solution of this problem by establishing average prices for a number of consumer goods. Foreign experts have had great difficulty in discovering exactly what criteria are used in price-setting. Recently there has been some attempt by Soviet planners to discover what goods are moving at given prices and what are not. There has also been an interest in family expenditure studies, presumably with a view to checking elasticity of demand, a consideration very pertinent to long-range planning. The price level has not declined in recent years, so rising living standards must necessarily be the result of rising money incomes.

Government-set prices for consumer goods are substantially higher than production and distribution costs. The turnover tax, levied primarily upon food and consumer goods, accounts for the largest part of the difference. By raising or lowering the rate of turnover tax levied on a commodity, the government attempts to set a price that will equalize anticipated supply with demand, regardless of changes in costs of production. Available evidence suggests that local authorities do a rather poor job of estimating de-

mand in their localities.

The Soviet domestic trade operations are relatively limited. The USSR had about 327,000 retail selling points of all types at the beginning of 1938, a little less than one-sixth the number of such establishments in the United States in 1939. During World War II the Soviet distribution system contracted seriously but began to expand again following the war. Today the shortage of retail outlets remains a major shortcoming of the distributive system.

Soviet distribution operates at almost every level of quality and efficiency. The central department store in Moscow endeavors to equal Western standards of service, instructs its staff in courtesy toward customers and attempts to stock every type of consumer goods made in the USSR. But even the regime would admit that this display of merchandising is completely unrepresentative of retail establishments. In many cases stores are dirty, have only a limited assortment of goods, and may not even carry staples.

Before being waited upon in a Soviet state store, the customer as a rule must stand in line to select the item he wishes to buy. If the item has not been sold out by the time his turn comes, he is given a purchase slip to take to a cashier where he again must wait in line in order to pay. He then returns to the sales counter to claim his purchase—and waits in line once more. The following example of Soviet humor reflects some of the popular resentment toward these clumsy selling methods:

A store is full of goods. Its doors are open, but there are no customers in sight. Finally, a woman approaches the store, but does not enter. The store clerk calls out: "Why don't you come in?" In confusion, she replies: "I'm waiting for the line to form."

Installment credit buying, a recent and apparently popular innovation, also involves cumbersome red tape, though efforts are being made to speed transactions. Store personnel, often possessing little or no knowledge of the goods they sell, are poorly trained and plainly rude. Popular dissatisfaction with such treatment is reinforced by a traditional hate of bureaucracy on the part of European Russians and a view of traders as tricky and inferior beings. The incompetence of the managerial and supervisory staffs of the distribution system is frequently attacked by the press. The mailorder organization also appears to operate in an unsatisfactory manner; customers frequently are unable to purchase goods that have been advertised, must wait long periods before their orders are filled, and then get products they did not order.

For the more enterprising Soviet citizens there is a constant temptation to buy goods in short supply and resell them at a profit. The Soviet press gives frequent accounts of "speculators" and their "profiteering." Speculators do indeed reap large profits. Not all classes of the population can afford to patronize them; thus their activities tend to increase discrimination among the various income groups. Speculators nevertheless attract some sympathy because they can supply people with what they want. Apparently many persons, including even the police and public prosecutors, often take a lenient

view of these operators.

Enforcement officials also have been accused of failing to investigate the ramifications of these operations, including the laxness and corruption of officials within the distribution system that makes such traffic possible. Even factories are reported to have contributed to black-market activity by manufacturing consumer

goods as an illegal sideline.

Public Finance

The Soviet regime devotes a very large proportion of the national product to capital investment and to financing elaborate government activities and services; as a result, the total value of consumer goods produced and available for purchase is far less than the total income received by the population. Consequently, the Soviet tax system, in addition to providing a steady flow of revenue to finance the high level of government expenditures, is designed to prevent inflation by absorbing, without destroying wage incentives, this excess purchasing power of the population. To accomplish these two goals simultaneously the regime places primary reliance on commodity or sales taxes, absorbing a large portion of the citizen's income through higher prices rather than through direct taxation on income.

Besides providing required revenue and closing the expected inflationary gap, Soviet taxation also has had to deal with additional, unanticipated inflationary pressures. The regime's efforts along this line have not been very successful. Persistently greater increases in wages than in labor productivity, overfulfillment of nonconsumption output plans, and failure to meet plans for increased output of consumer goods often have resulted in a greater disparity between purchasing power and goods available for purchase than the fiscal authorities had allowed for. The government then attempts to control the consequent inflationary pressure by mopping up the "unanticipated" increment in purchasing power after it has been generated.

Soviet taxes also perform important secondary economic and political functions, and serve as controls on the society. Indirect sales taxes are used to achieve a planned distribution of material resources by encouraging or discouraging the buying of particular goods. They further help conserve the effectiveness of wage differentials, since their impact on wages and economic position is obscured in the mind of the average citizen. Income taxes, although less important as sources of revenue, have been used as an instrument of class policy, being fashioned to discriminate against some groups while favoring others. They also have been manipulated to provide incentives for individual citizens to engage in particular kinds of economic activity. The regime has suggested that it may eventually abandon the income tax.

The USSR's financial resources are mobilized and government expenditures controlled through the all-union budget, which is for-

mulated annually by the all-union Minister of Finance working with and through the republic ministers of finance. All budgetary

receipts and expenditures are handled by the State Bank.

An essential element in each annual national economic plan, the central budget includes the budgets of the fifteen constituent republics, each of which in turn includes all the budgets of its subordinate administrative units. Normally, the central budget represents a consolidation of more than seventy thousand different subsidiary

budgets.

In this hierarchical arrangement, the authorities at each level of government exercise control over the budgets of the units under them. The expenditures planned for each level and the corresponding proportion of revenue each is allowed to retain depend upon their respective primary responsibilities. A net deficit in the budget of a subsidiary body is covered by an allocated percentage of the budget of the next higher governmental unit, which, on the other hand, also absorbs any net surplus of the subordinate unit. The present decentralization trend tends to increase the importance and independence of union-republic authorities in preparing their budgetary estimates.

The central budget is reviewed annually by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In the past this review, performed in a perfunctory manner, was little more than a formality, but evidence in the Soviet press indicates that the Supreme Soviet may now be exercising a greater voice on budgetary policy. The budgetary commissions of both houses of the Supreme Soviet have established, according to *Pravda*, special legislative subcommissions to prepare their own proposals on major income and expenditure items. The legislative approval of the budget may, therefore, be losing some of its

previous rubber-stamp character.

The largest group of expenditures in the USSR budget each year is composed of appropriations to finance national economic activity — outlays for construction of industrial capital equipment, agriculture, transportation, communications, for example; these appropriations are the most important source of capital investment funds.

The second largest item in the budget is for the financing of social and cultural services: education, health and physical culture, social security, social insurance, and family allowances. The category "education" includes expenditures for theaters, orchestras, museums, scientific research institutes, newspapers, and book publishing. Health expenditures include the cost of kindergartens, as

well as of hospitals and medical personnel. Social insurance expenditures include the cost of maintaining parks, sanatoriums, and rest homes, pensions to retired or incapacitated workers, and payments to persons temporarily unable to work because of accident or illness.

As far as the military budget is concerned, evidence suggests that only the direct costs of maintaining land, sea, and air forces are listed as defense expenditures. Since rations and matériel are procured at special low prices from the respective industrial ministries, the purchasing power of Soviet military appropriations is greater

than it appears to be.

The government's vast involvement in economic activity and its social welfare commitments place a great tax burden on the population. Since World War II the regime has taken, in money taxes, at least one-half and at times two-thirds of the individual consumer's personal income. A large proportion of this is done in the form of sales taxes. And this reliance upon taxes included in the selling price of consumer goods has meant that the household, the largest private unit to own anything in the USSR, ultimately bears the brunt of the Soviet tax burden. The structure of taxation reflects the regime's determination to achieve rapid industrialization; capital goods industries are generally not taxed in this way and are sometimes heavily subsidized instead. Recently revenue from turnover taxes has declined from sixty percent of the total budget to forty-five, perhaps indicating the first relaxation in the pressures on the consumer.

For most of the population, the size of the tax burden seems obscured since sales taxes are "hidden" in the prices of commodities. But resentment of the tax burden does find indirect expression in complaints about inadequate and expensive goods, clothing, and shelter.

The most important single means by which the Soviet government diverts potential consumer income to the treasury is the turnover tax (a sales tax). The turnover tax may be levied upon commodities at the time of manufacture, or may be paid by large-scale wholesale trading organizations. In the case of farm commodities, it is levied upon government procurement organizations. Once applied, this tax is a permanent part of the price of a commodity. The turnover tax on commodities has since 1933 amounted to considerably more than the actual cost of producing the commodities; the Soviet consumer, when buying these goods, has had to pay more than twice the cost of producing them.

The difference between the planned cost of production and final price of industrial goods — the markup — includes, in addition to the turnover tax, social-insurance costs and profits. Social-insurance payments go into a national social-insurance fund, from which old-age and sickness insurance payments are financed by the government. The residue remaining after the turnover tax and social-insurance costs are deducted from the markup is designated as either "planned" or "unplanned" profits.

Planned profits, as indicated earlier, are that part of the residue expected when an enterprise fulfills its output goals at the planned cost of production. Unplanned profits are the additional profits an enterprise may receive by lowering the average cost of production. The government deducts a portion of both through the "profits tax."

Different profits tax rates are applied from industry to industry and from year to year. In general, the profits of an enterprise whose capital is not to be expanded are taxed more heavily than those of an enterprise whose capital is to be expanded rapidly. The profits tax is the second most important single source of government revenue.

Direct taxes on the population have not, except during World War II, accounted for more than ten percent of the total Soviet tax revenue. An individual income tax has been levied on all nonagricultural workers in the USSR. For tax purposes these workers have been categorized as follows:

- 1. Workers, salaried employees, students.
- 2. Artisans and handicraft workers belonging to a cooperative.
- 3. Artists of all kinds.
- 4. Professional persons (such as doctors and lawyers) who receive income from private practice.
- 5. Artisans and handicraft workers who are not members of cooperatives; other persons having income not derived from government or cooperative employment.

With the exception of the second group, which pays at a rate ten percent higher than the first group, each of these groups has a separate schedule of tax rates.

Gross-wage differentials between and within these groups are sizable. Large sums of money can only be accumulated by highly skilled workers, favored intellectuals, managers, and the ruling elite. The taxes are progressive only to a certain point, in order, evidently, to preserve the incentive provided by high income.

(Similarly, there is at present no inheritance tax in the USSR, although fees for procedures relating to inheritance are substantial.)

The agricultural tax, a counterpart of the income tax on the urban population, is levied primarily on the income the peasant household is expected to receive from its private plot. It is also levied, however, on all peasants who earn their living from agricultural pursuits, e.g., beekeeping, animal husbandry, and fishing, including independent farmers and other citizens who are not members of a collective farm but to whom plots of land have been allocated in a rural area within the jurisdiction of a rural soviet. In recent years this tax has accounted for only some two percent of total tax revenue. It can, however, be used to stifle or stimulate production on these plots.

The family, rather than the individual, is the basic unit taxed. The tax is assessed on each holding according to the size of its plot of land, regardless of the actual amount of income derived from the holding. If any member of the family is expelled from the collective farm, the agricultural tax on the private plot of a collective farm family is increased 75 percent above the assessment that would otherwise apply. The collective farm household must also pay a 50 percent surtax if individual members of the family have without valid reason failed to work the established minimum of work days on the collective farm in the course of the year. The tax on the holdings of independent peasants, a small minority, is calculated as for collective farmers, but a 100 percent surtax is added.

Bonds sold by the government are considered a regular source of revenue rather than loans to cover a deficit. The Soviet practice of lumping revenue from government bonds with tax receipts accounts in part for the fact that an excess of revenue over expenditure has been an almost permanent feature of the Soviet budget for over two decades. In terms of United States practice, recourse to public

borrowing through bond issues indicates a deficit.

Bond sales possess some of the characteristics of taxes since the population is under very strong social pressure to purchase; the bonds are paid for by wage deductions, and employees are expected to contribute at least two weeks' salary per year for this purpose. There is some evidence that public loans are unpopular with many people. Cynicism sometimes is expressed regarding the "voluntary" character of bond purchases.

USSR bonds ordinarily cannot be cashed before maturity. Periodically, maturity dates have been extended and the nominal interest rates lowered without the consent of the bondholders. When the Russian who has bought bonds ends up with less net value after redeeming a mature bond, he is, in effect, taxed.

Banking and Currency

In its early years the Soviet regime held that the use of money would die out in a "socialist" economy. This view has long since been discarded. Money and financial institutions today are regarded as indispensable for the operation of the complex Soviet economy. The supply and distribution of money, the operation of the banking system, and other activities of Soviet financial organizations — all ruled by the economic plans — are used by the government to

accomplish its basic production and other objectives.

Money in the Soviet economy performs many of the same functions as it does in non-Communist states. The personal income of officials, ordinary workers, farmers, and others is paid partially or wholly in cash. The owners of money may use it more or less as they please, purchase whatever available commodities and services they desire. In transactions between different Soviet enterprises, money serves as a unit of account: all purchases and sales are expressed in money terms and are paid for either by some type of bank document like a check or by actual currency. Soviet money is also a repository of purchasing power: money may be deposited in a savings bank and will earn interest; it may be used to purchase government bonds; it may be hoarded at home until needed at a future time. But certain uses of money which are important in the United States are prohibited in the USSR: its use to finance a private endeavor entailing the employment of persons for private profit and its use by an individual to purchase commodities in order to resell them at a greater price.

The banking system under the Ministry of Finance consists of the State Bank (Gosbank), the basic source of short-term credit for all organizations and enterprises, and four specialized banks primarily concerned with long-term investment: the Industrial Bank (Prombank), the Agricultural Bank (Selkhozbank), the Trade Bank (Torgbank), and the Municipal Bank (Tsekombank). In addition, a national network of savings banks permits individuals to deposit savings or to invest them in government bonds. The Chief Administration for State Insurance (Gosstrakh), also under the Ministry of Finance, administers a variety of types of life and property insurance.

The periodic Soviet financial plan, covering important parts

of the over-all economic plans, determines in advance, insofar as is possible, the income and expenditure levels and patterns of all major portions of the economy. It consists of three important components: the central budget; the credit plan, which governs the granting of short- and long-term credits to industrial and other enterprises by the banking system; and the cash plan, which controls the supply of money in circulation. Through the financial plan, the regime attempts to insure that money and the influence of banks will not create any forces opposed to the goals of the over-all economic plan.

Monetary inflation has been a persistently recurrent feature throughout a great part of Soviet history. Though Soviet currency is relatively stable today, a substantial number of citizens still prefer to hoard their holding in the form of coin, cattle, or sometimes jewelry and scarce luxury goods. Peasants, particularly, exhibit little faith in banks. The majority of people, however, seem today to possess little incentive to save in any form because of at least three factors: the prevalent low standard of living; the fact that the welfare services of the government decrease the necessity to provide for a "rainy day"; the lack of opportunity for private investment to build up private capital. The peasant, subject to the risks of harvest fluctuations, probably is under greater compulsion to save than urban dwellers.

The heavy tax burden imposed upon Soviet citizens to some extent reflects the weakness of savings incentives. Although the higher income groups of the population are in a position to save for such luxuries as watches, jewelry, and automobiles, what money the majority of the people are able to accumulate is on the whole quickly absorbed by daily necessities.

The Soviet monetary system, at present, consists of three types of currency: bank notes, treasury notes, and metal coins. Bank notes issued by the State Bank circulate in denominations of ten, twenty-five, fifty, and one hundred rubles. Treasury notes, nominally issued by the government treasury but actually also governed by the State Bank, circulate in denominations of one, three, and five rubles. Coins of nickel and bronze circulate in denominations of one, two, three, five, ten, fifteen, and twenty kopeks (one hundred kopeks to one ruble). There also exist copper coins of one, two, three, and five kopeks; silver and copper coins of ten, fifteen, and twenty kopeks; and half-rubles in silver.

The ruble is a completely internal currency; the import and export of bank notes was prohibited in 1928, when the government

realized that the relative stability of its domestic currency was being undermined by the depreciation of the ruble on foreign monetary exchanges. But although the ruble is thus protected from the shifting valuations given it in foreign markets, the government must conduct its foreign economic transactions in other currencies.

Current Economic Goals

The Seven Year Plan for 1959–1965 frames the present Soviet "economic order of battle." It was endorsed by the Twenty-first Party Congress in January 1959 against a background of substantial economic growth. Striking Soviet industrial and agricultural expansion, scientific advance, and technological triumphs marked the 1950's. Both workers and farmers experienced a sense of measurable and continuous improvement.

Adoption of the Seven Year Plan, however, underscored the failure of the sixth Five Year Plan (1956–1960) announced at the Twentieth Party Congress. The demands of that plan had overtaxed Soviet resources. There followed a serious reappraisal of industry's long-range growth potential. The high rates of industrial growth of the 1930's and the first postwar decade could not be emulated. The

sixth Five Year Plan proved too ambitious.

Subsequent economic goals declared feasible by the Soviet leadership remained high and exaggerated. The volume of industrial output, for example, was to increase about 80 percent by 1965 over the 1958 level (8.6 percent per year). Steel production was to be pushed close to 100 million net tons. The Seven Year Plan was heralded as a decisive milestone of Soviet advance to the outcome postulated by Communist ideology.

Divested of propaganda and distortion, however, the plan revealed that the regime actually had accepted a marked slowdown in the rate of industrial growth compared to former years. It also reflected in broad outline the objectives and concerns that are likely

to guide Soviet planners in the years to come.

The USSR apparently will continue pressing for maximum industrial expansion during the 1960's. In the words of Khrushchev:

The economic might of the Soviet Union is based on the priority growth of heavy industry; this should insure the Soviet victory in peaceful economic competition with the capitalist countries; development of the Soviet economic might will give Communism the decisive edge in the international balance of power.

Though all the goals of the Seven Year Plan are not likely to be met, the rate of Soviet industrial growth still can be expected to be substantially higher than that of the United States. But the growth envisioned will not be balanced, and large areas in the economy will

remain grossly backward.

Efforts to improve the efficiency of the economy can also be expected. Much has already been done along these lines. In agriculture, collective farmers perhaps for the first time are being offered rewards making initiative and harder work worthwhile. The rush of reforms and new policies has eroded many institutional barriers to the introduction of improved farming techniques and practices. Farmers are given much better price and income incentives. The stifling regimentation and shortsighted exploitation under Stalin have given way to more flexible and subtle schemes of control encouraging the *kolkhoz* to adapt production to its particular conditions, to observe more timely schedules of farm operations, and to compare production costs with returns.

Flexibility and initiative are not absent in industry, though the changes here point to new conflicts and pressures as well as improvements in economic administration. In 1957 most of the central government's economic ministries were abolished and replaced by some hundred *sovnarkhozy* to supervise industry and construction at the local level. This radical reorganization of industrial management along horizontal, geographic lines eliminated a great deal of overlap and enabled economic managers to solve many problems regionally, without recourse to Moscow. But it also strengthened the tendency of administrators and officials to place local interests ahead of the national interest.

The regime responded by launching an all-out campaign against "narrow, local, anti-state tendencies." Party and state publications uncovered growing signs of arbitrariness, graft, and regional empire building. They flailed industrial directors for being callous and treacherous in dealings with other enterprises, and denounced the development of disturbing rivalries among separate economic regions.

Determined that decentralization will not interfere with national goals, the regime now is relying on various legislative, fiscal, and organizational measures to "strengthen state discipline." New control commissions, monitored by party and trade union organs, have begun to mushroom. Punitive measures have also received renewed emphasis. Failure to deliver goods to other economic areas or to adhere to over-all plans has been decreed a "flagrant violation of

state discipline" entailing "disciplinary, material, or criminal responsibility." Strict disciplinary action is promised for nonfulfillment of production and delivery quotas without valid excuse. The party has threatened "severely to punish all officials without consideration of rank" who do not conform to its decisions and who "permit

breaches in discipline."

These developments in industrial management, suggesting a partial return to Stalinist patterns of control, actually represent a new attempt to strengthen the policymaking function of the party while preserving the advantages of operational decentralization in the field. The regime apparently is trying to limit arbitrary political interference in matters of technical and operational detail to a minimum. What it seeks are ways to pinpoint responsibility and accountability more clearly and to increase the effectiveness of

policy direction and over-all control by the party.

The regime's stated objective is the development of a modern, flexible industrial society — employing the latest managerial, financial, and engineering techniques — with the party as supreme adviser and whip. A substantial effort to "modernize" the Soviet economy is being made. Targets for industry increasingly are backed up by more serious attempts to match output goals with resource availabilities. Cost factors are given more attention. Economists are assessing the economy's growth potential more thoroughly and critically. They are placing greater reliance on mathematical economics — input-output and other econometric techniques employing electronic computers — in shaping national economic plans. The techniques of planning are being overhauled to stress flexibility and over-all orientation rather than rigid and detailed direction.

There are, however, no signs of a genuine change in basic Soviet economic policy. The pattern of industrial development continues to be governed by an emphasis on strengthening the power of the state. The flow of resources available for national policy purposes is growing. The Soviet leaders appear confident that their industrial progress is providing Soviet political strategy with the material

means necessary to give it potency.

ORGANIZATION AND USE OF MANPOWER

THE MOST DISTINCTIVE FEATURES of the Soviet labor force are its recent rural background and the striking increase in the number of nonagricultural salary and wage earners, as distinct from collective farmers, since the first Five Year Plan. Over forty percent of the Soviet labor force is still in agriculture, however, as compared to

about seven percent in the United States.

Industrialization prior to World War II entailed the radical shift of millions of peasants to the city; this movement only partly accorded with the regime's intentions. Collectivization freed many peasants for absorption into industry. At the same time it made rural life relatively unattractive and much needed labor left the farms. The tremendous administrative and technical problems created by that shift were aggravated by the lack of a tradition of disciplined work habits. Official concern about bad work habits has not diminished over the years. Violations of labor discipline until recently were regarded as statutory offenses and subject to prosecution. A worker had to secure official permission to change jobs.

Even under the new regulations unduly frequent job changes, as defined by the government, may jeopardize a worker's social security benefits and pension rights. A substantial number of young men and women are still being drafted for technical training and must, upon graduation, accept for three to five years any job assigned them by the government. Trade unions are virtual organs of govern-

ment and help to guide and control the workers.

Along with coercion and restraints, the regime uses various incentives to spur workers to greater effort. The resulting complex system of reward and punishment, geared directly to the industrial worker's output, has fostered gross inequalities of earnings. It is designed to impel not only individuals but also workshops and en-

tire factories into "socialist competition" with one another. Even the various social-insurance benefits are used to obtain stricter work

discipline and cut down labor turnover.

The Soviet worker, coaxed and goaded to learn new ways of doing things, has by now acquired his own work tradition and habits. The stage of creating industrial workers by transforming peasants has passed. The influx to the city from the countryside has slowed down, and the smaller number of newcomers are absorbed more readily. There has arisen a very large, self-perpetuating group of industrial workers with its own values and attitudes. The Soviet regime has recognized these changes and appears to have become convinced that the most repressive features of labor laws have become superfluous, if not harmful, for the purpose of increasing labor productivity.

The overriding emphasis on the development of heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods has meant for most workers a low standard of living in comparison with that of other industrial nations. The rapid pace of industrialization and the destruction by war and enemy occupation have greatly retarded improvements in living and working conditions. Overcrowded living quarters, low real incomes, inadequate accident protection at work, inordinate wage differentials, harsh reprisals for breaches of work discipline, and incessant pressure to speed up production have been sources of frustration, resentment against the regime, and general dissatis-

faction.

Systematic steps for amelioration by the Soviet government reflect the urgency of the problems raised by negative attitudes among the workers. But reduction of the human cost of industrial development, if achieved at all, will probably be a by-product rather than a guiding principle of Soviet economic policy.

Requirements and Deficiencies

While the actual needs of the Soviet economy in terms of labor power have varied in different periods, the pre-eminent objective of the regime has been to create a large and growing industrial work

force with an appropriate distribution of skills.

A profligate use of manpower has been characteristic of Soviet industrialization. Between 1928 and 1958 the number of industrial workers increased nearly fivefold, even though catastrophic population losses kept the long-term population growth rate below one percent per year.

Soviet loss of life in World War II, as reflected in the 1959 census, has been estimated at a staggering forty-five million: a figure that includes those who would have been born had there been no war and those who would not have died. Military deaths alone claimed about one-half of the twenty million men reported to have served in the Soviet armed forces.

The enormous wartime deficit of births is today having a delayed impact on the age group entering the labor force. The working-age population (sixteen to fifty-nine years of age) continues to grow, but its rate of increase has been temporarily cut in half. The lean years in labor supply are expected to last through 1963.

This dwindling of the manpower pool is perhaps the most serious economic bottleneck confronting Soviet planners today. It has had the effect of quickening the need to bring about rapid "qualitative" changes in the labor force. As a result, heavy emphasis is placed on new means of raising productivity per worker: more efficient deployment of labor, plant specialization, and increased mechanization and automation.

The regime is relying on a variety of measures to ease the problem of labor supply. Wage increases, to hold down labor turnover and to draw more youths, women, and peasants into the work force, have been largely reserved for the lowest-paid categories (the minimum wage was raised from 300 to 450 rubles a month in 1959). Intensive efforts are being made to release women from the home and to encourage youngsters to leave school early for employment at better starting wages. To keep older workers on the job, retirement pensions are to be raised, but the increases will be deferred until 1963.

Other measures designed to strengthen the incentive to work appear to conflict with the objective of augmenting the labor supply. In 1959, the regime launched a long-term program to cut the average workday without reducing take-home pay. The forty-hour week is to become general by the end of 1960, with a gradual transition to thirty to thirty-five hours by 1968. Soviet factory and office workers have been working an eight-hour day, six-day week, except in heavy industry, where hours vary and compulsory overtime has been common. Added leisure obviously would aggravate the labor supply problem, but the regime apparently feels that such a policy, even if not fully carried out, has the advantage of pressing administrators and planners to use manpower more effectively and to introduce technological advances as quickly as possible.

Inordinately large labor requirements in Soviet agriculture

compound the difficulties faced by the regime in expanding its industrial work force. The very high percentage of Soviet manpower still tied up in agricultural work reflects not only the comparatively inefficient organization and operation of Soviet agriculture but also the severe housing shortage in urban industrial centers. The regime, moreover, is demanding a formidable production effort from agriculture, and the villages are finding it increasingly difficult to provide reinforcements for the nonfarm labor force.

The exact extent of the skilled labor shortage is not known. Some categories of trained specialists are in short supply, while in other specialties trained men, at least temporarily, may outnumber available jobs. The regime's concern to tie workers to their jobs and the difficulties it encounters in devising effective controls indicate the possible critical nature of such a shortage. A thicket of legal and economic restrictions still hinders freedom to change job or residence, but these restrictions have halted neither the illegal turnover

nor unplanned migratory movements of the population.

Despite intensive government efforts to improve training, worker productivity in the USSR still lags far behind that in the United States and other Western nations. Except in highly strategic industries, Soviet administrators are disinclined to invest in simple types of labor-saving devices and are even less willing to effect an increase in the over-all capital-labor ratio which would help to raise the level of productivity. This reluctance may be a carry-over from the traditional Soviet emphasis on the development of heavy industry

and on grandiose investment projects.

Great strides nevertheless have been made in augmenting the supply of trained professional manpower. To foster development of necessary skills, the regime has made a determined effort to provide industrial training at all levels, from skilled laborer to engineer, from technician to research scientist. Standards of instruction and quality of training vary greatly, however, and improvement in standards is to some extent restricted by a shortage of teachers, limited physical facilities, and the political demands of the state, which sometimes frustrate the development of individual talent. But the quality of Soviet professional training in scientific, technical, and applied fields is considered comparable to that in the United States.

At present the number of Soviet professionals who have completed higher education in applied science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine is about equal to, or somewhat higher than, the

number in the United States, even though more Americans have access to and complete higher education in all fields. The regime continues to complain about a shortage of professional personnel, and an increase in professional manpower at a rate greater than that of the labor force as a whole is its avowed long-run objective.

The regime's ability to meet the problem of an over-all labor shortage depends in great measure on the success of other national programs: reorganization of the schools, construction of more nurseries, consolidation of collective farms, modernization of agriculture, expansion of vast urban housing projects, and so on. These solutions to the manpower problem require a minimum reliance on coercion and seem to be favored for the present, though the alternatives open to Soviet planners include more direct and forceful measures.

Control of the Soviet labor force is by no means a "push-button operation." Manipulation of huge masses of people, even by an apparatus as powerful as the Soviet regime, does not proceed without friction, halts, and reversals. The degree of control and pressure exerted cannot be intensified without some attention being given to how this would affect labor productivity and the workers' fundamental readiness to cooperate. A succession of tightenings and relaxations of manpower controls gives evidence of the Soviet regime's determination not to let the situation get out of hand in either direction.

Women Workers

The Soviet labor force includes a relatively high proportion of women workers: in 1940 they accounted for some forty percent of labor in industry, transportation, and construction. Since World War II the percentage has sharply increased.

Although women are forbidden by law to work in especially arduous or dangerous jobs, many heavy industries use substantial numbers of women workers. The extensive use of women in peacetime limits the reserves available for emergency mobilization of industry.

Women are generally not found in top government administrative positions in the USSR and hold only about one out of every six "specialist" jobs available to graduates of universities and technical schools. This disparity is even more pronounced in Central Asia. Most employed Soviet women work in agriculture and in light

industries such as textiles. They are on the whole not among the skilled grades and receive relatively low wages, although substantial numbers of women have succeeded in entering the professions.

The Soviet regime has often reiterated that it "is interested in drawing as many women as possible into socially useful work in industry, agriculture, transportation, and construction." A number of factors — discontinuance of unemployment insurance payments in the 1930's, the constant difficulty of supporting a family adequately on the income of one wage earner per family, and intensified government pressure since the war to get a maximum number of citizens working — have combined to force women (as well as youth) into the labor force.

Among the women added to the factory work force are many mothers who pay eight to ten percent of their earnings to keep a child in a kindergarten or factory nursery. Although during the past several years child-care facilities have been considerably extended to accommodate additional children, the Soviet press continues to criticize many industries for failing to fulfill planned programs for establishing and expanding nurseries.

Child Labor

In its endeavor to meet periodic labor shortages, the Soviet regime increasingly has tapped the child labor reserve. Since 1955 there has been a greatly increased emphasis on technical education and

the linking of theory with practical application.

The performance of actual work by the children is part of the school program, and its volume indicates that its use is motivated by other than purely educational considerations. The major portion of this work is done during the summer holidays, with a corresponding curtailment of vacation time. No uniform payment is received by the young people for these efforts, remuneration depending on the employer's discretion: in certain cases they are paid like adults; in other cases they receive diplomas or medals or prizes. The major work incentive appears to be the fact that school authorities require a detailed account of work performed by each pupil during the working periods, with an evaluation of the work by the administrator of the enterprise or collective farm.

In urban areas pupils are given their practical training in factories and mills as apprentices and helpers, and encouraged to operate machines independently with a minimum of training. Socalled Children's Technical Stations are another way to get children to work in industry and on *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*, in addition to accustoming them to machines and equipment.

Worker Productivity

Interest in labor productivity tends to increase as labor power becomes relatively scarce during the course of industrialization. Where labor is in abundant supply the productivity of capital is likely to be of more concern. To the degree that labor must be economized, labor productivity acquires greater meaning as an economic indicator. It helps in the assessment of the ability of a nation to produce with a given quantity of manpower a combination of civilian and military goods sufficient at the same time to satisfy the material aspirations of various groups in society and to provide for national defense.

Labor productivity is influenced by a variety of factors. Workers have to be adequately housed, clothed, and fed. Literacy and the level of technical training also have a bearing on worker output, as have efficient factory organization and the degree of mechanization of industry. Finally, there is the problem of appropriate incentives needed to increase workers' willingness to make greater exertions.

Official Soviet statistics claim that industrial output per worker in 1950 was about ten times that of 1900, five times that of 1928, and about 37 percent higher than the 1940 rate. Although Western analysts believe that actual gains were smaller than these claims, they do not deny that substantial improvements in productivity have been achieved. In comparing the physical output per wage earner for the years immediately preceding World War II, Western economists have concluded that in 1939 over-all Russian industrial labor productivity was at about 40 percent of United States productivity. Variations by industry in respect to United States productivity are wide, however: 22 percent for construction machinery, 23 percent for beet sugar manufacture, 64 percent for tractors, and 72 percent for crude oil extraction. (In contrast, Soviet agricultural productivity in terms of output per person is notoriously low—only about 17 percent of the American level.)

The average rate of Soviet industrial productivity in 1950 exceeded the 1939 level by five to ten percent, leaving the prewar ratio essentially unchanged. Western economists have estimated that Russian industrial labor productivity by 1970 will increase from 49 to 71 percent of the United States level.

Many factors growing out of the circumstances surrounding Soviet economic development have kept Soviet labor from being utilized at a level of efficiency approaching American standards. The paramount concern with increasing total output, the wholesale transfer of labor from agriculture to industry, and the absence of efficient methods for re-allocating surplus labor all contribute to the uneconomic use of manpower even as mechanization progresses.

The existence of a relatively large force of low-paid, unskilled workers has hitherto been an important factor in delaying the mechanization of many operations – another brake on realizing the productivity potential of the Soviet economy. Such concealed unemployment in industry might allow the regime in the event of a military emergency to take a sizable portion of the nation's manpower into the armed forces without disrupting production and thereby actually force more rapid adoption of advanced techniques in all sectors of the economy.

Organization of Labor

The relationship between labor and management in the Soviet Union today is entirely different from that in non-Communist industrialized countries. According to the ideology, the exploitation of workers by private capitalists and the conflict of interest between workers and management has been eliminated in the USSR by placing the ownership of the means of production in the hands of the workers themselves: consequently, it is held that there is no need for labor organizations to protect the rights of the workers. In actual fact, except for a few months immediately following the Bolshevik coup when elected plant committees operated the existing industrial plants, there has been no worker control over management.

Lenin laid the foundations for the assumption of party and government control over labor in his insistence that the Bolshevik party alone knew the "right" paths by which socialist goals might be attained. He distrusted the "undirected masses" and condemned those who offered the people what they merely "appeared to want." To him, and to Stalin a few years later, it was self-evident that the party and the government should have complete control over labor and that trade unions should function as "transmission belts," passing on to the "backward masses" the ideology and directives of the

party.

Since that time the regulation of labor has been entirely a function of government. An elaborate system of rules, standards, incentives, and penalties has been developed by which labor is controlled and its efforts channeled into support of the long- and short-term Communist goals. All of these goals center around the expansion and increased productivity of Soviet industrial capacity, particularly that of heavy industry. Trade unions are, in effect, government agencies whose function is to create worker support for the goals set by the regime and obedience to the rules and regulations it promulgates.

The Control System

The Soviet system of labor control has two interlocking aspects – setting standards of attitude and performance, and maintaining those

standards by a system of rewards and penalties.

Inculcation of "proper" attitudes toward work — the glory of labor, diligence, promptness, and so forth — begins in the nursery school and is continued and expanded in the higher grades and in all the organizations to which a Soviet child, youth, or adult is exposed — the Pioneers, the Komsomols, the Communist party, the trade unions — as well as in all the mass media of communication. In short, the whole propaganda apparatus of the Soviet Union is utilized to promote these attitudes and to gain support for specific activities and production goals.

Themes vary widely. There are appeals for dedication to the cause of Communism, the USSR's "historic task" of building a new social order, service to the Russian motherland, loyalty to one's factory, and pride in technical achievement and craftsmanship. The advantages of superior performance are stressed, as are dire consequences of failure. The importance the regime places upon the function of education and propaganda in the control of labor is indicated by the severe criticism of those charged with indoctrination whenever production goals are not met or individuals fail to obey the rules of labor discipline.

In Soviet terms labor discipline refers to a series of rules which govern the behavior of workers on the job. The rules are addressed for the most part to two problems — the control of labor turnover and the regular, diligent performance of duties by individual workers. To a considerable extent the stringency and detail of the rules are the consequence both of the rapidity with which the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy was forced and of the lack of work habits necessary to efficient industrial production.

A very high rate of labor turnover has been from the beginning a problem of serious dimensions for Soviet industry. Among the various methods that the regime has used in an attempt to reduce this turnover, the most important has been the restriction by law of a worker's freedom to change jobs except for reasons approved by the regime. In addition, social security benefits are calculated on a graduated basis in which length of employment in the same enterprise is the most important component. Preference in housing also is often dependent upon continued employment with a given enterprise.

The "workbook" is the basic means for enforcing regulations. It was instituted in 1938, in addition to the internal passports which already restricted mobility. Every worker and employee in state and cooperative enterprise is required to have a workbook containing full information on his education, profession, work history, awards, and punishments. Management holds the book, keeps it up to date, and returns it to the worker only when a job transfer is in conformity with current regulations. According to the law, an employee cannot obtain a new job without his workbook and it is the basic document in the calculation of social security benefits. The general shortage of labor, however, has led to frequent violations of the requirements for the workbook; employers often do not ask for it, and forged books can be obtained on the black market.

In non-Communist countries work habits of employees are regulated by management or by collective bargaining agreements; in the USSR such things as absence from work, tardiness, drunkenness on the job, and malingering are regulated by law. Infractions carry criminal liability and the penalties have been severe, though strict application has varied in practice and is now considerably relaxed.

Soviet productivity is regulated by work norms — a measurement unit representing a definite minimum each worker is expected to produce in a specified time, or a minimum amount of work each is expected to accomplish. Every type of work, even the smallest task, has a norm which is generally determined on the basis of past performance — a statistical norm. A worker's pay is determined by the degree to which he fulfills or overfulfills the norm. Despite the government's contention that norms are often too low, there is considerable evidence that their fulfillment often taxes the health, strength, and skill of the worker to the utmost.

"Socialist competition," a device used in several forms by the regime to increase productivity, has resulted in extra effort on the part of individual workers that brings about short-term increases in productivity; the increases in turn have led to a further raising of the norms, a practice reported to be intensely resented by the workers. Such practices, plus the fact that there has been no precise definition of the principles by which norms are set, have resulted in various informal and illegal devices on the part of management—falsification of records, illegal overtime requirements, and similar devices—so that the planned production of the enterprise could be met. There has also been considerable variation in the norms for the same work in different industries.

Soviet sources admit that many workers are not able to fulfill their norms, and the blame for this situation is put upon the defects in the organization of production and work, which is said to result in considerable idle time for the workers. Accordingly, the present plans for revision of the wage structure include the replacement of "statistical norms" by "technical norms" based upon time and motion studies to show the "scientific" potentialities of any job.

Productivity standards derived from time and motion studies are not new to Western or Soviet industry. American as well as Soviet workers have resented and, when possible, resisted their adoption, considering them a step toward unwarranted and intolerable speed-ups. It appears, however, that the Soviet regime is now increasing pressure for general adoption of "technical norms" and is meeting resistance from management as well as workers.

The regime recognizes the fact that one of the big obstacles to improved productivity is the inefficiency of its industrial organization, and it expects the change to technical norms at least to help

bring about better organization.

In 1929 the regime began to sponsor socialist competition (also termed socialist emulation, Stakhanovism, and socialist innovation) among plants, shifts, shops, brigades, and individual workers. According to official statements, socialist competition differed from the competition capitalism fosters between workers in that it was an expression of "friendly rivalry" that did not cause dissension. "In a society in which the means of production have been nationalized, emulation in labor ought, without impinging upon the solidarity of workers, only to raise the sum total of the products of labor" stated a resolution of the Ninth Party Congress. In spite of this official position the several forms of competition have created strong jealousies and conflict among Soviet workers and, according to some reports, constitute a deeply resented speed-up.

Socialist emulation, the first phase of sponsored rivalry, began with production competition between factories and between groups of workers. Any material rewards were given to the winning factory or group as a whole. Within a few years the emphasis shifted to

competition between individual workers. The shock-worker became the official hero of production. He received extra wages and various privileges — better and larger living quarters, free access to schools, to sanatoriums, and for a time to special stores where consumer goods not available on the general market could be found.

The second phase, Stakhanovism, began about 1935. It placed major emphasis on the rationalization of labor — a necessary stage in industrial development — rather than on a temporary increase in production by means of extra effort. In the minds of most workers it was, however, different from emulation only in that it placed even

greater pressure upon individual workers.

Aleksey Stakhanov, a coal miner, cut over fifteen times as much as the normal coal output per man-shift, a record output, by forming a team which enabled him to cut coal continuously while the other members performed the subsidiary work of clearing away what was cut. The production was played up as that of one man; overnight Stakhanov became a national hero and a model to be imitated. As the result of an immense concerted propaganda effort by all government agencies and all party and trade union organizations, Stakhanovism soon became the symbol for straining every bit of energy.

Soviet writers repeatedly have emphasized that Stakhanovism, because it is based on rationalization of working methods, is distinct from shock work, the intensification of physical exertion. To the people, however, both terms are identified with some kind of

speed-up and often are used synonymously.

To qualify for the title Stakhanovite, a worker had to exceed by a definite degree and over a certain period of time the quantitative or qualitative norms of his job; but the precise requirements were vague and varied from industry to industry. In some cases Stakhanovites have been artificially created for propaganda purposes. In general, chances of becoming a Stakhanovite depended on youth, strength, health, skill, party membership, or sponsorship by the party. Working ability and cooperation from the authorities blended in the creation of Stakhanovites.

The drive resulted in the emergence of privileged individuals among the Soviet working class. Their earnings and standards of living, however, varied. A few were elevated to the top of the Soviet social ladder, attaining national fame. They enjoyed an exceptionally high living standard for the USSR and often were promoted to important managerial or administrative positions. At least some of the achievements of these "star" Stakhanovites were suspected of

being staged performances, but their prosperity and good fortune did not greatly concern the average worker, since he seldom saw the "star" and such achievements were completely beyond his reach.

A second and larger category of Stakhanovites consisted mostly of skilled workers whose more modest achievements did not warrant national prominence. On the whole these depended largely on their own capabilities and efforts to raise their material situation to a , level which, though below that of the star Stakhanovites, was substantially higher than that of the average worker. Some of them might be given opportunity to study and be promoted to such positions as foreman, shop head, and so forth, but most continued working and living among the mass of laborers, retaining some bonds with the rank and file. It is this group that was most resented by the average worker; it was blamed for the endlessly rising work norms, the speed-up, and the general deterioration of working conditions. In the eyes of the Soviet people, Stakhanovism was and still is symbolized by this group.

Workers, skilled or unskilled, whose achievements were much more moderate, formed the third and largest group of Stakhanovites. They were rarely advanced to nonmanual positions, though they might, by dint of physical exertion, temporarily achieve somewhat higher earnings than that of the rank and file. Their small and usually short-lived successes were not very strongly resented.

In 1954 the use of the term Stakhanovism was dropped, and the terms socialist competition and innovation now apply to all such production activities. Currently the emphasis is on the technical improvement of processes; individuals and groups are encouraged to develop such improvements and are expected to take the lead in demonstrating and putting them into effect throughout the plant. Sponsorship of competition along these lines is still one of the responsibilities of the trade union organization. It is doubtful that the change in name and emphasis has made competitive production drives any more popular with the workers.

Unions and other organizations exert control over ideological conformity, but further checks on political loyalty among workers are maintained by the Soviet political police, whose lines of authority are independent of management and the workers' organizations. A network of factory informers, recruited largely from the managerial elite, shop chiefs, foremen, and leading workers, reports on irregularities and dissatisfactions and encourages anonymous denunciations.

Statutory penalties for violations of labor discipline are severe, although their enforcement has been greatly relaxed in recent years. Formerly absence from work without a valid excuse could be punished by compulsory correctional labor at one's regular place of work at reduced pay for as much as six months. Tardiness carried a lighter penalty. Since the medical certificate was the only acceptable excuse for either of these violations, the factory and general clinic physicians have worked under tremendous pressure; malinger-

ing has been a problem of considerable proportions.

Quitting a job without permission carried, until the spring of 1956, a penalty of a prison term of two to four months. At that time, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, workers were given the right to quit jobs at will with two weeks' notice. They continue to forfeit their benefits for terms of continuous service and are only eligible for temporary disability benefits after a minimum of six months' service at their new place of work. The same decree ordered both cessation of prosecution of all cases involving quitting without leave or absenteeism without due cause and release of all persons convicted for such violations.

Drunkenness on the job is subject to the same legal penalty that formerly applied to absenteeism; loitering during working hours or sleeping on the job may be punished by admonition, reprimand,

or transfer to a lower-paying job.

For many of the violations of labor discipline there has been no official repeal of penalties, but a survey of the Soviet press indicates that at present only serious, malicious, and continuous offenders of labor discipline are prosecuted. Tardiness no longer requires a medical excuse, and absenteeism may be punished by temporary deprivation of supplementary seniority payments, dismissal, or other disciplinary punishment. The government apparently has ceased applying criminal penalties for infractions and now relies more upon keeping "backward" workers in line through administrative discipline, stepped-up campaigns of propaganda, and various techniques of public ridicule.

The Soviet regime has always placed great reliance upon the manipulation of material incentives as a motivation for workers to meet production goals. The theory of material equality—"to each according to his needs"—was set aside as a "leftist deviation," at least until such time as the final stage of socialism was achieved, and the Stalinist principle of "to each according to his work" adopted. The monetary rewards of labor were differentiated by official regulation so as to draw workers into those industries of major impor-

tance to the planned development, to keep workers at the same job, and generally to raise productivity. But throughout all industries and categories of labor, specific work norms were the standards by which individual performance was measured; wages varied with the

degree of success or failure in meeting the norms.

Wage rates have been used as an instrument of official policy since the first Five Year Plan. To buttress the development of heavy industry, the highest wages are paid in mining and in plants producing oil, iron, steel, or chemicals, and the lowest in light and consumer industries. In addition, premium rates are paid in geographical areas where development is being pushed, as in the Urals during the 1930's and in Siberia and Central Asia today. Until recently, the wages of individual workers were entirely dependent upon production. No minimum wage was guaranteed, and piece rates were established in as many industries as possible, with norms generally based on past performance. For output above the norms, rates were doubled for the first ten percent of excess and tripled for the next. In cases where piece rates could not be applied, bonuses were paid for above-norm production. The result was the development of extreme differences in pay among workers and, as Soviet leaders themselves admitted at the Twentieth Party Congress, "disorganization and muddle" in the wage system, which they promised to remedy. Norms and rates of pay for the same work varied from industry to industry, and bonuses and extra payments often made up as much as sixty percent of a worker's wages. Not only was the wide difference between the highest- and lowest-paid workers becoming an ideological embarrassment to the regime but, far more important, the wage scale was not functioning as an incentive to greater productivity.

The first official action in the promised revision came in the summer of 1956, when minimum wages for workers in industry, effective January 1, 1957, were established by official decree. All supplementary payments — bonuses, overtime, compensation for overfulfillment of norm, and the like — were to be over and above

the basic minimums.

A second step was taken by the government in October 1956 in ordering the test adoption of a new wage scale in fourteen major machine-tool plants that constitute one of the most important sectors of Soviet industry. This scale raised the basic wage rates by 10 to 55 percent and partially eliminated the system of premium and bonus payments. Since the original decree, minimum wages at the bottom of the wage structure have been raised several times. That bonus payments have not been entirely done away with, however, is indi-

cated by the case of a Leningrad factory director – by the summer of 1959 his bonus earnings continued to be twice, in lieu of his

previous average of three times, his base salary.

It is obvious that the regime still rejects the theory of "leveling" the monetary rewards to skilled and unskilled work, but the officially established differential in base pay, together with curtailment of the complex system of bonuses and the proposed elimination of progressive piece rates, may reduce the differential. The regime apparently feels that these changes will increase the incentives for greater productivity among the workers. For those whose wages are increased, this may well be true; but for those whose income may be reduced by the change, the reaction may be different.

The possibilities for advancement within the ranks of unskilled and skilled labor were almost without limit during the 1930's since there was widespread lack of and tremendous demand for trained personnel as industry expanded. Workers were promoted rapidly as they gained skills and experience. On-the-job training still plays an important part in supplying the trained labor force, and the entire educational system is geared to technical training. Although the rate of advancement today is slower than it was in the early years, the shortages in the ranks of skilled labor still provide opportunities for advancement.

Demotion and dismissal, particularly the latter, are regulated by law and administered by management. Violation of labor discipline is the chief reason for dismissal. Temporary or permanent demotions may be made for the same reason or for consistent failure to meet the norms. The power of management to fire employees has been used quite arbitrarily, according to many press reports and court actions on behalf of improperly dismissed work-

ers.

The possibility of advancement into administrative, supervisory, technical, or managerial positions plays a significant role in inducing some Soviet workers to improve their performance, but apparently this appeal is limited to a small proportion of skilled workers. Because of rapid industrial expansion, opportunities for social advancement in the USSR have been great. Advancement of workers to managerial and administrative positions was common up to the end of the 1930's; since then the rate has slowed down.

Before the death of Stalin most Soviet workers appeared to have become somewhat skeptical about their chances for social advancement. Many also were reluctant to take positions of respon-

sibility; the greater the professional or managerial responsibility, the greater the political pressures and the heavier the penalties for failure - considerations which often outweighed the attractive features. In the last few years, however, it appears that management is less vulnerable, and that greater independence is allowed. But today, as in former years, workers who do advance often bear the hostility of their colleagues: rejected by former co-workers, they are resented by their new ones. In some cases the earnings in the new position are lower than before - a skilled worker, for example, will sometimes find that his promotion to foreman entails a wage cut. Finally, some workers have no desire to advance to a supervisory position because they would then be forced to put pressure on those below them beyond what they consider reasonable or just. Many skilled workers who believe they have a chance to make a career for themselves will, however, assume initiative and undertake responsibility in spite of the risks involved.

The regime supplements material incentives with an elaborate system of prestige symbols. These skillfully exploit the worker's psychological need for approval, respect, and standing in the community, as well as his fear of public censure and shame. Outstanding achievements are given wide publicity. The names of honored workers are printed in headlines; their pictures are prominently displayed; ships may be named after them; they are awarded a host of honorary titles, decorations, badges, citations, medals, and orders; they are "elected" to public offices; special celebration meetings are organized for them at which they are honored amid the applause of

the audience and the fanfare of trumpets.

Several medals are in use — For Labor Valor, For Labor Distinction, Order of the Badge of Honor, Order of the Red Labor Banner — as well as many other awards. The title Hero of Socialist Labor usually carries with it the most honorific award, the Order of Lenin. There supposedly is a rule that anyone who obtains the title Hero of Socialist Labor three times has his portrait bust placed in the Moscow Hall of Fame. The only award that has recently carried a significant monetary benefit (up to 200,000 rubles and a gold medal) is the Lenin Prize, which replaced the Stalin Prize. Apparently only a few industrial workers have received this prize.

There are also awards for collective achievement — Stakhanovite Enterprise, Enterprise of Excellent Quality Output, and the like. Considerable pomp and ceremony generally accompany the public awarding of these honors; for awards to a factory, regulations re-

quire that they be made at meetings of the whole factory. Mikoyan, Khrushchev, and other party officials from the highest echelon have made the presentations of the Lenin Prize.

In practice, there is much confusion, arbitrariness, and lack of uniformity in making awards. Soviet sources cite many instances of abuse such as favoring unworthy workers and giving awards to enterprises that have not fulfilled their plans. The prescribed formalities of conferring honors in many cases are neglected, so that the effect of the pageantry and intended ceremonial solemnity often is lost.

For workers who are behind in output, various devices of public ridicule are used: "boards of dishonor" are displayed next to "boards of honor"; sarcastic comments, reprimands, and caricatures, are printed on wall newspapers in factories; "chairs of disgrace" are reserved in factory dining halls for those whose work is unsatisfactory; drunkards must collect their pay from "shame booths" shaped like vodka bottles, while jeered by onlookers; and slow workers are awarded satirical decorations, such as "the order of the laughing camel."

There is some evidence to suggest that the ordinary Soviet worker attempts to shun the limelight, having little desire to draw attention to himself by being either applauded or ridiculed for his performance. He is unwilling to face the resentment of his fellows for breaking records, and equally sensitive to their derision for failing to do a "man's work."

Function of Soviet Unions

The fact that Soviet trade unions do not function as protectors of labor in the Western sense does not mean that they are without importance in the Communist scheme. They play a vital role in binding the workers to the goals of the regime and may be considered among the many organizations making up the vast and intricate propaganda machine directed by the Communist party. They do not decide policy, but they have wide responsibilities in its implementation. As mass organizations they function as agencies for promoting participation and involvement in the goals of the regime, and perform many social service services for workers, their families, and communities. Through local organizations, conferences, and congresses they serve as a forum for airing worker grievances and to some degree as a check upon the performance of management.

Within a Soviet enterprise the factory director, the party secre-

tary, and the chief of the "special section" (political police) all exert much greater power and influence than the union functionary. Labor union activities have been geared to increasing production, and one of their main responsibilities has been to take the lead in planning and encouraging the various forms of socialist competition and emu-

lation among workers.

A measure of the labor union's subordination to the regime is its direct share of responsibility for the administration and enforcement of labor legislation. Other responsibilities include worker education in improved industrial techniques, workers' housing programs, safety and protection, social insurance, and other educational and welfare measures. Trade unions have at their disposal thousands of clubs and "houses of culture"; libraries; Red Corners, where political literature can be obtained in the plant; motion picture houses; stadiums, halls, athletic grounds, and similar establishments. Dances, concerts, amateur theatricals, literary readings, study circles, and lectures are arranged and organized by the unions. They also supervise work done at nurseries, kindergartens, homes for orphaned children of school age, playgrounds, and Pioneer camps.

Strikes, though not prohibited by law in the USSR, are branded by the regime as counterrevolutionary activity and severely punished. Wildcat strikes occurred in the early years of the Soviet regime but appear to have been eliminated after the institution of the

five-year plans.

In the USSR today no labor-management disputes (as understood by Americans) can exist. Working conditions, hours, and wage rates and salaries, the dominant concerns of most Western trade unions, are not subject to dispute in the USSR. Such matters are set by law. Within the various enterprises there are, ideology to the contrary, disagreements in such matters as job classification, application of wage scales, overtime pay, vacations, time lost by work stoppage, layoffs, severance pay, wage payments in connection with transfers, fines imposed for infraction of rules, damage caused by workers and payment therefor, dismissals, and the receipt of authorized benefits. The machinery set to handle such disputes serves to provide the worker with some sense of participation in management and of influence over the conditions under which he works.

Workers with grievances are expected to present their complaints to their shop or factory committee, or, if there is none, to the district committee of their union. Such complaints are investigated by a union official; if he feels they are justified, he has the responsibility of requesting management to correct the situation. According to Soviet sources, the majority of cases, which seldom involve any-

thing important, are settled in this way.

If the condition in question is not corrected, the dispute is usually taken to the shop or factory Norms and Conflicts Commission (RKK), although it may under certain conditions be taken to a public court. The RKK normally is composed of four members, two representing the workers and two, management. The RKK must hold a hearing within three days of receiving the case. Sessions are public, and decisions must be unanimous. If the dispute has been taken to a public court, either party, or the procurator, may appeal the decision of a people's court to a regional court, or on up to the supreme court of the constituent republic. Western observers report that the courts generally favor the workers in their decisions but, as stated above, management sometimes refuses to follow court orders. The frequency of such defiance cannot be ascertained. A certain amount of influence over management's compliance with labor agreements can be exercised by the unions through their control of such things as passes to sanatoriums and rest homes, bonuses, and the like, but it appears that often the union leadership itself sides with management rather than with the workers.

In the USSR a collective agreement consists of certain obligations assumed singly or jointly by the plant management and the union committee. These obligations are, first of all, "directed toward the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production plan." Unions commit themselves to encourage socialist competition and emulation. They promise to enforce regulations and laws protecting workers' rights, improve indoctrination lectures, help equip workers' clubs, rest houses, nurseries, and so forth. Management, in turn, promises to make fuller utilization of technological developments, improve working conditions, reduce work stoppages, and take action in the field of workers' welfare. Both unions and management pledge themselves to promote the construction of homes, work out methods for strengthening labor discipline, act on suggestions for the rationalization of production, and help raise the skills of the workers.

There appears to be very little difference between the obligations both management and unions are compelled to accept by existing government regulations and those they are instructed to accept under collective agreements. In the agreements, however, obligations are formulated in concrete terms and deadlines for their fulfillment are set. They are, in short, a more specific expression

of government desires.

Thus, collective bargaining in the USSR provides little more than another lever that helps the regime improve the performance of both management and labor through the precise definition of goals as they apply to a local situation and the involvement of the individual in those goals.

Structure of Labor Unions

Trade unions in the USSR are industrial, not craft, organizations. There is, for example, a union for the coal mining industry, one for metallurgy, one for teachers, and one for artists. The whole staff of an establishment, from manager to office boy, from highly skilled technician to unskilled labor, from school principal to janitor, be-

longs to one union.

Membership in a Soviet labor union is voluntary, but if a work-ker fails to join he loses a number of benefits. Union members are entitled to larger social insurance benefits in event of sickness, pregnancy, and childbirth. They have priority for entering health resorts and sanatoriums. They can borrow from the union's fund for mutual aid. They are eligible for free legal aid from the union legal staff and a number of other benefits. To join a union, a worker must submit a personal application and be accepted at a meeting of union members. He pays an entrance fee and monthly dues ranging from half of one percent to one percent of his wages. Some ninety percent of all wage and salary earners in the USSR belong to a union.

The primary unit of the union's administrative structure is the factory shop committee, nominally elected by a general meeting of the membership in any enterprise, institution, or economic unit with twenty-five or more employees. In actual fact, however, these elections are frequently dominated by the party management, and the committee always takes its orders and instructions from the trade union hierarchy, the party, and management, rather than from the union membership. The statute requiring annual elections of the

factory committee is rarely observed.

Local trade union organizations elect rayon conferences, which in turn elect oblast conferences, and the same procedure is carried on through the republic to the all-union level. The All-Union Congress of any given trade union represents in theory the highest national authority for that union. The committee organization exists at all levels.

The All-Union Congresses of the various unions elect an All-Union Trade Union Congress, which in turn elects the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. This last is the actual integrating

and controlling authority in Soviet labor unionism (see the plate,

Organization of Soviet Trade Unions).

The All-Union Trade Union Congress in theory meets biennially; in fact it has convened irregularly. Actual day-to-day work is conducted by the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Council, which direct the unions' lower echelons through inspectors and professional union organizers. Party control is exercised through party members attached to all union bodies and concentrated particularly in the higher levels of the labor union structure.

Attitudes toward Unions

The present views of Soviet workers concerning their unions cannot be determined. According to reports, their general feeling has been that their unions could do little to ameliorate conditions that are in violation of the collective agreements or to influence administrative labor regulations in their favor. The most tangible benefits that the union gives stem from its administration of social security benefits; it does provide an immediately available agency to which the worker can turn in an emergency with at least some hope of receiving assistance. The various recreational activities organized and sponsored by the unions are probably enjoyed. Other service activities of the unions — pressure for better housing, community facilities, and improvement of working conditions — would certainly gain approval of the workers if they were successful, but in these fields union officials are severely limited by chronic shortages of goods and services and have relatively little influence over management.


Forced Labor

Forced labor camps have been the brutal reality behind the Soviet use of organized terror as an instrument of rule. Incapable of tolerating any loyalties outside itself, the Soviet regime has subjected to arbitrary arrest and punishment persons or groups it considers

problems, either actual or potential.

As an instrument for the enforcement of political conformity, the forced labor system was not a Soviet innovation. However, though established on solid precedent, it was so extended that the proportion of Soviet families that have had a member at some time serving a sentence in the forced labor system seems close to the proportion of American families that have had some member in the armed forces. The camps have been a major source of fear and insecurity for the whole Soviet population.

ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET TRADE UNIONS



Though mass arrests were not designed principally to obtain a cheap labor force, huge economic enterprises developed on the basis of forced labor for the exploitation of resources in remote regions where the recruitment of free labor was made difficult by primitive conditions and hardships. Such labor has been used in the mining of gold and other metals, in the building of railroads, factories, canals, and cities, and has formed a large portion of the forestry labor force in the USSR.

While relatively few people were sentenced to forced labor during the first decade of Soviet rule, the policy of forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization in the 1930's resulted in an expansion of forced labor and an increase in the severity of treatment. The Communist regime singled out three main targets: private traders or "Nepmen," those who had attained a measure of prosperity under NEP in the 1920's; intellectuals, including scientific and professional personnel who were made the scapegoats for many of the early failures of the industrialization drive; and so-called kulaks, the peasants who actively or passively resisted the collectivization program. By 1934 the network of camps had spread into the central regions of European Russia and deep into Siberia, and forced labor had become an important factor in the planning of vast new construction projects. The number of forced laborers during the 1930's is not known, but the fact that over 200,000 were used on the Leningrad-White Sea canal project alone indicates that the total must have run well into the millions. Conditions in the labor camps deteriorated markedly in this period; inmates were subjected to great brutality and suffering.

The great purges which followed the assassination of Kirov in late 1934 were reflected in an enormous increase in forced labor. Party members, government officials, juvenile delinquents, and others swelled the labor camp population. Distinctions between guilt and innocence became meaningless as millions summarily were declared "enemies of the people." Persons accused of political crimes, the bulk of the forced labor total, now were subjected to the harshest treatment and became the lowest stratum of prison society. Ordinary criminals, recruited as foremen and overseers and given minor posts in the camp administration, persecuted the "politicals," stripping them of their food and possessions under the indifferent eye of the camp authorities. Insecurity, intimidation, and fear followed the prisoner every day in the camp, for an informers' network operated among prisoners and free personnel alike, and the inmate constantly risked sudden and incomprehensible denunciation.

reduction of rations, confinement in an "isolator," renewed interro-

gation, or extension of his term of confinement.

New arrests of thousands suspected of political "unreliability" followed the 1939 Soviet-Nazi pact. Occupation of Poland and the Baltic states was accompanied by systematic deportation of groups and persons considered dangerous. In the Baltic states alone, the deportees were estimated at 200,000, of whom 50,000 to 60,000 were sent to forced labor camps, the rest being resettled in exile.

During and after World War II the proportion of non-Russians in the labor camps increased considerably. Poles and Balts were followed by Bessarabians, Germans, Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians, and Japanese. To these were added scores of Ukrainians and Belorussians suspected of collaborating during the Nazi occupation. A number of national minorities — Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Karachai, Balkar, Chechen-Ingush — became special targets because of alleged disloyalty. Their national territorial units were liquidated, and large numbers were sent to labor camps.

After the defeat of the Nazis many returning Russian war prisoners also were sent to forced labor camps on suspicion of disloyalty. Japanese prisoners of war were retained for the forced labor system as part of reparations. New "elements" considered enemies of Communism, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and other occupied territories, further augmented the forced labor total, the greatest deportations

occurring in the Soviet zone of Germany.

After Stalin's death in 1953 there was a movement toward making the procedure of sentencing citizens to the camps more strictly a function of the regular legal process rather than an administrative action. This foreshadowed a significant shift in policy. In 1956 the Soviet government launched a program to abolish most if not all labor camps and to replace them with so-called "corrective labor colonies." According to the plan, the members of the newly organized colonies would work in factories and other institutions under semi-free conditions as long as they remained within a prescribed geographic area. Available evidence, though scanty, indicates that this shift was completed by 1958 or 1959.

According to new penal legislation adopted in December 1958, prisons and corrective labor colonies are the two major detention systems employed by the state today. Prisons are used for the harshest penalties imposed by the government; sentence to a corrective labor colony is considered a lighter punishment. The 1958 law also states that criminal penalties may be imposed only by the courts.

There is some question, however, as to how this provision is interpreted. Local citizens' groups and soviet executive committees are empowered to "banish" a person for periods of two to five years and to prescribe compulsory labor by a simple vote, without any

judicial process.

The system had been extremely wasteful of manpower. Population losses which resulted from collectivization, the purges, and World War II are now being felt, and the regime can hardly disregard its human resources. The labor colonies could be an answer to this economic problem. They can still maintain the function of punitive institutions, but conditions need not be so severe as to preclude worthwhile economic production on the part of the inmates. If the length of sentences are comparable to those that applied in the camps, a stable labor pool would seem assured.

Trends

The self-imposed rapid rate of economic development led the Soviet regime to adopt certain stringent methods of control and direction of its labor force, unthinkable under a nontotalitarian system other than in times of grave emergency. On balance, and aside from recurrent exceptions in the agricultural sector, these methods have tended to achieve the regime's goals in physical terms. But considerable economic and human waste, by any Western standard, as well as brutal coercion have accompanied this development, the very tempo of which also has created shortages and bottlenecks in the supply of various types of manpower.

One consequence of these manpower bottlenecks and shortages has been the increasingly strong emphasis on raising the productivity of Soviet workers by various forms of education and training. The Russian worker's characteristic interest in things mechanical (as distinguished from technical aptitude) may have been of some assistance to the regime's endeavors in that direction. But advances in productivity are retarded by neglect on the part of the authorities to provide the simplest labor-saving devices such as automatic

hand tools and conveyances.

Efforts toward higher per capita productivity, including measures to end the almost proverbial neglect of maintenance, are being partly vitiated also by marked and apparently persistent deficiencies in labor discipline and by negative attitudes of the workers toward the Soviet regime's efforts to improve work discipline. Labor turnover shows no sign of declining. There is also no indication that

cases of tardiness and absenteeism have become fewer, nor are the instances confined to any particular area. Interestingly enough, however, there has been little criticism leveled against the individual worker. Rather, it has been the party, the Komsomol, and the trade unions which are reproved for neglecting their responsibilities. Plant directors also come in for a share of the criticism whenever housing shortages, poor working conditions, or lack of opportunity for im-

proving workers' qualifications are discovered.

Statutory penalties for infractions of labor discipline were lightened some time ago, and it is reported that greater reliance is being placed on social pressure in the effort to keep workers in line. It is apparent that the comparative softness of recent official pronouncements has something to do with the present tightness of labor supply and that the Soviet government presently finds it expedient to use the carrot rather than the stick. However, no inference must be drawn as to the existence of a trend in this regard. The Soviet regime retains wide powers and control over its labor force and could revert—at some cost, to be sure—to more drastic measures if internal or external conditions should warrant such a change.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

THE CONCERN OF THE SOVIET REGIME for the welfare of the populace operates within the limits of an ideology that casts the individual in the role of servant of the state. This is not to say this concern is limited solely to the maintenance of efficient human productive machinery. Many of the leaders may be sincere in their belief that the achievement of Communism will bring to the people the best of all possible lives, and that for this goal temporary personal sacrifice is necessary. Also, the leadership is quite conscious that the wellbeing of the people is an important motivating factor not only for production but for loyalty to the system and general morale. Yet it remains a fact that improvement of living conditions has from the beginning been given a lesser priority than the development of heavy industry. Though it would be possible for the regime to radically shift this emphasis, it seems unlikely that it will do so in the near future. But while the accomplishments of the regime in the improvement of the nutritional level, medical care, and sanitary standards of the Soviet people fall short of official claims, actual accomplishments have been notable and are continuing.

Standards of Living

There is wide disparity of standards of living in the Soviet society. At one extreme, the social and political elite lives in considerable luxury; at the other, the peasant, receiving relatively few benefits from the state, has little to ease the dreariness and drudgery of his life.

The Soviet regime manipulates opportunity for higher standards of living in such a way as to support its own objectives. Wages and pensions are geared to favor workers in high-priority industries. To reduce labor turnover, social security benefits of most types increase as uninterrupted employment at one enterprise increases. Certain privileges also accrue to individuals who are considered to be of particular value to the regime: more and better housing is available to outstanding workers; automobiles are furnished factory managers and various other executives and officials; free passes are given to resorts as a reward for special performance or responsible position—the resorts varying in quality according to the status of the individuals involved.

The reactions of the Soviet people to their standard of living are determined by their experience. The fact that Americans and most Europeans are better fed, clothed, and housed than they is largely irrelevant. To a considerable extent the average Russian accepts and even exaggerates the comparative luxury of the West, but it has little reality to him. The aspirations of and the bases of comparison for the majority of the people develop within the context of their

own society and from their own experience.

In comparison with the postwar years of extremely high prices, shortages, and rationing, the situation today is considerably improved, but despite these changes, the standard of living has not met the aspirations of the Russian people or the goals of their government. Official goals have always been couched in terms of increased benefits to the people, but industrial expansion has always had top priority. Public dissatisfactions with the near-subsistence levels at which many workers exist, the inadequacies of social security benefits, and the red tape, uncertainties, and favoritism which have impeded their administration have undoubtedly contributed to recent official action to raise the lower levels of wages and pensions. But regardless of the slow rate of improvement and the difficult conditions of everyday life, during the last several years the people generally seem to feel that life is becoming somewhat more comfortable and more predictable. This attitude is typical throughout the USSR, except in the Baltic republics and perhaps in Central Asia. So long as the people believe that reasonable progress is being made toward the goal of good living conditions, dissatisfactions will be relatively restrained.

In the Baltics standards of living are lower than they were during the period of independence. Food supplies are shorter, prices are higher, and wages are lower. Whether or not the general improvements that have occurred in the last few years have been sufficient to raise the living standards to prewar levels cannot be determined. It seems probable, however, that the standard of living would have to reach a level much higher than existed in the 1930's

before it would be recognized as a contribution by the Soviet Russian regime to the Baltic peoples' well-being.

In Central Asia conditions have improved tremendously: beginning with a standard of living considerably lower than that of the European areas, industrial workers there today fare at least as well as those in other areas, and there is some indication that the collective farmer is better off than the average *kolkhoznik* in the USSR. After the abolition of rationing in 1947, Central Asia was placed in the zone of lowest fixed prices, as an incentive to attract workers and farmers to the developing industries and agriculture of that region. The rapid expansion of the area, however, has itself produced acute shortages of housing and other facilities and services. It has also brought still larger numbers of Russians and other people alien to the land and its people. Resentment at these and at the sovietization of their distinctive cultures probably more than counterbalances the satisfactions Central Asians may feel at improvements in their living standards.

Housing

Many observers have commented on the lack of "privacy" in Russian life. The hut of the traditional Russian village, often with only one room, gave the individual little chance to be off by himself, and a casual coming and going of guests seems to have been common at all levels of Russian life. Limited as the space was, however, only one family lived in it. Today the housing shortage in both urban and newly developed rural areas is so acute that often several families are forced to live together in one apartment or barracks; dormitory-type quarters are widespread.

Most Russians have never known the standards of housing and domestic equipment that are taken for granted in the United States; and, except at the pinnacle of Russian society, the idea of a room of one's own is practically unheard of for adults, let alone for children. But housing today is generally in such very poor condition, and living quarters so crowded, that the over-all morale and efficiency of industrial workers have suffered. New construction has barely replaced living space lost during World War II, and the re-emphasis on heavy industrial development does not indicate that housing congestion will be alleviated in the near future.

Urban housing, except for a small but increasing proportion, is owned by the government and operated through either city soviets or various industries and enterprises. Space is allocated according to fixed standards based on the socioeconomic status of the individual. These standards are not defined in terms of number of rooms, however, but in square meters of living space (excluding hallways, closets, kitchens, and baths). The basic standard is nine square meters (96.87 square feet) per person. High government and military officials, artists, writers, and scientists of high standing, holders of various "Hero" medals, and the like are eligible for additional space.

Since housing is allotted, like so much else in the USSR, according to the value of the individual to the regime, it becomes, under existing conditions, a powerful incentive to performance. The acute shortage also results in a great deal of illegal activity on the part of tenants and management. Officials of the organizations that control apartment buildings are in a position to give favors to friends and supporters and bring pressure to bear upon the noncooperative or unimportant. Managers, though they may be induced to overlook vacancies or otherwise manipulate facilities, have no legal power to assign space. This situation is the source of considerable resentment and bitterness.

The majority of Soviet workers today must do with even less than the legal housing standards — which, in fact, have never been met. In 1923 there was an average of about 6.45 square meters (approximately 69 square feet) of living space available for urban dwellers; in 1950 that average had fallen to 3.98 square meters (approximately 42 square feet) — just about enough space for a double bed, dresser, and chair. Actually, allocation of space by square meters often results in the crowding into one apartment, or even one room, of different families. For favored people, however, there are special apartment houses, with ample room and all modern conveniences. The people at the apex of the political hierarchy live in a luxury equal to that found anywhere in the world.

Public housing, owned and operated by various government agencies, may be divided into three general types: individually occupied apartments, communal apartments, and communal dwellings. The first type, with ample room and all modern conveniences, is restricted to those individuals deemed most useful to the regime. The second, the communal apartment, is generally found in older buildings: in such quarters a three-room apartment often is occupied by three families, one family to a room, all using the same kitchen and bath. Most new construction is of the third type, the communal dwelling, which may be one of three different kinds – the multiapartment dwelling, the dormitory, or barracks. The multiapart-

ment dwelling has separate apartments, the dormitory is divided into rooms, usually for four persons each, and the barracks are divided into large rooms in which fifty or more persons can be quartered; all types have communal kitchen and bathroom facilities.

Though private ownership of land and dwellings was abolished in 1918, private housing was again permitted in the mid-1920's. Today, private construction of housing for personal use is not only allowed but encouraged; ownership of the land, however, remains with the state. The house owner may rent or lease part of his house, but the rent is fixed by law and he is responsible for maintenance. Privately constructed houses generally are small, of three or four rooms, and are almost always located in suburban areas.

Architecturally, economy rather than beauty has been stressed in housing for the average worker in the USSR. This tends to lead not only to monotony and bleakness in appearance but also to the use of poor materials and workmanship. The whole construction industry suffers from a low priority in allocation of funds, materials,

and labor and from lack of procurement coordination.

The press frequently carries critical articles about poorly constructed new buildings (for example, windows and doors that do not fit). Major repairs often are needed by the time a building is completed—a situation made much worse by the fact that the acute housing shortage often results in occupancy of all or part of a build-

ing before construction has been finished.

Managers of multiple-dwelling units are appointed by local soviets or by the industry that owns the unit. A manager's main function is to supervise maintenance and enforce compliance with house rules. Individual tenants are responsible for routine repairs such as painting and replacement of broken windows; owners are responsible for maintenance of public areas, hallways, stairs, community

kitchens, baths, laundries, and for all major repairs.

The manager and the janitorial staff have a police function that makes them highly unpopular with the residents. (Janitors are appointed only after political approval.) Arrivals and departures of tenants and guests are — in theory, at least — controlled to assure that all have valid passports and registration papers. If a tenant is under special surveillance, the manager notifies the police concerning his visitors and activities. There is reason to believe that some of the residents also function as informants.

The manager is in a position to give favors, in violation of the law, to tenants. But the constant friction between him and the tenant over maintenance — always difficult because of shortages and

red tape — plus widespread knowledge of his police connections makes for strained relations. Turnover among managers is high, and able workers are not attracted to such work. Efforts to enlist tenants for management functions have met with little success.

The housing shortage is as general in rural areas as in urban, and is particularly acute in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia, where failure to provide promised housing has greatly in-

creased the difficulties of attracting settlers.

Individual homes are characteristic of rural areas throughout the Soviet Union, though barracks and dormitories have been constructed on the state farms and the *kolkhozes* in newly developed regions. Traditionally, among the Russians, as well as among sedentary farmers of Central Asia, homes were generally clustered together in small villages. In the Ukraine isolated farm houses were more usual, and in the Baltics the independent farmers almost always lived on the land they cultivated. The typical *kolkhoz* village is based on the old Russian pattern, with small private plots generally adjacent to the houses. Soviet policy, accordingly, has resulted in general dislocation for peoples who lived according to other patterns.

Services

A large proportion of the Soviet urban population is without running water, sewage systems, or gas. Electricity is more generally available, but many city dwellers still use kerosene lanterns for lighting, and electrical appliances such as irons and refrigerators are luxury items. Moscow and Leningrad are far better served by utilities than other cities.

In general, only large, multilevel houses in the central sections of the cities have running water, plumbing, and gas; even in these, individual apartments and rooms often lack such conveniences. Electric service apparently is more widespread. Presumably, few of the privately owned houses have utilities, for, as noted above, they are usually located at some distance from the center of the city.

Dwellings without running water are supplied from water spouts in their courtyards or from street hydrants or nearby streams and ponds; outdoor toilet facilities with cesspools also are provided.

In rural areas there is almost no plumbing.

The lack of running water in towns and cities has led to the development of a system of public baths and municipal laundries — both, however, reportedly inadequate in numbers and service. The

baths often are not properly maintained and may be closed for long periods. Laundry service is slow and very hard on clothing - a serious problem, given the high price of clothing and the poverty of wardrobes. Facilities for industrial housing are, however, considerably superior, since many industrial enterprises have their own water supply; rural areas are dependent almost entirely upon individual or communal wells or lakes and streams.

Domestic servants can be afforded only by the elite. Because household repair men are difficult to find, residents often do their own repairs, a practice which does not receive official encouragement. Such work as shoe repairing is done by members of cooperatives, also often on their own time. Beauty shops exist, but their clientele is largely restricted to women of the upper-income groups: barber shops, however, are fairly numerous and their charges relatively low.

In the area of food purchasing and preparation the regime is making considerable effort to ease household pressures on working women. Production of canned foods is being stepped up, and most of the bread consumed is baked in state-operated bakeries rather than in the home. Increased food supplies have resulted in shorter lines at the stores and quicker shopping. It is reported that American merchandising methods are to be adopted. One of the exasperations of shopping has been the necessity of standing in three lines to purchase one item — one line to select, one to pay, and one to pick up. Simplification of that system should meet with approval.

Most industrial establishments and schools have canteens in which workers may obtain meals at prices below those of public restaurants. Many restaurants, however, serve adequate meals at relatively low cost, and they are also urged to prepare meals for

home consumption.

Commodities

There have been marked fluctuations in the availability and the prices of foodstuffs during the Soviet era. The NEP period saw gradual recovery from the starvation conditions of World War I and the revolution; food supplies reached a relative state of abundance, particularly in rural areas, and prices were fairly low. For those who remember NEP, the period has taken on the nostalgic qualities of the "good old days," and with some justification. The immediate effect of forced collectivization of agriculture, which began in the late 1920's, was a sharp decrease in food supplies and a concomitant increase in prices. With certain variations this trend continued through the 1930's; it was intensified during World War II. Since then, however, the situation has improved considerably. Foodstuffs are available in greater quantity, quality, and variety. A series of price cuts for staple commodities in the state stores, along with reductions in free market prices, have served to make more food

available to the people.

The Russian population today is able to buy sufficient clothing for needed protection from the weather, but the average wardrobe is not large. There is a noticeable tendency for families to concentrate upon clothing the children well, while allowing the adults relatively little. Quality (of textiles and shoes in particular), style, and workmanship have been poor by European, American, or even Russian standards; according to recent reports, however, they have improved considerably. There have been price cuts in clothing in recent years, but scarcity, low quality, and high prices remain sources of considerable criticism and dissatisfaction, despite improvement.

Western clothing styles for both men and women are usual in the cities of European Russia — constituting to a considerable degree a symbol of prestige, a mark of "having arrived" socially and economically in both Russian and minority areas. Certain groups of sons and daughters of the elite (labeled with the derogatory term stilyagi) ape the extremes of Western fashion. In general, however, styles do not keep up with the changes of the West and lack the excellence of design and manufacture found even in many relative-

ly inexpensive clothes in the United States.

Many features of traditional costume are, however, still worn in the cities. In Moscow, for example, the embroidered blouse is popular with both men and women. Among manual laborers the felt boot commonly replaces leather shoes, especially in the winter. The annual output of leather shoes in the USSR is, in fact, little more than one pair per person, although high leather boots are worn not only by almost all those in uniform but also quite often by both men and women in civilian life. Winter outdoor costumes vary from fur-lined coats among the upper classes to the quilted jackets common among laboring women. Headgear for men includes a wide variety of fleece, fur-lined, or felt caps with ear flaps; shawls are used as headcovering by most women.

Minority peoples have adopted certain Western articles of dress

- leather shoes, for example - when these are found to be more functional than their own, but continue to wear many items of their traditional costumes. Even on adaptations they maintain regional types of decoration and ornamentation. In general, traditional modes of dress are more prevalent in rural areas than in urban centers.

Many nonessentials remain out of reach for the average Russian consumer. Jewelry, leather goods, household equipment, and so forth, are available in some stores, but the prices are kept high. In general, the homes of Russian workers are simply and cheaply furnished and contain few if any of the items of equipment taken for granted in the United States.

Radios are available but not widely owned; wired speakers are more common. Automobiles, in short supply and expensive, are rarely owned by individuals. Furthermore, full purchase price must be deposited with an order, which may be as much as a year in advance of delivery. Spare parts are almost nonexistent, competent

repair men are rare, and gasoline is expensive.

It should be remembered, however, that the Russian people have never been accustomed to the variety of commodities and the proliferation of household equipment that have become standard in the United States. Relatively few apartments would have the space for an electric refrigerator, stove, or washing machine, or the power necessary to run them. While desire for such equipment is growing, its lack is not necessarily viewed as deprivation.

Social Security Benefits

The Soviet Constitution guarantees citizens of the USSR "maintenance in old age and in case of sickness and disability," which is insured by state provision of social insurance and medical care. Though the provision of free medical care is, with certain limitations, applied to all the people, pensions and sickness benefits are limited to "factory and office workers." Peasants on collective farms, somewhat less than half the total population, are excluded. Each *kolkhoz* is expected to make provisions for its own members — an ideal rarely attained. There is some indication, however, that this situation may be changing. The employees of state farms are covered by social insurance by virtue of their being state employees, and their numbers are increasing. There is also a trend toward the monetization of the farm economy. If these tendencies continue, the peasants may eventually be covered by social security benefits.

Pensions

Though there have been many criticisms of the quality and quantity of service given and reports of manipulation of benefits to favored individuals, social insurance benefits are spread quite widely and systematically among workers and employees. Despite the fact that social insurance funds come from the state budget to which all contribute in the form of taxes, Soviet workers tend to look upon the services and pensions as free. Their criticism is directed toward improvements in the quality and availability of such services; they strongly approve of the existence of the system.

According to the law the following are entitled to state pensions: (a) workers and employees, (b) servicemen, (c) students in higher educational institutions, specialized secondary institutions, academies, and training courses, (d) other citizens if they become incapacitated in connection with the performance of state or public duties, (e) the families of these citizens in the event of the loss of

the wage earner.

Three types of pensions are paid: old age, disability, and dependency. Funds for state pensions are provided in the annual state budget, including funds under the budget for state social insurance made up of contributions from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, with no deductions from wages. None of the pensions

are subject to taxation.

Amount of pension is computed on the basis of average actual earnings over the last twelve months of work or, if the pensioner so requests, over any consecutive five-year period within the ten years preceding application for pension. Actual earnings include all earnings and long-service bonuses but exclude overtime payments, any kind of lump-sum payments, and earnings from other jobs. High and low limits are set for pensions, though it is possible in some cases for the amount of pension to exceed 100 percent of the earnings from which the pension is calculated, as in the case of total disability of a worker with three dependents. Scientific workers, artists, composers, and writers are covered by special arrangements.

Differential benefits are given to (a) workers in underground or other industries where conditions are likely to be injurious to health, (b) workers and employees "engaged in work under other difficult conditions," and (c) workers in all other industries. The ambiguous wording in the second category enables the regime to manipulate premium pensions as an incentive to draw workers into whatever industries are deemed important and can be defined as "difficult."

Sickness Benefits

Sickness benefits are provided for workers temporarily unable to work because of illness — but only after at least six months' employment at the same job. Fifty percent of wages is paid if uninterrupted employment is less than three years, the rate increasing to a maximum of ninety percent for twelve years' service or more. This scale applies to union members only, about ninety percent of the labor force; nonmembers receive only half as much.

Though there is no evidence that these payments are not made, there is at times difficulty in getting the necessary medical certificate for legal absence from work. It is reported that as a result of pressures on management to meet production goals, and of physicians' quotas for sickness certificates, workers are sometimes kept on the job when they are ill. It is also reported that space in sanitariums and rest homes and special diets supposedly provided out of social insurance funds are often impossible to get in spite of the requisite certificates of need.

Special Benefits

In addition to the benefits described above, there are others which are awarded on a less general basis. Pensions for long service, forty to fifty percent of basic salary, may be granted to certain groups of officials, employees, teachers, and others outside the regular pension categories after twenty-five years' service. Funeral allowances, varying between 200 and 500 rubles according to age of the deceased and the location of the burial, are provided for workers, functionaries, pensioners, students, and their families.

In addition to the medical attention and holidays granted pregnant women, funds for layettes and food for the child may be provided out of social insurance funds. Unmarried mothers with one, two, or three children are paid, respectively, a subsidy of 50, 75, and 100 rubles per month, in addition to the grants given to married mothers, until the children reach the age of twelve. Married mothers receive, whether working or not, a lump-sum payment on the birth of each child after the second (or a monthly sum, while the child is between the ages of two and five), ranging from 200 rubles on the birth of a third child to 2,500 rubles (or 150 monthly) on the birth of an eleventh child. Adopted children and stepchildren are included in the count, and if a mother entitled to a subsidy dies the sum can be paid to the father or guardian of the children.

In addition to monetary assistance, graded motherhood honor-

ifics are awarded. The "Motherhood Medal," second and first class, is given to mothers who have borne and reared five and six children. The "Order of Motherhood Glory," in three classes, is awarded for seven, eight, and nine children. A mother of ten children is awarded the title "Mother Heroine" and a special certificate from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. These and other honorifics are given wide publicity by Soviet authorities.

Sanitariums and Rest Homes

Sanitariums are hospitals treating specific diseases such as tuberculosis and are on the whole operated by the Ministry of Health, although some industries maintain their own. The rest home, as its name implies, is a rest and vacation institution - sick people are not admitted. Since April 1956 the rest homes have been operated by the republic Ministries of Health; prior to that time they were operated by various organizations and industrial concerns and had been subject to considerable official and public criticism. Officials of the operating concern were accused of issuing passes, over and above those reserved for awards for outstanding work, to friends and relatives not even employed at the factory. Deserving and otherwise eligible workers could not get space, even when they were ready to pay the full charges in addition to the transportation costs required for all visitors. The charges were rather high, but the inadequacies of facilities and services were far greater objects of criticism. Rooms were not cleaned and linens not changed often: dining rooms were inadequately staffed, and the food was poor; no recreational opportunities were provided. As a result of these and other conditions, many workers preferred to spend their vacations at home or to visit friends and relatives. It is too early to know whether the centralized administration within the Ministry of Health of all except over-night rest homes will result in improvements. The regime is, however, apparently committed to seeing that these publicized workers' resorts are made attractive to the population.

Child Care Institutions and Camps

Nurseries and kindergartens for children of working mothers are operated on social insurance funds by industries and other organizations. Parents are required to pay part of the expenses, but the charges are graduated according to family income and the number of children attending. These facilities serve a dual function for the regime: numbers of women who otherwise would be occupied at

home are freed to enter the labor force, and the training of the "new Soviet man" can be begun at an early age. Though many children attend, some working mothers apparently prefer to make other arrangements, such as leaving the children with an older relative in the household.

Summer camps for children between seven and fourteen are operated by labor unions and other organizations in conjunction with the party and the Komsomol. They are financed in part from social insurance funds and in part by contributions from union budgets, director's funds, and the like. Children of dead or disabled soldiers, of disabled workers, or from large or low-income families may be accepted at the camps without charge; others pay a part of the cost.

Medical Care

The administrative structure of Soviet medicine is highly centralized. Through the Ministry of Health, the regime exercises almost complete control over civilian medical activity in all its phases: not only in hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries, but also in the recruiting, training, and assignment of physicians; health education and medical research; the manufacture of drugs, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment; and the compilation of medical statistics.

A few doctors in the larger cities carry on private practice in addition to their prescribed duties. Private practice is tolerated by the state, but the proceeds are very highly taxed. A doctor acting privately is not allowed to issue medical certificates. There is no extensive information available as to the prevalence of such practice,

or the degree of control to which it is subject.

Medical care in the USSR is financed through the government budget. The Soviet citizen does not, therefore, pay for it directly, nor is there a specific medical-care deduction from his wages. Soviet sources estimate that free medical care has the effect of adding

about seven percent to real wages.

Each medical unit submits a budget for the coming year to the next higher unit, and the Ministry of Health finally approves an over-all allocation with which each unit must comply, a system which results in "padding" by units seeking to be prepared for emergencies. The approved sums are made available to the local units through branches of the State Bank.

In the years since the war about five percent of the total budget

of the USSR has been allocated to health measures. The proportion, however, increases markedly on the lower administrative levels, running as high as twenty percent of republic budgets and seventy

percent of local budgets.

The availability of medical services follows the rule generally applicable in all areas of Soviet life: the higher a man's rank in the administrative or political structure, the better is the service available to him. Such discrimination is justified by the regime in terms of an individual's value to it. The contribution of a high party functionary or a highly skilled engineer is considered far greater than that of a farmer. The farmer, in short, is comparatively expendable.

Medical facilities are as a consequence organized into two major networks: the general or "open" network, maintained by the Ministry of Health for the general population; and, the exclusive "closed" network. The latter has two important subcategories: the first subcategory includes establishments (comparable to the open clinics and hospitals in the large cities) that are reserved for the rank-and-file workers of certain specific organizations, such as army, navy, and state security; the second, or upper, category includes polyclinics, sanitariums, etc., reserved for the top echelons of Soviet

society - but here again there are gradations.

Though information in regard to this second, or upper, division is limited, it seems that each of the highest party leaders has his personal physician who treats no one else, is in constant attendance, supervises work habits, diet, and exercise, and accompanies him on any trips. Should the official become ill, his physician may call in specialists, even foreign ones. The hospitals to which the official will go provide the very best and latest equipment in palatial surroundings. If a rest is deemed advisable, he may go to establishments in the Caucasus or the Crimea, where everything he might desire is provided in an atmosphere of luxury said to exceed that maintained by the tsars.

In a slightly lower category are lesser party officials and certain scholars, writers, artists, and ballerinas — outstanding members of the intelligentsia. These may have to share a physician with five or six others, and their hospitals are less luxurious. A third group of still lesser officials may share a physician with fifteen to twenty families and use still less elaborate hospital facilities, but the care they receive is still considerably above average.

Comparable gradations in medical care exist for the local political elite. In all cases, however, these special facilities are avail-

able only so long as the individual retains his position. Should he fall into disfavor, these and all other privileges of his rank are

immediately withdrawn.

According to the law, all citizens of the Soviet Union are registered in medical districts where they are eligible to visit the district outpatient clinic or, if confined to bed, to be visited by the district physician or *feldsher* (medical assistant with training roughly equal to the public health nurse in the United States). The physician or *feldsher* decides whether additional care is needed, and the patient may be referred to an appropriate polyclinic or

hospital.

Rural medical districts are large in area and number of people. It is estimated that there is one rural medical district for every six thousand rural residents, approximately one for every seven collective farms. A collective farm may have a maternity and nursery home if it pays the expenses and if there is a midwife or a feldsher available. But free medical care begins with a government-established "feldsher-midwife point"—supposedly manned by a feldsher and a midwife but more usually by either one or the other, who then takes over the duties of both. If a villager needs a physician's attention, he may be referred to the rural medical district of his area. Occasionally the chief of the rural medical district makes a local visit, but more often the villager must go to the doctor if he can afford it and can arrange for transportation. The latter is a considerable problem since the distances are often long and the roads are generally poor.

The urban population has somewhat better medical facilities. Theoretically, there is a medical district for every four thousand inhabitants, with a district medical center manned by two general practitioners and one pediatrician. There is one obstetrician for every four districts. The chief medical officer of the district functions as family doctor and public health officer. As such he is supposed to know the people of his district and their needs and also see that the sanitary conditions within the district are satisfactory. This obviously is an impossibility, and the complement of the medical center is often not filled. Most medical care is given in outpatient clinics; home calls are usually made after clinic hours, but it is very difficult if not impossible for a person to arrange for a house call after the clinic closes. Emergency treatment may be procured from medical stations. When further treatment is required the patient is referred to polyclinics and hospitals.

For the rural citizen there are further inadequacies in medical

service. The equipment and facilities of hospitals and medical centers are far poorer in the country than in the cities, where, even though they often fall far short of excellence, there are some hospitals with the best of everything. Pharmacies are thinly scattered in rural areas, as are the medical stations where the *feldshers* dispense proprietary pharmaceuticals. Even in urban pharmacies common drugs often are in short supply; a considerable length of time is required to have a prescription filled — twenty-four hours or more. Since the mid-1930's patients have had to pay for all drugs; prescriptions are often expensive. Many of the pharmaceuticals in use in the USSR are herbal in origin, but there is also widespread use of various antibiotics and the sulfas. Bottlenecks in production and distribution often result in serious shortages of all drugs.

The best physicians tend to gravitate to the cities. This is not surprising, since conditions for practice in rural areas are harsh, living conditions are rough, housing is scarce, and the rural doctor is required to serve a large area where transportation difficulties are far greater than in the urban areas and where the shortage of facili-

ties and equipment makes efficient practice difficult.

Popular support of and cooperation with the public health agencies are built up in a variety of ways. Extensive health-education programs are carried out by the authorities through schools and various organizations. Popular participation is extended by having laymen as members on various local medical and sanitation boards; a considerable amount of the sanitary and epidemiological inspec-

tion is done by the lay members.

The degree of the Soviet regime's control over medical facilities has led to an extremely complex and cumbersome bureaucracy. Through this organization it has been possible to "storm" the health and sanitation problems of the nation, give priority to the building of hospitals, provide sanitation and medical personnel for new cities, factories, and other expanding industries, mobilize and assign epidemiological teams to areas threatened with the outbreak of dangerous epidemics, and arbitrarily order into retraining thousands of general practitioners to meet the need for surgeons during the war. In sum, the organization has made possible quick mobilization of medical resources to meet developing needs — but at a price.

The Soviet system has serious drawbacks which impair the quality of its medical services. The most serious is that directives from the top often are issued under political pressure — and lack of personnel, equipment, and drugs makes compliance impossible at

the local level. Yet merely nominal compliance is likely to bring about charges of "formalism" — one of the worst sins a Soviet bureaucrat can commit — and may lead to prosecution, replacement, or both. Bridging the gap between the possible and impossible is a difficult and continuing hazard for the Soviet physician and medical administrator, who is thus forced to devote an inordinate amount of effort to political survival.

Administration of such a system requires personnel familiar with the problems of medical practice—in short, physicians; yet many physicians are loath to give up the practice of medicine for administrative duties and it appears that the least capable medical students frequently become administrators. Since most administrators are party members, as opposed to only about twenty percent of Soviet physicians, joining the party can, in effect, be simply job insurance for the inferior medical student. Also, since most adminis-

trative positions are in the cities, choice of this field rather than medical practice reportedly is used to avoid assignment to isolated

areas.

The very size of the bureaucratic structure permits manipulation for private advantage. It also seems sometimes to bring about a loss of the physician's motivation and a decline in his personal responsibility toward the patients—a dangerous tendency in a profession where the interpersonal relationship between the physician and patient is vitally important.

Though the control of medical practice is far-reaching, political interference with medical theory and general methods of treatment has been fairly limited. Soviet medicine must be credited with real accomplishments in the development of techniques for treatment of

injury and disease.

There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that the role of the physician, whether in the hospitals and other medical care centers or on the medical staff of a factory in the USSR, is difficult. He is likely to be caught between the sometimes conflicting demands of the regime, which to a considerable degree sees him as a maintenance engineer for its human resources, and the demands of the people, who see him as a person who helps them and can mitigate the harshness of labor discipline. If a physician adheres too strictly to the rules he is subject to the regularly channeled criticism and complaints of his dissatisfied patients and consequently to reprimand or more severe punishment, or he may lose the confidence of his patient and thus be unable to dispense the quality of

care he would like to give. On the other hand, if he stretches the rules too far he runs the risk of criticism and punishment from his superiors. His personal code of ethics and standards of practice and

service must be adapted to these pressures.

The greatest pressure of the bureaucracy upon the general practitioner consists of the large number of records he is required to keep and the quantitative performance norms set for him by medical authorities. Very detailed case histories are required, and many certificates, orders, and analyses must be written; the physician may spend more time on paper work than on treatment. The basic norm in 1954 for the general practitioner's sick call was ten minutes per patient. He may save time on one patient and devote the gain to another, but he also has a norm for the number of patients he must see within a given time and is under considerable pressure to maintain both norms. The small amount of time that can be shifted can scarcely allow sufficient attention to a patient who is really ill. He is also given a norm for the number of sickness certificates he may issue during a given period, and sometimes a precise number of degrees of fever necessary for officially excused illness is set. Such regulations, if rigidly adhered to, are absolutely incompatible with good standards of medical practice.

One of the most difficult of the physician's problems has stemmed from his enforced role as mediator between workers and the stringent labor discipline, since until recently a medical excuse was the only sure way to escape from penalties for various infractions. Recent reports indicate a relaxation of the penalties for minor infractions of labor discipline, but in the past the long working hours, with no time off in which to attend to personal business, and the severe penalties for absence or tardiness contributed to a high rate of malingering among workers. Considerable ingenuity reportedly has been used in simulating illness, and self-inflicted wounds have not been uncommon. The physician has had the task of sorting out all who were not really sick, or, if he was so inclined, the actual malingerers from those who had a legitimate, but not a medical, reason for being absent. Though this strain may now be lessened, the general situation of the physician remains much the same.

Despite these difficulties and the profession's rather low material rewards, the physician is honored by the people. In a sizable sample of former Soviet citizens, the practice of medicine was rated above all other professions in prestige and in general desirability. A physician was also thought to gain a high degree of personal satis-

faction and to be relatively safe from arrest. It was indicated that many physicians tend to develop a code of ethics that places the well-being of patients above the dictates of the regime.

The Soviet doctor's pay is considerably lower than the engineer's. Since more highly paid jobs are seldom actually open to women, this factor and the relative safety of the profession perhaps explain the preponderance of women - about eighty percent - in Soviet medicine today.

The people of European Russia have been oriented toward Western medical practice for generations. The elite of tsarist days were attended by Western-trained doctors. In the countryside, rudimentary Western treatment gradually replaced dependence on herbs and charms. It is to be expected, then, that at least in European Russia medical treatment is widely accepted.

It is probable, however, that acceptance is less prevalent in the republics of Central Asia and among the indigenous peoples of Siberia where there was little if any contact with the West before the Communists came into power. But there are now a number of medical institutes, hospitals, polyclinics, and similar facilities with trained personnel in these areas - as well as many Great Russian settlers - and Western medical concepts are in all probability spreading.

So far as can be determined the Soviet medical system is generally approved by the people, who, although they may be critical of certain aspects of its administration, strongly favor free medical care. The criticisms are not directed at the system but are concerned with the need for more doctors, better hospitals, and generally improved service.

Social Problems Related to Living Conditions

Statistics for and studies of social problems in the USSR are cloaked by censorship. But a study of the Soviet press makes it clear that the establishment of the "new order" has not been accompanied by the disappearance - predicted by the Communists during the revolution - of the various crimes, delinquencies, and grievances found in all rapidly changing and industrialized societies. Today the regime rarely refers to this early prediction. Instead, failures are blamed upon parents, teachers, party members, the Komsomol, and other organizations and institutions charged with the responsibility for the "upbringing" of youth.

It is rarely possible to establish a direct causal relationship be-

10. Social Problems Related to Living Conditions

tween illegal or antisocial behavior and a given situation, for there are generally a number of contributing causes. But the crowded housing conditions described earlier would seem to be the primary cause of a considerable amount of litigation and crime that clog the USSR court calendars. Reported legal actions range from complaints over nonconformance with house rules to accusations of assault with intent to kill. It seems inevitable that overcrowding and space-allocation procedure which force people of different interests and backgrounds to share the same room and common facilities should result in difficulties.

In all probability, low living standards are a contributing factor to the petty thievery frequently reported in the press, as well as to the not-quite-thievery of the endlessly ingenious methods used by people in some occupations to acquire extra cash. Bus drivers have been accused of illegally selling tickets, pocketing fares, and developing a system of signals to warn other drivers of the presence of inspectors. Practically all warehouses, railyards, and other supply concentration points are under constant armed guard, in both urban and rural areas, and guards are also maintained on the fields of collective and state farms during harvest time. Nevertheless, thefts are frequent and to a considerable degree condoned by the guards. Some of the accounts of trials for such crimes indicate desperate need as the motivating factor. Acquisition of goods, legally or illegally, for resale and the illegal sale of goods in stores at prices above those officially established are considered especially reprehensible by the regime because such "speculation" – putting private gain above public good – has no place in the "new order." "Speculation" reportedly sometimes occurs on a grand scale.

According to the official ideology, alcoholism is specifically the product of a diseased and disorganized economy and society (i.e., capitalism) and will be eliminated completely by Communism. But evidence in the press indicates that it has not disappeared and may even be increasing in both cities and rural areas among workers and the privileged classes. This is officially explained as a "remnant of capitalist consciousness" which the party and other responsible authorities have not been sufficiently diligent in combating. Hard work for long hours under strict discipline, the lack of comfort in living arrangements, the general drabness of life for the average worker, however, probably are the major causes. For whatever reasons, it is an irrefutable fact that drunkenness, chronic alcoholism, and the crimes that often result from these achieve serious propor-

tions among the adults and the youth of the USSR today.

Though there is very little information on beggary in the USSR, Soviet press reports suggest that there are considerable numbers of young men and women who make their living by begging in trains and railroad stations. Dubbed the "new generation of beggars" or "parasites," they apparently are not in general disabled or destitute but merely find it easier and more profitable to beg than to work; they simulate various disabilities to gain sympathy from travelers. It seems that they cannot be arrested so long as they have certain papers, such as a certificate of residence, unless their behavior is such as to be classed as "hoodlumism." Heavy drinking is a common

practice among them.

Juvenile delinquency receives continuous attention from Soviet authorities. It was considerably reduced in the mid-1930's through the establishment of special schools and institutions for homeless children, the tightening of laws and penalties, and the re-establishment of family responsibility for the actions of children. But after World War II juvenile criminality again increased. Special schools were established for war orphans and for those children who had been deprived of elementary schooling by the invasion. Establishment of the Labor Reserves Schools was probably at least in part an attempt to control increased delinquency. Yet, in spite of these measures and the regime's constant demand that the Komsomol, Pioneer, and Octobrists organizations, the schools, and individual families all increase their efforts to interest and train youth in socially acceptable modes of behavior, it appears that Soviet youths frequently are guilty of thievery, vandalism, drunkenness, sexual promiscuity, and general hoodlumism, as well as more serious crimes.

Delinquency among the sons and daughters of the elite has been of increasing concern to Soviet authorities in recent years. Since 1956, there have been a number of arrests and convictions of children of high government officials for theft and assault. The press has campaigned actively against this group of offenders—termed *stilyagi* by the Russians and "jet set" by Western officials in Moscow. Characterized by their strong attraction to things Western—clothing, hair styles, jazz, movies, automobiles, and the gay life of restaurants and drinking parties—and a consistent avoidance of work, their behavior is particularly outrageous within the mores of a socialist society. Brought up under the system and in a high social position, they are expected to set examples of "correct" deportment instead of self-centered, "bourgeois" behavior.

The precise crime rate cannot be established, but certain social

factors that may contribute to the incidence of delinquency can be inferred from the Soviet press. There is little doubt that here, as in all societies that have undergone rapid urbanization, family solidarity and control over the children have been lessened. Crowded living conditions and lack of family privacy, the high proportion of working mothers, and the many officially sponsored youth activities have combined to produce a situation in which the urban family is a particularly weak factor in the social control of youth. It would seem that simultaneous official emphasis upon increased family authority and more active youth organizations may be working at cross purposes.

Similarly, there is some evidence that the incorporation of teenage boys and girls into the labor force through either the special training schools or on-the-job training courses also is related to delinquency. Students often live at these schools and work assignments often are at points distant from their homes; thus the young people are removed from family control and placed among strangers. Usually they live in dormitories or barracks, in which, according to many reports, there are few if any provisions for recreation and leisure activities. Even those young people who continue to live at

home often face boredom and unpleasant living conditions.

It has also been suggested that the sacrifices and grueling work required during the growth of the Soviet regime and, somewhat paradoxically, the present improvement in standards of living may contribute to crime and delinquency. Parents who were willing to endure the hard conditions of work and living to build the industrial economy now wish their children to receive the benefits of their labor. They encourage their sons and daughters to get training so they will not have to do manual work, deny themselves in order to provide for their children, and are generally indulgent. Independent, well-paid working youth, as well as adults, spend their wages on frivolities, including alcohol. Availability of consumer goods has not kept up with the increase in purchasing power; as a result, numbers of Soviet citizens find themselves with money - and nothing to buy. This situation, against a background of generally bleak, crowded, unsatisfying living conditions, may well generate pressures and frustrations that find release in antisocial behavior.



POLITICAL SETTING



DYNAMICS OF POWER

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE Soviet Union (CPSU) is the supreme political power in the USSR. All organized expression of opposition to the party has been eliminated and today there exists in the country no organized force to challenge the party's claim that it constitutes "the authentic spokesman of the will of the masses."

Party dominance in Soviet society, however, has not meant an elimination of conflicts of interests, controversies over policy, or the existence of competing power centers. The aspirations and demands of the elite categories of the population — the managerial, technical, scientific, and cultural intelligentsia and the officer corps - are sources of political pressure. The numerous bureaucracies that compose the Soviet state administration generate, as do all bureaucracies, their own special interests, create areas of limited power and patronage for themselves, resist the encroachment of those who seek to invade their jurisdiction, and attempt to extend their own influence over rival institutions. Within the inner core of the party itself rivalries and tensions are persistent; conflict and bitter struggle for power have marked the history of the leadership group. There is, then, in the Soviet Union a continuous interplay of social and political forces. Just as important, however, are the limits that contain it.

An understanding of those limits can be provided by a clear realization of the party's domination of Soviet society. The Communist party is more than a "political" organization. In reply to recent Western speculation that a multiparty system might be introduced in the USSR, *Pravda* replied:

As for our country, the Communist party has been and will be the only master in the minds and thoughts, the spokesman, leader, and organizer of the people in their entire struggle for Communism. As an organized and articulate set of beliefs about human experience, Communism possesses many of the attributes of a religion. It has its authoritative scripture (the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin) and its heresies. It provides the believer with intellectual orientation in this world and gives him emotional participation in a group through various forms of common action. As the bearer and protector of "truth" the party attempts to guide the Soviet citizen's thoughts, judgments, and actions. Party membership—particularly in the case of full-time functionaries—carries with it the responsibilities of a "secular priesthood" charged with exhorting the masses to follow the party's lead. And as a church is not judged on the merits of its priests, so the party is not judged on the merits of its servants—individual leaders may be expelled, defamed, purged, all without undermining the authority of the organization, because it claims an impersonal doctrine as the foundation of its authority.

For some, at least, the supremacy of the party is a matter of just such a faith and is not questioned, even though it may be felt that individual party leaders have abused their power. Stalin's most serious rival and critic — Leon Trotsky (assassinated in Mexico

in 1940) - once declared:

One can be right only with the party, and through the party, for history has created no other road for the realization of what is right.

Today, however, many Soviet citizens, both within and outside of the party, accept the party's predominance in life not so much out of ideological conviction (though they cannot escape entirely the effects of constant indoctrination) but simply because there is no alternative open to them. For those possessing ambition, ability, and the qualities of leadership, party membership is almost the only possible and "normal" road to power and preferment in society.

The Communist recognition that power is generated in the course of all types of action and is latent and exploitable in every group enterprise has produced an organizational structure that has penetrated all social institutions and invested them with political import, and that now seeks to guide and coordinate all organized human endeavor in the USSR—economic, political, social, intellectual. While there may be those who as individuals inwardly reject the party's position in society, the party's hold on the eco-

nomic and intellectual life of the country prevents private judgments

from crystallizing into group opposition.

The Communist leadership at the apex of the party pyramid—the "regime"—has gained access to the major sources of power in the Soviet Union by creating and assimilating into the party the elite groups who occupy the strategic positions in society. A highly centralized hierarchical organization of about 8.3 million members (less than five percent of the population), the party now includes nearly all citizens who possess a significant measure of distinction, privileges, and influence—persons who hold leading positions in state administration or in the armed forces and technicians, intellectuals, plant directors, foremen, and brigade leaders.

In order to maintain contact with the mass of the population, party ranks are periodically opened to leading manual workers and collective farmers. Further influence over the great mass of citizens who are not members is achieved through the party's control of the communications media and of the complex network of educational and propaganda activities, whereby the people are involved in the goals and activities of the state and popular support for

policies determined by the party leaders is manipulated.

In controlling the party organization and, through it, shaping and ruling Soviet society, the top leaders rely heavily on a core of full-time party functionaries, the party "apparatus." The size of this group has fluctuated, but probably has never come to more than ten percent of the total membership. Membership in the "apparatus" (and to a lesser extent general membership in the party) shapes an individual's entire life. He is bound into the party structure through repeated ideological indoctrination, discipline, and absorption into a wide network of subordinate party organs, discussion circles, committees, and subcommittees. Time-consuming duties (meetings, demonstrations, agitation, distribution of literature) command his entire attention. All facets of his social life acquire a political meaning. Voluntary withdrawal from the party is denied; expulsion is used as a disciplinary measure and may entail ostracism, defamation, or in some cases execution.

Fully integrated into the party, the functionary becomes more than an adherent. As in a military organization, he can be deployed where necessary. Members of the "apparatus" are usually the party secretaries at republic, oblast, and rayon levels, as well as within every important enterprise and organization in the country. They are responsible for guiding, in line with directives from above, the activities of all party members and of all economic and governmental institutions. At any level of the territorial-administrative structure they hold the power of personnel appointment (nomenklatura,

"nomenclature") for all key positions in the area.

Thus, the limits within which political conflicts take place and the special interests of different groups advance are set by the fact that the position of the Communist party in Soviet society is not in any important way challenged by anyone with power — political or social. The extent of direct party control over various aspects of economic, social, or intellectual life appears to be an issue for many today, but the principle of party supremacy faces no effective opposition.

Soviet Political Dynamics

In the USSR the officially recognized method whereby differing opinions and conflicts of interest may be resolved is termed "democratic centralism." Theoretically, decisions taken by a party, governmental, or other organization should be preceded by a free discussion of the issues involved. All concerned are expected to engage in spirited "criticism and self-criticism," but within certain limits. The Soviet press recently recalled Lenin's statement:

The principle of democratic centralism . . . means precisely the *freedom to criticize*, completely and everywhere, provided this does not violate unity of *definite action* — and it means inadmissibility of *any* criticism that subverts or hampers *unity* in action decided upon by the party.

Once a decision is taken, it must be given absolute, unanimous

support.

Actually, the numerous discussions held by party, governmental, trade union, or professional groups are usually confined to questions of executing policy already determined by higher authorities. They help to air various practical problems of administration, serve as a check on the performance of those responsible for the execution of policy, and are consciously utilized by party leaders as a means whereby subordinates can be disciplined and blamed if the policy fails. Within the party itself, "democratic" discussion and criticism are frequently manipulated to channel grievances that may accumulate among the rank and file against lower party officials. Occasionally, wide public discussions and conferences are held, apparently in order to explore and clarify all sides of an issue or to gauge the

moods and sentiments of the population. The party, however, has always reserved the right to decide what proposals or interest groups

to support, or whether to make an independent decision.

In practice, Soviet experience appears to have produced no specific rules to define and control political controversy. The party does not seem to have found a regularized procedure for resolving either personality clashes or policy disputes. As far as can be determined, individuals and interest groups in the USSR depend on informal channels and organizational techniques for exerting pressure in behalf of their own particular interests. Control over the hiring and placement of personnel and over periodic internal administrative reorganizations is used by administrators and political leaders to build a personal following; this creates numerous limited power centers within the various specialized parts of Soviet public administration. Influence over rival groups and administrative units is sought through infiltration of personnel. Personal influence is sought with those in key positions, and alliances are formed and

broken according to the dictates of expediency.

Stalin is known to have applied forceful and brutal methods, even to his close associates, to assure his personal supremacy as dictator. By attaching a "public enemy" label to his real or suspected rivals ("German-Japanese-Fascist spies, diversionists, murderers, double-dealers, hostile elements") he isolated and liquidated competing leaders, discredited their memory before the public, and confused and intimidated their sympathizers and followers. He founded his own security on the insecurity and rivalry of his subordinates. Delegated power was diffused and subject to the constant checks of overlapping and competing bureaucratic controls. Encouraging the development of a leadership cult in which his god-like infallibility became an object of official worship, he himself became the sole arbiter of differences and conflicts among the bureaucratic hierarchies that governed Soviet society. Survival in the party and government rested on unquestioned obedience to his dictates. While the various bureaucracies of Soviet administration functioned and continue to function as indispensable power structures in their own right, individual administrators were expendable. Even the highest Soviet dignitary faced the ever-present threat of a purge: demotion, removal from office, or total disappearance from public life.

Stalin's death left a vacuum that was not easily filled. In an effort to consolidate their positions, the Soviet leaders sought to broaden the base of their support among the Soviet elite, the party rank and file, as well as the masses. The liquidation of Beria, fol-

lowed by a purge and reorganization of the state security agencies, and, finally, the denunciation of Stalin's despotic rule and claim to infallibility (the "cult of the individual") were presented as a renunciation of the terroristic and arbitrary aspects of Stalin's reign—aspects that had been resented and hated by the entire population and most feared, perhaps, by the Soviet higher intelligentsia as well as the present leadership itself. Rule by administrative fiat, which admittedly had become widespread at all levels of administrative life, was vigorously condemned.

At the same time, the party leadership appeared to respond to an awareness, born out of more than two decades as administrators of a swiftly developing industrial power, that there are limits to the effectiveness of arbitrary force in governing a complex modern society. The effort to stimulate greater local initiative, responsibility, and efficiency by decentralizing administrative functions was accompanied by a curbing of the prerogatives of the political police.

The attack on the arbitrary exercise of power through "heavy-handed bureaucratic methods" was not meant to undermine the authority of leaders as such, and it is interesting that some people were accused of attempting to do just this. As early as April 1956, an issue of *Partiynaya zhizn'* (*Party Life*) complained:

At meetings of a number of party organizations which discussed materials of the 20th Party Congress there were particular instances where correct criticism of the cult of the individual was accompanied by rejection of all authorities in general and was aimed at subversion of one-man management, discipline, and organization. Some went as far as to doubt the right of a managerial official to make appropriate transfers in work, to impose administrative penalties for infringements of discipline, etc. Such anarchistic ideas have been duly resisted by Communists.

In another article, the Soviet press found it necessary to state:

While fighting against the cult of the individual and for the materialist concept of history, revolutionary Marxism by no means denies, but attaches enormous significance to, the role in the social process of executives, chiefs, leaders whom the people advance and trust. . . . The Leninist principles of broad independent activity of the masses and of collective leadership do not in any way mean management of production, school, the army, etc., through meetings. Marxism-Leninism has waged and wages a struggle both against idealistic views of "heroes" as the chief makers of history and against anarchy, which denies the authority of leaders.

It was demanded that leaders who "do not notice ordinary people and have lost the knack of talking with them" should be open to the suggestions of the rank and file, should talk things over with their colleagues, and should exhibit a greater sensitivity to the wants and complaints of the masses. Local party leaders were criticized for relying "only on pressure" and were advised that "the most important means of gaining authority among the masses . . . is the method of persuasion."

Since then, the competing aspirations of the rival elite formations in Soviet society have asserted themselves with greater insistence. Members of the Soviet higher intelligentsia have been at times remarkably outspoken in advancing their interests. Though acknowledging the need for general party guidance, they have criticized excessive centralized direction—party interference in their day-to-day activities, the lack of freedom of independent judgment—in a way which would have been unthinkable a number of years

ago.

But the basic power position of the Communist dictatorship is not, at present, threatened. It is well to remember that the Soviet regime has often exhibited a striking ability to maneuver, to relax tensions when necessary, and to broaden its support (retreat from "War Communism" during the NEP, modifications in the collectivization program in 1933, relaxation of the Great Purge in 1938, exploitation of national and religious feelings during World War II). This capacity to maneuver is an important element of strength in the regime, and helps the Soviet totalitarian system of power maintain its own dynamic momentum.

Popular Political Awareness

With the possible exception of the native population of the Baltic states, intellectual leaders of other minority ethnic groups, and members of the managerial and professional intelligentsia, the Soviet masses do not appear to possess the political awareness that would lead to their demanding a share in shaping the political destiny of their country. Their lack of interest in politics seems to border on apathy. They apparently accept as "natural" a strong, independent, centralized governmental power, in whose hands they have proved to be extremely malleable.

The Soviet regime, however, constantly strives to secure more than mere passive acceptance of its power. It sponsors numerous mass activities - such as elections to the soviets - in an attempt to provide the population with a sense of participation in government, as well as to place community pressure upon individuals to en-

thusiastically support state objectives.

Soviet elections are a public rite rather than a form of political self-expression. Nomination of candidates is controlled by party and governmental organs, and, though legally any number of candidates may be proposed and registered for a single office, only one candidate's name appears on the ballot for any one position. According to a Soviet source, "the moral-political unity of the Soviet nation is expressed in the fact that in all the electoral constituencies only one candidate is always registered." Candidates are not necessarily party members, but, since the nominating procedure is entirely an administrative process, all of them represent a party-sponsored slate.

During a Soviet election campaign, then, public support is sought, not so much for an individual candidate, as for the policy for which he is supposed to stand. Loyalty to the Soviet system and approval of the aims of the government constitute essentially the

only campaign issue, one that few, outwardly at least, reject.

Lists of electors are compiled by local soviets, and checked at the time of balloting. There are no residence requirements for voting. When necessary, certificates are issued to citizens enabling them to vote wherever they happen to be at election time. Ballots may even be cast on long-distance trains; the votes so secured are simply included in the total of ballots cast in the precinct where the train makes its next stop. Should a Soviet citizen attempt to avoid voting. it is practically impossible for him to prevent having his failure recorded and made a matter of notoriety. The regime regards passivity during elections as opposition. For Soviet citizens, consequently, going to the polls is largely a matter of demonstrating loyalty to the regime.

While the mass of Soviet citizens play no active role in determining political decisions in the USSR, they appear to approve of many policies and goals of the government - measures designed to improve social welfare benefits and to increase the industrial and military might of the nation (the collectivization of agriculture is an important exception). At the same time, however, the general population has resented the forced and often brutal methods used by the regime in accomplishing its objectives and the sacrifices suffered in terms of living standards and personal injustices. Khrushchev's promises of greater sensitivity to public welfare and dignity have probably brought the regime increased popular support.

Among the minority nationalities, certain dissatisfactions are not as easily appeased. The native peoples of the Baltic countries possess a relatively high degree of political sophistication. Here by the time of World War I illiteracy had been practically abolished, and many native Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians had assumed important and leading positions in public life. The peoples of these countries gained further political maturity during the interim between the two world wars, when they achieved independence, organized numerous political parties, and acquired some experience at self-government. Of all the ethnic groups in the USSR, they are probably the most dissatisfied with the single-party system, which was impressed upon their way of life with considerable intimidation and terror. Only a small minority of these peoples appear to be pro-Communist; most of them resent the Soviet political system as well as the Russian occupation of their land.

In other minority areas dissatisfaction with Soviet rule appears to express itself more as resentment at Great Russian domination than as antipathy toward the Soviet political system. In Belorussia and the Ukraine this resentment seems to be shared less by the mass of peasants and workers than by members of the intelligentsia. In the Caucasus and Central Asia a greater number of the ordinary masses appear ready to identify Soviet rule with simple Russian oppression, chiefly because of their own non-Slavic cultural traditions and values. Here, however, many intellectuals are attracted to the Westernization Soviet rule has meant for them. Although they often would like to preserve much in their own cultural heritage, they accept as valuable the material and scientific progress offered under the regime and are to this extent more sovietized and ready to follow the leadership of Moscow. In their relations with Russians, however, they are frequently distrusted, and they are not given equal opportunity to rise high in the Soviet system. For many this is probably an important source of frustration and bitterness.

Of the various social groups, the peasants and workers possess the least political influence in the USSR today. The social and political influence of the Soviet urban labor force, however, is stronger than that of its rural counterpart. The social prestige of the peasantry as a group is low; the working class, on the other hand, has benefited in prestige from the official theory of proletarian dictatorship and has always been a more reliable source of support for the regime. Periodically, thousands of people have been sent by the party from the cities to the villages to assist in various agricultural campaigns. Urban tutelage over the countryside is also achieved through the staffing of numerous rural technical and administrative positions by

city-trained personnel.

Members of the Soviet higher intelligentsia play a more important role in Soviet life. Party membership among them has risen sharply during the last two decades, and their influence in the party has increased. Higher education is increasingly a prerequisite for access to higher party posts. Today, at the top levels many full-time functionaries are likely to be efficient technicians and administrators as well as politicians. At the same time, more and more individuals from the ranks of the intelligentsia, trained for responsibilities in ever-enlarging spheres of activity, are acquiring the capacity for political leadership.

The greatest amount of dissident political opinion on domestic and foreign policy is probably generated at the higher levels of the Soviet social structure. Individual members within the governmental bureaucracy, economic administration, armed forces, and the professions have deeply resented the intrusion of party as well as police controls in their own spheres of activity. But while these may favor a change in certain methods of rule, or even in policies, they do not think in terms of a fundamental political alternative to the Soviet

system as such.

Interplay of Political and Social Forces

Aside from the party, no group in the USSR—not even the army—can be considered an independent, organized political force. Various aspirations and desires, however, especially within the elite formations of Soviet society, do generate conflicts and pressures. While these competing interests must be accommodated within the framework of a system of rule wherein power is the unquestioned monopoly of a disciplined, semireligious order, their expression is an important aspect of Soviet political reality.

The Communist Party

The Communist party of the USSR is a highly centralized political machine. Except for the RSFSR, each constituent republic has its own party organization. The RSFSR, alone, has no "national" party organization; its party affairs are handled by the central, all-union party organization.

The party numbered less than 8,500 professional revolutionaries at the beginning of 1905. Since that time, it has grown steadily. It has repeatedly broadened its membership, only to thin its ranks by

expulsions and purges when control and discipline were felt wanting. World War II, however, was a period of exceptionally rapid growth, and analysts have suggested that the absorption of millions of new members since 1939 (when the party included only 1,588,852 full members) may eventually weaken the party as an effective instrument of the dictatorship. Thus far, however, the expansion appears to have been a success. The present leadership is making special efforts to control the party as a mass organization by keeping its inner core of full-time functionaries small and tightly disciplined.

The preparation of Soviet citizens for party membership begins with the training of youth, which starts at the beginning of formal schooling. The organization and indoctrination of youth has been a constant concern of the Soviet regime from its earliest days. Youngsters up to the age of nine are enrolled in the Octobrists, where some political indoctrination is mingled with children's play, singing, and storytelling. (According to an unverified report, this group may be no longer active.) A child from nine to fourteen years of age is eligible for membership in the Pioneers. Membership is almost universal in this age group, and the Pioneers are now approximately nineteen million strong. At the age of fourteen a child becomes eligible for membership in the Komsomol (Young Communist League), which is a more selective process. He must obtain recommendation of two persons who have been Komsomol members for at least a year or of one member of the Communist party. Ordinarily, a person remains a member of the Komsomol only until he is twenty-six years of age (though on request this limit may be extended to twenty-eight), at which time he is removed from the rolls unless he is elected to a Komsomol executive body. Actually, many Komsomol leaders today are over twenty-six.

Komsomol members (their number is about eighteen million) are steeped in political topics. They are taught to be agitators and propagandists for the party and are expected to participate in loan drives, pre-election campaigns, and other community activities. They are required to supervise the play and social activities of Pioneer brigades and to instill the Communist spirit in their charges. They are also expected to cultivate many-sided "cultural" interests by participating in dancing, dramatic, literary, and singing groups, to take the lead in physical culture and sports as well as military and paramilitary training, thereby readying themselves for service in the Soviet army. As assistants to the party and government, members of the Komsomol must be ready to accept any assigned tasks, such as helping with the harvest, working on a new construction job, etc.

The most active, loyal, and capable are prepared for party and other responsibilities. The power of the regime to manipulate the careers of Soviet youth is of crucial importance in securing their services for the state. At the same time, the maintenance of a high proportion of younger persons in the party has prevented its ossification. Purges and expulsions have renovated periodically the membership of the party, and young blood has constantly replenished its energies. For many young Soviet citizens the purges have been a springboard to career opportunities.

Application for admission to the party may be made by anyone reaching the age of twenty, or, if a member of the Komsomol, after his eighteenth birthday. An applicant must fill out a life-history questionnaire, declare that he accepts the rules and program of the party, and submit a recommendation from three persons who have known him and worked with him for at least one year and who have been members of the party for at least three years. The application is submitted to a "primary party organization," the lowest unit of the party hierarchy, which may accept or reject the application. If accepted, the applicant must serve as a "candidate" for a year.

Once he is a party member, the citizen's time is no longer his own. Leisure hours are filled with extracurricular party assignments and duties. The member is expected to set an example of devotion in studying the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and, until recently, Stalin. His political training and retraining ends only with his death or expulsion. The party leadership seeks to transform the member into a dedicated, iron-disciplined, and completely integrated instrument. Repeated criticism in the party press, however, indicates that the average rank-and-file member falls short of this ideal. Many are not sufficiently familiar with party ideology, fulfill their obligations in a "passive" formalistic spirit, and join for purely "careerist" reasons.

A party member's successful adaptation to party life and advancement in the hierarchy depends largely on his unquestioned identification with the goals proclaimed by the leadership. The most faithful, able, and experienced members are assimilated into the "apparatus" as full-time functionaries. As the directing and supervising agents of the regime, they can acquire great power.

For those who remain in the rank and file, the feeling of identification with the regime is probably less intense. They do, however, have access through party functionaries to influence that is denied the nonparty person. Their right to harangue colleagues, transmit derogatory information through party channels, and attend closed party meetings provides a sense of belonging to an elite group in Soviet society.

In the eyes of the majority of the people, the party is a privileged body whose members enjoy special opportunities for advancement and whose functionaries exercise decisive political power as unquestioning subordinates and servants of the regime. Party members, however, do not seem to be judged as a group but on their individual merits. Many are viewed as opportunists but are not particularly hated. Some can be relied upon for help in difficulties. Others are found to be harsh and dictatorial, and arouse antagonisms. It is of interest that, in the post-Stalin campaign to reintroduce "democratic" principles in the party, the Soviet press has complained that too many party secretaries hold themselves aloof from the population and tend to behave in the manner of a samozakonnik—an old Russian word meaning "he who is a law unto himself."

At the bottom of the party pyramid, the primary organization — called a "cell" until 1934—is formed within the limits of a single enterprise or unit with a definite location and having a corporate form: a school, an army unit, a factory, or a farm. Each member must belong to a primary party organization at his place of work. Above the primary level party organizations are developed on the basis of "territorial" considerations. The territorial-administrative units of the government are matched by territorial organs of the

party.

This pattern of subdivision is basically the same throughout the USSR, with the exception of party organizations within the Soviet armed forces and, at least until recently, in the transport system; these are organized on a functional basis and are not subject to the jurisdiction of territorial party bodies but directly subordinated to

the central organs of the Communist party of the USSR.

Formally, democratic centralism is supposed to be "the guiding principle of the organizational structure of the party." In practice, intraparty democracy exists only to the extent that discussion and criticism, encouraged within carefully defined limits, do not encroach on the decision-making powers of the top leadership. Individual party leaders are usually promoted to higher positions by designation from above, and party elections serve as devices for registering assent.

The All-Union Party Congress is theoretically the "supreme organ" of the party (see the plate, Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). It must convene not less than once every four years (a rule which was ignored between 1939 and 1952, when

no congresses were held). The Congress, according to party rules, elects a Central Auditing Commission, concerned primarily with financial affairs, and a Central Committee, which is supposed to direct the work of the party in the intervals between congresses.

The major central organs of the party, formally chosen by the Central Committee, are the Presidium, the Secretariat, and the Control Commission. The Party Presidium, which is empowered "to direct the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions," stands at the pinnacle of the party and governmental hierarchies as

the decision-making body in the USSR.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee, according to party rules, directs all current work, "chiefly as concerns the verification of the fulfillment of party decisions and selection of cadres." Its secretaries, whose number fluctuates, bear the central responsibility for guiding and controlling the work of the party apparatus. The Secretariat is charged with wide-ranging duties and is organized into a series of departments which are responsible for party control over all important areas of life: industry, agriculture, finance, trade, public administration, education, propaganda, foreign policy, defense, and so on. The various departments under the Secretariat exercise control over the assignment of key personnel within their field of supervision. The position of First Secretary of the party was used by both Stalin and Khrushchev as a crucial lever of power to secure control of the party and government apparatus.


The Party Control Commission is responsible for checking the observance of party discipline and examining appeals concerning expulsions from the party. It has been criticized for using improper procedures in investigating the personal affairs of members, and its right to take action against those who violate the rules of the party

appears to have been curtailed.

At the lower levels of administration, party organizations generally parallel governmental organs. The party organization in each constituent republic—with the exception of the RSFSR—is patterned on that of the USSR, with a Party Congress, a Central Committee, a Secretariat, and an executive body, or Bureau. The Congress in the largest republics is to be convened once every four years; in the smaller constituent republics, once in two years. A Bureau for the RSFSR was created in 1956 under the All-Union Central Committee, with Khrushchev as chairman; but the RSFSR has no Congress or Central Committee, and its territorial-administrative units report directly to the central party organs.

At the level of the kray, or oblast, or autonomous republic, the

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION



Note: The RSFSR is the only constituent republic without its own party organization. A Bureau under the central committee of the CPSU is in charge of party work in the RSFSR.

Party Conference, comparable to the Congress at higher levels, is to be convened every two years. It elects a Committee (*obkom* for the oblast, *kraykom* for the kray), which in turn chooses a Bureau, headed by several secretaries. In minority areas, at least one of the secretaries is generally a Russian, who is likely to wield decisive control within the organization.

The city and rayon party organizations are in form similar to those at the oblast level. Their Committees are known as *gorkom* (for the city) and *raykom* (for the rayon), and ultimate authority

within the Bureau rests with the first secretary.

A primary party organization is established in any enterprise or institution where there are at least three party members. These lower units vary greatly in size. A rayon with a thousand party members, for example, may have forty primary units in various establishments, while a single factory with six thousand party members may have only one primary organization. Units of less than fifteen members elect one or two part-time secretaries. Somewhat larger units elect a Bureau of not more than eleven persons which in turn elects a secretary. In large enterprises with many departments or with over three hundred party members a Party Committee (with a Bureau and several secretaries) may be formed with the consent of the All-Union Central Committee.

In certain crucial sectors of Soviet life, party work is organized so as to provide for an exceptional degree of centralized control. Particularly in the army, navy, and possibly in branches of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee of State Security, political departments or administrations directly responsible to the All-Union Central Committee are in charge of all party work.

In important economic spheres, especially centralized party supervision is achieved by assigning independent emissaries of the central party units, or "party organizers," to enterprises of certain vital industries, such as agricultural machine production, metallurgy, coal mining, and chemicals. The organizers carry out functions parallel to those of the local party organizations but are expected to

report on their shortcomings as well.

The general duties of all party organizations are to enforce the directives of the central leadership, supervise the work of subordinate party units, exert pressure on the economic enterprises to achieve and surpass the goals set for them, and extend, through a constant barrage of agitation and propaganda, the influence of party ideology among the nonparty masses. Decision-making powers within the party are generally concentrated at the top.

11. Interplay of Political and Social Forces

Practically no information is available on how decisions are arrived at in the highest party echelons. The party Presidium is probably organized around a system of subcommittees and specialists to deal with specific problems, a pattern believed to have prevailed in the pre-World War II period. Presumably, each member of the Presidium acts as a court of first instance on matters under his jurisdiction and disposes of many issues without consulting his colleagues. A full-dress meeting of the Presidium is probably convoked

if the issue is one of major importance.

Central policy covers so many fields and is so comprehensive that local bodies are, as a rule, expected to limit themselves to observing, supervising, and verifying the work of establishments under their jurisdiction, and reporting on deficiencies to superiors. Above the primary level, however, local party organizations do enjoy extensive powers in the matter of personnel selection. From the rayon and city up, each organization has the right to confirm or remove personnel in important positions which fall under its "nomenclature." The duties of oblast party secretaries include the selection and placing of personnel to occupy various local economic and administrative posts, which may involve in some cases over

2,500 types of position.

While the supervisory functions of local party functionaries help the regime to check on all aspects of economic and social activities, the danger faced by the party's high command is that its disciplined agents will be absorbed into the institutions they are supposed to watch. Bearing a prominent share of the responsibility for seeing that things get done, party secretaries become involved in a maze of technical and local problems and as a result sometimes tend to resist control and manipulation from above. In many cases they have covered up infractions of regulations committed by administrative directors, where such violations have appeared necessary to fulfill the goals set by the plan. This problem has been a source of persistent concern to the top party leadership. The Soviet press has stressed the point that party officials will be severely disciplined if they allow themselves to become "tools in the hands of administrative organizations."

The party leadership relies on a number of methods for achieving internal party control. From the primary unit up, minutes of meetings and periodical reports are studied by higher organizations and forwarded to the All-Union Central Committee through regular party channels. Direct information on the work of lower bodies is also obtained from the rank and file through letters of complaints

addressed to newspapers or to the party center. In addition, the leadership makes use of a network of official informants assigned to every level of the hierarchy. Agents of the Central Control Commission and Secretariat, as well as their corresponding representatives at the republic and oblast levels, work as informers and prepare secret reports to higher authorities on the mood of party meetings

and the private lives of individual members.

The higher units also frequently ignore the chain-of-command principle, bypass their immediate subordinates, and send a team of instructors to inspect the meetings and operations of any lower party organization. The All-Union Central Committee may concern itself even with the work of a primary unit, thus setting an example for the intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Life for party members at the lower levels, consequently, is demanding and highly uncertain. A high rate of turnover has characterized party officialdom at the rayon and city levels, which represent a kind of testing ground wherein the tenderhearted are likely to fall by the wayside and the ambitious who survive move rapidly upward.

The selection of key personnel for party posts is especially centralized, and is, perhaps, of chief importance in maintaining internal control. From the rayon committee to the republic Central Committee, the most important party officials fall under the "nomen-

clature" of the All-Union Central Committee.

This system of patronage is extremely important for the top leadership in securing the loyalties of citizens occupying key positions in society. It is easily abused, however. Powerful party leaders strive to establish friendships and alliances both within the party and in other parts of the Soviet bureaucracy. Subordinates must be ever ready to shift their personal loyalties when their patron's star

appears to wane.

The past history of party controversies and hints gleaned from the Soviet press indicate that rivalries, tensions, and personal influence form an essential ingredient in the informal organizational life of the party. Below the surface of party uniformity there is a constellation of power centers, some great, some small, each with an entourage of satellites, that apparently determines the real lines of power within the party apparatus, as well as within the police and the administrative hierarchies.

In the 1930's, Stalin frankly admitted and criticized the influence of the personal entourage in filling important governmental

party posts:

11. Interplay of Political and Social Forces

Most frequently so-called acquaintances are chosen, personal friends, fellow townsmen, people who have shown personal devotion, masters of eulogies to their patrons, irrespective of whether they are suitable from a political and businesslike standpoint.

A report presented to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 stated:

The main shortcoming is that in selecting cadres some executives are guided not by political and professional qualifications, but by considerations of kinship, friendship, and cronyism.

That cliques continue to rise and fall in the Soviet hierarchy, depending on the fortunes of their patrons, is shown by the purges among the lower officialdom that inevitably follow the eclipse of any member of the top command.

The Managerial Elite

Although under Stalin the party absorbed into its ranks the power seekers and talented representatives of society who were to serve the regime as a managerial and governing elite, the most politically active element in the USSR, the regime's real base of power, was confined to the higher echelons of the central party apparatus. The essentially totalitarian character of the regime has not changed since Stalin's death. However, the top leadership seems to be broadening the base of the dictatorship in the upper stratum of Soviet society by widening the circle of political participation.

The Soviet managerial group is apparently able at present to exert pressures, of a limited sort, for political change. Khrushchev has made an effort to recognize and meet the desire on the part of the Soviet administrator, factory director, and professional specialist for more functional authority and security from police terror. Soviet official literature has admitted the paralyzing effect of overcentralization upon spontaneity among officials, technicians, specialists, and managers and has been filled with a growing number of personal complaints and grievances. In one Soviet journal shortly

after Stalin's death, a factory director stated:

We are fettered by the framework of present planning, by the framework of present organization of administration. . . . A charter of the rights of the director has got to be worked out quickly and put into practice. I am not talking about obligations — the comrades in the Center will take care of the obligations

without being reminded. But I, as a director, would like to get — along with the charter of obligations — the right to stand up for my rights, and simply to have them finally in my hands.

Under Stalin such a frankly worded public expression of dissatisfaction would have been inconceivable.

A reassertion of the party's authority as an institution has accompanied the trend toward decentralization, and the principle of party control over all fields of administration is stressed. It is possible that as the regime moves to correct the overwhelmingly centralized bias of the Stalinist era, pressures are building up which threaten to take it further than it desires. This may indicate a point of growing tension in Soviet internal politics today.

The Intellectual Elite

The leaders of the Communist party have always been sensitive to the danger of independent thought which could challenge the ideology that justifies their rule. Claiming their system of belief is a comprehensive method for viewing the entire universe, they have extended it to practically all fields of intellectual expression. This system is not inflexible. Party ideologists stress that their philosophy is not a dogma, but must be revised from time to time in the light of new experience. The right to make revisions, however, is almost entirely limited to persons at the head of the party. The regime attempts, in this way, to reconcile the necessity for change with the need to maintain the absolute rightness of the party leadership at any given time.

As a consequence, Soviet intellectual life has become shot through with intrigues and attempts to curry favor. From issues which non-Communists would consider nonpolitical—involving such matters as laboratory methods, philology, criticism of literature, art, or music—may arise serious conflicts. Separate factions seek to gain the ear of those in authority. In these conflicts the party may intervene in a relatively unobtrusive manner from behind the scenes, or may openly and dramatically assert its authority. Although this type of maneuvering is probably limited to small groups who have gained a measure of political acceptability, few can remain unaffected. A shift in the party line, catching a person unawares, can mean an end to one's career.

A substantial proportion of leading Soviet writers, musicians, artists, scientists, professional scholars, actors, and journalists are tied to the regime through high material rewards and prestige, while their work is subject to various organizational controls (such

as the Academy of Science and the professional unions). Their conformity to the party line, however, is often bought at the cost of personal frustration, loss of professional self-respect, resentment, and a stifling of creative impulses.

The present regime has recognized these dissatisfactions and has at times permitted leading intellectuals to voice their individual grievances. But, as far as can be determined, Soviet intellectuals remain subject to party guidance and instruction and are not in a position to induce any far-reaching changes in Soviet society.

The Armed Forces

Although many military men have been absorbed into the party, the military services do not represent an independent political force in the USSR. Despite the mounting prestige of the army, a complex of party and police controls within it enables the regime to maintain a strong hold. The army has always been viewed as an instrument of the dictatorship, and it has little opportunity to "play politics" as a distinct entity, at least in time of peace. Arbitrary political controls, however, have been a major source of discontent in the armed forces, whose leaders may resist any return to the police terror of Stalin's era.

The Minority Nationalities

In the non-Russian areas of the USSR the regime attempts to educate and recruit politically reliable native personnel for local party and government positions, but their actual authority appears to be limited. Decisive Russian influence in the constituent republics is most frequently maintained by means of placing Russian supervisors in posts that are nominally of secondary importance.

Educated for administrative and other responsibilities, representatives of the Soviet-trained native intelligentsia face frequent frustration in their aspiration to real as well as formal authority. If they become too restive or are thought to exercise too much independent authority or to enjoy too much local prestige, they are quickly charged with bourgeois-nationalist deviation and removed from office.

Thus, the non-Russians who successfully fill many of the legislative and executive positions in their respective republics must, at least on the surface, show primary allegiance to the Moscow regime. The number of indigenous people considered sufficiently reliable to be entrusted with official responsibilities seems to vary in different republics. In the Armenian SSR a large percentage of native politi-

cal leaders reportedly hold prominent positions. The same situation seems to be true in the Georgian SSR. On the other hand, in Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent in the Baltic republics there appears to be a chronic shortage of reliable native personnel.

There is some evidence that the regime will on occasion attempt to govern certain minority nationalities through native cultural forms — by blending Communist ideology with local folklore and entrusting traditional village leaders with responsibilities. More frequently, however, Russian officials in the minority republics appear on the whole insensitive to the cultural traditions of the native population. In Latvia, party and administrative leaders have been criticized for failing to appreciate the "sound national traditions, language, and culture of all peoples whether large or small." In Siberia, party officials have been rebuked for distributing a large number of pamphlets and literature on beekeeping and sheep farming to

reindeer herders living near the Arctic Coast.

Russians appear to exhibit a particular contempt for the "backward" ways of life of the peoples of Central Asia. Russian officials in those regions live apart from the local population, mingle with the natives only when required by official duties, and hesitate to place natives in positions of responsibility and trust. Much of this distrust stems from an inability on the part of Russian administrators to cope with the traditional Central Asian patterns of life. The strength of local customs can be seen in the frequent denunciation of native officials, including party members, who practice polygyny and exhibit a "feudal" attitude toward women. Native women, traditionally isolated from public life, are practically absent in positions of responsibility. Local nepotism is a perennial problem, since traditional family and kinship ties persistently override all other loyalties. The tensions created as a result of differences in Russian and Central Asian ways of life are aggravated by the regime's insistence that party and other officials in the minority areas must strive to eliminate the economic, political, and cultural "backwardness" of the formerly "oppressed" peoples and help them to "catch up with Central Russia.'

Some analysts feel that the collectivization and industrialization of the minority areas may eventually lead to a substantial integration of the nationalities in the USSR. It is true that a uniform pattern of indoctrination as well as experiences shared in factories, farms, and offices, regardless of nationality, may tend to obliterate the consciousness of national differences; but the primacy of the Russian people as the "older brother" in the Soviet family of nations

is one aspect of the present official ideology which continues to breed resentment and which stimulates a revival of nationalist feelings.

Youth

The younger generation in the USSR poses certain special problems to the regime. Youth in pre-Soviet Russia, rebellious and independent, had evolved a tradition of its own. A distinctive feature of Russia's prerevolutionary radical movement was the great part played by university students. Today, through the Komsomol and the party the Soviet leadership attempts to harness the energies of

youth for its own purposes.

While the official position of the regime is that most young people join the Komsomol out of ideological dedication, the Soviet press has expressed alarm at the number of Soviet youths who have resisted discipline and displayed a lack of enthusiasm for their Komsomol organizations. Tens of thousands have been sent to agricultural, industrial, and construction projects — in Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East — where they have had to cope with primitive and demoralizing conditions of work. Many have been reluctant to go and have left their assignments at the first opportunity. A considerable number are students who prefer to remain in the larger cities, such as Moscow, and who exhibit a marked distaste for manual labor.

Komsomol members have been criticized with particular severity in the local press of the non-Russian republics. In the Baltic area they are rebuked for lacking enthusiasm for economic work. The Estonian press denounces many as "violators of discipline" and as loafers, hoodlums, and drunkards, who shirk work, are under the influence of religion, and are losing interest in Komsomol activities. Similarly, in Moldavia they are charged with staying away from work and taking part in religious observances. The Moldavian press also complains about "poor growth of the ranks of the Komsomol, frequent violation of labor discipline, and numerous instances of immoral behavior by the youth." The press recently noted that five thousand Moldavian Komsomol members had dropped out of the organization and left no trace of their whereabouts. Decrease in Komsomol membership is also a concern of the Tadzhik press.

Although a substantial number of young Communists appear to submit to party indoctrination and guidance halfheartedly, there are also those who regard the ideology of Communism with a great measure of idealism. For these, disillusionment, when they are faced with the realities of Soviet life, is often rapid and bitter; many of them look back to the now almost legendary Lenin as the true champion of Communist values. The wide gap between Soviet reality and the utopian visions of the Communist faith is likely to remain a recurrent source of disappointment for those of the coming generation who become sincere in their ideals.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT

THE SOVIET STATE FUNCTIONS TODAY under its third constitution. Derived in part from the constitutional ideas of the West and in part from Marxist theory, "constitutionalism" as practiced in the USSR mirrors the dualism of its origin as well as patterns of behavior rooted in Russian history.

A small body of Russian intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were fully involved in the currents of political theory at work in the rest of Europe. Defenders of monarchy were outnumbered by those who claimed that the sole source and justification of power was the popular will. To those Russians who thought about alternatives to tsarist autocracy, constitutions came to be the central symbol of popular sovereignty.

The Soviet regime has adopted Western constitutional forms usually associated with a government expressing the will of the people. These forms, however, are translated and manipulated in terms of ideological preconceptions and traditional Russian attitudes and thus assume a significance in the USSR which differs from that in other Western countries.

Marxist theory stresses that constitutionalism is not sacrosanct. While constitutions came into being in the West generally for the purpose of limiting governmental power in the interests of individual liberty, the Soviet Constitution is regarded by the rulers of the USSR as a creation and instrument of the "proletarian" dictatorship—it is to serve, not to be served or worshiped for its own sake. Fundamentally, in the Soviet view, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a power not limited by any laws.

This emphasis on authority and concentrated power in Soviet

theory is reinforced by the fact that the mass of Russians had for centuries known only absolute rule. Democratic habits and traditions—a readiness of those in power to recognize the right of opposition, a readiness on the part of the opposition to cooperate as well as criticize—have no firm roots in Russian history.

Like the tsars before them, Russia's present rulers are unwilling to restrict their power. Their claim to power, however, rests not on a mandate from God or custom but on an ideology that states that they alone understand, and therefore represent, the interests of the people. This ideology, in the view of the Soviet leaders, gives them the right to guide and, if necessary, coerce the people into patterns of conduct designed to achieve the goals set for society — goals that

theoretically reflect the ideals of the Communist faith.

Accordingly, constitutionalism, as it is understood in the democracies of the West, does not exist under the Communist regime. Nevertheless, a constitution serves the regime in several definite ways. It spells out the official governmental forms through which the Communist leaders exercise their power. It expresses principles calculated to have general mass appeal and preserves the trappings now popularly associated with democracy and legality, and is thus designed to gain popular approval not only at home but also abroad. It is used as an internal propaganda document, proclaiming Soviet ideals and educating the people in the values and principles of Soviet society. In short, it is intended to serve as an important means by which passive acceptance of the regime might be transformed into participation.

Popular participation in government is demanded of the masses, but is carefully directed by the Communist party. Legislative assemblies in the USSR have been constructed so as to serve as high-level barometers of public opinion as well as instruments whereby social pressure is exerted upon the masses to become actively involved in the goals and policies of the party leadership. Soviet elections are viewed as a means of political education — in the official verbiage, "a huge political school in which millions of working people deepen and extend their understanding of the party and

governmental policy."

An election drive in the USSR is accompanied with great fanfare, and the pressure to vote for a single slate of candidates falls upon everyone. Voting is carried out in a festive spirit, and is one of the principal occasions used to whip up social pressure in behalf of greater productivity in every line of endeavor. At the same time, persons exhibiting particular organizational or agitational skills in the course of an election campaign are noted and sifted for eventual recruitment into the party and government. The outcome of an

election is a foregone conclusion.

On the local level of government, directed popular participation is stimulated by a genuine concern with such everyday needs as housing, sanitation, transportation, and recreation. Ordinary members of local government bodies and unofficial "activists" are recruited and cajoled into helping to arouse general public enthusiasm with regard to various civic and economic tasks. Numerous conferences and meetings, arranged primarily for the purpose of exposing shortcomings in existing practices, provide the people with a sense of involvement in politics. Discussion and criticism of local officials are invoked within such bounds as may be permitted by the party leadership.

This emphasis on mass participation expresses several concerns of the regime: a perennial quest for legitimacy; a desire to demonstrate to the outside world that the Soviet population endorses the government; an attempt to secure political intelligence concerning the state of the public mind; an effort to promote popular approval of governmental policy and induce initiative, enthusiasm, and active

support among the people in the execution of policy.

While the Communist regime utilizes a structure of democratic forms to secure these objectives, the Soviet constitutional system does not guarantee the individual citizen any safeguards against the authority of the state. It does not offer a forum in which competing political forces may find free expression, or a framework within which political change may take place at the will of the electorate. There exists no locus of power outside the Communist party which can oppose the violation of constitutionally prescribed rights. And the party itself, in practice, has found it frequently expedient to disregard the rights "guaranteed" by the Constitution. It has deprived individuals of life and liberty without constitutional sanction. Within the Constitution itself, moreover, there are sufficient qualifications to permit the party to control the entire governmental structure, the electoral process, and the civil rights that are specifically enumerated.

The USSR Constitution

The Constitution now in force in the USSR was adopted on December 5, 1936. It proclaims the triumph of socialism and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The principle of public ownership of land,

resources, and means of production is given in concrete detail; but private property, which includes houses, savings, and furniture, is also defined, and the right of inheritance is specifically affirmed. Unlike the first two constitutions, the 1936 Constitution did not declare that the Soviet state was the nucleus of the future World Soviet Socialist Republic (it had become customary to write "Soviet Socialist" rather than "Socialist Soviet" by 1936).

The new Constitution declared that "all power in the USSR belongs to the toilers of city and village." The term "toilers" was intended to embrace all categories of the Soviet population — workers, peasants, and intelligentsia — and to emphasize the monolithic unity of Soviet society. Ever since, the party has been referred to less as the "vanguard of the proletariat" than as the "vanguard of the toilers." This shift represented a significant theoretical revision of the proletarian-dictatorship principle. The party relinquished the aspect of single-class exclusiveness by maintaining that since "exploiters" had been liquidated as a class in the USSR the will of the entire Soviet population was, in theory, fully expressed through the dictatorship.

In line with this emphasis on unity, the Constitution eliminated the former differences in franchise between workers and peasants. Although the intelligentsia is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, Stalin's report on the constitutional draft in 1936 gave the intelligentsia legal recognition as a "stratum" rather than as a class.

In order to stress that the Soviet dictatorship represents the will of the majority of the population, the regime insists that all elections under the new Constitution are conducted with the support of a "bloc of Communist and nonparty persons." Although a candidate for office need not be a party member, needless to say, he must have demonstrated his complete loyalty to the regime. In actual practice the influence of the party is decisive in the nomination of candidates. Only one candidate is permitted for each office. The right to nominate "is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and cultural societies."

The 1936 Constitution restored the vote to all who had previously been disenfranchised, with the exception of persons in prisons or insane asylums, or who have been deprived of their rights by law. It also terminated the practice of voting by a show of hands, stating that henceforth all elections were to be conducted "on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot."

The Constitution contains an impressive number of provisions to provide human freedoms and welfare: freedom of conscience and religious worship, freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly; the right to be elected to public office, the right to employment, rest, leisure, social insurance, and free education. Both explicitly and implicitly, all rights and freedoms can be exercised only within the pattern of what is beneficial to "socialism" and to the Soviet regime. To Soviet leaders, "freedom" and responsibility to the regime are inextricably bound; and since it is their province to decide what is of benefit to the regime, they can, within the framework of the Constitution, retain control over every right and freedom for which it provides.

Certain rights actually assume the form of obligations. Party members, for example, are exhorted to exercise their right of antireligious propaganda. Similarly, the right to vote and participate in elections is a duty not easily evaded by the ordinary citizen. Passivity of the voter in an election campaign is interpreted as opposition. A citizen, therefore, if he is to demonstrate his loyalty, must take the initiative and show active support of the party-supported candidate. It is difficult for him not to participate in the electoral process. The registration of all voters in the USSR is the responsibility of the state; the individual voter has no choice in this matter. With complete registration, the authorities are in a good position to know who does not vote. The regime appears determined that every citizen shall make use of his right to vote, whether he wants to or not. Thus, some provisions of the Constitution appear to facilitate pressure upon individual citizens in order to achieve a desired pattern of behavior.

This aspect of the Constitution is seen most clearly in a unique feature of the Soviet bill of rights: the listing in detail of the duties of citizens along with their rights. Work is "a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen in accordance with the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat.' "It is also a duty to abide by the Constitution, observe the laws, and maintain labor discipline; to perform public duties honestly, and respect "the rules of socialist intercourse." It is a duty "to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system." Military service, finally, is a "sacred duty" of every citizen of the USSR.

It is questionable whether most Soviet citizens ever think of applying the Constitution as a standard by which to judge the

actions of the state. While no doubt aware that they have a Constitution, they are certainly not in the habit of insisting on, or even expecting, recognition of their constitutional rights. Elections are viewed, not as a means of changing rulers or inducing greater accountability from them, but simply as a form of mass activity on the order of parades and rallies, which may inspire excitement if not enthusiasm. The Russian citizen, particularly, appears very susceptible to the social pressures exerted by such group and mass activities. However, intellectuals and members of minority nationalities, more familiar than the mass of Soviet citizens with Western history and ways of life, are more aware of the difference between the largely ritualistic significance of democratic forms in the USSR and the political function of such forms in other countries.

Government Structure

Actual political power in the USSR is concentrated in the top leaders of the Communist party, many of whom hold key posts in the governmental structure. The formal government is, essentially, the administrative machinery through which this party high command rules the country.

An organized hierarchy of about eight million adherents, the Communist party in the USSR is itself a creature of the leadership group. Its members — many of whom come from the ranks of industrial and administrative management and who occupy strategic positions of power in state administration — help to guide and check the execution of policies issued by the top command.

For the mass of Soviet workers and peasants, the state bureaucracy that regulates so much of their lives continues to be something alien and apart — an insensitive and distasteful officialdom, with

the party riding herd.

The compass of Soviet state administration is practically all-embracing. The state is the sole landowner; it owns all the mineral resources, operates thousands of industrial enterprises, is the chief trader, banker, and financier in the economy, and holds at least supervisory power over the labor of the entire adult population. The bureaucracy in Moscow, with an interlocking network of subordinate agencies, serves as the mechanism by which the concentrated power of the Soviet rulers radiates over the land. In semiofficial jargon, Moscow has come to be known as the "center"; the rest of the country — including the constituent republics — is simply referred to as the "periphery."

Administrative Divisions

The USSR is legally a federal state made up of fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (known as SSR's, constituent republics, or union republics). The standard subdivision for all but the smallest SSR's is the oblast (variously referred to in English as oblast, province, or district). The next smaller division is the rayon (in English rayon, district, or region). Finally there are villages, which, for administrative purposes, often are grouped in clusters of three or more. Cities are separately administered, generally at the level of rayon; but the larger ones come directly under SSR jurisdiction and themselves contain several municipal rayons, which are then roughly equivalent to city wards in the United States.

In addition to these administrative divisions, there are subdivisions theoretically based on autonomy for ethnic minorities. Autonomous republics (ASSR's) exist as more or less separate entities within some of the constituent republics. Autonomous oblasts are smaller units of the same type. Certain large and sparsely populated areas within the Russian Republic are classified as krays (territories); they are administered like oblasts but themselves often contain oblasts or autonomous oblasts. A smaller, sparsely settled minority area, with fewer provisions for self-government, is called a national area or natsional nyy okrug (see the plate, Administrative Divisions of the USSR). The territorial-administrative structure of the USSR has undergone frequent rearrangements, particularly at the lower levels of the national-territorial pyramid, and will probably continue to do so in the future.

Central Administration

The formal structure of government consists of a pyramid of soviets, extending up from the village and city to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Theoretically, all soviets are elective bodies. The USSR Supreme Soviet is constitutionally designated "the highest organ of state power in the USSR, which alone exercises legislative power in the union." Its two houses, the Soviet (Council) of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, are officially supposed to represent both the common interests of the entire Soviet people and the specific interests of the nationalities. The Soviet of the Union is composed of one deputy for each 300,000 of the population; that of the Nationalities consists of twenty-five deputies from each constituent republic, eleven from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous oblast, and one from each national okrug. Members of both chambers serve a four-year term.

At the summit of the formal soviet pyramid is the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, elected at a joint session of the two chambers. The Presidium is considered a "collective president," and its chairman is considered the official Soviet chief of state. In addition to electing its Presidium, the USSR Supreme Soviet appoints a USSR Council of Ministers (known until 1946 as the Council of People's Commissars), which exercises the highest executive and administrative functions. The Supreme Soviet also chooses the Supreme Court of the USSR, for a term of five years, and the Procurator General of the USSR, for a term of seven years; these together form the apex of the Soviet judicial system. While the Supreme Court stands out as a separate body and Soviet judges are declared to be "independent and subject only to the law," this highest Soviet judicial organ is not considered a superior or independent branch of the government. The Supreme Court is denied the right to judicial review of legislation and lacks the power to void decisions made by the party and the Council of Ministers.


The Supreme Soviet of the USSR sets the pattern for supreme soviets of constituent republics and autonomous republics (which lack a counterpart to the Soviet of Nationalities); the bases for election to these and the lesser soviets that exist all the way down to the village level differ in the various republics. Each of the constituent republics also has a council of ministers, which is set up in a form parallel to that of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. At all levels of the administrative pyramid, parallel party organs

supervise the work of the governmental bureaucracy.

Officially, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the highest embodiment of the popular will. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers is not a legislative organ and is strictly accountable to the Supreme Soviet and, in the period between the sessions of the latter, to its Presidium. In practice, most of the legislative as well as executive powers are concentrated in the Council of Ministers, which works in close association with the summit of the party hierarchy. To a lesser degree, legislative functions are also lodged in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet itself meets only briefly each year and functions as a ratifying and propaganda body.

The USSR Council of Ministers is the most important organ of government. Most of the top party leaders hold positions in the upper ranks of the Council, thus insuring that the makers of policy can see to the execution of their own policies. Besides preparing

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE U S S R



* The USSR contains 15 Constituent Republics, with considerable variation in subdivisions.

legislation to be introduced by relevant ministers at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers enacts statutes, rules, and regulations affecting almost all aspects of Soviet economic and cultural life.

The Council of Ministers consists of a chairman, several first deputy chairmen, the ministers of the USSR, chairmen of various committees, and directors of a number of other organs attached to the Council. The chairman of the Council of Ministers is the official equivalent of the premier or prime minister in European parliamentary republics. This post and the first deputy chairmanships are invariably filled by top party leaders, who form a presidium within the Council of Ministers.

In addition to the political and social portfolios that are found in European republics, the Council of Ministers has included an array of economic ministries covering the entire agricultural, industrial, and commercial life of the nation. Ministries in the Soviet Union are divided into three categories: all-union, which have no counterpart in the individual republics; union-republic, which have parallel ministries in some or all of the republics; republic, which exist only in constituent republics and are formally subordinate only to the council of ministers of the respective constituent republic.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR has undergone an almost constant process of reorganization. Between 1936 and 1947 the number of ministries rose from 18 to 59, reflecting the tremendous growth of the economy during this period; these changes generally involved subdividing the various economic ministries. In 1947, apparently because fragmentation had gone too far, the number was considerably reduced. After the death of Stalin in 1953, a further "streamlining" took place. By 1959, the total number of ministries was brought down to 16.

An attempt is made to provide Soviet ministers with the experience or long tenure necessary to make them experts in the affairs they administer. The majority of them, however, are not policymakers. They serve, rather, as high technical advisers and adminis-

trators, executing the will of the party leadership.

Committees and other bodies attached directly to the USSR Council of Ministers are highly important in the structure of the government. Among them is the State Planning Committee, responsible for short- and long-term economic plans embracing virtually the entire economy of the Soviet Union. The Committee on State Security (KGB) performs the important political police function. Numerous chief administrations (glavki), committees, councils, commissions, bureaus, and other organs serve as all-union, union-republic, or republic agencies for specific problems. In addition, there are special chief administrations within many union-republic ministries which bypass the republic ministries and operate under direct central control.

All the ministries and auxiliary agencies cannot, of course, be considered equal in importance. Defense and Foreign Affairs, naturally, are among the most vital, and their heads are near the top of the Soviet hierarchy. The State Planning Committee, the State Control Commission, the Ministries of Finance, Internal Affairs, and the Committee on State Security play particularly important roles in checking up on the activities of other ministries, and they overlap in various areas of responsibility. The diffusion of responsibility, together with the separate controls exercised by the party, creates much conflict and confusion throughout the administrative bureaucracy. Whether in industry or agriculture, in science or the arts, the ordinary Soviet administrator is placed in the difficult position of accommodating the various pressures of several authorities.

Regular sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet officially are supposed to be convoked by its Presidium twice a year; this provision has not always been observed. Both chambers are required to hold their sessions simultaneously. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet have lasted variously from three to twelve days; the brevity of the sessions debars the Supreme Soviet from serious deliberations of any politi-

cal significance.

Both chambers are empowered to initiate legislation, and laws are passed as the result of a simple majority vote of both. The vote is not secret. There are provisions for measures to be taken in case the chambers disagree, but these have never been invoked. There is no set rule on when sessions are to be conducted jointly and when separately, except that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers must be formally chosen at joint sessions of the chambers. In practice, most of their work is done at joint sessions.

Commissions are set up to assist the Supreme Soviet in its practical work. A Credentials Commission passes upon the credentials of the deputies. Each chamber, in addition, elects three permanent commissions — legislative, budgetary, and foreign affairs — for the purpose of preparing drafts of laws to be introduced.

Deputies to the Supreme Soviet are required to report back to their electors concerning their work and may in theory be recalled by them at any time. Among the privileges deputies enjoy are free transportation over rail and water routes throughout the USSR, immunity from arrest and prosecution (unless sanctioned by the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium), and special monetary allowances. Though drawn from all walks of life, the delegates of the Supreme Soviet represent in great measure those who have advanced most under the Soviet system: party and governmental officials, directors of large economic enterprises, chairmen of collective farms, men of the arts and sciences, outstanding industrial workers, persons who have won various state awards, and so on. For many if not most of these deputies, membership on the Supreme Soviet is largely honorary and entails little power. The deputies who are members of the permanent commissions, however, are more involved with governmental policy. The budgetary commissions of the two chambers, for example, consider the state budget before the plenum of the Supreme Soviet, and are able to gain some understanding of the budget provisions. They regularly make certain revisions of the budget presented by the Minister of Finance and just as regularly these revisions are unanimously adopted.

Soviet leaders are at present calling for more debate at sessions of the Supreme Soviet. As yet, however, the debates that have occurred appear carefully controlled. For the most part the Supreme Soviet confines its activity to the wholesale confirmation of decrees adopted by its Presidium. Its enactments include: amendments to the Constitution; changes in the territorial-administrative structure of the USSR; passing on the budget; adoption of laws on citizenship, military duty, judicial structure, formation of ministries, various taxes, the new economic plan; and approval of foreign policy reports. The laws passed by the Supreme Soviet are relatively few when compared with the great number of "decisions and ordinances," which have all the force of law, adopted by the Council of Ministers.

The Presidium acts between sessions of the Supreme Soviet and normally holds office for four years, until a newly elected Supreme Soviet elects a new Presidium. It convenes and adjourns the session of the Supreme Soviet and appoints or relieves cabinet ministers on recommendation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, subject to the confirmation of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet. It also has authority to appoint or remove higher ranking officers in the armed forces, order mobilization, proclaim a state of war in case of armed attack, proclaim martial law, ratify treaties, appoint or recall diplomats, and receive credentials of foreign envoys. It alone possesses the right to interpret laws. The Presidium has regularly exercised most of these prerogatives and enacted considerable

legislation in the form of decrees; but in all its work it follows the

instructions of the party leadership.

The Supreme Court of the USSR is declared in the Constitution to be the highest judicial organ in the nation and is charged with supervision of all other judicial organs in the USSR. Subsidiary courts include the Supreme Courts of the fifteen republics and a chain of lesser courts down to the people's court at the level of the rayon. Under the Constitution, courts are to be elected for periods of five years by soviets at their own levels. As elsewhere, party influence here is decisive. There are, in addition, a number of special courts that operate in all parts of the USSR: military tribunals, railroad-transport courts, and water-transport courts.

In cases of exceptional importance the USSR Supreme Court may act as a court of the first instance. Its main function, however, is to act as the ultimate court of appeal. It is subdivided into five collegia: criminal, civil, military, railroad-transport, and water-transport. It has been composed in recent years of around eighty judges and over thirty people's assessors (laymen) elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet. When it sits as a court of original jurisdiction, a collegium consists of two people's assessors and a professional judge; when it acts as a court of review the collegium is three judges. A plenum consisting of the entire membership of the court is called regularly in order to consider instructions for guidance of general court practice, or such verdicts, decisions, and rulings of the court's collegia as have been brought up for reconsideration by the president of the Court or the USSR Procurator General.

Soviet authorities insist that judges must render decisions in accordance with their own inner convictions, but also that this does not exclude the duty to follow the general policy of the party and government. Only those men who are capable of keeping abreast of the unfolding policies of the party and who are loyal to the cause of

"socialism" are considered fit for election as judges.

The independence of Soviet judges is further undermined by the fact that Soviet legislation is exceedingly chaotic. Several commissions have been set up to codify the laws of the USSR, but as yet with no result. There is no systematic reporting of cases, and even the publication of new statutes and orders is irregular. There do exist codes of law for the individual republics (all patterned after the RSFSR codes), but here, as elsewhere, law is subject to the decisions of the party, hence may be changed at short notice. Criticism of judges in the Soviet press often points to the fact that a judge is not abreast of the latest legislative development.

The most direct control over the courts is exercised through the Office of the Procurator General. It appoints procurators, for terms of five years, down to the level of the oblast; these are responsible solely to the Procuracy and function both as watchdogs over the bureaucracy and prosecutors in criminal cases. The procurators of constituent republics in turn appoint procurators of rayons and cities.

The Procurator General is not a member of the Council of Ministers. As the "guardian of legality," he supervises the carrying out of laws by the organs of executive power. The constitutional provision vesting in the Procurator General of the USSR "the highest supervision over accurate execution of the laws by all ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by individual officials and citizens of the USSR" gives the Procuracy even broader supervisory competence than that possessed by the USSR Supreme Court, which is concerned only with the activity of judicial organs.

Law in the USSR, of course, is not intended to restrict the power of the regime; it is developed as an instrument of policy and administration. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," Soviet ideologists assert, "is a power unrestrained by any laws." The Russian citizen by and large accepts this subordination of law. The people have become accustomed in the course of their history to arbitrary and paternalistic rule and are not generally familiar with abstract principles of law and legal procedure. But they are concerned with "justice" in a vague and personal sense. While accepting that a government should have broad powers, they expect it to be "fair," in the sense of not being capricious, and to act in their interest. And they apparently rely more on the "personal justice" that may possibly be obtained from individuals in authority than on the judicial machinery as an institution.

The Soviet legal order, however, often fails to satisfy even this elementary concept of justice. In order to strengthen the hold of governmental discipline, the regime has brought a wide range of activities under the rule of public law and criminal penalty. There are, in addition, a vast number of executive directives with the force of law and a host of regulations and disciplinary rules, enforced by administrative authorities, which impinge upon daily activities of citizens in all walks of life. In effect, the regime has sought to establish a detailed "state discipline" to control many forms of social behavior which, in most Western societies, are governed by custom and informally accepted norms.

As a result, the gap between what the regime considers wrong

and what a majority of the population may so judge is sometimes large. It is not improbable, moreover, that if the multitude of extremely technicalized regulations and laws enmeshing nearly all economic and social relationships were enforced with full vigor both the economy and the society would founder. A great deal of material in the Soviet press suggests that many officials and ordinary citizens are driven to illegal action in order to fulfill the responsibilities placed on them by the regime and to function in the society.

The effectiveness of law in the USSR is further weakened by the power of the regime to intrude its will into any facet and at any level of activity in the nation, independent of and without regard to the legal system and its enforcement provisions. The Soviet political police for a long time were permitted to define a crime arbitrarily and in the vaguest of terms, deal with offenses by administrative action, and impose punishment even if the accused committed no

specific act but was merely considered "socially dangerous."

For the present, the political police are held firmly in leash. The Khrushchev regime, groping for new forms of social direction, has acknowledged "lawlessness and arbitrariness" in the past. It has not, however, relinquished its right to take summary action against any actual or potential threat to itself or its policies. The attempt has been to persuade the citizens, with some effect, that in the future this power will be used with greater discretion. But the ability to intervene in all the affairs of men remains, and contributes to the precariousness of the legal order.

The government in recent years has tried to strengthen the legal order as a substitute for arbitrary administrative action, so far with limited success. The regime's heavy reliance on a variety of extralegal mechanisms to preserve order and safety in the society—voluntary citizens' groups, informal tribunals at factories, farms, and public organizations, and quasi-judicial commissions in local communities throughout the country—attests to the failure of the formal judicial system to cope with many problems of law enforcement in the USSR.

Local Administration

Local soviets, from the oblast level down to the village, have a two-year term of office. They meet infrequently and have no essential function. Actual administration at the local level is entrusted to the soviets' executive committees (*ispolkom*), whose officers perform their functions with the assistance of numerous local offices attached to the committees.

These local offices are of two kinds: the sections and administrations of the various ministries or committees at the republic or USSR level; and departments or commissions of local interest, such as trade, communal economy, roads, municipal services, etc. The number and nature of these local offices depend on the specific features of a given area.

As a rule, the offices of a ministry are subordinate both to the executive committees to which they are attached and to the ministry itself. The rayon office of agriculture, for example, is responsible to the oblast and national organs of the Ministry of Agriculture as well as to the rayon executive committee. In some cases, however, the offices of certain national agencies are independent of local control even though administratively attached to local soviet organizations. The militia (civil police) administration within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, and the representatives of the Committee on State Security (political police) are free from the control of local executive committees.

At the very lowest level of the Soviet structure are the village soviets. Although these generally represent several villages each, they have no executive committees and carry on their very limited administrative activities through one or more secretaries. They have some jurisdiction over village trade and services, and it is their function to help in rounding up villagers for temporary work at harvest and other critical times. The local village administrators attempt to recruit "activists" from the countryside to assist in carrying out tasks of public peace and are expected to keep informed of the activities of the *kolkhoz* of their area. In all matters of importance the village soviet turns to the rayon soviet executive committee for guidance and instructions.

Although the executive committees of local soviets, being permanent organs of administration, are far more important than the soviets they are supposed to represent, their activities are under the close supervision of local party organs. Control by the party from within is achieved by means of overlapping personnel. Various sections of local party committees, furthermore, share many of the concerns of the soviet executive committees. Party organs also have the decisive voice in appointing personnel to all the key positions in any locality: in the soviets, in their executive committees, in the proc-

urator's office, in the people's courts, etc.

All functions of the offices attached to the soviet executive committee and of the local party organizations are so divided as to breed considerable confusion. The Soviet press contains frequent references to usurpation of functions among soviets, ministerial

representatives, factories, and farms.

The leaders of the USSR assert that the local soviets—embracing hundreds of thousands of members, most of them nonparty people—are the most tangible expression of popular participation in government. According to the Soviet press, one of the most important means of "drawing the broad masses into the work of soviets" consists of the commissions of the soviets concerned with local problems—e.g., civil improvement or sanitation. These commissions are frequently criticized for showing "no signs of life." The public is exhorted to speak out about such things as the need for draining marshes, repairing roads, or eliminating shortcomings in trade. But, in attempting to gain public assistance in activities of even the most immediate interest to the citizen, the government faces considerable public apathy.

Problems of Public Administration

Traditional tsarist administrative practices as well as more contemporary circumstances and imperatives have shaped the character of present-day governmental administration in the USSR.

Tsarist Precedents

For several centuries the tsarist autocracy looked upon the mass of its illiterate subjects as raw material for the realization of political and economic policies. This relationship between rulers and ruled colored the entire system of tsarist public administration. For tsarist officials, the state was an end in itself; all matters in which the interests of the state were involved stood above the wants and rights of individual citizens. Generally unresponsive to popular sentiment, the old Russian bureaucrat looked only to his superiors for direction and approval. To the people, the apparatus of bureaucracy appeared as something alien, impersonal, and harsh.

The difficulties of administering a vast and varied territory by means of a strongly centralized government left an indelible imprint upon Russian bureaucratic practices. Many tsarist officials dreaded responsibility; in order to avoid it they simply passed their problems on to higher authorities. The most trivial matters from all

parts of the empire swamped central government organs.

This reluctance to exercise initiative was accompanied by a formidable lack of familiarity with the practical problems of administration. Ignorant of actual conditions in the country, tsarist

officials devoted a great part of their energies to fulfilling all the prescribed formalities on paper only. Even at the highest level of administration, reports and proposals on instituting various legislative reforms dealt with the actual problem at hand in vague and general terms and — in order to "shed the light of science on the question" — were filled with pedantic expositions of numerous theories held by foreign jurists and philosophers.

The efficiency of imperial administration was further impaired by the existence and toleration of widespread corruption, bribery, and other malpractices. The acceptance of favors, ironically called "sinless revenues" (bezgreshniye dokhodi), for personal services was

standard practice.

The tsarist autocracy attempted to root out such abuses, but with little success. It gave no publicity to official delinquencies, for fear of undermining social discipline, and relied primarily on a cumbersome internal system of checks to control the administration. The most ordinary tasks were repeatedly verified and countersigned. Special governmental agencies, such as the political police and the Procurator's Office, were set up to check, among other things, the abuses of local administrators.

But all such controls only served to produce a greater variety of means to evade them, helped to undermine the confidence of honest officials, and tended to encourage the habit of systematic falsification. Fact that were never examined were certified. Minutes were written of meetings that had never been held. Even the most conscientious of men could rarely fulfill all the prescribed formalities of official routine, involving an endless number of documents, reports, registers, ledgers.

Soviet Development

When the Communist leadership came to power in 1917, it took over one of the world's largest state economic machines and was to develop further, under other forms, the state machinery and far-flung centralism that had tied together the expanding Russian empire with its multitude of peoples scattered almost halfway around the globe. Despite initial efforts to do away with the tsarist bureaucracy, the Soviet government absorbed much of its personnel, patterned many administrative practices on tsarist models, and inherited many of the attributes of the former governmental administration.

Shortly before seizing power Lenin insisted (in his pamphlet State and Revolution) that any state — with its standing armies,

bureaucracy, police forces — was an oppressive institution, an organ of class rule. He felt, initially, that once the proletariat was victorious, it could not simply take over the existing repressive apparatus of the sate, but would have to destroy it. The overthrow of the capitalist class was to be followed by a long transitional period, known as the dictatorship of the proletariat, during which a new proletarian state would have to be used as a weapon of coercion in order to destroy the old ruling class. In time, society was to be transformed and perfected to the point where the state would simply "wither away."

Once in power, Lenin claimed that the masses would be given a share in the day-to-day work of government. He professed to believe that capitalism had so simplified the functions of government that ordinary laboring people could, with a little education,

take over the responsibilities of state administration.

The realities of power forced him to accept a different view. He admitted in 1918 that the art of administration is acquired only by experience and that the new government was dependent on the guidance of specialists in various fields of knowledge:

. . . we have had to resort to the old bourgeois method and agree to pay a very high price for the "services" of the biggest bourgeois specialists. . . . Clearly, such a measure is a compromise . . . a *step backward* on the part of our Socialist Soviet state power, which from the very outset proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing high salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker.

The difficulties in transforming good revolutionaries into good administrators were formidable. In 1922 Lenin stated:

We must not be afraid to admit that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the responsible Communists are not in the jobs they are now fit for, that they are unable to perform their duties, and that they must sit down and learn.

In the absence of a skilled group trained in the arts of civil administration within the party, the tsarist bureaucracy managed to hang on to a considerable extent. Lenin commented in 1922:

We now have a vast army of governmental employees, but we lack sufficiently educated forces to exercise real control over them. Actually, it often happens that at the top, where we exercise political power, the machine functions somehow. . . .

Down below, however, there are hundreds of thousands of old officials who came over to us from the Tsar and from bourgeois society and who, sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously, work against us.

Ten years later former tsarist officials made up as much as 50 percent of the personnel in some sections of the bureaucracy.

But while the party lacked administrative skills, it could furnish men of proved political reliability. Communists filled the key posts in political and economic affairs. In order to ensure the lovalty of the old-regime bureaucrats, the new leadership surrounded them with party and police controls. To cope with the problem of inadequate administrative resources, the Soviet regime concentrated its major efforts on educating the new generation for administrative and technical responsibilities. Under the impetus of economic expansion during the 1930's a new Soviet-trained intelligentsia began to emerge and fill the needs of industry and administration. Increasingly, new party members were recruited from this intelligentsia, thus gradually transforming the party into a managerial and administrative elite.

Improvements in Soviet public administration followed. The system of highly centralized control proved most efficient in cases involving a thorough mobilization of men and materials under concentrated pressure for a definite purpose. Some of the government's greatest successes have been in the military and industrial fields.

At the same time, however, governmental performance in the USSR continued to be hampered by widespread bureaucratic inefficiency, red tape, and delay. The volume of official "self-criticism" today still points to considerable bureaucratic confusion, procrastination, and fear on the part of officials to take responsibility for decisions.

The complaints in the Soviet press deal with a great variety of bureaucratic deficiencies. Local agencies are castigated for refusing to act without consulting higher agencies, for desiring "to have in every case a document from higher up, as insurance." Local officials are criticized for callousness in dealing with the problems of ordinary citizens, for employing "a bureaucratic, indifferent attitude" toward the vital needs of the people.

Confusion within local soviet executive committees is often deplored. A typical article cited the case of a man denied a pension by local authorities. The case went on for months, and scores of people

were "dragged into the matter." According to the article:

A minor request grew into a whole pile of opinions, demands, receipts, and references. Yet all the comrades on the executive committee needed to do was to acquaint themselves carefully with the documents and the case would have been settled a year ago.

In another case, one official of an executive committee granted a citizen's request, while shortly thereafter another official turned it down. Attempts "to drown practical work in a stream of general

resolutions" are frequently criticized.

In discussing the industrialization of eastern Siberia, *Pravda* expressed alarm at the fact that "instead of a state solution of many urgent questions we find a scattering of forces and departmental confusion, which often leads to a useless expenditure of public labor and national funds." The article continued:

Planning has been and still is a bottleneck in construction. . . . All this arises because the working plans for large projects . . . are prepared in Moscow, far away from the work itself. Local groups . . . are incapable of solving questions on the spot; besides, they are simply unauthorized to solve anything. Supervision is carried out from Moscow, too.

Other articles have criticized the courts and procurator's offices for an irresponsible attitude toward a man's fate, "permitting the unjustified arrest and conviction of citizens." Various ministries have been criticized for failing to assure the smooth and accurate operation of enterprises under their jurisdiction, for sending out "rush and super-rush orders to the plants without taking steps to provide the material and technical means for filling these orders."

The complaints are endless. Much of the bureaucratic maladministration they reflect can be traced to several factors: the complexity and novelty of administrative problems in a country recently embarked upon a large-scale transformation of the economy; fear on the part of officials to take responsibility for decisions, in the knowledge that their performance will be carefully scrutinized and their failures will not be overlooked; the extraordinary size and

centralization of the apparatus of government.

The problem of efficiency in the USSR has been further magnified by the variety of ways devised by the Soviet leadership both to check up on the execution of its policies and to secure the loyalty (as well as the efficiency) of its expanding administrative apparatus. The regime faces a persistent dilemma in that its interests in bureaucratic efficiency frequently conflict with its interests in maintaining the political reliability of its governmental machine.

Various planning, financial, personnel, legal, and investigatory controls are built into the administrative structure. Administrators at all levels are under the surveillance of the political police or various party functionaries. Within the various sections of state administration, overlapping bureaucratic hierarchies are pitted against each other and often given joint responsibility for the fulfillment of directives.

A major attempt to correct the overcentralization, the 1957 reorganization of industrial management transferred more authority to local officials and gave the managerial and technical groups in the USSR more functional autonomy. According to *Pravda*:

The Communist party is striving for the maximum utilization of local resources and for the development of initiative in every republic. The party Central Committee and the Soviet government have . . . introduced a number of organizational measures directed at raising the role of the constituent republics in the management of the national economy. New union-republic ministries have been set up in the constituent republics. Many enterprises of the coal, lumber, oil, metallurgical, meat, dairy products, electricity, textile, food, and building materials industries and of highway transport and communications have been transferred to republic jurisdiction.

All this guarantees the realization of the Leninist principle of combining centralized leadership with the increased independence and the development of initiative of local agencies.

One result of decentralization has been to increase the accountability of local officials. Individual regions and republics must now themselves find and mobilize local resources, means, and funds for increasing the output of food products and consumer goods; continued failure of enterprises to fulfill production plans is less easily excused.

The available evidence suggests that the problem of securing greater initiative and efficiency at the local level without losing the capacity for centralized direction will plague the regime for some time. Moscow officials are now frequently criticized for continuing to run things "from the center," for interfering "from force of habit" with the operations of enterprises transferred to republic jurisdiction. At the same time, republic ministries are called to task for being afraid to assume full responsibility and relying on direction from above.

12. Problems of Public Administration

But despite many problems, there is no question that the quality of administration in the USSR has greatly improved with experience. Particularly at the top levels of government, Soviet administrators seem resourceful and professionally competent; however, this is less true of the lower levels of the governmental bureaucracy.

PROPAGANDA

Basic to the soviet system of rule is an elaborate propaganda apparatus, entailing a complete monopoly of the means of communication, by which the regime controls and directs all forms of public expression, including the arts, in order to further the interests and objectives of the state. Propaganda in the USSR is used to indoctrinate the people in a particular point of view, to inhibit deviant thought, and to elicit conditioned responses to a set of politically-charged slogans, symbols, myths, and arguments. Communist ideology, establishing the conceptual framework for viewing the world and providing a special vocabulary for describing and interpreting specific current issues, is manipulated by the regime as the central component of this highly developed technique of persuasion, intimidation, and control. To the extent that the ideology is internalized by the individual, he tends to become, in effect, another unit in the propaganda apparatus.

Communist propaganda, then, is used to play upon men's hopes and fears, arouse their anger, and call forth deep-seated loyalties and antipathies, with the final goal of shaping their total intellectual and emotional make-up. Abroad, propaganda must aim at subverting existing governments and ways of life, at persuading people of the necessity for radical change, and at sapping their will to resist; at home, its prime object is to preserve and strengthen an existing order. Abroad, it is subject to wide variation according to the part of the world with which it is concerned; at home, its geographical variations are comparatively slight. Communist propaganda abroad is an integral part of Soviet foreign policy; this chapter

will discuss domestic propaganda.

In the Communist's scheme persuasion has always held priority over force in the process of "educating" the masses, though the knowledge that force could always be applied has enhanced the ability of Soviet propaganda to intimidate as well as to persuade. The end-product sought by persuasion is a public opinion molded to voluntary and enthusiastic support of the regime and its policies. The popular state of mind is seen as an indication of the pace at which the party program can proceed, not as a control upon policy formation. The "educational" function of the party permeates every corner of Soviet life. It is carried out through the schools, the trade unions, the arts, "voluntary organizations," and nearly all organized activities of the people, as well as through the mass media of communication.

As early as the 1890's Georgi Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist, made a distinction between two types of persuasion—"agitation" and "propaganda." This distinction is still used by the Soviet regime. "Agitation," simple and direct, is concerned largely with the development of public support for specific policies and goals. It is aimed at the masses, who are assumed to have neither the ability to comprehend nor the need to know more than relatively simple explanations of what is expected of them. "Propaganda," on the other hand, is directed at active party members, agitators, and others in positions of leadership and is concerned directly with Marxist-Leninist theory and its application to the long- or short-range policies of the Soviet regime.

Party Control

Direction of all agitation and propaganda is centralized in the hands of the Section of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the all-union Communist party. Once a policy and a "line" are established by the Central Committee or its Presidium, Agitprop acts as planner, director, and watchdog over all agencies that are responsible for the actual dissemination of information to the public. Its directives are mandatory and are spread so quickly throughout the whole information apparatus that a new approach and even a new stereotype or symbol will appear simultaneously in all media in all parts of the Soviet Union.

The organization of Agitprop on the all-union level is elaborate and is largely reproduced in the republic, oblast, and rayon organizations. In local party organizations the responsibilities for propaganda and agitation activities are generally given to a special secretary or some one member. The arrangement is not, however, strictly hierarchical, for directives are given directly from Moscow to local or regional organizations as well as through the chain of command, and reporting from below goes either directly or indirectly to the

center.

Agitprop is divided into numerous subsections or departments. Some are purely administrative. Only one, the Department of Party Propaganda and Mass Agitation, is directly concerned with operations. The rest deal with the direction and control of the various mass media of communication and with other activities that are

considered to be involved in public opinion formation.

The Department of Party Propaganda and Mass Agitation is responsible for the organization and ideological content of printed and oral Marxist-Leninist propaganda and directs the selection. training, and assignment of oral agitators and the political training and retraining of party members. The Central and Local (Provincial) Press Departments are responsible for newspaper publication in their respective divisions; the Publishing Houses Department supervises the activities of the state publishing houses as well as the relatively small amount of publishing that is done by agencies not in OGIZ (the Unified State Publishing House). There is a Department of Films and a Department of Radio. Fictional literature of all types comes under the jurisdiction of a department of that name, while the activities of artists and musicians are supervised by the Department of Art Affairs. The Cultural Enlightenment Department supervises the activities of village reading huts, libraries, "houses of culture," museums, and the like, making sure that these organizations contribute to the advancement of the general party line. The schools and the sciences also come under the purview of separate departments of Agitprop. Through all these organizations the party attempts, with considerable success, to make sure that its policies and propaganda are effectively disseminated.

Policy directives and operating instructions, based upon Central Committee decisions, define the content of communications and are issued by Agitprop directly to operating agencies, not through the lower levels of its own organization. For example, the editor of a regional newspaper receives his orders directly from the Local (Provincial) Press Department in Moscow and is required to report to it. He also receives instructions from the regional Agitprop organization, but these never contradict or take precedence over a Moscow directive. The regional organizations function to a greater degree in advisory and supervisory capacities, particularly with regard to adaptation and selection of regional and local materials.

News of policy changes or new propaganda campaigns is also generally initiated at the highest levels — an editorial in *Pravda*, an address by a leading party or administration figure, or an article by an acknowledged leader in a specific field. For example, the de-

Stalinization campaign was opened by the (at first) secret addresses of Mikoyan and Khrushchev, then followed by editorials and articles in the leading papers and journals. Statements and writings from authoritative sources set the pattern for the lower echelons of the information media.

Through its power to determine the ideological content of all propaganda and agitation, Agitprop makes its influence felt in the schools, party organizations, unions, and all the mass information media. But it has, in addition, more specific duties in the training of personnel. It recruits, trains, and directs the oral agitators and has the responsibility for the training of Pioneer, Komsomol, and Communist party members as well as their retraining in special seminars, conferences, and courses of study. During this training and on the basis of performance in various capacities in the propaganda apparatus, selection and advancement of individuals of demonstrated "reliability" are accomplished. In general, the greater the responsibility of a position, the greater the likelihood that the incumbent will be a disciplined party member.

Certain departments of Agitprop have the responsibility of approving or vetoing appointments of key personnel in other fields as well. For example, editors of newspapers below the all-union level are nominated by the Agitprop organization at the same level in the hierarchy, but the appointment is confirmed by Moscow. The organization maintains similar control over personnel in other mass media of communication, and it can at least supervise appointments to sensitive positions in such fields as the arts and education.

In the Soviet Union there is both prerelease and postrelease censorship, as well as perpetual jeopardy for past performance in that approval is not permanent. By the time a film reaches completion or a book is released — or even months or years afterward — the official policy may have changed and the work be condemned for

ideological deviation.

The party's censorship is both direct and indirect. In all the departments of Agitprop there are sections in which drafts, scripts, and manuscripts are scrutinized carefully for their adherence to the current directives before release, and the output is subject to review and criticism after publication by the division of Agitprop in the next higher administrative echelon and by the central organization. Radio broadcasting is monitored and spot-checked. Considerable reliance is placed, however, on the indirect control made possible by the presence of party members on the staffs of the various operating agencies. Many of the agencies are subject to prerelease censorship

from within their organizations, rather than ideological control from the outside.

The most important nonparty censorship office is the Chief Administration for Literary Affairs and Publishing (Glavlit), of the USSR Council of Ministers or its subsidiaries at the republic level. This organization was established to pass upon political, ideological, military, and economic security questions in the press and in manuscripts, photographs, and other materials intended for publication, and to eliminate anything that militates against the goals of the regime and the party, discloses state secrets, arouses nationalistic or religious fanaticism, or is of a pornographic nature. Lectures, exhibits, and some aspects of broadcasting are also subject to Glavlit scrutiny. It too engages in prepublication and postpublication censorship, the latter largely to make sure that the printed text actually conforms to that which was approved.

Two statutory exceptions, however, actually exempt the greater part of Soviet printed material from control of Glavlit when questions of national security are not involved. First, the materials published by the Unified State Publishing House (OGIZ) — which accounts for the majority of books published in the USSR — are censored by the staffs of the publication houses which make up that organization. They are generally trusted party members. Second, all publications of the Central Committee of the party, of all lower level party committees, as well as the publications of the Academies of Science and the government newspaper *Izvestia* are exempt from politico-ideological censorship by Glavlit. Most ideological control is left in the hands of the Communist party and it may be assumed that the personnel of Glavlit itself is directly or indirectly under close party supervision.

Themes and Symbols

Underlying all Soviet propaganda is the basic theme of the superiority of the Communist system and its inevitable triumph over its enemies or rivals. This theme, cast in the form of struggle between irreconcilable forces, has remained constant during all the years of Soviet power, though the specific manifestations have varied with changes in official policy, in internal and external conditions, and in the interpretation of the ideology. Examination of a few of the major themes and of the symbols used to develop them will serve to illustrate the type of information that is the steady diet of the Soviet people.

Propaganda that deals with internal affairs is closely tied with current economic and social problems. It is designed primarily to influence overt behavior, though it also is concerned with inculcating attitudes related to that behavior. Industrial development and increased productivity have been major themes since the late 1920's. In the beginning the "bourgeois," the "Nepmen," the landowners, the "profiteers," and the kulaks were the villains impeding industrial progress; today the laggard, the uncooperative, the "bureaucrat," and the "speculator" impede progress. The workers and peasants, the Stakhanovite, the innovator, and "socialist competition" are symbols of progress. In similar manner many other themes are developed to gain support of specific policies and to correct certain problems. These, of course, reflect chiefly the values and attitudes of the regime, though the desires of the people are not entirely disregarded.

A large part of propaganda is more broadly designed to mold the attitudes of the people toward their government, toward the Communist system, toward other countries, and toward themselves. Peace, patriotism, nationalism, and democracy are among the most important of the themes. Each has been developed through a myriad of subordinate themes which have been adapted to the events and

conditions of the times.

Russia's role as the defender and promoter of world peace against the "war-mongering" powers has been a significant theme of Soviet propaganda since the early 1930's. Calls for disarmament, treaties, summit conferences, prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons, and the like are all variations upon this theme. Without a doubt, it has tremendous appeal to the Soviet people, among whom fear of war is genuine and widespread. That the allegations of Western "warmongering" and "capitalist encirclement" and the trumpeting of Soviet peaceful intentions have been accepted to some extent by the people may be inferred from the reports by visitors to the USSR of being frequently questioned as to why their countries want war.

Themes of patriotism and nationalism in Soviet domestic propaganda have a number of aspects, all aimed at strengthening popular support of the regime as the vehicle for carrying out the destiny of Russia—as defined by the regime. Regardless of ideological accretions and changes, these themes have a strong appeal to the Russian people because of the deep love of country and the belief that Russia has had a worldwide leadership role to play.

In the beginning a complete break with the past was attempted; the tsarist days were painted in the darkest colors and MarxistLeninist theory was promoted even in the agitation directed toward workers. Literature was encouraged to "mirror the problems posed by the revolution." By the mid-1930's, however, Soviet propaganda began the identification of the regime and of Marxism with Russian nationalism and the traditions of the Russian past. As the international situation degenerated and war became imminent, this emphasis was increased.

In the Central Asian and some other republics a similar effort was made to use the indigenous traditions of the minority peoples as a rallying point, but the effect was not always what was desired by the regime. The peoples responded to the appeals but often associated these symbols with resistance to the Russians. In such

cases propaganda policy was quickly corrected.

After the war a new synthesis of nationalistic propaganda was promoted, in the guise of "soviet patriotism," throughout the USSR. Its central aspect was the glorification of the state and the men who lead it, reinforced with the more negative concept of the USSR as a "besieged fortress." It also included considerable emphasis upon the greatness of the Russian nation and people and the civilizing force of Russia's role both past and present. Tsarist imperialism was portrayed as having brought enlightenment and freedom to the peoples of Central Asia — a parallel for the "liberation" and "enlightenment" in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other European satellites. Present-day Soviet activities in Southeast Asia and the Near East are presented in similar terms. That these themes have had appeal and conviction is suggested by reports that some Russians were outraged at the "ingratitude" of the Hungarians, who revolted "after all we have done for them."

In the Soviet lexicon "democracy" is another favorite propaganda term. It is defined in terms of an ultimate goal, the achievement of happiness for the masses, and since only Communism or "true" socialism is said to be dedicated to this end, only Communism or "true" socialism is democratic. Soviet propaganda has exalted democracy in this sense as a moral right belonging to all the masses everywhere, since all of them, Communist and non-Communist, are basically peace-loving, fair-minded, courageous, industrious, loyal, honest, and impatient of injustice and oppression. With the single and temporary exception of the Germans during World War II, Soviet propaganda has not characterized a nation and its people as enemies of democracy and Communism. To governments and "ruling circles" is reserved the extensive vocabulary of derogation — "capitalists," "imperialists," "exploiters," "fascists," "counterrevolutionaries,"

and the like. Thus the regime seeks to establish a universal base for its form of democracy in the minds of the Soviet people, and in the process plays up the messianic role of Russia and the Russians — a role which is congruent with a traditional value of the Russian people.

Techniques

In the systematic development of propaganda techniques the Soviet Communists have been pioneers and have provided a model for other totalitarian systems. Most of the techniques enumerated below are widely applied today outside the USSR, even in fields as far removed from political propaganda as commercial advertising. But in the Soviet Union these techniques are reinforced by the consistency of goals and the enormous degree of control described above.

Exclusion has two aspects in Soviet propaganda. Because of the regime's complete control over the mass media of communication as well as over practically all aspects of life in the USSR, it has been able to monopolize the channels of information and to regulate the flow of information from unofficial and non-Communist sources. In its own propaganda it is able to exclude all reporting of information which by its definition is unimportant, contradictory, or harmful to

state or party.

Selection entails not merely withholding of news but also a purposeful choice of subjects and various aspects of those subjects in order to create an effect. In the Soviet scheme an event is news not simply because it occurred but only if it can be used to teach, to put across a specific or general point. A happening that has intrinsic significance may be ignored or a minor incident may be magnified to fit the purposes of current policy. Currency of the news itself is of relatively little importance; delays in the presenta-

tion of events are frequent.

When events thought to be adverse to the regime cannot be ignored, they often are de-emphasized or only partially presented so that they place the Soviet position in a favorable light. Widespread foreign support of Soviet positions is generally implied through using quotations from the foreign Communist or leftist press as if they were representative of the general press reaction. Debates in the United Nations are usually reported in this fashion. As a rule, distortion of fact by purposeful omission, selection, overemphasis, and underemphasis are constants in Soviet public information.

Nuances rarely appear in Communist propaganda; the possi-

bility that there may be more than two sides to any question — that there are extenuating circumstances, multiplicity of causes and effects, or a variety of conditioning factors — is not admitted. Anything that interferes with or opposes progress toward the goals of Communism is, by definition, wrong. Failures of the system to attain its stated goals are not failures of the system but faults of individuals and groups who have not performed their duties properly. Though the official definition of the "right" may vary in time, all information is measured, and praise or castigation bestowed, according to the current line.

With its control over the content and media of communication, the regime is able to concentrate its propaganda campaigns upon a limited number of objectives at any given time and to coordinate the selection and interpretation of events throughout the whole USSR. The simultaneous crescendo and decrescendo in all the mass media of criticism of social conditions (hooliganism for example), of campaigns for increased productivity, or of concerted attacks on various countries of the Western world is a constant phenomenon of Soviet mass communications. Identical terms, slogans, and tone occur in all.

Soviet propaganda relies heavily upon the use of stereotypes to bring to its people in capsule form a composite of facts and emotionally colored ideals. Thus "Stakhanovite" and later "innovator" came to represent the workman who was outstanding in his contribution to industrial productivity, while "capitalism," "reactionary forces," and "fascist" epitomize the forces that are said to be dedicated to the overthrow of Communist society.

The authority in all Soviet propaganda is, of course, the Communist party; it and its organization and leaders are constantly cited to give absolute authoritativeness to propaganda. References to Lenin or quotation from his writings and speeches carry the sanction of unquestioned dogma. Pronouncements by the political, scientific, and artistic elite are constantly used. In the context of a society in which argument, controversy, and division of opinion are settled by pronouncements from the leadership, appeal to authority is a particularly useful technique.

Repetition is one of the most important methods used by Soviet information agencies. Many of the major premises, slogans, stereotypes, and clichés have been repeated week in and week out for many years, and even when a new one has come into use the connotations of similar old ones have been transferred to it. Sometimes the old will be given a new focus, as was the case when "fascist"

came to refer to the "ruling circles" of the United States rather than to the government of Nazi Germany. A great deal of the monotony and general lack of variety in the Soviet press and in oratory stems from the constant reiteration of the same words, phrases, and ideas.

Much of the Soviet propaganda is cast in an argumentative form. A formal appearance of logic is maintained in which deductions from a principle supported by evidence lead to a conclusion. The burden of the argument, however, bears little if any relation to objective marshaling of fact. The proposition always stems from ideology or current policy, the "evidence" is selected by the use of the various propaganda techniques, and the conclusion is one

suited to the purposes of the propaganda campaign.

Actually, relatively little importance is placed upon the rationality of the appeal. The emotional impact is far more important. Contending forces are almost invariably presented in extremes which give a melodramatic flavor to the propaganda output. Apparently no extravagance of language is too great to extol the virtues of the system and its heroes or to derogate the faults, failures, and machinations of the "enemies of socialism." Characteristically, domestic propaganda opens with a positive, glowing statement of progress and accomplishment, followed by a dark grim depiction of the forces opposing and impeding that progress, and ends with an exhortation to greater effort and vigilance by which the forces of evil can be defeated.

Satire, ridicule, and mockery are widely used in Soviet propaganda, not only in political cartooning but in all oral and written forms. By far the harshest and most biting satire is used in depicting the activities of foreign countries, particularly the United States. Domestic satire is, however, more circumscribed both in tone and in direction. Sharp ridicule and mockery is permissible and is encouraged, but the extremes found in treatments of foreign subjects are lacking. The butt of domestic satire is usually the bureaucracy, or individuals and groups who are considered to be impeding accomplishment of the goals of socialism. The party, the government, and the ideology are never criticized as such. Constant didacticism and almost complete lack of compassion and sympathy for its targets are characteristics that distinguish Soviet satire from satire in the non-Communist world. A lesson is always taught, and the foibles of men are not considered deserving of sympathy.

Stripped of its ideological trimmings, Soviet propaganda is one of the tools by which the Communist party seeks to maintain and

extend its power and to weaken, reduce, or eliminate the power of real or imagined opposing forces at home and abroad. By means of its tight control of all mass media of communication and nearly all other agencies of opinion formation, it is in a position to give the citizenry only that information judged to be useful for party purposes. By assuming and assiduously maintaining a position of infallibility as a group and providing scapegoats for failures and mistakes that must be admitted, the party attempts to manipulate the formation of attitudes and opinions to produce support for itself and hate for those it defines as its enemies. By reducing information to a simple form easily comprehensible to the most uneducated, by reliance upon appeals to the emotions rather than to reason, and by constant repetition, it seeks to drive home its message.

The Russian people have traditionally looked to an authority for direction and have been accustomed to avoidance of or release from individual responsibility through the placement of responsibility upon the group. The great advantage of the simplistic and repetitive approaches is that they supply easily understood and familiar explanations, requiring little effort for the recipient to absorb, and provide a certain quality of assurance because of their familiarity. Apathy and boredom are the most often reported effects, but as reactions they may indicate acceptance rather than rejection and may even create an imperviousness to any conflicting propa-

ganda.

Perhaps the greatest potential threats to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda are (1) personal experience and contact with peoples and conditions in non-Soviet countries and (2) education of the people themselves. Nevertheless, there is little indication that, in general, the propaganda machine and its output are not successful in supporting the immediate aims of the party. It may not generate the unbounded enthusiasm and active participation it seeks and claims, but acquiescence has been largely accomplished and many of the attitudes and values it has preached have been accepted.

Communications Media

The mass media of communications are assigned a central role in the campaign to mold public opinion. All of the usual mass media — press, radio, motion pictures, and television — are used. In addition, three techniques of mass participation that have both information and control functions, have been highly developed — oral (face-to-face) agitation, samokritika (self-criticism), and the use

of *rabsel'kor* (worker and peasant correspondents). There also is constant pressure upon drama, fiction, and every other form of literary and artistic activity to promote the cause of Communism.

Specifically designed and controlled to further the goals of the party, the whole content of mass communication may be considered propaganda or special pleading. That it informs the public of certain conditions, requirements, and happenings is, of course, true; but any attempt to distinguish between propaganda and information, difficult in any context, is impossible and largely without value in considering public information in the USSR. All communication — fact or fiction, biased or unbiased — is designed to further the develop-

ment of the socialist society as defined by the party.

All media promulgate "propaganda" for the leadership groups and "agitation" for the masses. Though all of them are directed toward the unchanging goal of producing well-disciplined and enthusiastic support of the regime, the immediate goals, interpretations, and emphases vary. Thus, operating agencies must keep in close touch with party representatives, watch carefully the many rules, regulations, and directives issued, and particularly at the higher levels develop nonofficial lines of communication and an ability to read between the lines so as to anticipate changes that may take place without prior notice.

Samokritika (self-criticism), oral agitation, and the rabsel'kor (worker and peasant correspondents) have no exact counterparts in non-Communist countries. All three serve to pass along to the people the official information and views of the regime; they also serve to involve larger numbers of individuals in active participation in the daily affairs of their society and keep the leadership in

touch with public opinion and morale.

Samokritika is a fairly general term, referring to both confession of error and criticism of others. In the latter sense it is found in the press, on the radio, and extensively in various local meetings of all organizations. It is most institutionalized, however, in the press in the form of letters to the editors. Though the amount of space devoted to it varies with the paper, nearly all print some and receive more. Any citizen is free to write a letter to the editor, but his criticism must aim at strengthening the performance of official policies. He can never openly question these policies; for example, samokritika on the subject of labor discipline is acceptable only if it points out failures in that discipline and supports the official position. Letters to the editor are very concrete and specific, pointing out such shortcomings as the inadequacy or absence of public baths,

the failure of the management of an apartment building to make necessary repairs, or failure of officials to perform their duties. In spite of the limitations on content, thousands of Soviet citizens write letters to the editor.

Only a small proportion of the letters received can be printed, but a newspaper has the responsibility of acknowledging, cataloguing, and sending them on to the authority that has jurisdiction over the area of complaint; it also must check periodically to see that situations leading to legitimate complaints are corrected. Reprisals for such complaints are not unknown – they are occasionally mentioned in the *samokritika* itself – but, in general, they are not so

widespread as to be a deterrent to writing.

The Communist regime always has placed heavy emphasis upon daily personal contact between the people and party representatives as a means of shaping opinions and attitudes and of mobilizing support for party goals. Following the principle that agitation is a simple and continuous hammering home of the immediate goals of the socialist society to the masses, the oral agitators today concentrate largely upon reading newspapers aloud, explaining production norms and other directives that affect the daily operations of the local plant or collective farm, and gaining the support of the workers for fulfillment of norms, enforcement of labor discipline, etc. They also form the most direct link between the party and the people and are required to report back to the party on the state of popular morale.

Mass agitation is the only means of opinion formation (except the party press) which is operated as well as controlled by the party. The Mass Agitation Sector of Agitprop is responsible for all political education of the masses and has direct charge over all mass agitation activities. It calls general meetings of agitators and issues directives, instructions, and handbooks. Actual selection of agitators and organization of their activities, however, is the responsibility of the primary party organization in plants, on farms, etc. Candidates for selection are local workers — often "innovators" — and other leaders, Komsomol members, and intelligentsia who are loyal to the party, though sometimes not members, and who have had previous training in agitation. Komsomol members especially, always expected to engage in various other activities in addition to their regular duties, view agitation as an extremely acceptable type of special work.

The agitators are usually organized into an agit-kollectiv, of which there may be several in large plants and collective farms,

that meets every ten days or so under the local party leadership to plan activities. Through their personal contacts, either individually or in small groups, agitators play a vital role in the all-pervasive

propaganda efforts of the Communist party.

So that public information, printed and broadcast, will have close contact with actual day-to-day living and working conditions, a large staff of part-time worker and peasant correspondents is encouraged by the regime. About half of the contents of any newspaper is expected to come from nonprofessional journalists. Though supposedly any citizen may contribute articles to the papers, the rabsel'kor are selected from trained and active supporters of the system and are thoroughly organized. Over-all supervision of their activities and training rests in the hands of Agitprop, which issues a magazine and handbooks for their benefit and calls periodic conferences. Each editor, or local party organization, however, is responsible for recruiting and maintaining his own staff and providing them with such facilities as reference materials and space in which to work. The responsibilities of these part-time reporters include helping the party organize the people in support of official policies, but their main duty is to report inadequacies in the work of any and all organizations, from the largest enterprises to the smallest shop brigades, and to inform on deviations from the party line.

Although the Soviet regime has gone to unusual extremes in consolidating its monopoly of the media of communications, it has been unable either to eliminate or to rigidly control word-of-mouth communication of ideas and information. Foreign observers, former Soviet citizens, the Soviet press, and other sources all attest to the prevalence of rumor and the importance placed by the citizen upon information obtained through unofficial channels. The government, although officially disapproving this informal communications network, reportedly plants its own rumors, thus tacitly recognizing the network's effectiveness. By means of its secret informers, the regime can also use this medium as a source of information on the

state of public opinion.

It appears that reliance upon word-of-mouth communication is prevalent among all people regardless of their attitudes toward the regime, but that such communication serves different functions for

different economic classes.

Among the intelligentsia, rumor and discussion seem to be used as supplements and correctives to the regular news sources. The members of this group, largely urban, have easy access to the formal media but are also in a position to see clearly the disparity

between reality and claims, to recognize the strictures of the dialectic, and to spot the distortions in the official media. If their position limits their abilities to gather information themselves, they generally will know someone with access to such sources of information as the foreign press or unpublished production figures. It is also to their advantage to keep abreast of many aspects of official policy in order to anticipate changes that would affect them and their work. They use the unofficial network, then, to evaluate and

put in perspective the official information they receive.

At the opposite end of the economic scale, the peasant seems to get most of his information through informal channels. Because of the inadequacies in coverage of the rural areas by formal media and the low educational level of the audience, rumor and discussion become not merely supplements of official information but substitutes for it. The peasant has little need to be well informed on national and international events or political theory in order to do his work, nor, after his long hours in the collective fields and in his own garden, does he have much time or energy to devote to reading. This general situation, quite usual in agricultural societies, is aggravated by the fact that the Russian peasant has few reasons to be grateful to the Communist regime. He exhibits indifference to the content of official communications and seeks to avoid exposure to oral agitation. As a group, the peasants appear to concentrate upon their own problems and are only vaguely concerned or informed about what is happening around them, except as it immediately affects them.

Word-of-mouth communication is the newspaper of the rural areas. Transmission is accomplished chiefly through friends visiting in private homes, fellow workers, and travelers such as recruiters of industrial labor, workers from the cities on visits in the country, and truck drivers who regularly traverse the roads. In Russian rural areas there has never been an institution comparable to the teahouse of the Orient and Near East to serve as the focal point for informal communications. In Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus, however, teahouses are a central gathering point for the men, and the regime has attempted to adapt this long-established tradition by creating a network of "Red Teahouses" to bring to these peoples entertainment, songs, and agitational or propagandistic information.

Among the elite, the information passed along informally is generally reliable; these individuals have access to press and radio, both foreign and domestic, and to official but unpublished sources. Such sources are unavailable to the rural population, and rumors

based on accounts at second and third hand of what an agitator has said at a meeting or what a collective farmer has brought back from the market often are so distorted that resemblance to the original is minimal.

The average urban worker also depends heavily on informal communications for information. What he receives is likely to be more reliable than what the peasant gets, but not so inclusive or

detailed as that available to the elite intelligentsia.

For all groups, word-of-mouth channels are not only important but often amazingly rapid. This was true even under Stalin. For example, within an hour after the Voice of America went on the air with the story of the escape of Mrs. Kosenkina from the Soviet Consulate in New York in 1948, the affair was being discussed on the streets of Moscow.

To a considerable degree, popular attitudes toward the content of formal communication also vary among social and occupational groups. This does not necessarily imply a corresponding differential in the effectiveness of the propaganda carried by the communications channels. The political, professional, and artistic leadership groups probably are the most receptive since the information they receive is more varied in content as well as source. Though they may not believe all they read and hear from official sources, they are in a position to evaluate, discard, and fill in gaps from sources not available to the other groups.

At the opposite extreme, the peasants and manual workers have the least access to information, official or informal, and are least involved in the goals of the regime. The official information they receive is largely agitational, both oral and written. Consisting of very simple ideas and instructions presented over and over again in mass meetings of workers, from public loudspeakers, and through the press and other media, the information becomes exceedingly boring and tends to produce disbelief, particularly if certain items can be compared with known conditions and found false. Information from informal channels then assumes greater value and achieves a certain credence regardless of its truth or falsity.

The most widespread reaction to information from the formal channels of communication appears to be apathy. The first page of newspapers, largely inspirational, is generally ignored, while foreign news on the back page gets attention. Such classic Russian authors as Pushkin and Tolstoy are read on trains and other public transpor-

tation more often than books on Marxist theory.

Strict official control over information has produced another

widespread reaction: the development among all classes of people of a high sensitivity to what is not said, and of the ability to read between the lines. To leadership groups this ability is an absolute necessity, for often their job or even their existence is dependent upon anticipation of shifts in policy and the locus of power. Such seemingly insignificant matters as the order in which the names of leaders are listed in reports of attendance at theaters and social gatherings or the unexplained absence of one name lead to speculation concerning a shake-up of the leadership.

The regime itself seems to be concerned about the actual effectiveness of much propaganda and agitation and there has been considerable official pressure in the form of editorials, articles, and directives to get writers, radio commentators, and agitators to make their presentations more lively and interesting. A 7,000-word party injunction in January 1960 claimed that too much propaganda "stops at general appeals and slogans," that party members and intellectuals seemed receptive but some groups remain "altogether outside everyday ideological and political influence," and that there is a deplorable tendency among party and government officials to "adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the remnants of the past in the consciousness of the Soviet people" once the production target or other immediate objective has been reached. There was no intimation, however, that the volume of propaganda and agitation is to be reduced.

There appears to be considerable resentment at the amount of time which "inspirational" meetings, lectures, and similar gatherings take from work and leisure. Lunch time is interrupted by agitators, evening hours at home with families are cut short by required attendance at meetings of organizations, "correct" interpretations are

appended to the showing of a film or to a radio program.

But despite their negative reactions and their reliance on informal channels of information and techniques of reading between the lines, most Soviet citizens must depend upon official sources for most of their information. The reaction of the people toward information seems to be roughly comparable to that of Americans toward advertising - much of what is read and heard is disbelieved and ignored, yet a considerable portion sticks and is consciously or unconsciously absorbed.

FOREIGN POLICIES

LIKE THAT OF ANY STATE, the foreign policy of the USSR is shaped both by the international balance of power at any given moment and by the Soviet leadership's view of the world and of the national interest. Soviet foreign policy, like that of all governments, has to respond to unexpected problems, threats, and possibilities thrown up by the course of events outside the USSR. The regime faces the constant necessity of estimating the strength of rival forces. In adapting itself to the changing pattern of power imposed by international political relationships, the USSR has had to rely to a considerable extent upon the techniques of traditional balance-of-power diplomacy.

Conventional power politics alone, however, cannot explain Soviet policy. While the Soviet leaders, in order to survive, must take into account the existing pattern of world politics, they react to specific situations within the framework of their cultural and ideological background. This affects their image and estimate of world political factors and their behavior in international relation-

ships.

As Russians, the Soviet leaders feel responsible for the destiny of Russia as a state. To some extent they are undoubtedly influenced by the same geopolitical facts that helped form tsarist imperial ambitions in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Their approach to foreign relations is also to some degree colored by certain traditional Russian traits: intolerance, suspicion, and a lack of understanding of Western values and ideas; a deviousness and distrust in diplomatic practice (unmodified by any traditions of compromise); an apparent inability to grasp anything in the way of an equal and permanently peaceful relationship between states; a tendency to view every peace treaty as though it were a provisional armistice; a habit of ascribing to Russia a messianic role in history.

As Communists and patrons of Communist movements throughout the world, the Soviet leaders feel responsible for the world revolutionary cause. They see the world divided into two forces: the camp of "capitalism and imperialism," and the camp of "socialism and peace." In their view the antagonism between these two camps is fundamental and irreconcilable. At certain times there may be armistices and talk of coexistence (necessitated today by the existence of mutual nuclear deterrents); there can, however, be no *lasting* community of aims between the capitalist powers and the USSR — in the end, one or the other must prevail. The Soviet leadership's commitment to this doctrine has an important bearing upon the USSR's actions as a member of international society, and contributes much to the basic unfriendliness, suspiciousness, and duplicity evident in its conduct of foreign relations.

By subordinating the interests of Communist movements abroad to the requirements of national power, the Soviet regime has reconciled its ambition to spread Communism throughout the world with its feeling of responsibility to the Russian state. In the Soviet view the future success of the world revolution is dependent on the security and national strength of the "bastion of socialism," the USSR. Accordingly, foreign Communist parties are to be controlled

by Moscow and used to further the interests of the USSR.

The USSR undoubtedly feels that its security interests are threatened today. The Soviet conception of security is distinctive, however, in that nothing has been able to reassure the regime. The degree of security sought by Soviet leaders implies in the final analysis the undermining of all other states. This also accounts for much of the revolutionary quality of Soviet policy, which has never

been content with perpetuating the status quo.

In pursuing its foreign policy goals the Soviet regime combines the conventional use of power politics with unconventional techniques for the extension of its own political influence or control in the rest of the world. When the survival of Soviet power is involved, the regime has relied on traditional balance-of-power diplomacy in a manner similar to that of other national states. At the same time it has developed and applied a battery of psychopolitical methods, based on lessons learned in staging and consolidating its own internal revolution, for the subversion, assimilation, or control of foreign states. These range all the way from the support and direction of subversive groups and parties, diplomatic feints and maneuvers, economic penetration, to aggression by proxy and direct military action. Controlled conflict is central to Soviet operational doctrine and

brackets all possible relationships between states and groups - po-

litical, economic, cultural, military.

Many of these techniques are not new in themselves. What is new, however, is their integrated use by the Soviet regime (as also by Nazi Germany) as part of a policy of indirect, political warfare designed to gain influence and control over other states through use of essentially sociological and psychological rather than strictly military means. Violent and nonviolent activities are invariably linked with one another.

A display of Soviet armed might — or controlled violence and terror by local Communists — may be an integral part of the process. Such use of force often involves the calculated risk of igniting a major war, but is employed primarily for its psychological effect. War in general is viewed by the Soviet not only in terms of ordinary power politics, to be used when diplomacy fails, but also as a political tool for the creation of chaotic economic and social conditions favorable for "controlled" revolutions abroad and for the consequent expansion of Soviet power. The Soviet regime is ready to welcome or provoke a war between rivals, or a war in which the USSR is only indirectly involved by its support of local Communist or anti-Western movements, if it feels such a war would not threaten to disrupt the Soviet power system itself.

processes in which propaganda and localized violence play decisive roles. First, an effort is made to secure the internal collapse of the victimized state by exploiting all possible divisive forces within it. Political, class, ethnic, religious, racial, and other groups and factions are pitted against each other. Where possible, social and economic groups such as cultural associations or labor unions are diverted from their usual social or economic concerns and made to serve purely political ends. This is followed by an attempt to subvert the loyalties of important social and political groups in the country and to transfer these loyalties to symbols of Communism and to the institutions of the Soviet Union. Covert control of the victimized state is sought by exploiting the sympathies of fellow travelers at executive and

Soviet political warfare usually entails a series of interrelated

The Soviet regime applied these techniques in its conquest of central and eastern Europe following World War II, and is using them now in the Middle East and Asia. In advancing its interests,

policymaking levels of the government. Communist-inspired riots, strikes, and assassinations may at the same time serve as a prelude to the actual physical seizure of power by local Communist forces or the assimilation of the country into the Soviet power complex.

the regime has always been ready to improvise in the face of rapidly and unexpectedly developing situations. The collapse of the Axis in Europe and Asia afforded opportunities which the USSR was quick to exploit.

The major effort of Soviet diplomacy at present is to persuade the West that the catastrophic horrors of a nuclear war permit no alternatives between total peace and total war. At the same time the USSR itself is placing reliance on a campaign of economic, political, and psychological attrition to avoid a showdown with Western strength, to wear down the West's will to resist, and to keep uncommitted nations uncommitted or draw them into the Communist orbit. Techniques of political warfare and diverse forms of graduated violence are coordinated in a strategy of limited operations over a protracted period of time. This strategy, in which battlegrounds, weapons systems, and operational tactics are constantly shifting, appears anchored in the psychological acceptance of the risk of total conflict.

The Pattern of Policy since 1917

Upon seizing power in 1917, Russia's Communist rulers felt that the new Soviet regime, surrounded by hostile "capitalist" powers, could survive only through the spread of the proletarian revolution throughout the world. As hopes for a spontaneous world revolution faded, the rulers began to regard the Soviet state as the center of the revolutionary struggle and sought, by means of propaganda and the services of people sympathetic to the Communist cause, to strike a bond between their revolution and the tensions and discontents that had accumulated in the rest of the world.

During its first decade of power the new regime engaged a large part of its energies and talents in an effort to bring about the proletarian revolution in other countries, but failed, partly because of its own physical helplessness at the time. The regime survived as a state by coming to terms with the capitalist world and by utilizing with considerable skill the techniques of traditional balance-of-power diplomacy. The Soviet leaders quickly learned not to depend entirely on a "class struggle" abroad for their salvation and rapidly became aware that the capitalist world did not represent a solid hostile front, that there were splits in the enemy camp and techniques for taking advantage of them.

While relying considerably on conventional power politics for securing immediate goals, the regime modified but did not abandon its basic ideological preconceptions. It never lost a deep distrust of all capitalist governments. Although the Soviet leaders sought to satisfy the short-run requirements of internal power by establishing normal relations and alliances with various capitalist states, depending on the power balance of the moment, they continued to manifest an obsession with the threat of capitalist "encirclement," and to indicate that in their view ultimate and complete security could be gained only after the victory of the "revolution" in the rest of the world. During most of the 1930's, however, the goal of world revolution was postponed in the interests of immediate security. In the meantime, Soviet Russia's physical power regained its prerevolutionary potential and began to grow.

Division in the West during the late 1930's brought the Soviet regime a historic opportunity. Seizing the chance to turn Nazi aggressiveness toward the West, the Soviet regime signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, expecting a long-drawn-out war between the Western "capitalist" states, which would create conditions favorable for an expansion of Communist power. Throughout World War II, in which the Soviet Union itself became a victim of Nazi aggression, the regime never lost sight of this aim.

The USSR emerged from the war as one of the focal points of world power. The period of postwar dislocation witnessed an extension of Soviet military might or political influence over much of Europe, as well as in China, Southeast Asia, and the Near and Middle East. The gains made by the USSR in Europe have been primarily military. Despite certain ideological inroads in European politics, the Soviet threat in Europe today appears to be basically a physical one. In the Far and Middle East, however, the Soviet example has considerable appeal for those who are attempting to free themselves from the heritage of Western tutelage and control. In these areas of the world, where the struggle is more for the minds of men, the Soviet Union attempts to identify itself with social changes of a long-term nature and make them serve its own power interests. The expansion of Soviet power and influence has been, and continues to be, limited primarily by the strength and unity of the West's will to resist and to organize.

Revolution and World Politics

Guided by simple considerations of self-preservation, the Soviet regime followed several, often contradictory, policies in foreign affairs during its formative years in power. Many of its actions, bearing the imprint of deep distrust of the outside world, were improvised in the face of changing situations, threats, and opportunities. The regime attempted simultaneously to promote immediate revolutionary upheavals abroad, to undermine the Western states indirectly by supporting various anticolonial movements throughout the world, to establish normal diplomatic relations with the capitalist world, and to split the capitalist front by means of both propaganda

and traditional diplomacy.

Almost immediately after seizing power, the Soviet government issued appeals, designed to rouse the masses of all nations, calling for an immediate end of World War I. In December 1917 it secured an armistice with Germany — which was anxious to see Russia out of the war — and attempted to prolong peace negotiations as much as possible in the hope that the revolutionary situation abroad would ripen. The Soviet delegates, led by Leon Trotsky, proclaimed that only a victorious proletarian revolution in all countries could guarantee genuine peace. Appeals to throw out the Kaiser and declare a revolutionary peace flooded the German trenches. These efforts failed to produce a revolution in Europe. To stop the advance of German troops, the Soviet regime signed a humiliating peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.

Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk many Soviet leaders continued to feel that the processes which brought about the revolution in Russia would repeat themselves in Germany with a minimum of Russian assistance. The Soviet Embassy in Berlin purchased arms for German revolutionists and established a 10 million ruble fund for the support of revolutionary activity. These activities were accompanied by an attempt in 1920 to transform a brief war with the new Polish government into a revolutionary crusade and an effort in 1921 to organize a Soviet republic in the province of Ghilan in northern Iran. None of these early ventures met with success.

The Russian Communists attributed the failures of revolutionary activity abroad to inadequate and undisciplined leadership on the part of local Communists. The Communist International (Comintern) had been founded in March 1919. During the first years of its existence, however, the Comintern, in the words of one of its leaders, was little more than a "propaganda society." By 1920 the Soviet regime decided to refashion it into something more concrete.

By creating a strictly disciplined conspiratorial elite, Lenin argued, the Russian Communist party was able to overthrow the tsarist autocracy. The same principle of tight organization should promise success in the international field. In 1920 the Second Con-

gress of the Communist International adopted Lenin's "Twenty-One Conditions" for admission into that body. These conditions established, at least on paper, a centralized organization very similar in structure to the Russian Communist party, and were designed to exclude from the movement mere waverers and sympathizers. Although the Comintern remained a rather loose agglomeration for

some time, tight centralization was achieved by 1935.

Throughout its history the Comintern was torn by factional disputes, wholesale expulsions, and purges. Many of these disputes reflected the dissensions and struggles within the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Often, however, they also arose from a conflict between the interests of local Communist parties — whose prime goals were survival and increase of power in their own countries — and Moscow's appraisal of the local situation and interpretation of larger world political factors. Survival in the Comintern often depended on personal contacts and accurate information on the opinions of the Russian leaders. As a result, many — if not most — of the leaders of Communist parties outside the USSR today are more apt to be skilled bureaucratic intriguers than fiery revolutionaries.

During the 1920's the Soviet regime made two further major attempts, in Germany and China, to maximize its power and security by revolutionary means. The French occupation of the Ruhr set off a series of disturbances with revolutionary turmoil, and in contrast to the 1918–20 period, the Soviet could now count on the German Communist party to follow its orders. A bloody Communist uprising

occurred in Hamburg, but was quickly crushed.

In China the Soviet at first supported a Communist coalition with the Kuomintang, directed against Western "imperialism." This coalition disintegrated in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek executed a successful coup and resisted Communist interference in Chinese affairs. At this, certain Soviet leaders, particularly Trotsky, demanded an outright revolutionary policy in China. Stalin attempted at first to maintain the coalition, but gradually moved toward an open break. A Communist uprising in Canton in December 1927 was put down by Chiang's troops, ending another abortive revolution. For nearly twenty years the Chinese Communists were to live in the outer reaches of China, before returning as a major factor in international politics.

While these early revolutionary policies met with failure, the Soviet regime's efforts to adjust itself to the existing pattern of world politics by more conventional methods led to more positive results. By 1922 the Soviet government succeeded in gaining official recogni-

tion from Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Turkey, and Afghanistan. It was still politically isolated, however, in its relations with

the major European powers and with the United States.

In 1922 the Soviet government was invited to attend a conference at Genoa — the other participants including England, France, Germany, and Italy — for the purpose of discussing the restoration of European economy. The Soviet delegation took part in the conference in a conciliatory spirit. It spoke about the "peaceful coexistence of two social systems during a given historical period," stating that, while the Soviet regime remained true to the principles of Communism, it recognized the current need for economic cooperation between the "new" and "old" systems of the world. The Soviet delegates then proceeded to split their opponents by playing on their mutual suspicions and conflicting interests. Capitalizing on German resentment of the Treaty of Versailles and fears of isolation, the Soviet government signed a treaty with Germany at Rapallo by which both countries agreed to political and economic cooperation (April 1922).

The Rapallo pact detached Germany from a position of dependence on England and France and relieved Soviet isolation in Europe. Thereafter the Western powers, seeking to prevent the exclusive cooperation of Russia and Germany, entered into more serious negotiations with the Soviet government. Italy, where the local Communist party was being suppressed by the Mussolini dictatorship, was one of the first major powers to grant recognition, and gained thereby a favorable trade treaty (1924). In the same year England, France, and a number of smaller countries followed this example. (The United States extended official recognition to the

Soviet government in 1933).

The Soviet search for recognition, allies, and a strengthened power position conflicted at many points with ideological aspirations and with the policies and hopes that emanated from the Communist International. Delegates to the Comintern had to be reassured that it was a tactical situation of the moment which demanded agreements with capitalist states. The acceptance of loans and the formation of alliances with bourgeois states were defended by the argument that the national interests of the Soviet state coincided with the ultimate interests of the world revolution.

Response to a Changing Balance of Forces

During the 1930's the regime, pursuing in earnest the slogan of "socialism in one country," devoted a large part of its energies to

transforming the Soviet Union's internal social order. The major foreign policy moves continued to be influenced by obvious national interests and followed a course dictated largely by the prevailing structure of international relationships. But the habit of analyzing and interpreting world problems according to Marxist patterns of thought also continued to color events as the Soviet leaders saw them and to affect the way in which they reacted to the changing interna-

tional balance of power.

In part because of ideological preconceptions, the Soviet Union was slow to respond to the threat implicit in Japanese and German expansionism. With the outbreak of war in Manchuria in 1931, the Soviet government hesitated to ally itself with Japan's opponents, chiefly because it continued to suspect the intentions of the Western powers. The regime remained antagonistic toward the League of Nations until 1934, denouncing it as an "international organization of the capitalists for the systematic exploitation of all the working peoples of the earth," and expressed fear that the League's efforts to settle the conflict in Manchuria would embroil the Soviet Union in war with Japan.

Similarly, ideological factors prevented the regime from understanding the true play of political forces in Germany. While the Communists were opposed to Nazism on principle, the German Communist party was instructed by Moscow to devote the greater part of its energies to attacks upon German Social Democrats and other representatives of gradualist socialism, who were seen as the real

enemies of the revolution. The German Communists declared:

A Social Democratic coalition government, standing over a split and bewildered proletariat, would be a thousand times worse evil than an open fascist dictatorship that stood over a class-conscious proletariat, unified and decided upon battle.

In the Reichstag, Communists allied themselves with the Nazis, apparently convinced that a Nazi triumph would be a prelude to the revolution. These tactics, directed by the Soviet leaders, materially contributed to Hitler's success in 1933.

After the Nazi coup, which was followed by an effective suppression of Communists in Germany, the USSR did not immediately align itself against Hitler but attempted to continue the policy of friendly relations that had been followed since Rapallo. In evaluating its national interests the Soviet state continued to see Germany as a useful counterweight against England and France. Soviet leaders seemed to hope that the Nazis would remain on good terms with

the USSR and limit their anti-Communist policies to domestic matters. The regime was ready to sacrifice the interests of a local Communist party if this would serve to strengthen the Soviet Union's position in world politics. In early 1934, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Stalin declared:

Of course we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the USSR from establishing the best relations with that country.

As the danger of German and Japanese expansion increased, the Soviet gradually changed its policies and began to seek out other allies. In September 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations, evidently in the belief that it could now serve Soviet purposes, and remained among the strongest supporters of the League, the principle of collective security, and universal disarmament up to 1938. At the same time the regime continued to hope for an agreement with Nazi Germany. In January 1935, Molotov repeated the theme that the USSR sought good relations with all countries, "not excluding countries with a fascist regime."

In the summer of 1935 the seventh and last World Congress of the Comintern announced a complete change in Communist tactics

by declaring:

In the face of the towering menace of fascism . . . it is imperative that unity of action be established between all sections of the working class, irrespective of what organizations they belong to, even before the majority of the working class unites on a common fighting platform for the overthrow of capitalism and the victory of the proletarian revolution.

From this point on — until 1939 — antifascism became the dominant theme of Comintern and Soviet propaganda. The "united front" was extended into the "popular front" as Communists were instructed to welcome as allies all, no matter how conservative, who would stand together against fascism. In the West many young intellectuals, usually knowing little about the Soviet Union, accepted the Communists as brothers-in-arms against the Hitler menace. In the Far East the Chinese Communists gradually abandoned their hostility to Chiang Kai-shek, and agreement between the two groups was reached in 1937.

The various united- and popular-front coalitions, however, were highly unstable. Mutual suspicion between Communist and Socialist leaders persisted. It became clear on many occasions that the Communists owed their allegiance primarily to the USSR. Wherever possible they attempted to capture the leadership of intellectual gatherings, political pressure groups, and trade unions. While cooperating with others, they kept their own organization intact and refused to tolerate criticism of their policies.

Protection against Germany and Japan was also sought through regular diplomatic channels. Mutual assistance pacts were signed with France and Czechoslovakia in May 1935 (whereupon French Communists immediately dropped a propaganda campaign against lengthening the period of military service in France). Tension with England over the question of the Dardanelles was reduced at the Montreux Convention in 1936. A nonaggression pact was signed with

China in 1937.

Strong mutual suspicions, however, divided the Soviet Union and the Western allies and contributed to the collapse of efforts to form a bloc of powers against Axis expansion. Each side feared that the other would divert Hitler's anticipated attack from itself and let it turn toward the other. The Western governments, further, were disturbed by the purges within the Soviet Union during the late 1930's, distrustful of the popular-front movement, and suspicious of Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War. On the Soviet side, Western appearement of Hitler seemed to indicate that a Western alliance could not be counted upon. Continuing to express strong fears of all capitalist powers, the USSR sought to split the "imperialist front" as it had done at Rapallo in 1922.

After Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 both the Western Allies and Germany entered into more serious talks with the USSR. From March to August of that year the Soviet regime kept negotiations open with both camps, playing one off against the other in an attempt to get the highest possible bid for a minimum of Russian support. While desiring a Soviet alliance, the Western powers were unwilling to make concessions that compromised third parties and in effect opened the Baltic states, Poland, and Rumania to Soviet penetration. Germany, on the other hand, asked only for Soviet neutrality, and was prepared to concede large areas in Europe as well as Asia to Soviet influence. On August 23, 1939 the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact formalized the agreement reached by the two states.

The record of the conversations preceding the pact makes it clear that the Soviet regime understood this would unleash war. The agreement gave the Soviet an opportunity to divert war from Russia as well as to gain territorial concessions in the West. In following this course the regime was motivated in part by considerations of security and defense from a potential German attack. It occupied strategic regions along the USSR's western frontier, directed considerable attention to the retraining of the Red Army and the modernization of its tactics, and put various industries on a war footing, moving many armament plants from the exposed Belorussian and Leningrad areas to the Urals. At the same time it was also thinking in terms of expanding Soviet power without being drawn into a general European war.

Expansion of Soviet Power

Upon publication of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Communists throughout the world were once more instructed to shift their line abruptly and to attack Social Democrats and liberals as their enemies. They condemned the Allies for starting the war and campaigned against military-preparedness legislation and lend-lease aid. Anticipating a long and exhaustive struggle between the Western powers, the Soviet regime prepared to strengthen its position and to make the most of opportunities as they presented themselves, convinced that it would have everything to gain in the aftermath of war.

German and, later, Soviet troops invaded Poland in September 1939 and partitioned the country. In December, after Finland refused to grant it certain strategic bases on the Baltic shore, the USSR declared war (and was thereupon expelled from the League of Nations) and, despite severe setbacks, defeated the Finns by the spring of 1940. At the height of German military successes in France in June of that year the USSR annexed the Baltic states (transforming them into Soviet republics), and seized the Rumanian

provinces, Bessarabia and Bukovina.

Up to this point German-Soviet relations had been subject to only minor strains. In the summer of 1940, however, interests began to clash in southeastern Europe. The Soviet regime discovered that it had underestimated the dynamism of Nazi expansion. Asserting his own southeastern interests, Hitler forced Rumania to cede territory to Hungary. In the autumn of 1940 German troops entered Rumania proper. Italy's attack on Greece in October spread the war to the Balkans.

In an attempt to iron out differences in regard to the Balkans,

Molotov went to Berlin in November 1940. In vague, grandiose terms Hitler offered Molotov an enormous future Soviet sphere of influence, which would extend through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and include India. Molotov replied that Soviet participation in the Axis was "entirely acceptable in principle," but failed to reach an agreement on a number of specific issues.

After Molotov's return to Moscow the Soviet government informed Germany that it would join the Axis as an active partner on four conditions: withdrawal of German troops from Finland; a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria and establishment of military bases within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; recognition that the area south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf was the "center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union"; and renunciation by Japan of concession rights on northern Sakhalin.

Hitler countered these demands by secretly ordering immediate preparations for an all-out attack on the Soviet Union. With the Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia in 1941, Soviet apprehension increased considerably, but despite growing war rumors and repeated warnings by the Allies (who even correctly predicted the date of the German invasion) Stalin appeared determined to remain on good terms with Hitler.

In April 1941 the USSR signed a neutrality pact with Japan in Moscow; at the departure of the Japanese foreign minister, Stalin personally appeared at the railroad station and made a public affirmation of Soviet-German friendship. Though Germany increasingly lagged behind in its trade obligations, the USSR continued on the whole to fulfill its deliveries promptly. In May 1941 the Soviet government broke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium, and Norway in an effort to underline its community of interests with Germany. On June 14, Molotov assured the German ambassador that Nazi troop movements in the Balkans would have no effect, as far as the USSR was concerned, on friendly Soviet-German relations. Despite these and other efforts to appease Hitler, German armies invaded Soviet territory on the morning of June 22.

Thus the shifting balance of power once more made the Soviet Union an ally of the Western democracies. Soviet policy throughout the war was directed at both gaining the full support of the Allies and seeking an advantage against them, in anticipation of a future clash of interests. Almost from the very beginning of the war the Soviet regime directed its efforts, not only toward a military victory, but also toward assuring for itself a strengthened power posi-

tion following the conflict. It prepared itself for the postwar period by participating in international agreements as well as independent action, using every opportunity to secure definite commitments from

the Allies without itself conceding much.

In order to gain the support of a suspicious Western world, the USSR accepted the Atlantic Charter, signed the "Declaration by the United Nations" (January 1, 1942), and a twenty-year assistance pact with England (May 1942), accepted lend-lease agreements with the United States (June 1942), and dissolved the Comintern (May 1943). Revolutionary ideology, though never wholly abandoned, was carefully soft-pedaled. The USSR also participated in the food and agricultural conference at Hot Springs, Virginia (1943), the United Nations Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (1944), and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference at Washington, D. C. (1944). It attended the organization meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945.

The Soviet Union simultaneously pursued an independent policy with an eve toward the future. Stalin apparently entertained specific dreams of empire as early as September 1941, when he insisted on detailed political discussions with the Allies - in addition to military negotiations; the range of topics disclosed that Soviet interests touched on Finland, Poland, Rumania, the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Turkey, East Prussia, Bavaria, and even the Rhineland. Thus tension and friction among the Allies were present from almost the beginning. Comparatively early in the war the Soviet began denouncing the principles of the Atlantic Charter, demanding general recognition of the absorption of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, and, as the war progressed, exhibited increasing reluctance to provide United States' bombers with bases in the USSR. The USSR broke relations with the Polish government-in-exile in April 1943 and began to form the nucleus of a future Communistdominated government for that country. In Yugoslavia, Communist forces under Tito managed to eliminate opposition leaders and achieve a near monopoly of political power.

On British initiative an attempt to resolve existing conflicts in the Balkans through an agreement on spheres of influence was made in June 1944. The British suggested that Greece should be treated as part of the British zone of influence, and that Rumania and Bulgaria should belong to the Soviet zone. The USSR agreed and was given a free hand to eliminate its opponents in the Soviet zone in its own way, but the basic frictions remained. More formal discussions at Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945) also failed to

eliminate the sources of existing and future tension. At each of these conferences Stalin willingly made what seemed to be a promise that the Soviet Union would alter its policy; in practice, the USSR continued to consolidate and extend its power position in eastern Europe, having won in the meantime important diplomatic gains in the Far East. For promising to enter the war against Japan and to conclude a pact of friendship with the Nationalist government in China (which implied that the Chinese Communists would be repudiated), the USSR won the southern part of Sakhalin Island, the Kurile Islands, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base.

Soon after the end of hostilities in 1945 competition increased sharply for control over areas of the world considered to be actual or potential sources of political power. The Soviet regime appeared determined to extend its own influence, without precipitating another major war, into the power vacuum created by the Axis defeat. The USSR had made by this time enormous territorial acquisitions: Japan's southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands, Rumania's Bessarabia, Czechoslovakia's Ruthenian lands, eastern Poland, parts of Germany's East Prussia, Finland's Karelia and Arctic shore line, and the Baltic states. In addition a strong economic and military hold was established on Manchuria, northern Korea, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany, and Finland. At the same time the pressure of Soviet power and influence had increased considerably (often through the activities of local Communist parties) - in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

The increase of hostility and tension between East and West at the end of the war was accompanied in the USSR by a powerful revival of Leninist doctrines, through which the regime sought to explain the new distribution of power in the world. The first signs of an ideological resurgence had appeared in 1943, when Soviet forces assumed the offensive which promised victory. By the end of 1944 propaganda was already aimed against the United States and England and Soviet troops were being told not to be deceived by the existing alliance with capitalist states. After the end of the war the Soviet regime declared that World War II "arose as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism" and warned the people that "American monopoly capitalism now stands at the head of the imperialist and antidemocratic camp and has become the advance guard of imperialist expansion in all parts of the world." In Soviet eyes, the United Nations had become a coalition of Anglo-American power directed against the USSR. The Soviet government continued to participate in the United Nations, but with the prime purpose of using it as a lever against the *status quo* in the non-Communist world.

The vigorous restatement of Marxist-Leninist beliefs does not mean that the Soviet followed in practice a detailed, long-range plan designed for spreading Communism throughout the world. The regime was ready to probe whatever weaknesses appeared in the non-Soviet world and exploit unexpected opportunities, but apparently it did not possess a unified, clarified, and elaborated plan of action. The impact of ideology on actual behavior, however, can be discerned in the Soviet refusal to reach a genuine modus vivendi with the capitalist West (except in the form of an armed truce of undetermined duration) and in the manner in which the USSR exploited the opportunities to strengthen its own power.

In Europe the limits of Soviet expansion correspond roughly to the line reached by the Soviet armed forces at the end of the war. From the Soviet point of view, however, military occupation by itself was insufficient. Leninist patterns of thought made it difficult for the Soviet leaders to be satisfied with anything less than total political control. The exercise of power in a society composed of freely competing interest groupings was alien to their experience, and they felt compelled to stamp out systematically all actual or potential

opposition, as well as its economic and social roots.

Soviet political control over most of eastern Europe was established by stages. The tempo of sovietization in the satellites varied from country to country, but all of them went through more or less the same process. Only Yugoslavia, a model state of the new Soviet empire up to 1948, deviated from the remarkably uniform pat-

tern of development.

The first period, roughly from 1944 to 1947, was one of relative moderation. It was a time of popular fronts and coalition governments composed of several political parties following programs of fairly radical social reforms (such as the breakup of large landed estates), of a foreign policy initially friendly to both the Western Allies and the USSR, and of a purge of fascists and their collaborators. Within the coalitions local Communists sought, at first gropingly, to dominate the situation. Aided by the presence or threat of the Red Army, they managed to secure decisive positions of power — key posts in the police, army, and the interior and information ministries — and to build up a dependable administrative staff of their own. In time, their strongest enemies were removed

from office and purged. There followed a series of bogus coalitions; parties other than Communist were still represented in the governments, but only by individuals chosen or approved by the Communists. Opposition to Communist domination was rendered increasing-

ly difficult and impotent.

The pace accelerated in 1947, partly in response to Western measures to counteract growing Soviet influence. The United States proposal that a plan be worked out for re-establishing European economic prosperity (Marshall Plan) was denounced by the Soviet government, which apparently feared that the economic recovery and stabilization of Europe would lead to a decline in Communist strength and possible American domination of Europe. Before the Soviet position had been made clear, however, a number of the East European satellites had indicated a desire to participate in the Marshall Plan. This display of "independence" was politically intolerable from the Soviet point of view.

Within the satellites all opposition to Communist rule was now ruthlessly suppressed. The internal scene was marked by arrests, purges, liquidations, and spy trials. At the same time the Soviet regime took steps to tighten control over non-Soviet Communist parties. In the summer of 1947 the satellite as well as the French and Italian Communist parties were organized into the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) for the purpose of coordinating their activities. In part, this signaled the beginning of a counteroffensive in the form of a series of Communist-inspired strikes and riots throughout Western Europe against United States efforts to aid the economic recovery of Europe. Basically, the initiation of the Cominform served as notice to the rest of the world that the USSR regarded East Europe as part of a unified power system, not a group of separate states, and provided the organizational framework for integrating the satellites and increasing their dependence on the Soviet Union, Direct control was enforced in Czechoslovakia, which was still in the coalition stage, by means of a coup in February 1948.

Gradually, the tightening of Soviet controls met with opposition from various local Communist leaders, particularly Yugoslavia's Tito. Their basic loyalty to Moscow was not in question, but they began to disagree with the USSR on a number of issues. By the summer of 1948 the crisis with Tito came to a head. On the Yugoslav side there were various grievances: unfavorable trade arrangements, lukewarm Soviet support of Yugoslav demands for Trieste, Soviet opposition to Tito's desire for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian union. The fundamental conflict, however, was over the character and degree of Soviet control. Tito insisted on freedom from direct and detailed Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs. In the belief that Tito would capitulate, the Cominform expelled Tito and the Yugoslav party in June 1948. For Tito, however, the issue had become one of his life, as well as the life of his regime. He defied the Soviet attempt to intimidate his government, succeeding largely because of his own political and military strength in Yugoslavia, the favorable geographical position, and Western offers of aid.

The case of Tito was unique in that he possessed the ability to withstand Soviet pressure. A series of purges and trials followed throughout the satellites. Gomulka in Poland, Kostov in Bulgaria, Patrascanu in Rumania, Rajk in Hungary, Clementis and Slansky in Czechoslovakia, and others were found guilty of abortive or suspected resistance and removed from office, jailed, or executed.

Tito's break with the Cominform and the USSR strengthened Stalin's determination to exercise virtually complete direct management over such areas as were controlled by the USSR. Administrative patterns and bureaucratic techniques that had evolved out of Soviet experience were applied by force, regardless of popular feeling and much against the will of such authentic national Communist movements as existed in these countries. By the end of 1948 the satellite states of Eastern Europe were fully "sovietized," transformed — despite their different political, social, and economic histories — into distorted replicas of modern Soviet society.

In the meantime resistance to the growth of Soviet power gradually stiffened throughout the Western world. On the initiative of the United States and with the help of American military and economic aid, the Western nations consolidated their efforts to resist the threat of Soviet military might. Soviet efforts to subvert Iran, Turkey, and Greece through indirect aggression were vigorously opposed. An attempt to force the Western Allies out of Berlin by blockading the

city proved a failure and was abandoned in May 1949.

Soviet expansionist pressure then shifted to the Far East. The Soviet government had, by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, recognized Chiang Kai-shek, and not the Communists, as the legal ruler of China. Following the subsequent conquests and triumphs of the Chinese Communists – largely due to internal conditions in China, but aided by some Soviet assistance – the USSR abandoned its formal position of neutrality and granted the newly proclaimed Chinese People's Republic diplomatic recognition on

October 2, 1949. The Communist victory in China opened the way for a tremendous extension of Soviet influence on the Asiatic mainland.

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces (North Korea by this time having been transformed into a Soviet satellite) came as a new shock to the non-Soviet world and helped to unite and strengthen resistance against further Communist expansion. Apparently, the Soviet regime was genuinely surprised by the vigor of American and United Nations defense of South Korea.

When it became clear that the United States government desired to confine the war to Korea, the Soviet Union gradually sought ways of extricating itself from an inflexible position without losing the ground that had been gained. In 1952, at the Ninteenth Party Congress, Malenkov attempted to assure the rest of the world that the Soviet Union was not interested in further expansion by claiming that the USSR had attained all it wanted with its existing frontiers, which he termed as more just, better suited to defense, and corresponding "to the historically evolved conditions of the development

of the peoples of our country."

In the same year tentative steps were taken to modify the militant, revolutionary character of Communist movements in other parts of the world. Addressing himself specifically to Communist parties not yet in power, Stalin urged them (at the Party Congress) to broaden their base and champion the "banners" of bourgeoisdemocratic liberties and national independence, rather than press for an immediate, revolutionary class struggle. There followed intensified propaganda efforts to divide Western and world opinion on the issues of peace, disarmament, and neutralism. Although the immediate aim of the Communist "peace" movement, according to Stalin, was to avoid an immediate war, he added that "under a certain confluence of circumstances" the struggle for peace could in one place or another - develop into a "struggle for socialism."

After Stalin's death in March 1953 the tempo of relaxing international tensions gradually quickened. An armistice in Korea was finally reached in July. Soviet anti-West propaganda began to soften its tone. Exchange of visits between Soviet and non-Soviet governmental leaders was resumed on a limited scale. The USSR began showing a more cooperative attitude in the United Nations, at least as far as agreement on procedures and methods was concerned. In early 1955 a major review of foreign policy and methods apparently took place and was followed by a series of dramatic steps

to overcome the rigidity inherited from Stalin's policies. A treaty with Austria ended a ten-year period of Soviet occupation. Military bases in Finland were evacuated. The size of Soviet military forces was officially reduced by 640,000 men. At a conference in Geneva formal relations with the German Federal Republic were established and Soviet leaders exhibited a more "friendly" attitude toward the West. Negotiations with Japan (with whom the USSR had refused to establish normal relations until it denounced its mutual assistance agreements with the United States) were initiated. Relations with Tito were resumed, and Soviet territorial claims against Turkey were abandoned. In general, the USSR attempted to convey to the rest of the world a new spirit of moderation by stressing the theme of "peaceful coexistence" of East and West.

By the time of the Twentieth Party Congress (February 1956), it became clear that the Soviet regime had regained considerable flexibility in its tactics (facilitated by a dismantling of the Stalin myth), but that it had not relinquished its view of an inescapable struggle between the Soviet and the Western systems of power, continuing to guide its foreign policy between two rather fixed points: on the one hand, a refusal to seek a sincere reconciliation with the West combined with an attempt to extend Soviet influence wherever possible; on the other hand, a desire to avoid a general war.

At the Party Congress, Khrushchev outlined three "principles" of Soviet foreign policy: "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist system; rejection of the idea that war is inevitable; acceptance of the idea that the transition to "socialism" in other countries may take various forms and does not in all cases entail violence and civil war. Each of these ideas were subsequently "clarified" by other party leaders. "Coexistence" was not to be regarded as a permanent state of affairs. According to Shepilov:

The capitalist and socialist outlooks cannot be reconciled. . . . We are convinced that the final victory in the historical competition between the two systems belongs to socialism as the higher, more progressive, social system.

Lazar Kaganovich repeated the theme:

As always, we stand on our revolutionary-class positions. Socialism must inevitably replace capitalism, socialism alone will deliver the peoples from the terrors of exploitation, impoverishment, oppression, wars, crises, unemployment, etc.

As for war not being "inevitable," this was true for the "present time" because of the strength of the Soviet bloc. The capitalist world itself was incapable of making any positive contribution to the preservation of peace. "There is no doubt," Shepilov announced, "that, if it depended only on capitalism, mankind would once again be plunged into a world war." Mikhail A. Suslov went further, claiming that a true, lasting peace could be achieved only by replacing "obsolete capitalism with a new, advanced social system bringing the peoples deliverance from exploitation, from wars, and from all forms of social and national oppression."

The replacement of capitalism by an "advanced social system," according to current Soviet views, does not in all cases entail revolutionary violence. Where capitalism is still strong, bitter revolutionary struggle is to be expected. In some countries, however, a parliamentary road is possible, but only under Communist leadership. Suslov, the only man intimately associated with the ideology of the Stalin regime who remains in the inner circle, recently reaffirmed the idea that "a transition to socialism requires the establishment of political leadership of the state by the working class, headed by its vanguard." He emphasized this point by adding:

Recognition of this fundamental and decisive condition for the transition to socialism is the primary distinction of the revolutionary Marxists as opposed to the reformists.

Thus, the present revival of "popular-front" tactics differs significantly from their use during the 1930's, when their essential purpose was to help create governments friendly to the USSR. Today the "parliamentary" road is viewed as a means whereby "socialism" or full Communist power can be achieved. Soviet political techniques developed and applied in Eastern Europe following the war — enabling centralized parties to exploit the institutions of parliamentary democracy and seize power "legally" — provide a model of action for Communist parties elsewhere. However, the more important parties abroad cannot depend on direct Soviet assistance, as could those in Eastern Europe; apparently they have been given a greater measure of autonomy in working out many of their own policies.

The Cominform was dissolved in April 1956, partly as a concession to Tito, partly as a gesture to impress such neutralists as Nehru, who had been critical of the organization. Although the Cominform never became as centralized and effective an organization as the Comintern, its dissolution served to symbolize the apparent relaxation of Soviet control over local Communist parties.

who were encouraged to experiment more independently in seeking the right road to power. Under Stalin, foreign parties exhibiting too much "independence" were deeply distrusted and their leaders quickly purged. Tito's defection in 1948 was a serious warning that Communist interests abroad do not necessarily coincide with Soviet interests at home. Whether Khrushchev will be more successful in resolving this dilemma is yet to be determined.

Soviet hopes for a revival of popular-front movements seem to be highest in the so-called underdeveloped countries, where a stable parliamentary tradition is absent and where the difference between Communists, socialists, and various other reform groups is only vaguely understood. At the time of the dissolution of the Cominform, Shepilov emphasized the Soviet sympathy for the "struggling" peoples of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Near East, and Africa. The "colonial system" was disintegrating in these areas, he affirmed, and declared that "the question of complete liquidation of the shameful colonial system stands as the order of the day."

The community of aims of the Soviet bloc and the "uncommitted" countries professing neutralism is at present heavily underscored; the Soviet government is making strenuous efforts to cultivate closer political, economic, and cultural relations with India,

Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria.

In all these areas the USSR is striving to make indigenous forces serve its own power interests. Its ability to do so has been enhanced in recent years by the timely and strategic use of small amounts of economic aid. A major burden of Soviet propaganda in the less developed countries is that Communist economic ties at once drastically reduce the need for close ties with the West and bring the gifts of industrialization to all formerly colonial peoples. Skillful exploitation of the ambivalence with which many newly independent and developing nations view the West—antagonism toward institutions associated with colonial rule and admiration for Western industrial achievements—is fundamental to the Soviet approach in these areas.

Simultaneously, by indicating a willingness to "coexist" with capitalist states and exorcising the spector of "capitalist encirclement," the USSR evidently hopes to undermine Western unity and power of resistance which in the past had been held together by a harsher and more threatening Soviet posture. A reduction, at the very least, of the influence and power of the United States in the rest of the world is at present a fundamental aim of the formulators of Soviet policy. The Soviet "peace" offensive launched in 1959—

dramatized by Khrushchev's impatient call on the United States and his appeal for universal disarmament before the United Nations — did less to open a new epoch of international relations than to establish the basis for new Soviet pressures.

Instruments of Policy

The USSR relies upon a flexible combination of diplomatic, economic, military, and ideological weapons for the expression and execution of its foreign policy. These may be utilized in a conventional manner or employed in a new way for purposes of political warfare and indirect aggression. This section will limit itself to a consideration of three principle tools used by the regime in advancing its interests in the world: force, Communist parties, and the procedures of diplomacy.

Force

The use of force to defend at least basic national interests when diplomacy fails is the standard policy of any state, including the USSR. The Soviet regime at the same time relies upon the threat of force or its limited use as one of many instruments of political warfare.

Under Stalin, direct military aggression for the purpose of gaining political objectives was not ruled out. Stalin had stated in 1930:

We are in fact not against *all* wars. We are *against* imperialist war, which is counterrevolutionary war. But we are for liberating, anti-imperialist revolutionary war, regardless of the fact that this kind of war, as is well known, is not only not free from the "horrors of bloodshed," but actually teems with them.

In 1939 the head of the Red Army's political indoctrination apparatus warned that, should "the second imperialist war turn its point against the first socialist state in the world" the Red Army would "fulfill its internationalist obligations and increase the number of Soviet Republics." At the time of the Tito defection in 1948, Soviet leaders expressed regret that "the Soviet Army did not and could not render assistance to the French and Italian Communist parties."

In the early phase of World War II the USSR indulged in direct aggression, notably in the case of Finland. In the postwar period, however, the USSR extended its power without direct military aggression, preferring to use the threat of its armed forces or the militancy of indigenous Communist groups (in combination with

diplomatic, propaganda, and fifth-column tactics) to secure control or influence over non-Soviet territories. The major techniques of Soviet indirect aggression since the war—in Eastern Europe, Greece, China, Thailand, Burma, Indochina, Korea—have involved the processes of *coup d'état*, civil war, or war-by-proxy. As late as 1952, however, Stalin evidently also envisaged the possibility of provoking a more general war, affirming that the "struggle for peace" could in some places and under certain conditions become a revolutionary battle for "socialism."

Since Stalin's death, the regime, keenly aware of the dangers of a reciprocal nuclear attack, has exhibited an increasing sensitivity to the limitations and dangers inherent in the use of force as an instrument of policy. The Soviet leaders have been reluctant to risk a major war. There is also some indication that the present leadership may feel concerned about a lack of popular support of any Soviet military action abroad that is not clearly necessitated by considerations of defense. There is no reason, however, to believe that the Soviet leaders will hesitate to rely on force, at home or abroad, if they are convinced that without it their power would be seriously jeopardized, or if they feel assured that its use will not fail.

Communist Parties

The strengths and weaknesses of local Communist parties as servants of Soviet interests stem from a common source — their indigenous character. The foreign Communist is an effective Soviet agent to the extent that his national loyalties are transferred to the Communist cause and the USSR. His ideological bonds with Soviet power are, however, vulnerable. The interests of the local Communist movement may at times conflict with the aims and purposes of the Soviet regime. If any degree of independence develops in a local party, there is immediate danger of dissidence. Disillusionment with Soviet policies in some cases may lead to a complete break with the Communist movement on the part of individual party members.

The Soviet regime has as yet found no satisfactory solution for this problem of incipient Titoism. The post-Stalin admission that there are many roads to socialism, that local parties should take account of the national peculiarities of their countries and promote the Communist cause in their own way, followed by Soviet repressive measures in crushing the Hungarian rebellion, apparently produced a restiveness among many foreign Communists. Soviet leaders have since felt it necessary to denounce "bombastic words about 'national communism,'" and to insist that it is impossible "to move separately

or haphazardly" toward the great goal of Communism. The pressures generated by the conflict between Soviet and indigenous national Communist interests appear to be endemic, and to some extent limit the effectiveness of Communist organizations abroad in advancing purely Soviet interests.

Nevertheless, foreign Communist parties continue to serve, with varying degrees of efficacy, as important "fifth-column" weapons in the arsenal of Soviet political warfare. Their function from the Soviet point of view is to disrupt the political and social fabric of their own countries; their aim is to secure power in the name of their cause. In furthering these goals they depend not on numbers but on organization and will. While many parties apparently suffer a high turnover of rank-and-file membership, internal control is maintained by a disciplined party nucleus, a hard core of "professional revolutionaries" which is ready to capitalize on any signs of mass discontent but always determined to "stand above the masses."

To the disciplined Communist all groups and institutions outside the party are proper objects for subversion. According to doctrine: "Any group not controlled by the party, both at home and abroad, is an enemy. . . . That is, there are no intermediate, neutral groups. . . . That is, the only good neighbor is the absolutely controlled neighbor." The mode of warfare chosen at any one moment is dictated by expediency, and is subject to frequent change. Communists may attempt to work through national parliamentary institutions (in order eventually to destroy them); they may seek to disrupt the national economy by inciting strikes and demonstrations;

or they may attempt an armed insurrection.

There are several million party members outside the Soviet bloc in Europe today. They are, however, very unevenly distributed. In some countries the party is almost nonexistent; in others it is quite powerful. Party strength is greatest in Italy, France, and Finland. Communists have a large representation in the legislatures of these countries and control important offices in the largest trade union organizations. In Italy the party is particularly strong in the industrial areas of the country, but has also gained notable strength in the depressed agricultural regions of the south, which traditionally have been monarchist. In both Italy and France, however, many Communist voters are not genuine Communists but simply opponents of the political party in power. Communist forces in these countries do not at present seem to be in a position to seize power directly, but they are able to provoke serious disturbances in the form of strikes and riots and to undermine the stability of the existing governments.

There is some indication that Italian party leaders have been dissatisfied with Moscow's leadership. At least some of them have supported the Titoist argument for independent and "polycentric" Communism, and interpreted the revolts in Eastern Europe as the fruits of Stalinist policies. A similar factional struggle seems to have developed in the French party, although officially this party has thus far carefully followed the Soviet line in blaming the developments in Hungary and Poland on "reactionary activity." In most of the other European states the party has little parliamentary representation but wins a considerable vote in elections. The bulk of its electoral strength comes from industrial workers and large cities.

Despite the continued activities of Communists in Western Europe, there appears to be no imminent threat of any indigenous revolution. Recent Communist efforts to forge a new "popular front" with European socialists have failed. It is perhaps significant that European Communist parties came to power after World War II

only where aided by the presence of the Soviet Army.

In most of the countries of the Near and Middle East the Communist party is illegal and operates through a number of front organizations. The core of party members in this area of the world is small, but gaining in influence. Local Communists are most active among students and teachers, in intellectual circles, and in national-

ist groups.

In Southeast Asia, Communist parties are numerically small but very powerful. Here they have successfully identified themselves with native nationalism and anti-imperialism. The triumph of Communism in China has added to their strength and influence. It is in fact difficult in some regions to determine whether Communist movements are native or Chinese.

The Communist movement in the Middle East and in Asia seems to be primarily a nationalist movement. The Soviet regime to-day apparently places its greatest hopes—for undermining the position of Western powers and advancing its own influence—on the upsurge of anti-West nationalism in these regions.

Diplomacy

Soviet diplomats are carefully trained in the formalities and techniques of diplomatic practice and are familiar with international law. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Soviet diplomacy and that of the West. The Western tradition assumes that sovereign governments share a common field of interest, and that it

is the purpose of diplomats to find this common ground and build upon it. Soviet diplomacy, on the other hand, is predicated upon the assumption that the USSR and "capitalist" countries share no en-

during common interests.

Accordingly, Soviet diplomatic maneuvering has been governed primarily by considerations of expediency. Soviet leaders are not committed to scruples that demand treaties and agreements with other states be honored on principle. Soviet participation in international organizations has thus far been motivated more by a desire to use these bodies as a sounding board for propaganda and to confuse and divide opponents than by a genuine concern for settling major world problems.

Since World War II the importance of diplomacy as one more weapon of Soviet political warfare has increased considerably. Soviet negotiation at the end of the war had one primary purpose: to confuse and divide the states resisting Soviet pressure. In conjunction with the activities of local Communist parties and the threat of the Soviet Army, Soviet diplomacy played an important role in helping to create the conditions that facilitated the implementation of Soviet aims. Diplomacy, for example, helped the USSR to seize control of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, first by assuring the Western Allies that the USSR had no aggressive designs on these countries, then by gaining recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence over them, and finally, by obtaining Allied consent to armistice terms desired by the Soviet Union. After 1945 the regime used diplomacy to intimidate adjacent and weaker powers, to undermine the determination of strong opponents, and to cow potential adversaries into submission.

For the West, negotiation with Soviet representatives has been a bitter and frustrating experience. Particularly up to the time of Stalin's death, Soviet delegates behaved as though they were under instructions to strain their ingenuity to multiply local conflicts on the diplomatic level. The instructions of a Soviet delegation sometimes consisted solely of an order to "report back" and not to commit itself to anything. Debate in such cases was practically fruitless. The Soviet negotiators felt free to raise any number of criticisms, but avoided being pinned down to approval of any specific proposal. At other times, apparently having merely been told to build up a propaganda position, they engaged in bitter and prolonged attacks on Western "colonialism" and aggressiveness. More often, however, they were bound by detailed instructions, and in such cases they

exhibited little interest in isolating and diminishing major points of conflict. Instead, they frequently appeared to take pride in discovering the maximum number of disagreements, dwelling on them to the full. Often, they seemed to be under a compulsion to make a certain number of attempts to secure each point of their own, regardless how minor, conceding the point only after a terrific struggle, as though to prove to their superiors that they had come up against an immovable force. Thus, a prolonged period of deadlock frequently ensued over each item in dispute. This tactic was often used as a means of gaining concessions and as a test of the staying power

of the opponent.

Aside from this manipulation of diplomacy as a tool for political warfare, there are a number of other factors that make negotiation with Soviet representatives difficult. As a Russian, the Soviet negotiator shares little in the Western tradition of compromise. The word carries no favorable connotation in his mind. He is likely to feel uneasy when giving up a demand, and to sense that he is being dominated by an alien will. Frequent shifts in the position of the other side tend to be taken as a sign of weakness and seem to encourage the Soviet negotiator to hold out for his own position. His behavior at the conference table may further be colored by traditional Russian attitudes toward the West; a blend of curiosity, admiration, and distrust, and an underlying sense of inferiority which sometimes evokes a defensive and arrogant posture. A lack of familiarity with Western life, values, and ways of reaching agreement through a swift give-and-take of views, coupled with an apparent Russian tendency to subject numerous points at issue - both substantive and procedural – to exhaustive interpretation, may also create obstacles to effective communication between the Soviet delegate and his Western counterpart.

Other difficulties in dealing with Soviet representatives stem from the role of the Soviet negotiator in relation to his government and its ideology. He is generally permitted to exercise less discretion than are Western negotiators, and is under the constant fear of violating any minor or major part of his instructions. He cannot on his own introduce important variations into proceedings, nor can he take initiative in finding a reasonable meeting ground. It is difficult for him to participate in an informal day-to-day exchange of information with his opponents. His inability to discuss any positive proposal without instructions from Moscow accounts for much of the noted "woodenness" of Soviet negotiation. When his opponents try out many variant versions of a proposal, in order to meet specific

Soviet criticisms, he is likley to be confused and left at a loss as to

which version to report to Moscow.

Another fear the Soviet delegate must live with is that he may be accused of "falling captive to imperialist insinuations." He cannot, and probably does not by habit, believe in the "good will" of the opponent. The ill will of the "capitalist environment" is assumed. Thus, throughout the course of negotiation, the Soviet attitude is permeated with deep suspicion. When Western delegates get together informally and reach a swift agreement, the Soviet negotiator is likely to feel that the strongest power, usually the United States, has forced its will on other governments.

While difficult, genuine negotiation with the USSR is not impossible; satisfactory agreements, at least on minor questions, have been reached where the Soviet regime has been able to visualize the issues in terms of definite material interest. Informal discussions with Soviet delegates have been held and have helped Western rep-

resentatives to clarify certain issues.

Since Stalin's death there has been a change in attitude, a new and milder manner, but not a new policy. Apparent compromises (as in the 1959 Berlin crisis) have cost the Soviet Union nothing. On the other hand, the new attitude of seeming moderation has yielded profit in the propaganda sphere, divided world opinion, and confused the issues on which real concession is required. The basic issues between the Communist and Western camps—such as the division of Germany—have remained unaffected.

Aims and Prospects

Soviet efforts since the war have been aimed at breaking up the North Atlantic alliance (NATO) and the Southeast Asia defense pact (SEATO), dividing Britain, France, and the United States, promoting neutralism beyond the Soviet orbit, and confining American power to the North American continent. The United States did not play a significant role in Soviet foreign policy calculations before World War II; since the end of the war, however, it has loomed as the most serious obstacle to Soviet aspirations.

Thus far the Soviet leaders have succeeded in doing little directly to reverse the consolidation of the free world against Soviet power, though they have been aided by strains and tensions within the Western camp. While attempting to preserve the gains made in Europe, they continue to press for further advantage in the Near and

Middle East and Asia.

Western Europe

Soviet policy in Western Europe has been directed at weakening this region in order to lessen its capacity to counterbalance Soviet power. It has sought to hinder the productive and recuperative capacities of Europe generally, and has made it difficult to restore any real political stability to the central and western European areas.

In many of its aims the USSR has failed. It was unable to prevent a strengthening of the Western alliance and a revival of the West European economy. Although the present prospects for strengthening Communist influence in Western Europe do not seem especially promising, the USSR is able to promote its interests by exploiting many existing tensions. It is benefiting from disagreements and rivalries among the Western powers — on over-all strategy as well as on specific issues, such as the national aspirations of colonial peoples — and is able to capitalize on local fears of another war and European neutralist sentiments.

In many ways Germany is the pivot of the East-West struggle for power in Europe. As long as Germany remains divided, political

stability in Europe will be almost impossible to restore.

The USSR has attempted to extract the maximum possible political advantage from the German issue. It has played on French fears of German militarism in an effort to prevent German rearmament. It has made several offers to reunify Germany in an effort to prevent the integration of the German Federal Republic with the West. It has subjected the German people to a propaganda barrage designed to show that United States "interference" in European affairs seriously jeopardizes world peace and prevents any settlement of the German question.

Up to now the Soviet government has exhibited no haste in coming to a genuine agreement on the unification of Germany. Its leaders have taken the attitude that the USSR can wait, evidently in the belief that the Soviet bargaining position cannot but improve with time.

Eastern Europe

The forces that brought unrest in Eastern Europe into the open in 1956 appear to have been triggered by the post-Stalin relaxation of controls – over foreign Communist parties, in the satellites, and at home. There is evidence that direct management of satellite affairs by Moscow had weakened the structure of effective administration in Eastern Europe. The Soviet regime's reliance on the raw power of its occupation army in quelling the East German riots in

June 1953 vividly disclosed the impotence of the local German Communist administration. The techniques of control developed under Stalin had not proved to be efficient, from either an economic or a political point of view. Furthermore, they violated deep feelings of nationalism which constituted a source of serious dissidence and which could not be easily exorcised.

The regime appeared to some extent ready to foster development of greater nationalism inside its empire. In line with destruction of the Stalin myth, Soviet leaders signed an agreement with Tito as a "free and equal" partner, admitted that the "ways of socialist development vary in different countries and conditions," praised both the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists for developing new methods of surmounting problems peculiar to their national situations, and encouraged satellite leaders to solve their own problems in their own ways.

This development, which once would have been branded as "heresy," may have been intended as a cautious step toward something like a commonwealth of Communist nations. Soviet leaders seemed to have become aware that in the long run preserving the old pattern of rigid control and ignoring national interests created

more problems than could be solved.

In Eastern Europe, however, the relaxation of the Soviet grip eased dissatisfactions less than it raised hopes that full liberation from Soviet control was possible. Demands were raised for better living conditions and greater freedom from Moscow's domination. In most of the satellites, certain concessions were made. Purged "Titoists" — living and dead — were rehabilitated. Political prisoners were amnestied. Promises of higher wages and more goods were made. In Poland and Hungary, however, concessions only intensified popular ferment which finally exploded in open revolt against Russian rule.

The USSR was hardly ready to give up the advantages gained in Eastern Europe since World War II. From a military point of view, a satellite bloc in this area permits an offensive operation which could strike immediately at the heart of Europe; in defensive terms, the area provides an enormous buffer zone which protects the western territories of the USSR. Politically, Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe gives the regime the power to influence developments affecting Europe as a whole. In particular, control over East Germany and Poland assures the USSR a voice in determining the political future of the German people.

For the time being it appears that the USSR is continuing to

experiment with a combination of concessions, intimidation, and force to achieve greater stability in Eastern Europe. Eventually, the Soviet Union may hope to construct a new and perhaps more viable system of alliances in Eastern Europe which could be sustained without the direct and constant pressure of Soviet military might.

The Near and Middle East

Soviet aspirations in the Near and Middle East are aimed at eliminating British and French influence in the area, preventing its replacement by American influence, and filling the power vacuum that would then be created. Russia has been concerned with gaining control of the Dardanelles and access to the Mediterranean ever since it established itself on the shores of the Black Sea in the latter half of the eighteenth century, but has consistently been resisted by Turkey and by Great Britain and other Western powers. The Soviet regime apparently feels, however, that time is on its side. It directs its propaganda appeals to the masses, frustrated intellectuals, and governments of this region, promising to help them in their struggle to destroy the last vestiges of traditional colonial rule.

The perennial disturbances in the Middle East political scene tend to favor the Soviet talent for capitalizing on unrest. And opportunities for an extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East are enhanced by the conflict between the Western powers in this strategic area and the failure of the West to acquire the confidence and cooperation of the peoples who inhabit this portion of

the world.

Asia

Asia is viewed by the USSR as a particularly promising field today. The Soviet regime relies on economic and diplomatic pressure as well as on local Communist movements to gain its objectives in this part of the world. If the Asian determination to free itself from Western colonial influence is subverted by the Soviet Union for its own ends, it will be a defeat for the West of major proportions.

The USSR places great hopes on the ability of indigenous Communist parties in southeastern Asia to champion popular nationalist aspirations, discredit existing governments, and, where it is opportune, to seize power through armed insurrection. This entire area — of great importance to Europe's overseas commerce — is blanketed with propaganda exploiting the themes of anti-imperial-

ism, Western disregard for Asian opinion, and the "great achieve-

ments" of Russian and Chinese socialism.

The position of leadership in the Communist movement in Asia is now held by the Chinese Communists. As a distinctly Asian power, Communist China has acquired a special kind of prestige and exerts considerable influence in the Asian arena. The Chinese Communists are determined to play a world role in their own right. Hopes have therefore been expressed in the West that Communist China may eventually follow the course taken by Tito in 1948 and openly break with the USSR.

Rifts between the two states have been noted with increasing frequency. Ideologically, Communist China reflects the passion of a revolutionary impulse which by now has been greatly diluted in the USSR. Politically, the Chinese leaders, with a centrally controlled population of about 650 million people and coming into possession of modern technology, represent a potential challenge to Soviet

supremacy in the Communist bloc.

Tensions between the two powers can be expected to grow, but a complete break does not seem imminent. Both derive important military, psychological, and political assets from their alliance. The power gap between the Russians and the Chinese, moreover, remains wide, and seriously limits China's ability to act with complete independence on the world stage. It is nonetheless apparent that Soviet relations with China are becoming more demanding, and that long-term conflicts of interest are developing.

Foreign Policy and the People

In formulating and conducting its foreign policies the Soviet dictatorship is not nearly as much affected by public and pressure-group opinion as are most Western governments. It does share, however, with other states a sense of dependence on some measure of popular support for its actions, and it seeks to create and mobilize this support through all the propaganda techniques at its disposal.


The peoples of the Soviet Union are constantly informed that all "progressive" mankind looks upon the USSR as the center of the struggle for peace in the world. The pains taken by the regime to deny that the USSR has at any time followed an expansionist policy may indicate doubts in the minds of some Soviet citizens as to their government's foreign policy intentions. It is perhaps significant that Soviet troops in some instances refused to take action against riot-

ing Germans in East Berlin in 1953 and sided with Hungarian rebels in 1956.

Fear of war in the USSR is great today. The people are being reassured at present that war is not inevitable and that peace can be maintained — only, however, if the anticapitalist camp (the Soviet bloc and other countries with an anti-West bias) remains united, resourceful, and strong enough to deter the "imperialists" from promoting war. As long as capitalism exists, according to current Soviet statements, the danger of war will also exist.

Presumably, much of this propaganda effectively plays upon real fears and suspicions of the outside world and helps to mold the attitudes of the people toward foreign states. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the propaganda is sometimes taken with a grain of salt. While many Soviet citizens, particularly Russians, still seem to distrust and fear a remilitarized Germany, they have not in all cases transferred the same feelings to the United States, for which there exists a substantial reservoir of good will. Among the non-Russian ethnic groups, especially in the Baltic area and in western Ukraine, many are more likely to regard the Soviet Union as an imperialistic and "oppressive" state.

VALUES AND ATTITUDES



VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

THE SOVIET RECIME IS TRYING TO IMPOSE on the mass of the people a system of values intended both to make the dogma of Marxism-Leninism a normal way of life and to meet the practical functioning needs of an industrial society within a modern totalitarian state. Both of these goals represent breaks with the Russian past, yet to achieve them the regime uses methods that tend to relate to that past. It invokes, builds upon, manipulates traditional values. Its ways of introducing new modes of acting and thinking, of getting them accepted through use of both persuasion and force, hark back to basic prerevolutionary Russian patterns. The ability of the regime to carry out changes in values in such a way as to keep the present in harmony with the past and to make the Soviet Union seem the heir of Holy Russia is a great source of strength.

Although the manipulation of basic values and social forms has often been conscious and deliberate, the process has not been entirely one of simple demonic machination. The Soviet regime has had perforce to rule and communicate with the Russian people in terms of Russian culture and traditions; no government, no matter how authoritarian, can with impunity divorce itself from the cultural traditions of the people it governs. Moreover, while the invocation of tradition may appear to be merely cynical or wholly the counsel of cold political calculation, the Soviet leaders remain the children, legitimate or not, of their fatherland. Regardless of how much they have borrowed from alien sources, they are themselves imbued with, influenced by, acted upon by their country's traditional cultural forms.

Nevertheless, many of the values fostered and imposed by the regime are the opposites of those of the past. A deliberate effort has been made to destroy the religious base of Russian culture, to replace God by the State, to make Marxism-Leninism a new orthodoxy. The

regime has proclaimed man the sole and total master of the physical and social world, but at the same time it has denied the value and worth of the individual human person. The regime has denied the present so that the future may be achieved, no matter how great the sacrifice and suffering demanded. It has given the peasant land but denied him the fruit of his labor. It has prodded the industrial worker into a frenzy of productivity but given him only a meager return.

The decision to push rapid industrialization had effects that helped the regime impose the new system of values. It caused a series of reactions that pushed society itself in the direction the regime desired and reinforced totalitarian control, since the changes in values demanded by the operation of an industrial society are similar to those that are part of the regime's ideological goals. In all regions of the world, industrialization has led to a breakdown of the smaller loyalties of the extended family and of the village, to the weakening of friendships, to a trend away from religion and from the ethical codes propounded by religious institutions. In the Soviet Union, however, these changes have gone much further than elsewhere, and they have not come about gradually. On the contrary, social institutions and the values they represented have been altered by government fiat.

One of the methods used at times by governments of old Russia to impose their will upon the people was coercion – the application of the ruthless power of a centralized government. The Soviet regime also resorted to this method, both to speed up industrialization and to force acceptance of Marxist-Leninist values. But if there was similarity in kind, there was difference in degree. Unlike Russian governments of the past, the Soviet regime struck not only against the acts of the individual but also against his private thoughts and feelings. It not only destroyed institutions that appeared to offer a threat but tore the very fabric of society itself. Then, when the accustomed pattern of society was in shreds, when social institutions had been broken down, the Soviet regime was better able to maintain its control. With the destruction of the communal village and with the weakening of the family, of religion, and of the old codes of behavior, the state became the sole force of control and order in society. In a totalitarian regime, however, state control does not always equate with or achieve social order. And under the Soviet regime the exercise of such control has often been arbitrary and unpredictable. The regime has ruled by terror, and the essence of the effectiveness of terror is unpredictability.

The outer limit approached by the regime in its manipulation of values is the point where predictability in every area of social and personal life threatens to break down. A society, to function, must be based on a regular, known order, an order provided and maintained by the sharing of a set of values. Without the knowable, foreseeable norms of such a regular order there is disintegration of society — breakup of the family, crime, juvenile delinquency, drinking, apathy, other escapisms; the individual ceases to respond to anything except threats to his personal survival. The regime has often come close to this outer limit; each time it has found it necessary to retreat, reduce pressure on the individual, reaffirm the values traditionally associated with the family and the church, and turn back to a greater reliance on legality than on administrative fiat.

When the regime finds it necessary to pull back from a dangerous situation created by its manipulation of values and to re-establish a social consensus, the Soviet leaders never put the blame on the regime and its system. They find an individual culprit. To blame the system would be to impair or destroy their own position. For the mass of the people this variant of political scapegoatism leads back to pre-Soviet values, for the pattern of guilt and punishment of individual culprits is a familiar landmark of the old Russian system. On the other hand, the effect is quite different on members of the intelligentsia, who have more fully accepted the official ideology and the new industrial patterns than have the masses. Instead of turning back toward traditional values they look for more rapid modernization, a broader diffusion of power, a rational technocracy, steady progress in the making of a great industrial Communist state. As the thaw penetrates to all levels of society, with relative legality melting some of the ice of terrorism, the regime relies on crisis psychology and uses as the principal means of motivation a renewed emphasis on material incentives and a promise of progress. Nevertheless, there remains as always, off stage if not playing an active role, the threat if not the actual use of force, to impose the values and carry out the goals of the totalitarian regime.

The central task of the regime, then, is to maintain itself in power and to continue making industrial and social changes as rapidly as possible without, however, reaching the pace at which social fragmentation and a consequent loss of motivation result. At the same time it must meet the demands of the intelligentsia for even more sweeping changes. To cope with this task the regime permits itself compromises in deciding matters such as timing and tactical methods. But the basic goals remains constant — to maintain

power, to keep the state and its economic machine the center of the individual's universe and the source of values and social patterns.

The totalitarian chauvinism of the regime has also created problems in its relations with the minority nationalities. The pre-revolutionary regimes were content to let the nationalities follow their own paths, so long as they accepted officially sponsored proselytizing by the Orthodox Church, recognized the political sovereignty of the tsar, and continued to maintain the flow of tribute to Moscow. The Soviet regime, however, is not content with imperialistic political control. It is deliberately destroying indigenous institutions and the values they represent in order to replace them by Soviet Russian institutions and Soviet Russian ideology. Thus, the nationalities problem, which in the Soviet Union is a question of political domination by Moscow, has become for the nationalities themselves a losing battle for cultural survival.

The Russians

The traditional value that most impressed Slavophile intellectuals of the nineteenth century as uniquely Russian was that placed on collectivity, as exemplified in the old village organization, the mir. This value was the essence of the "new word" that Russia considered itself destined to speak to the world. Though the mir had its origin in early history, it was fashioned under the pressure of the tsarist government and the landlords. At times government and landlords encouraged its development, at other times they intervened to control, manipulate, and finally destroy it. The mir was the predominant type of village organization through 1905 and resisted final destruction until 1930. The cultural patterns and the values in the life of the mir illustrate in almost laboratory fashion those values of the mass of the Russian people that have persisted, in greatly altered form, down to today. Indeed, the regime, while destroying the structure of the mir, has taken the values once part of peasant life alone and transformed them into techniques of government on a national scale.

Collectivity

The mir was organized on the basis of family household units. Within each unit there was a "great man" or elder. All the elders together formed a kind of village council, and out of their number they chose a *starosta* (village chairman or village elder). Decisions made by and in the name of the mir by the *starosta* and the council of elders were "unanimous." This unanimity of decision did not mean that

people agreed to the decision in a positive way but rather that they passively accepted it or did not wish to continue to talk against either the proposition or those who upheld it. Discussion of any issue would continue in the council until all were heard. Russians are typically prolific speakers, and discussions would carry on far into the night; at times, they would continue for days. Finally, when a lull occurred, the elder would suggest that a conclusion had been reached. If no further comment or objection was made, the decision was asserted as the unanimous opinion of the group. No vote was taken. Anonymity was preserved. If further discussion did occur, this would in effect prevent decisions from being made and the issue would then simply die.

The man who continued to comment or object, after the leader had suggested that a unanimous agreement had been reached, did so in the full knowledge of how the rest of the group or community thought. In this way the primitive democracy of the mir crystallized the will of the group. Only a strongly individualistic person would attempt to resist the group by continuing to champion his position after the others had concurred or indicated their acquiescence by remaining silent. It was much easier for the individual to go along with the decision of the group, while expressing his own opinion

within his family or to a close friend.

That a mystical-religious sanction was given to the decisions of the mir is indicated in such common folk sayings as "The mir is like a wave; one man's thought is everybody's thought," and "The mir's conclusion is God's decision." These expressions of feeling about the mir had a direct parallel in the religious concept of *sobornost*: congregational or collective equality and responsibility in the eyes of God. The fact that the communal unit and not the individual made the decision permitted the individual to slough off his responsibility and assign it to the group. Life and personality were thus given to the group. Things sanctioned by the mir inevitably were "right."

Within the village the individual was subject to group pressures exerted either upon him directly by the mir or upon the head of the household in which he resided. The family elder was held responsible for any erring member of his family; the mir itself was held accountable to the government for any action of its members. Tax liability was attached to the mir as a whole, not to the individual or the household. Land was apportioned by the mir to households, not

to individuals.

The mir could indirectly discipline an individual by requesting the head of the household to punish him. If this failed, the recalcitrant's father could curse him and withhold his blessings, thus bringing misfortune upon him. As a last resort he could be cast out of the household. Since the individual as an individual had no rights to the land, a man cast out had to leave the protection of family and community and make his way in the city in order to live. Cut off from his world, he was truly a social outcast.

Through rumor, gossip, and the village meetings, an individual could be ridiculed and shamed before the entire community. "Where there is conscience there is shame, and where there is no shame, there cannot be any conscience." Shame and ridicule were important mechanisms of social control, and parents typically admonished their daughters: "Obey your husband and do not make yourself ridicu-

lous before the eyes of the mir."

In the apportionment of land by the mir's council of elders, as well as in all other activities, it was recognized that everyone in the mir had at least a right to life, so long as he did not endanger the community. This was the principle behind periodic redistributions of the land belonging to the mir; sooner or later all households would have a chance at the good fields. But this principle did not lead to any active efforts to help people as individuals. Rather it functioned as a leveling device, bringing community disapproval and envy to bear on any household that, through the efforts of its own members, bettered itself economically.

Russian concepts of justice and cruelty also were shaped by the overriding value placed on the survival of the mir and its members. It was expected by the peasant that the harsh conditions of life, the frequent drinking bouts, and the inability of the individual to control his emotions would result in brawls, injury, and occasionally murder. Such matters were handled by the families concerned, rarely by criminal prosecution outside of the community. Stealing, however, was seen as a threat to the entire community. Loss of a horse or a cow could ruin a peasant family; such theft was considered the most heinous of crimes. When the thief was captured there were no limits to what would be done to him by the enraged peasants. The violence that marked this kind of situation was an accepted part of life, justified by the enormity of the threat.

The individual who remained within the mir was assured of a place within the larger family of humanity. He saw himself fortunate and safe. The mir was his world. So all-pervading was the sense of security provided by this order-ensuring group that it was said "even death is pleasant in the mir." The world of the mir was portable, in the sense that it was an integral part of the peasants'

life, carried with them wherever they were. When, under economic pressure, groups of peasants were delegated to find new lands for the village, each seeking group would contain an elder and would maintain the pattern of group decision, group order, and group security. Similarly, when community land no longer provided full sustenance, peasants would migrate to a city as a group; there they would stay for six to nine months of the year, living together according to the familiar pattern and practicing a trade together; finally they would return to the village together. Even when a peasant went off to live in the city, he would pay his taxes to the mir and make frequent visits to keep his social "lifeline" intact. In this manner, the values of the mir were perpetuated in the urban-industrial populations.

Authority

Leadership in the mir was pushed onto the oldest people. The leader was an identifiable individual who had to take responsibility for the group's actions. He was the buffer between mir and government, held accountable by the government for collection of taxes, the fulfillment of army conscription quotas, and the general behavior of the mir and its members. His villagers in turn held him responsible for protecting their interests in relations with government officials.

The leader was needed to make decisions, since the council of elders might argue endlessly unless a leader crystallized a proposition that could be accepted. By making a decision the leader emerged from the anonymity of the group; he was the only individual forced to represent the group, to accept publicly a responsibility for its decisions. His position was viewed by others and by himself more as a burden than an honor. On occasion there were individuals who showed a talent for leadership and responsibility. These deviants from the general value pattern found it easy to acquire power because the normally conformist members of the group were only too willing to unburden themselves of responsibility. On the other hand, the leader on the local level was subject to community pressure which kept him in line. The excessive deviant who sought power and was strong enough to disregard community sentiment was ultimately forced to leave the mir, or left of his own volition.

With the full development of serfdom in the eighteenth century, the authority exercised by the *starosta* became rather narrow. The State, the Church, and the landlords received their lands

from the government as rewards for service and loyalty. The Church received much of its land as gifts from the nobility; in some cases it made outright purchases and administered the land as a private estate. The majority of peasants were required to work three days a week for the landlord in return for use-right of the mir land. Others, working poorer land, were required to

make a yearly cash payment to the landlord.

The landlord could intervene in the community or the family; until 1837 he could even separate families. Before the full development of serfdom the mir was responsible for payment of taxes to the government, but when the landlord took over this responsibility the mir had to make its payments to him. The landlord also took over the responsibility for seeing that army conscription quotas were met. Required to pay the government a head tax on his serfs, he had a considerable investment in them. He had absolute authority in the community and was able to override the elder, but he also had to provide food in time of need. He was judged by the peasants on the basis of his fair use of power and his benevolence. It was to the benefit of the landlord — and to the Church in its role of landlord — to promote group responsibility. The elder could then help keep the peasants and serfs in line, and the landlord could deal with the elder instead of each individual family.

There was, then, for the village an indigenous communal leadership and the exterior authority of the State, Church, and landlord. To the peasant the role of leadership or command, high or low, near or far, was looked upon as an unpleasant duty. He prayed constantly for the tsar and the landlord as a regular part of Orthodox ritual — not only that they might be protected, but also that God might relieve them of some of the burden of ruling. The power of the tsar and the landlord was seen as absolute, and rightly so. It was hoped that all those in authority would use their power benignly, but if they did not such failure reflected only on the character of the individual. Abuse of power was not seen as the effect of a corrupting influence of power itself. Power was neither good nor evil—it acquired such attributes according to its use.

Social control and official power over the individual were considered by ruler and ruled alike as necessary to the very existence of society. Men were viewed as fallible. The tradition of collectivity shifted some of this guilt to the group, but the individual was responsible. Since it was assumed that the individual was never confident of his ability to control his emotions and actions,

the community faced disruption if it was not strong enough to control him. If he were not controlled he would even harm himself. But once the limits of action were set by the mir the individual could safely indulge his emotions within those limits. There was, and there is today, a lack of barriers to free expression of emotion. Men may weep openly; fondness between men may be openly exhibited. Indeed, the open expression of emotion between people marks an honesty much valued in a relationship.

The people apparently are still most responsive to the leader who gives the impression of being sympathetic and humane, even if harsh when necessary. But self-control seems very difficult for many Russians in public life. There is vacillation between the cold, emotionless maneuvering familiar in negotiation and the open vivacity

characteristic of the social gathering.

The Russian people have long agreed to strong centralized government and powerful figures of authority - the family patriarch, the landlord, the priest, the tsar. But absolute obedience to the decrees of authority, especially those emanating from the government, has not been automatic, and Russia's rulers have had to impose bureaucracy, with its complex structure and regulations, upon a tradition of administration by "rule of thumb." When the concept of precisely written laws did enter Russia, primarily through Germany, there was little understanding of law as a system based upon a philosophy of intent. As administered by the bureaucracy law became dehumanized and technical. It reflected the limitations of the bureaucracy and was often completely divorced from the realities of society. For example, a law concerning the minimum amount of land to be allotted to households in the mir disregarded the fact that many such communities did not have sufficient land to meet these requirements. The peasants paid lip service to such a law or ignored it. The bureaucracy would construe this behavior as meaning that the law had not been properly understood by the "ignorant" peasants and adopted an even more technical and unrealistic version. As laws became more complex and as their true intent was disregarded, more loopholes appeared in them, and the peasants often seized the chance to twist the laws to their own advantage. This kind of reaction, which still plagues the regime today, gave rise to the persisting notion of the Russian peasant as "crafty and sly."

Fragmentation and Isolation

Acting on the basis of a totalitarian doctrine, the regime has sought to break down all the smaller loyalties in society and to substitute for them all-encompassing allegiance to the government. It has struck at all the mainstays of prerevolutionary society—the tsar, the Church, the family, the peasant community. But though it has destroyed or impaired these nuclei of basic loyalties and values, it has been unable to replace them with a consistent set of values, nor has it found a substitute for the social orderliness that was inherent in these institutions.

The state has intervened in the family and attempted, rather ineptly, to take over some of its disciplinary and educational functions. The role of the parents in disciplining children has been weakened by the absence of a respected set of values in child-parent relations to which appeal could be made. Moreover, it is hard to teach a child a double standard of morality: on one hand, what is right and proper; and on the other hand, diametrically opposed, what is necessary to get ahead in society. The state's use of the children to penetrate the family circle has made it difficult for the parents to communicate freely with their children. The husband-wife relationship has become more important, for it must now bear the burden of all that cannot be said, felt, or thought elsewhere in society. Often both parents work and come home to overcrowded living quarters, and it is not surprising that the relationship may sometimes be strained to the breaking point.

The results of this kind of pressure on the individual seem to be mass apathy and withdrawal. Apathy is seen in the reaction to most regime-sponsored activities. The tendency to withdrawal is expressed in the desire to keep from getting involved in things. For instance, the regime is constantly pressing people to intervene when they see breaches of the public order, but the courts have been so strict or capricious in interpreting such intervention that the citizen who goes to the defense of the militia has often landed in jail for assaulting the actual culprit. Even "self-defense" has become a very unreliable plea. The regime recently instructed the courts to recognize the circumstances of cases in which a bystander has intervened or has been forced to defend himself. But the citizen seems to feel he is far safer minding his own business. Drinking is also a familiar type of withdrawal, perhaps the most satisfying kind. It produces forgetfulness and euphoria, and the drunkard is excused for a certain amount of aggressive behavior and even anti-regime statements while he is drunk.

Those Russians who turn to religion often do so in a positive way, seeking some consistent set of values and a community of interests with others; nevertheless, the element of withdrawal from the realities of society is also present. Religions that demand strict behavior and daily involvement of the individual have had the strongest appeal; the precepts of some groups cut their members off from a great deal of official propaganda. There is also an element of excitement in religious involvement for such participation is an officially "undesirable" activity. To join an active religious group is to eliminate all chance of rising in the social structure.

The excitement accompanying forbidden activity is a definite factor in the "hooliganism" now widespread in the Soviet Union. Young people have not been trained to accept fully the value of work and other aspects of either Christian or Communist ethics. They see around them extralegal activities condoned by their elders. Moreover, there is a drabness and repetitiveness in life from which antisocial acts and "high living" provide an escape. Such activity is in its own way a withdrawal from the harsh and unrewarding demands made by the regime.

Fragmentation presents problems to the regime, but the social conditions it has helped create also benefit the regime. The individual, every phase of his life under strict surveillance, all media of information firmly controlled, tends increasingly to acquiesce in a defensive isolation. He can never be sure just how many others feel as he does. As long as such controls are exerted, the mass of the population is not able to act in any concerted fashion against the regime. The withdrawal and apathy of the majority of the population signify a weakening of personal responsibility. Individual responsibility is renounced, surrendered to the state. Individuals thus are loath to act against injustice, whether stemming from other individuals or the regime.

The Nationalities

This discussion must of necessity be limited to a consideration of basic value clashes between the various nationalities and the Soviet regime. Most such clashes, evident only at the local level, are relatively unimportant in terms of the over-all loyalty or disaffection of these peoples - the primary fact is that they are dominated by the Russians.

Central Asia

The peoples of Central Asia are to a certain extent culturally diversified, ranging as they do from the traditionally sedentary and more thoroughly Islamized Tadzhik and Uzbek to the traditionally nomadic and only partly Islamized Kazaks. Nevertheless, there is a common core of values in Central Asia which conflicts with the goals

and practices of the Soviet regime.

In both nomadic and sedentary Central Asian society, with the exception of the few major urban centers, the kin group, coextensive with the village or the herding group, has been the primary political, social, and economic unit. An individual's place in the world is determined by his place in this kinship unit, which in turn rests upon an orderly assessment of family property, age, birth, precedence, etc. Who you are and who your father was determine where you sit at feasts, where you stand before the law and in the eyes of your fellow man. Tracing individual descent is part of a larger pattern which also includes forms of ancestor worship as well as a sense of the

past that makes distant events immediate and relevant.

The more completely Islamized peoples of Central Asia tend to accept passively the greater fortunes and misfortunes of life. The nomadic peoples, however, tend to believe they can do something about their fate; they hold to a concept of personal responsibility and the individual blames himself or others if things go wrong. Such differences reflect ancient, basic dissimilarities between herding and agricultural societies. Steppe people like the Kazak looked upon agriculture as woman's work, and instead became herders, their lives governed by orderly, regular seasonal movement to and from traditional grazing grounds. Manliness was expressed in horsemanship, physical prowess, and rhetorical ability. Exposed to climatic extremes, the steppe peoples felt themselves hardier, braver, and more aggressive than other Central Asians and the Russians who had overwhelmed them. They explained the Russians' success as resulting from superior technology rather than from any innate superiority.

Through collectivization the regime struck at the heart of the life and values of these peoples. Forced settlement on the land involved doing the woman's work they despised. Many fled across the borders or were killed for resisting. Collectivization also brought the eventual breakdown of family control. After briefly experimenting with traditional leaders as chairmen of the newly established collective farms, the Russians brought in their own people to take over what was essentially a combined kin and economic unit. This introduced a new set of social relationships, relationships that in the

eves of the Central Asian are mechanistic and impersonal.

The regime has drastically changed other elements related to family life, such as bride-price and the separation of women from full participation in community life. More important, it has violated the traditional paramountcy of the kin relationship. In the Central Asian scheme of values it is expected that anyone who can trace a kin relationship will receive preferred treatment over a stranger. Among the Russians, as among Americans, this is condemned as

nepotism.

Despite such blows at basic institutions and value patterns, there has not resulted the kind of social fragmentation evident in Great Russia. Soviet policy has been resisted not only as new policy, but as an alien thing introduced by outsiders — the Russians. Further, the Central Asian family has not been so thoroughly penetrated as the Russian family, and most of the social values of Central Asia are based in the family. While indigenous religious, political, and social institutions have been destroyed or vitiated, the family traditionally has preserved and still preserves the values advanced by and through these institutions.

Thus, the regime is constantly plagued by problems of nepotism whenever a Central Asian official is in a position to help his relatives. Enrollment of girls in high schools is extremely small, and the celebration of religious rites goes on as a family rather than as a mosque activity. The exclusion of girls from the schools by the parents also means that when the girls marry and are responsible for rearing children, they will not have been fully exposed to Soviet indoctrination and can pass on prerevolutionary values and traditions to the next generation.

The traditional system and set of values does seem to break down in the cities. To the extent that urbanization has spread, and continues to spread, the older Central Asian values will in all probability lose their vitality.

The Caucasus

Whether Christian or Moslem, the peoples of the Caucasus share a common base of values that bear a strong resemblance to those of Central Asia. Here, too, extended kin or family loyalties reach into all areas of life and are the basis for views of the human world. At the same time there is more flexibility in the widening of kinship bonds than is found in Central Asia. In the Caucasus, among the mountaineers as well as in Armenia, "strangers" may be taken into the kin group through the "milk relationship" by symbolically suckling at the breast of a woman in the family. The individual is then accorded full family membership. All of the kin group are obligated to support him in any venture and to avenge any insult

to him, and he is under the same obligation to them. The Caucasian peoples' strongly developed sense of personal dignity also has implications in a wider social context: an insult to an individual becomes an insult to his family group, and blood revenge for such

insults is evidently still a widespread practice.

There are many differences between the mountain people, who value raiding and other "manly" activities, and the more settled agricultural and livestock-raising peoples of the lowland areas. Among the mountaineers, only a life of danger and audacity can win a man public esteem; carrying or owning weapons is essential to living by such values and despite pressure from the regime the mountaineers have refused to give them up. Despite differences, however, throughout the Caucasus the primary unit of loyalty is the family and the village. Outsiders are viewed with latent hostility but the tradition of hospitality is very strong. A guest is sacred, any injury done to him being taken as a direct insult to the family of the host. The regime tried to violate the tradition of hospitality when, for example, in 1933 it ordered the Caucasians to turn away the Ukrainians who had fled from collectivization. The Caucasians refused. They continue now to maintain this traditional hospitality, though the guest may be labeled an enemy by the regime. As in the tradition-bound family society of Central Asia, the Caucasians pay homage to age through a formal, universally observed etiquette.

Throughout the Caucasus the regime's efforts to change values have been blocked by nepotism and by parochial rather than national loyalty. It has met resistance to collectivization and to Soviet laws that do not take into account the family and social status of the individual. The Caucasians continue to value individual initiative, enterprise, and personal dignity, rejecting the collectivist, totali-

tarian values of the regime.

The Baltics

Among the Baltic peoples the basic value conflict between traditional Slavic collectivism and the more individualistic orientation stemming from north European culture comes into sharp focus. But the fact of Russian domination is of far more immediate consequence than the existence of such conflicts.

The Estonian, for example, is an individualist, always wanting to think things out for himself. He recognizes and accepts an authority that seems wise and sensible, but he does not readily submit to authority supported by power alone. Common actions by individuals who unite for the benefit of all on a common-sense basis have

a great appeal. During the period of independence there was a strong cooperative movement in Estonia, modeled on that in Finland.

All the Baltic peoples have a long history of struggles to become owners of the land they tilled. They won a series of land reforms during the period of independence; the peasants became landowners, tilling their land as families, with little community activity. The Baltic family included the hired hands, who lived and ate with the family on a basis of equality. This unit kept to itself, except for church activities (primarily Catholic in Lithuania, and Protestant in Estonia and Latvia) and festivals, when even distant relatives would convene to renew old ties.

Collectivization was a crushing blow in this area. It destroyed the land reforms so bitterly fought for and Baltic farmers consider that they have been thrown back into the eighteenth century, owning no land of their own and having no freedom of movement. As might be expected, the regime is having great difficulties in motivating these people to produce within the collective farm system.

The Ukraine and Belorussia

In general, the Ukrainians and Belorussians subscribe to the same basic value system dominant among the Russians, but there are some differences. The western areas of these two republics have been periodically under Polish and Lithuanian influence, so that there has been some transmission of Roman Catholic values which remain strong despite the present suppression of the Uniate Church. The Ukrainian family was never as tightly ruled by a patriarch father as was the Russian family. The mir was not developed in these areas to the extent it was in Russia proper, and Ukrainian families lived on scattered farmsteads rather than in villages. There is a value on individualism similar to that found in the Baltics, and, again as in the Baltics, feelings of national identity (stronger in the Ukraine than in Belorussia) loom large. More than any other element in the value conflict, nationalism shapes the Ukrainian attitude toward the Soviet regime.

Continuity and Conflict

Neither the premises of Marxist dogma nor the traditional Russian values exemplified in the mir can be used separately as keys to the values in contemporary Soviet society. In some areas of life, such as those concerned with religion, there are open conflicts; in others,

such as those concerned with the centralization and power of the government, there are continuities. It is not always the mass of the people who support tradition against the innovations of the regime. At times the regime seeks its goals by reverting to a tradition which has been rejected by the people. There is no simple formula for tracing the origins and bases of the underlying cultural dynamics and conflicts of Soviet society. The real key is a recognition of the areas of synthesis and conflict.

The present concentration of power and control in the central government stems directly from traditionally accepted patterns of government and from traditional concepts about the nature of power and the need for and use of it. At the same time the Soviet regime has made its control more complete and all-pervasive than that of any previous Russian government. In addition, some of the means it has used to maintain its power, as well as some of the ways in which it has used such means, have come into conflict with tradition-

al values.

There has persisted, from the mir down to the present industrial society, a feeling that the Russians' natural "straining toward anarchy" can be controlled only by strong measures. But the kind of arbitrary authority that reached its climax in the terror and the great purges of the 1930's directly conflicted with the traditional Russian concept of orderly government. The regime took care to label its victims "enemies of the people" and to elicit confessions from them to this effect. As the purge continued, however, the basis for the accusations became ever more vague. No individual could predict the regime's reaction to anything he might do. The authority that was supposed to provide order and regularity to life was acting capriciously. No one knew who would be its next victim, or why. The attempts of the present leadership to dissociate itself from many of the acts committed during this period may indicate consciousness of latent hostility.

The regime has to some extent been able to maintain acceptance or even prestige by borrowing from and building upon the traditional values regarding the role of the individual and the proper use of power. But it has done so at the expense of its own set of values. It has admitted that very serious abuses of government power and control did occur. In the American political tradition such an admission would prove the need to lessen the concentration of power itself. Indeed, this view is supported by Marxist dogma, which blames man's "depravity" on the institutions of his society rather

than on the individual himself. Since Stalin was shaped by the Communist revolutionary institutions of his society, his shortcomings and "sins" should have placed those institutions in question. But the Communists' criticism of Stalin conforms with the pre-Marxist pattern of blaming the individual, not the institution, for evil action. The regime has emphasized that "it would be a gross mistake to look to the nature of the Soviet social system for the source of the personality cult." This explanation was intended to strengthen the position of the regime with the mass of the people. Among some of the intelligentsia, however, presumably those most imbued with the dogma of classical Marxism, de-Stalinization has raised questions

about the social system.

While denigrating Stalin, the regime still tries to present a picture of the top leadership as all-wise, omnipotent, and benevolent. During his lifetime Stalin appeared in song, story, and official pronouncement as the all-wise leader, ruling with a mandate from history and the people, concerning himself with the welfare of the people and the country. That appeal was largely to the masses. It evoked little response from those members of the intelligentsia who had freed themselves from the Byzantine monarchical tradition; in their eyes, Soviet political leadership maintains its power through being "in step with history" and the party is theoretically infallible. The regime, however, must maintain its prestige with the bulk of the population, where it is more difficult to create allegiance to Marxist theory. It tries, therefore, to exploit the traditional expectations regarding leaders. In an officially approved postwar novel the party secretary is shown as a combination of father, priest, and village elder. He is able to read the minds of the supplicants who come to him, to anticipate and meet future problems and difficulties. This is the picture presented to the people, the role that government and party officials in contact with the people are theoretically required to play. Such an image has obvious popular appeal. Nevertheless, the monolithic bureaucratic system discourages this type of leader, and few officials feel the need to play such a role in their relations with the people.

The regime continues to act on the assumption that "mass participation" and "unanimous approval" lend sanction to any action. It may seem to the outsider that "unanimous" elections of government officials and meetings of the Supreme Soviet to confirm policies already decided by the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Council of Ministers are nothing but sham maneuvers

intended to impress foreigners and a gullible public. They are at least in part, however, an attempt to use a pattern of political conduct developed in the small prerevolutionary peasant village and to apply it on a national scale to legitimate governmental action. The use to which the tradition is put is illustrated by the case of a party secretary who was reprimanded for posting a list of subscribers to a government bond drive — before these persons could "volunteer" to subscribe at a mass meeting. Thus mass participation on the national level serves to bring social and community pressure to bear on the individual.

In the mir the use of public meetings for shaming individuals was a common pattern. This too has been taken over and adapted by the regime. Shaming is done through samokritika - "criticism and self-criticism" - in the newspapers as well as at meetings in industrial and agricultural enterprises. Under the guidance of a party leader, individuals whose production is lagging or who are violating "Communist morality" are made to stand up before the group, listen to the charges made, and publicly confess. Shaming as a disciplinary device is also carried out through wall newspapers and by such devices as a laggard's corner or a special pay booth for those in disgrace. The individual may feel that the criticism is unjustified or that it could with equal justice be directed against others. Yet he will try at any cost to avoid being exposed to the shame and accompanying ridicule. Many of those who participate in the public shaming do so with a vehemence against the chosen victim in direct proportion to their fear of being implicated in his guilt.

Mass participation also prevents the individual from assessing the true nature of public opinion. He may disagree with a guided decision of the group but still, in common with the others going through the prescribed ritual, give his nominal assent to some part of governmental policy. He will never know just how many others are, like himself, merely participating without any real belief. The weight of a "unanimous" vote, no matter how it is arrived at, is

difficult for the individual to throw off.

Mass participation as a method of social control depends upon enthusiasm in group activity. The most potent weapon against it is apathy or silence. The ordinary person who is able to hide his feelings by silence or apathy is felt to be somewhat dangerous. He is thought to lack emotional warmth, to be somewhat inhuman. The inscrutability of Stalin did much to contribute to the popular awe of him. The peasant seems to be able to maintain lack of response in the face of official pressure at meetings. Officials find this extremely

unsettling.

Apathy and passivity also figure in the older peasant pattern in which safety is found in numbers and those who stand apart from the crowd are immediately suspect. Latent envy and hatred of those too far above the others in the collective were effectively tapped by the regime during the 1930's. The peasants were encouraged to attack the kulaks — those who had broken out of the mir, achieved economic independence, and were resisting collectivization. The traditional value of submerging oneself in the group still keeps the mass of Russian people from aspiring to be "in the forefront of socialism." The group still provides security as well as anonymity for the individual. Soviet officials prefer to pass authority on to the hierarchy, or, failing that, to call a meeting of all local officials so that no one person need take full responsibility for a decision.

The anonymity provided by the group gives the individual strength. This is recognized both by the ordinary Russian and by the regime. When a group seems especially recalcitrant, for example, in failing to volunteer subscriptions to bond drives, the meeting is adjourned and personal visits are made to each individual. Thus cornered, the individual usually will succumb; according to an

old Russian proverb, "One man in the field is not a warrior."

The traditional dislike of the position and responsibilities of leadership, coupled with fear of its hazards, determines one of the party's major functions: the search for an "adoption" of persons capable of leading. This is more than a question of recruitment. Individuals with a capacity for leadership are brought under the control and discipline of the party, to ensure that they will be put to work for the regime rather than against it. Most of those selected are young, a fact which, although by and large a strength of the system, at times causes some difficulties, especially on the collective farms where the mir equation of age with leadership persists.

The regime has recognized that in Communist-directed group activities decisions are accepted passively rather than with the enthusiastic participation it desires. It seeks to stimulate enthusiasm but at the same time demands that the enthusiasm be kept within certain limits which are not always clearly defined. On occasion, when a meeting of peasants or workers is thrown open for criticism of a particular person, a general hubbub may ensue in which even officials are severely and, in the general noise, "anonymously" criticized. The intelligentsia are at times vociferous in their open

criticism, even questioning the system itself. A writer in Pravda hints that once some of the limits on discussion are removed criticism quickly goes beyond permitted bounds:

The party cannot permit the freedom of discussion of problems to be interpreted as freedom to propagate views alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

In contrast to the apathy shown in the face of official pressure and coercion, Russians in all walks of life have become past masters of the art of twisting a law to their own uses. This is true of both the regime and the mass of the population. The regime maintains legal flexibility for itself by drawing up laws worded so broadly that they can be interpreted at will. On the other hand, laws and administrative decrees intended to control the behavior of the people are spelled out in painfully precise detail. But the complexity of such detail often defeats its own purpose, offering easy chances for evasion.

At times the literalness of a deliberately simple-minded-peasant approach can do as well as a lawyer's expertness in finding a way to evade a law. Izvestia reports that workers treat the official allowance for shrinkage and spillage losses in the shipment of certain goods as if it were an administrative decree. In a particular example, one out of every thousand freight cars of sugar was diverted to speculators; thus, the expected normal loss during shipment of one-tenth of one percent was "fulfilled." The official response, a demand to change the estimated loss figures, did not strike at the heart of the problem - an intentionally literal reading of the law, which is a traditional

type of resistance to administrative decrees.

The evasive behavior typical under the present regime is part of a double standard of morality that developed from a prerevolutionary tradition and has been reinforced by actions of the regime. There are two standards of behavior. One standard, reserved for friends, demands complete loyalty to the point of sacrifice; the other, for enemies, does not recognize "moral" bounds. The state has become the "enemy" in this regard, so that stealing of state property or lying to officials is to be condoned. But the other tradition of unqualified honesty in dealing with friends has been weakened as the regime's use of threats and coercion threatens the bonds of personal friendship. The man who today openly speaks his mind to his friends or betrays his emotions may soon find himself out of his job or subject to disciplinary action; no longer can even the closest

friends fully trust each other.

Traditionally, relations between family members were in Russia the most intimate, the most frank and open of all possible relationships. In the mir the family was the social and economic unit and was dealt with as a unit. The regime's efforts to use children as spies to penetrate the family's privacy has impaired the old intimacy. Expressing political opinions at home is restricted by the fear that a child may intentionally or unintentionally carry tales. However, the early attempt of the regime to deprive the family of all but a biological function failed. The family still remains a strong economic unit in the cities and on the collective farms, and socially it is everywhere the unit of primary loyalty for the individual. Even while trying to destroy the family during the War Communism period and the 1920's, the regime was aware of the value of family loyalty. The doctrine of family accountability made all members of the family responsible for any act of its members. This doctrine is kept today as a means of control over both children and adults.

Russians do not hold the ideal of the inviolability and sacredness of individual life. In the mir and other such communities, periodically devastated by famine or disease, the survival of the family and the commune rather than of an individual was of central importance. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that Soviet treatment of forced laborers and political prisoners is considered as abhorrent by the Russian people as it is by Americans. Political prisoners are treated legally with far more severity than ordinary criminals, the latter being viewed as having simply succumbed to common human wickedness and base emotions, while the political prisoner is an "enemy of the state," of the collective. He who threatens the collective is, like the horse thief of old, destroyed or cast out of the community. The Soviet regime has always labeled those it wished to eliminate "enemies of the state."

Before "cruel" behavior can be brought into play, however, the victim must be clearly labeled for the people as a willful, dangerous, and destructive enemy. Once an individual is so labeled, the limits of action go far beyond Western standards. The core of the conflict between the regime and the population is not the treatment but the labeling of offenders. In the past the labeling was done by the small community. The threat of the horse thief to the community was clear and irrefutable. Today the label is handed down by edict from above. The threat of the political offender to the community

is not always clearly seen. Thus, the official criticism of Stalin's excesses has been concerned with the inconsistent labeling of individuals rather than with the treatment that resulted from such

labeling.

The upper class, both before and after the revolution has been affected by a stream of influence from the West. Especially among the intelligentsia there has been some acceptance of the concept of the innate dignity and value of the individual, and this group was the most sensitive to the seeming capriciousness as well as the excesses of the Stalinist regime. The regime's attitude toward the individual is suggested in the propaganda formula that where "proper social conditions" exist in an ideal future a "free, proud, Soviet man" will come into being. At present, however, the totalitarian state puts an ideological mission and goal above the worth of a particular individual. The Western ideal which has taken hold among the intelligentsia has also influenced at least part of the general urban population. The regime finds it useful, therefore, to proclaim the "dignity of Soviet man" and to present itself as the champion of this concept against the indignities inflicted by its own appointed bureaucrats. Although not fully effective, such propaganda does strike a responsive chord.

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

THE ATTITUDES OF SOVIET CITIZENS toward their country and government are a composite of the views they inherited from prerevolutionary days and those the Communist regime has sought to impose. The shift from the past to the present has met with the greatest resistance among the minorities, and change there has been effected largely by force. Among the Russians themselves the regime has tried, with some success, to manipulate the old nationalist symbols and attitudes in order to create the new. But reversion to the old symbols by the regime is something more than simply a means to an end. The Soviet regime today is composed largely of Russians who, despite their preoccupation with Marxist-Leninist ideology, share the Russian inheritance. The Russian people remain Russian, no matter how great their degree of sovietization, and for the minorities Russianization and sovietization go hand in hand.

The Soviet regime aims ultimately to produce a rational allegiance to a system of government resting upon the "scientific" foundations of Marxism-Leninism. One of the cornerstones of rational Soviet patriotism is "the spirit of proletarian internationalism" for all the working people of the world. Ideally, Russian workers and peasants should be willing to go to the aid of these "oppressed" people and support their efforts to overthrow their capitalist oppressors. The Soviet Union is to be viewed as the model and center of the Communist world, the first among the socialist nations, a leader in the march toward true Communism, and thus standing at "the head of all mankind." The regime presents itself as the proper recipient of the unquestioned faith and loyalty of its people, receiving its mandate to rule both Russia and the Communist world, not from God, but from the laws of history and the simple fact of possession of power.

With the abdication of the Tsar in 1917, the great mass of the Russian people lost a symbol which united the Russian soil and the Russian government under the blessing of the Russian God. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the people they were to rule retained intact their love of the Russian land, of "Mother Russia"; but the sanctity of the ruler and his identification with the motherland, built up over five centuries, was gone. One of the major problems confronting the new regime was the creation of a new symbol of authority that could hold the allegiance of the Russian people and lend some sort of sanctity to the machinery of government.

Under the tsars the people made a distinction between the injustice of bureaucrats and the sanctity of the tsar whom the bureaucrats represented. Their acceptance of the tsar was essentially personal in nature: he was the *Batyushka*, the Little Father of his people. The "laws of history" had none of this symbolic value, and there was thus nothing to preserve the distinction. Hatred of the bureaucracy could be extended indefinitely — to include the leaders of the regime themselves. It is possible to speculate that the need of a sacrosanct person, not only to provide a unifying symbol, but to restore the earlier distinction in the public mind by placing the lower bureaucracy in a position where it could be made the scapegoat for unpopular actions and policies led to enshrining the dead Lenin as an object for pilgrimages of the faithful, and elevating Stalin to the status of an all-wise, fatherly bearer of the Communist "truth."

With the crisis of World War II the regime fell back upon traditional "Russian" symbols and appeals to patriotism, rather than its own distinctive "Soviet" ideology, slogans, and symbols — thereby suggesting that it had not been able to create anything capable of commanding the depth of feeling formerly associated with tsardom

by most of the Russian population.

The Russian chauvinism of the Soviet regime has created new problems regarding the various minority nationalities within the Soviet Union. Under the tsars the government made little effort to transform its subject minorities into Russians. The Soviet regime, however, except for a short period when it was unable to enforce its will directly over the nationalities, has carried out a program of cultural imperialism aimed at destroying the differing minority cultures at their roots and making them over into the Soviet image. This program has met with varying resistance, depending upon such matters as language difference, previous history of political independence or submission, and the degree to which the minority cul-

ture conflicts with Soviet values. Each minority group in the Soviet Union thus represents something of a special problem and makes it difficult to draw any broad generalizations regarding over-all national unity. Certain trouble spots stand out especially — the western Ukraine, the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In maintaining control over most of those areas the regime is aided by the fact that the ordinary Russian seems to count them as part of his home ground, includes them as part of his concept of the nation and the motherland, and presumably is willing to fight for them.

Toward the Country

The Motherland

The Russians are deeply attached to an image of their nation as a land of mighty rivers and boundless space and of themselves as a great and enduring people. Their attachment is not only to the lands of Great Russia but includes many of those inhabited by minority

peoples.

The Russian rivers are particularly beloved by the people. Songs about the Don, Dnieper, Kama, and others are numerous; but of all rivers the Volga is the most renowned. The emotions felt by Russians for this "mother" of rivers may account, in part, for the stubborn resistance of Soviet soldiers at Stalingrad. During World War II the regime consciously encouraged this attachment to the land.

In addition to national patriotism there are also regional loyalties which the regime plays upon as positive elements, both to ensure the allegiance of the Russian people and to stimulate each area to compete in the completion of goals set by the regime. Regional loyalties have existed from ancient times, and the folk epics (byliny), many of which are still part of the school curriculum, echo in friendly fashion the regional differences as in the following:

Ah there is open country at Pskov,
And there are broad open spaces at Kiev,
And high hills at Sorochinsk,
And church buildings in Moscow the city of stone. . .
Ah, there are sly rogues in the Valdai Hills,
Ah, there are fine fellows and dandies in the city
of Yaroslavl',
And easy kisses in the Belo-Ozero country,
And sweet drinks in St. Petersburg.

Today Moscow is the heart of the country, conscious of its focal position, proud of its historical monuments, yet claiming peasant roots. For the Muscovite, the planned orderliness of Leningrad is symbolic of the alien European influence to which it has been subject. Leningrad is also characterized by a sense of independence among its general citizenry and by the political irreverence of its students and intellectuals toward the tsars in the past and toward the regime today. Like the Leningraders, the Russian settlers of Siberia have also maintained a certain individual spirit of independence, though they were never free enough of the central power to develop a sense of political independence. The expanses of Siberia are viewed as lands vet to be fully developed, harsh in climate and living conditions. Exploits of the Cossack adventurer Yermak, who led expeditions beyond the Urals in the late sixteenth century, are remembered in the folklore of the people. Siberia has of course also been known as the home of exiles and prison laborers.

Throughout the USSR, however, regional traditions and loyalties are overshadowed by a common feeling, shared by all Russians wherever they reside, that Russia is one nation. "I fear not Siberia," has been an old Russian saying, "for Siberia, also, is Russian land." Today, the broad steppes of Central Asia are viewed — with a propaganda assist from the regime — as another pioneer area to be developed by Russians as a "bread basket," in competition with the

traditional position held by the Ukraine.

Many of the heroes of the people, to whom the regime has also had recourse, are glorified for defending their native soil from foreign enemies: Alexander Nevsky, the Prince of Novgorod who repelled German, Swedish, and Lithuanian invaders in the thirteenth century; Dimitry, Grand Duke of Moscow in the later fourteenth century, whose bloody battle with the Mongols on the upper reaches of the River Don broke the spell of the Mongol-Tatar domination; General Suvorov, who under Catherine the Great fought against Turks, Germans, and Poles; General Kutuzov, who led the Russian armies against the Napoleonic invasion. The regime was most influential in reviving the glorified image of Kutuzov during World War II, and even gave to the war the very appellation applied to the Napoleonic War - the Fatherland War. The regime has recognized that these traditional feelings remain the strongest bond uniting the people, but at present it is once again stressing allegiance to Communist ideology in the hope of making it a substitute for traditional Russian patriotism.

Messianism

Elements both old and new have been combined in Soviet-sponsored messianism. It has combined this with some of the more militant ideas of a small group of both Russian and Balkan Pan-Slavists in the nineteenth century. The early Church tradition stressed the position of Russia as the upholder of "truth" and as the "Third Rome" in a world gone astray. Some Russophile intellectuals, influenced by the Church, felt that the message Russia had for the world was piety, humility, and love for life. The regime has disregarded this approach and has stressed the position of Russia both before and after the revolution, as a dynamic leader among nations. This type of campaign has been waged internally for a long time and is partially directed against any anti-Russian inclinations that may exist among minority groups within the USSR.

The Russians have been held up as leaders, liberators, and benefactors of the minority peoples, and these attributes have been claimed for Russia's role on the world scene. This chauvinistic build-up seems to have met with some favorable response, but possibly it has redounded less to the credit of the regime than to the over-all traditional feeling of loyalty, pride, and faith in the destiny of the Russian nation. In contrast to the kind of messianism preached by the militant Slavophiles, the brand absorbed by the mass of Russians has been a kind of pacifistic belief that Russia in time would be served, since it had stood and waited for so long. The regime is interested in developing a more aggressive, militant outlook.

It is difficult to determine how many Russians share the Soviet messianic outlook. The traditional concept of Holy Russia is retained as a mystique by the peasantry and to a lesser extent by those urban workers whose rural ties are still strong. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, are more inspired by Russia's progress as a powerful industrial nation, although this attitude is tempered by some feeling of guilt about the human sacrifice sovietization has entailed—a guilt only partially eased through a cathartic belief in their country's progress and future. A smaller number of intellectuals appear absorbed with Russia's "mission" in the world, either to give mankind new "spiritual" values to replace the "decadent" ones of Western civilization or to lead the international revolutionary movement that is to "liberate the toilers" of the world.

Russians seldom have fought well on foreign soil—except when they clearly felt the defense of their country demanded it. If history is a reliable guide they will bear sacrifices in order to preserve the nation, but not to expand its territory. The regime has been careful to justify its postwar expansion in terms of the "voluntary" union of the satellite countries with the USSR, but it has been hampered in maintaining control by the general lack of Russian enthusiasm for armed suppression of the satellite peoples.

Toward the Government

The Regime

While the people's love of their native soil and loyalty to their nation is intense and unequivocal, their attitude toward the present rulers is more complex - composed of conflicting and vacillating feelings. The concentration of absolute power in the state is part of their heritage and is associated with the greatness and power of the nation itself. In the past the concentration of power in the tsar was taken as a kind of guarantee that political power would be used benevolently, both for protection of the nation and for the good of the people. Not many tsars lived up to this ideal, and the regime has represented itself as the heir of a long tradition of revolt against the oppressive tsars and landed gentry. It has supported the popular feelings about such figures as Stenka Razin, who led a Cossack revolt in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and Emeylan Pugachev, leader of a similar exploit a hundred years later. Both these leaders stand out in poetry and song as leaders of the rabble - the ruined and unfortunate - revolting against landlords and masters. "I have hanged many lords and princes," boasts Pugachev, "throughout Russia I have hanged also unjust judges."

Pugachev presents an interesting example of the convolutions and twistings of the regime's use of history. The General Suvorov who is honored by the regime for his leadership against Turks, Germans, Poles — and incidentally against a revolutionary France — also was the man who captured Pugachev and had him sent to Moscow in

a wooden cage.

As the regime has learned, history is a two-edged sword, presenting Russians with an image not only of national greatness, power, and fortitude but also of sufferings endured and examples of uprisings against those who misused their power. Ivan the Terrible has traditionally been remembered as evil incarnate—a pitiless and cruel tsar. Under Stalin, Soviet propaganda tried to build up Ivan as a major contributor to the power and unity of the Russian state. In an obvious effort to justify the existence of the Soviet secret police,

the regime spoke favorably of the quasi-military police force (the Oprichnina) which Ivan organized and used in his struggle against the boyars. In a recent effort to repudiate the cruelties, tortures, and wholesale executions for which the Soviet political police were responsible, the regime has implicitly recognized the parallel, reevaluating the Oprichnina as a force that served "to suppress the spontaneous mass movement against the feudal lords."

Whatever the twisting of the propaganda line, however, the reigns of Nicholas I, Alexander III, and Nicholas II have remained symbols for the people of the high points of tsarist repression and reaction. Certain parallels between the behavior of these monarchs and that of the present regime very probably have weakened the government's effort to identify itself in the people's minds only

with the best in Russia's national heritage.

The Bureaucracy

In the minds of the people, many of the evils of the past were attributed less to specific rulers than to a corrupt class of bureaucrats, officials, and landlords. Rebellious peasants in Russia often revered the tsar, while venting their hostility against his "kennel-keepers," his subordinates, charging that they prevented the sovereign from seeing the true condition of his people. The heroes of peasant revolts sometimes posed as pretenders to the throne, insisting that the reigning monarch was an impostor and tool of the government bureaucrats.

Today, more than in the past, a great host of subordinate officials at various levels are constantly involved in the lives of the citizens. A multitude of regulations, decrees, orders, and laws govern and dictate practically every step of each citizen's activities. The citizen may, at times, view with sympathy and understanding the difficulties faced by a local official with whom he is in frequent contact and on intimate terms. More often, however, government officials—particularly those without "local" roots—represent the impersonal, sometimes frightening, instruments of an arbitrary and capricious power.

The regime often condemns the "callous and heartless" attitude of officials toward the problems of individual citizens. It has repeatedly emphasized, though evidently with little effect on the officials, that the bureaucrat "is sitting at his desk precisely for the purpose of serving the people." The Soviet circus clown Karandash (the pencil) has won great popularity by ridiculing annoying aspects of

Soviet life, especially the red tape of Soviet officialdom. He has been disciplined several times for satirical excesses, yet, like the outspoken buffoons found in the traditional folk epics he has managed to survive.

Toward the Minorities

Government policy toward the minorities has reflected only to a very limited extent the attitude of the Russian people themselves toward the other ethnic groups of the USSR. As the dominant majority, the Russians are naturally inclined to look down on the "lesser" peoples within their country — peoples whom, in the course of history, the Russians have succeeded in dominating by force of arms, technological superiority, or sheer weight of numbers. Speaking in the very broadest terms, it might be said that some Russians regard the minorities as simple or dirty or tricky or funny, or occasionally as romantic and colorful.

Such generalizations do not imply that all Russians see the minorities through the same eyes. A Russian's opinion of a minority people varies according to the nature and extent of his contact with that people, with the extent of his education, and with his social and economic status. A peasant of central Russia is likely to be aware of very few minority groups except perhaps Ukrainians, Jews, Volga Tatars, and Gypsies; a Siberian, on the other hand, is likely to have come in contact with an enormous and confusing variety of northern nomads and Central Asians and to have formed his opinions at first hand; while a Muscovite, who has seen the minority groups chiefly in the guise of wide-eyed visitors to the city, looks upon most of them as outlandish yokels, not to be taken seriously. We may say, nevertheless, that the categories of "simple," etc., are stereotypes in the minds of the many Russians who are aware of the minorities but have had little close or intimate connection with them.

Among the "simple people" would be included all the Arctic herding, fishing, and hunting peoples, from the Lapps on the Finnish border to the Chukchee across the straits from Alaska. Representatives of these small groups seldom appear in Russian centers of population; they are encountered chiefly by government agents, personnel of Arctic weather stations, and forced laborers. Some of these groups are also described by Russians as "dirty people."

Also in this category — to some central Russians, at least — are the Central Asians and other Turkic or Mongol groups, whom Russians have traditionally identified under the general title, *Tatary*

(Tatars). In recent years they have sometimes been called *Eldash*—a scornful corruption of their own word for comrade. Toward these, however, the Russian attitude is rather ambivalent. However much they may look down on the "Tatars" of today, they are nevertheless aware of their centuries-old connection with these eastern peoples. To any Russian inclined to generalize on such matters, this connection is part of his uniqueness as a Russian, part of what sets him off from the European world. "Scratch a Russian and you find a Tatar" may have been intended as a Western insult to the Russians, but many Russians do not appear at all ashamed to claim "Tatar" blood as an explanation for the occasional Mongoloid traits in their own physical appearance.

To the Russians, two groups especially would be classified as "tricky" – the Jews and the Armenians. The Russian word for such people is *khitryy*, which actually bears a less derogatory connotation than "tricky," perhaps closer to that of "cunning," "artful," or even "astute." Though there is much anti-Semitism among Russians, and more especially Ukrainians, the feeling toward Armenians does not appear to be especially antagonistic. A Russian's delight in telling strange and often apparently pointless riddles and calling them "Armenian riddles" is a curious contradiction to the general attitude toward this people. Gypsies might also be classified among the "tricky," and certainly among the "dirty," but always, as in most

countries, with an aura of romance about them.

Georgians are also regarded as "tricky," and after the revolution some antagonism was generated by the belief that they received special treatment under Stalin. The fact that both he and Beria were Georgians may well have had an adverse effect on the Russian feeling for that people. But Georgians have also a reputation for being sunny and amusing, with some of the swashbuckling bravado that is regarded as typical of Caucasians in general. Pushkin, Lermontov, and other Russian writers of the early nineteenth century contributed much to the view of the Caucasians as romantic people.

Most of the other minority peoples elude such easy characterizations by the Russians. The Finnic groups in European Russia are by and large so much assimilated as to be considered virtually Russian; and there is little available information to indicate that any particular stereotype exists concerning the Baltic peoples, who until 1945 were not thoroughly incorporated into the USSR. A long-standing antagonism and suspicion toward Poles may have been extended to the Catholic Lithuanians. Germans in Russia have traditionally been regarded as able but rather boorish, stolid, and unimaginative.

In general, it may be said that Russians have few deep-rooted antipathies toward the other peoples of their own country, except perhaps for Poles and Jews. As the dominant people, they have tended to be condescending rather than inimical toward the minorities.

Toward Foreign Nations

Despite nearly forty years of Soviet propaganda describing the "spiritual decadence" and the predatory anti-Soviet interests of Western countries, the present attitude of the Russian people toward the West seems to be compounded of a blend of admiration, distrust, arrogance, pride, and a sense of inferiority. They are impressed by the material progress of Western nations, sensitive to their own country's shortcomings, and resentful of any suggestions that they are a "backward" people.

Soviet propaganda teaches Russians to view individual foreign countries in terms of a dichotomy between people and government, and, perhaps on the basis of their own experience in the Soviet Union, the people seem to have absorbed this view fairly readily. The official ideology insists that the governments of non-Communist nations are instruments of oppression, in constant conflict with the aspirations of the masses. A propaganda theme, muted at the present time, has been that it is not the people of these nations but their governments that are constantly conspiring to make war upon the Soviet Union.

Russian attitudes toward most foreign peoples and nations of the West appear to be formed by both traditional prejudices and official propaganda. Poles, for example, are generally regarded with distaste, if not contempt, and have been for centuries. The Nazi invasion left a heritage of latent fear of and hostility toward Germany, though the bitterness was not strong enough to prevent some Russian troops from refusing to fire on rioting East Germans in 1953.

The Russians' attitude toward the Soviet satellites is ambivalent. The Eastern European countries have been resented by some Russians as constituting a drain on Russian resources, though in fact the regime has been taking more out of them than it has put in. At the same time, there has been some feeling that thanks to the satellites "we no longer stand alone."

The peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are pictured by propaganda as struggling against exploitation by capitalist colonial powers, and probably arouse some sympathy. Official propaganda concerning the Middle East seems to have tapped a ready response in the population. The popular attitude toward Communist China seems to contain a mixture of fascination and growing

anxiety.

Despite an officially sponsored xenophobia, when the official bars are down or relaxed within the Soviet Union individual Russians are eager for friendly contacts with any foreigner who comes their way. The basic friendliness of the people as a whole toward foreigners seems symptomatic of an intense curiosity about the outside world and a general desire for peace with other nations. Like other European peoples who fought World War II on their home ground, the Russian people are anxious that their leaders avoid a war. In contrast to the basic ideological premise of a hostile capitalist world full of oppressed workers who one day will be liberated and set on the path of Communism, the regime has presented itself to the world and its own people as the leading exponent of peace and the creator of a peace bloc among nations. The people have responded to this propaganda line more than to ideological messianism, and it would be difficult for the regime to whip up enthusiasm for an openly aggressive war.

Attitudes and Social Class

Attitudes toward the regime and its bureaucracy vary with social class. Suspicious of bureaucratic ways, the peasants and to some extent the workers still seek redress through direct appeals to the fount of authority. The present effort of the regime's leaders to appear more human and more in touch with the moods of the people is an attempt to reassure the people that power will be wielded benevolently and personally. When discussing the merits of their system with foreigners, ordinary Soviet citizens stress free medical care, universal education, full employment — all "benevolent" welfare activities of the state.

The political elite and the upper levels of the intelligentsia complain that the government has not trusted them sufficiently to give them proper information and freedom so that they can take the initiative in contributing more fully to building the socialist (eventually Communist) state. The frequently voiced complaint that during World War II the people were not told the true state of affairs figured prominently in some of the attacks made against

Stalin, especially by the military. Plant managers seeking more autonomy have also asked that the regime place greater faith in them.

Some in the intelligentsia may wish reforms to go further than they have; these individuals have been the exponents of a return to "Leninist democracy" and "collective leadership." While the mass of the population does seem to respond more readily to an all-powerful but benevolent ruler, the intelligentsia, which includes much of the bureaucracy itself, after Stalin's death favored more power for itself and a diffusion of power among the top echelon. The growing pre-eminence of Khrushchev, however, would seem to point to a

reversion to the pattern of a single dominant leader.

In the meantime the Russian people are conscious of a dependence on their government and continue to expect their rulers to care for their welfare. Khrushchev's promises to rule the country with less severity and the verbal crackdown on "bureaucrats" have brought the rulers renewed favor in many eyes. In the face of supposed threats from without, the fact that the regime is after all a Russian government is likely to be sufficient in itself, as during World War II, to command the basic loyalty of at least the Russians. Threats from within are controlled, at the present time, through the totalitarian structure of the society and the lack of any clear alternative to the regime.

PEOPLES AND LANGUAGES OF THE USSR:

AN APPENDIX





PEOPLES AND LANGUAGES OF THE USSR

In dealing with the Russian use of the term narody (peoples), as that term appears in various discussions, maps, and charts dealing with the population of the country. Peoples, as the Russians use the term, are primarily groups who are bound together by a common mother tongue or who possess a sense of group identity as a result of having been so bound formerly. Physical appearance, as such, is not a basis for ethnic distinction in the eyes of most Russians, although they would of course recognize marked differences in physical traits between themselves and, for example, the peoples of the Arctic, the Far East, Central Asia, or the Caucasus.

About eighty ethnic groups of varying size and importance are officially recognized, and a number of others are distinguished by ethnologists (see the maps, Minority Groups of the USSR: Part I, RSFSR and Western Republics; Part II, Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia). This diversity is a result of the expansion of the Slavic peoples of eastern Europe in the west, north, and south, despite uninviting physical conditions and in some instances hostile populations, and of their achievement of political and economic control and progressive cultural domination of the entire area.

This expansion began as early as the tenth century, as the eastern Slavs developed trade routes between areas of Kiev, Smolensk, and Novgorod. After the Mongol invasion Moscow emerged as the center of an increasingly unified Russian state, whose territory expanded until it assumed the character of a huge empire. Major territorial objectives then were centered around the desire for access to ice-free ports and the need to secure the western and southeastern boundaries of the country against invaders — for the gently rolling





plain of European Russia offered no natural protection, other than its vastness, against the inroads of powerful neighbors. A number of wars were fought in the succeeding centuries with various European powers; by the end of World War II Russia's boundaries with European countries included nearly all of the territory it had ever claimed and gave, through Kaliningrad (Königsberg) and Riga, relatively free access to major ocean trade routes.

Most notable in terms of area, however, was the expansion to the east and southeast. Exploration of Siberia had begun as early as the sixteenth century and progressed slowly but steadily during the succeeding centuries without serious opposition from indigenous peoples. Expansion south of the Amur River was, however, prevented by Chinese troops. The land itself, with its severe climate, high mountains, and lack of river routes to the east, was a major and formidable enemy. The first Russian expeditions, sponsored either by the government or by commercial interests, established trading posts in the interior, on the Pacific, and as far east as Alaska and San Francisco. Furs were the chief items of trade in the early days, but after the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (1902) some industries were started, most of them at points where the railroad crossed the great north-flowing rivers.

Large-scale migration to the new territories east of the Urals did not begin until after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The legal restrictions upon the movement of the peasants had previously resulted in overpopulation in the rich agricultural areas of southern Russia and the Ukraine. At first the tsarist regime attempted to limit the movement of the surplus population in the interests of cheap labor. Not until the 1890's did it begin to encourage and subsidize migration to Siberia and Kazakhstan, and then largely as an instrument to reduce agrarian discontent. It is estimated that over five million people moved to the agricultural lands between the taiga and the deserts of western Siberia and Kazakhstan, displacing the native population. Though roughly a fifth of them are reported to have returned because of physical hardships, lack of adequate planning, and frictions with the local police and earlier Cossack settlers, those who remained established the Russian control of the country. A smaller number, some 450,000, migrated to the Far East to join the descendants of Cossack garrisons and the children and grandchildren of exiles and formed the basis of subsequent Russian development of that area.

World War I, the revolution, and the accompanying famine and epidemics created such widespread disruption and dislocation of

population that the eastward stream of migration and urbanization was temporarily halted. Hunger drove thousands of city dwellers and peasants from the northern regions to the proverbially rich provinces of the south, and from the cities to the countryside. But in these regions also they found famine and starvation. Those refugees who moved to the east found that the best agricultural lands were already occupied by earlier Russian settlers; they were forced to choose between returning or staying on without means of survival. The Bolsheviks in the years of the NEP (1921-28) sought to relieve the shortage of food in the European areas, particularly the cities, by requisition and high taxes in kind upon the farmers of Asia. As a result, many of the farmers became bankrupt and returned to the European areas. Simultaneously, native peoples at whose expense the earlier Russian colonization had taken place began to take matters into their own hands, and a general de-Russianization policy, temporarily tolerated by Moscow, became evident from Buryat-Mongolia to the Caucasus, wherever there had been friction between the native peoples and the Russians. Methods employed ranged from outright massacre to expropriation, but the result was a large-scale move of Russian colonists back to European Russia. The proportion of natives in the population increased because of both this withdrawal and the return to homelands of many of the minority peoples - such as the Kazak and Kirgiz, who had emigrated by thousands to China in the face of the earlier Russian colonization.

This recession of the Russian eastward movement was, however, only temporary. By 1928 the economy had become stabilized and the migration of the Slavs to the east was resumed. But the goal of this movement differed from the predominantly agrarian movement of the earlier years. Though the Soviet government continued to encourage agricultural colonization during the 1930's the major emphasis shifted and migration was chiefly to the developing industrial enterprises and urban areas in Siberia, the Fast East, and Central Asia. It is estimated that in the twelve years prior to 1939 more than five million people moved to the east from central and western Russia and the Ukraine, some as individual peasants or as workers for state and collective farms, but the majority to the new industrial centers of Soviet Asia (see the map, Major Paths of Russian Migration during the Soviet Era, Including Ukrainians and Belorussians).

By the eve of World War II the eastward population movement was declining, but the German invasion again set in motion a mass flight of the population of the southern areas. The government,


though no longer needing to provide incentives for migration, took care to control the exodus to prevent any disruption of communication lines and to insure against a large influx of people into areas lacking the facilities to absorb them. The "scorched earth" policy consisted of the removal of goods or their destruction, but more important was the evacuation of skilled personnel and industry to locations of safety. Whole plants were in fact removed and re-established in the Urals and Central Asia, along with as much as forty percent of their technical personnel. Only a small part of the rural population was evacuated, though many fled. It is estimated that some 10.5 million persons were thus transplanted. Despite government efforts to keep these peoples in the economy of the east, they began to return almost as soon as the Germans retreated.

In general, the transplanted industry was retained in the new location, though the destroyed centers of the old location were rebuilt. This, together with continued industrial expansion and the increasing need to raise agricultural production to sustain a growing and steadily increasing urban population, has created an expanding demand for labor in the eastern areas. The movement of the Russian

people toward the Pacific continues.

In addition to this eastward movement, numbers of Russians and Ukrainians as well as some of the other ethnic groups have migrated to the west and the northwest and to the northern parts of European Russia as industrial expansion and Russification proceeded in those areas. As the borders of the USSR widened to include the Baltic countries, Finnish territory, East Prussia, and sections of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, large numbers of the original population fled Soviet rule, were repatriated according to treaty arrangements to their mother countries, or were moved into other parts of the USSR by Soviet authorities. Into the vacuum thus created came Russians and Ukrainians from both adjoining and distant regions.

Climate, resources, and the exploitation of resources have been the major causes of concentration or sparsity of population in the USSR. The intense cold of vast areas of European Russia and Siberia and the high mountains of the southern portions of Siberia have been and, to a considerable degree, still are effective deterrents to settlement. But, as modern technology was introduced both in land utilization and in industry and as mineral resources were located and their exploitation was begun, the population began to move north and east — up the Pechora River into the Urals, the Kuznetsk Basin of western Siberia, the Karaganda region of Kazakhstan, and to the



Pacific. Within the last few years, development of the area along the Angara River to the northwest of Lake Baykal and Irkutsk, largely ignored in the beginning of the eastward movement, has begun.

The main artery for the eastward movement has been the Trans-Siberian Railroad. People have settled along its route across the plains in the western part of Siberia and in the mountains to the east. From it they have moved northward along the rivers, until population density along their banks runs as high as twenty-five to thirty inhabitants per square mile. There are still, however, large areas of northern and eastern Siberia that are almost uninhabited and are likely to be for many years. The frozen tundra does not attract settlers.

The mountains, semideserts, and deserts of the southern regions from the Caucasus to Central Asia have also caused large areas to remain uninhabited or sparsely settled, with pockets of densely populated land along the Black Sea Coast, in mountain valleys, at oases, and along the rivers - for example at Sochi, Bukhara, Samarkand, and in the Fergana Valley. In these areas, too, modern machinery and methods are making possible the exploitation of land and resources - hydroelectric power, oil, minerals - and the consequent support of an increasing population.

In spite of these changes the greatest population density has been and still is located in the fertile black-earth belt which includes most of the Ukraine and the areas of the RSFSR south of Moscow. With the richest agricultural land of the whole country and extensive mineral resources (the first to be developed in the USSR), it will continue to be the most densely populated area of the country for some time to come (see Table 1. Area and Population of the USSR, and Table 2. Growth of Cities of the Soviet Union, at the end

of the appendix).

Peoples of the Southwest

Ukrainians

Ukrainians, to the number of more than thirty million, constitute the largest and most important ethnic minority in the USSR. They form a large majority in their own constituent republic, and many more are to be found, as separate agricultural colonies or mingled with Russians in engineering, industrial, or administrative work, in the north Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia as far east as the Pacific.

Until the end of the eighteenth century Ukrainians were not generally regarded as a separate people, and non-Slavs are inclined

to regard them as part of the dominant Russian majority. Educated Ukrainians in modern times have always known standard Russian, often even speaking it among themselves. Many high officials of the Soviet regime — including Khrushchev — are of Ukrainian origin.

Despite these bonds with the Russians, Ukrainian nationalism and separatism have existed for at least a hundred years. The Ukraine had the richest soil and was the most densely populated part of the Russian empire; the Ukrainian capital, at Kiev, was the early center of Russian civilization. Ukrainians felt some resentment that the center of government had moved out of their territory, and that so much of the fruit of their labors moved toward the less productive north, with no adequate return. With the rise of nationalism among the nineteenth-century intelligentsia, the differences between the Great Russians and Ukrainians were stressed. The "Tatar Yoke" of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and later association with Poland and Lithuania, had contributed to these differences. The Ukrainian peasant, on his individual farm, lived differently from the less prosperous Russian peasant in his village. The urban Ukrainian looked more toward the west, was less conscious of the Asiatic hinterland.

Ukrainian nationalism has created a continuing dilemma for the Soviet regime. Its depth is difficult to assess. Committed on the one hand to encouraging indigenous language and culture and on the other to repression of separatism, the regime has often appeared to repress what it had itself earlier fostered, Collectivization, with the accompanying "liquidation" of prosperous farmers, probably did more to antagonize Ukrainians than any other act of the Soviet government. It was probably the major cause of the mass defection at the time of the German invasion in 1941. Though German behavior undoubtedly caused many Ukrainians to be more willing to bear those ills they have under the Russians, the postwar period has posed new problems. Ukrainians from the new western lands brought with them a stronger tradition of nationalism, as well as the Uniate (Rome-oriented) faith, which the regime forced them to renounce in favor of Orthodoxy. Various groups from this area have been the main source of the sporadic uprisings that continued for several years after 1945.

Cossacks

The Cossacks cannot be said to constitute an ethnic group; they deserve attention rather as a unique institution. As early as the sixteenth century they lived as marauding bands on the frontiers of

those lands still held by Moslem groups. Ukrainian or Russian (usually the former) by origin, language, and religion, they adopted many of the customs - as well as the women - of the non-Slavic tribes who were their traditional enemies. They lived chiefly in the southern Ukraine, around the lower Don, and in the Kuban area just north of the Caucasus. In the seventeenth century, under Bogdan Khmelnitsky (who is still recognized as a hero by Ukrainians and Cossacks alike), they formed an independent republic in the Ukraine, which came to an end with the death of its leader. By the eighteenth century they had acquired official recognition by the Russian government, and were given special rights in return for their continuing defense of the frontier. Trained to excellent horsemanship and other military arts, and with a thorough understanding of Turkic tribesmen and others in the area, they were in general a great asset to the tsarist regime; the Cossack Yermak, in the seventeenth century, was a pioneer in Russian occupation of Siberia. But their traditional independence also provided a problem for tsarist governments. Stenka Razin, in the seventeenth century, and Emelyan Pugachev, in the eighteenth, were Cossack leaders of peasant revolts - for which their names are honored by the Soviet regime today. At the time of the 1917 revolution, however, many Cossacks supported the Tsar, and a large number escaped abroad or were liquidated. Some of the remainder regained favor with the Communists by assisting in the suppression of uprisings in the Caucasus. Today collectivized Cossack villages still exist in the Crimea, the Don and Kuban areas, and the steppes of Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. There is little to distinguish them from other Russian and Ukrainian villages, but some traditional institutions, such as Cossack choirs and the ceremonial passing on of a sword from father to son, have been revived, with Soviet approval, since the late 1930's.

Belorussians

Of far less importance than the Ukrainians, the Belorussians constitute about three-fourths of the eight million population of their constituent republic. Others, scattered over the rest of the USSR, tend to become identified with Great Russians.

Although the Belorussians, like the Ukrainians, had for long periods lived outside the Russian empire and although some in the western areas became affiliated with Roman Catholicism, their sense of ethnic identity has never been highly developed. Belorussian nationalism exists more in theory than in practice, and its encouragement at various periods has generally been a matter of political

expediency on the part of some external group. Most educated Belorussians generally read and write in standard Russian. Since World World War II many Great Russians have been moved into the republic, especially in areas along the western border, and there is every reason to believe that the significance of the Belorussians as a separate people is steadily declining.

Moldavians

The incorporation into the USSR of the Bessarabian area of Rumania brought back into the country about a million Rumanian-speaking peasants whose lands had formerly been part of the Russian empire, along with a few cities of mixed Jewish, Ukrainian, and Russian population. The Moldavian farm land is rich, and there are some indications that collectivization is encountering resistance; but there is little available information on the subject. Moldavian peasants have traditionally led a rather isolated existence without much contact with cities or with the outside world.

Others

BULGARIANS. Some Bulgarians live in a few villages in that part of the Ukraine which was annexed from Rumania in 1940. Others, formerly reported in the Ukraine, are believed to have been either repatriated to Bulgaria or absorbed into the Russian or Ukrainian group.

GAGAUZI TURKS. About 120,000 Gagauzi Turks live in villages of the Moldavian SSR and adjacent coasts of the Ukraine. They are Turkic-speaking, but have been Orthodox for centuries.

GREEKS. There are Greeks in various Ukrainian villages, with individuals scattered widely over USSR. Of 206,000 who were listed in the 1926 census, many have since returned to Greece and others are believed to have been liquidated for wartime cooperation with the Germans. The total today is probably less than 100,000.

ALBANIANS. An insignificant scattering of Albanians live in a few Ukrainian villages. In 1926 the total number was about 3,000.

GYPSIES. About 250,000 Gypsies are to be found, living chiefly in Moldavia, the Ukraine, and Central Asia. Though the regime has made attempts to settle them on collective farms, a considerable number remain nomadic and some are still to be seen in many major cities.

The Baltic Peoples

The Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are probably the most unwilling members of the "multinational" Soviet state. All three have experienced almost a generation of political independence and there is every indication that the vast majority bitterly resented, though they were powerless to resist, the re-establishment of Russian rule over their lands. In contrast to many of the minorities the Baltic peoples, especially Estonians and Latvians, shared fully in northern European culture, had been in intimate contact with Finland, Scandinavia, and Germany, and had reached a high level of literacy and education.

The Estonians

Before World War II almost a million Estonians constituted the majority of the population of what is now the Estonian SSR. Today, as a result of war losses, emigration to the West, and the forced removal of large numbers first by the Nazis and later by the Russians, the Estonian population of their homeland has been greatly reduced. Many thousands were sent to forced labor camps; others are reported to have been resettled in the north Caucasus and in southwestern Siberia. A few have lived in the Leningrad area and in other colonies in Russia since the days of the Russian empire.

Geographical proximity with the Finns and closely related languages are both an evidence and a cause of similarity between these two peoples in religion, customs, and folk traditions. Estonia, during the period of its independence, maintained intimate contact with Finland. Like the Finns, Estonians were much interested in cooperative movements and various group activities. A very high percentage were literate and had received a secondary education. Estonian scholarship showed considerable evidence of German influence. The University of Tartu, established on the German model long before the revolution, maintained a very high reputation up to the time of World War II. Most Estonians were Lutherans, though there are a few groups who joined the Russian Orthodox Church.

Although in general the physical differences among the European peoples of the USSR are insignificant, it is pertinent to note that the Estonians are on an average the tallest people in the USSR, with the highest incidence of blond hair and blue eyes. The population of the Estonian SSR is estimated as 75 percent rural, rather thinly scattered, with dairy farming and lumbering as their chief occupations.

The Estonians' opposition to Russian rule is deeply rooted and violent. Although the most outspoken have undoubtedly been deported (especially in the "purge" of 1950), it is probable that outlaw groups still exist in forest regions of the country, with secret support by the peasants, who have been very unwilling to accept collectivization. Many Russians and other ethnic groups have been settled in the country, however, and the possibilities of a concerted uprising are very slight.

LIVONIANS. On the Baltic shore of Latvia, a few small fishing communities are all that remain of the Livonians, a people, linguistically related to the Estonians, who are no longer of any significance as an ethnic group.

The Latvians

According to the most recent Soviet estimate, the total population of the Latvian SSR is about two million. The stormy history of Latvia over the last seventeen years makes an estimate of the number of Latvians in this population very difficult, but the figure is probably between one and one and a half million. Several thousand Latvians — many in forced labor camps — are probably scattered in other parts of the USSR; and a very large number live as emigrants in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.

The history of the Latvian people has always been complicated by the political and economic power of Germans and Russians within their country. Although they pride themselves on the maintenance of their language and their ethnic identity through centuries of foreign domination, many Latvian intellectuals are at least as conversant with German or Russian as with their own language. Riga, the capital, and other major cities have long been of very mixed population, with the total of Russians, Jews, Germans, and others approaching, if not exceeding, the number of native Latvians. In rural areas, however, Latvians have predominated except in a few spots.

Latvian independence was achieved only after World War I, when the Bolshevik revolution and intervention by the German and the Allied forces had reduced the country to a state of chaos. Political dissension and dictatorship marred the whole period of independence, though notable strides were made in land reform and peasant education. Ruthless action on the part of Soviet and Nazi invaders since 1940 took heavy toll of the native population. Nationalism and anti-Russian feeling are still strong, but factional divisions, plus deportation of known resistance leaders, make the pos-

sibility of effective resistance to the Soviet remote. Russians today find the Latvian peasant reserved, suspicious, and noncommittal.

The Latvian peasants, comprising about two-thirds of the total population, have been largely stock raisers. Flax, sugar beets, and potatoes are among their leading farm crops. With a tradition of individual farms, they resent collectivization and the accompanying effort to bring them together in Russian-type villages.

The Lithuanians

Despite their linguistic connection with the Latvians, the history of the Lithuanians in modern times has been more closely connected with that of the Poles and Belorussians. They were politically associated with these peoples from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and during the earlier part of this period were the rulers of a kingdom extending over much of what is now Poland, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. It was the Poles who introduced among them the Roman Catholicism which is now their major religion, and Polish was spoken by all educated Lithuanians. Even today the population of the southern part of the country — especially in the cities — is a mixture of Poles, Belorussians, Germans, and Jews, with Lithuanians often in the minority.

Today the population of the Lithuanian SSR is about three million, of whom about two million are ethnic Lithuanians. As in the other Baltic republics, death, deportation, and voluntary emigration have materially reduced the total. Many Lithuanians today live outside the Soviet Union.

Like the Latvians, Lithuanians have resisted collectivization. During the period of tsarist Russian rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries their land was mostly held by big landowners, but land reform between 1920 and 1940 encouraged the development of small, individual farms. The Lithuanian peasant, however, was generally less prosperous and less advanced in technology and education than his Baltic neighbors. The general pattern of Lithuanian life was much like that of Poland. Lithuanians today are deeply resentful of the Russians, who have come into their country in great numbers and hold key posts in party and government. Soviet sources indicate that many refuse to learn Russian and at least through 1949 an active anti-Soviet underground was operating within the republic.

Peoples of the Caucasus

From the north slopes of the Caucasus southward into the constituent republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the narrow mountain valleys contain an immense number of ethnic groups, speaking a great variety of languages but rather similar in customs and way of life and chiefly Sunni Moslem by religion. Isolated by the nature of the terrain, many of these peoples are fiercely independent, with a long history of resistance to Russian rule both before and after the revolution. Some are Turkic speakers; various Caucasian tongues are spoken by most of the others. It has been mentioned above that several of these groups were deported eastward as a result of their alleged sympathy or collaboration with the Germans during World War II.

Generally small, dark, and wiry, the north Caucasians live by stock raising and agriculture where the land permits. Those in the more remote areas live chiefly by hunting and by occasional raids on their more settled neighbors. Excellent shots and horsemen, they preserve a rather romantic reputation despite widespread poverty and disease. Comments in the Soviet press and in literature indicate that sovietization throughout the area has been difficult. Such practices as bride-price, the "kidnapping" of brides, and blood feuds between families appear to persist, according to recent reports of cases in Soviet courts. Women are often veiled and secluded and given little chance for the schooling that the authorities are seeking to make universal. Nevertheless, some progress is being made. Western dress is tending to replace the traditional costume of long coat, cartridge belt, and fleece cap. Native writers are turning out works on the Soviet model. Improved communication and an increase in the Russian population of the area are helping to wear away the old independence. Economic necessity also tends to further cooperation with the ruling power.

Among the Turkic groups remaining in the area, the most notable are the Nogai, a chiefly agricultural group on the lower northern foothills, and the Kumyk, along the northwest shores of the Caspian. A few Turkmen from across the Caspian Sea have also settled in the area.

The Caucasian-speaking groups are so numerous as to make cataloguing difficult. Many could really be classified as subdivisions of larger groups. South of the Nogai are the Kabardins, Cherkess, and Adyge, closely related groups, each with an autonomous area. Further east, the Avars and Lezgin of the Dagestan ASSR are the

largest and most important of a great complex of groups within that republic. The Abkhaz, along the northeast shore of the Black Sea, live in an autonomous republic which is part of the Georgian SSR. They have had much contact with the Georgians, and many can speak the Georgian language at least as well as their own. Since their republic includes many resort towns of the Black Sea Coast, they have also been more exposed to Russian ways than most Caucasians.

The Osset, an Iranian-speaking people numbering about 400,000, occupy an area in the very middle of the Caucasus. Their territory has been divided into a North Ossetian ASSR (within the RSFSR) and a South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (in the Georgian SSR). The northern Osset are chiefly Sunni Moslems, much influenced by the neighboring Kabardins, while most of the southern group have joined the Russian Orthodox Church of the Georgians.

The constituent republics of the south Caucasus contain three major ethnic groups - the Georgians, the Armenians, and the Azerbaijani – of far more significance among Soviet minorities than

those of north Caucasus.

The Georgians

The Georgians, now amounting to more than two million, have lived in their present territory since the beginning of recorded history of the area. They call themselves Kartveli, and their language, with a few surrounding minor languages or dialects, bears no established relationship to any other. The Georgians accepted Christianity in the fourth century, and at least from that time on maintained contact with the Byzantine and European world. They highly value this long tradition, as well as the rich literature their people have produced since the Middle Ages. After they came under Russian rule, their upper classes were often educated in Russia and many achieved high place in the Russian nobility.

Their lands extend from the semitropical coast of the Black Sea to remote valleys in the high Caucasus; there are agricultural communities strongly reminiscent of those in Mediterranean France and Italy, and mountain villages similar to those of north Caucasus. The Georgians, held together by a common language, religion, and folklore, present to the world a combination of sunny humor, swashbuckling bravado, and a considerable amount of wily cunning perhaps born of their continuing struggle for survival against such great powers as the Turks, the Persians, and the Russians. The struggle has up to now been successful, at least so far as ethnic survival is concerned. More than almost any other Soviet people, they have remained free from direct Russian control. The Communist leaders of their republic are almost entirely Georgian, and two of their citizens sat until recently at the very peak of power in the USSR. The replacement of fallen Georgian Communists has been by other Georgian Communists; and the republic has still a very small percentage of Russians settled within its borders.

A small group of Moslem Georgians, known as Adzhars, have given their name to an ASSR on the Black Sea Coast by the Turkish border; and a few thousand more Moslem Georgians live in Turkey. Other closely related groups include some 300,000 largely agricultural Mingrel farther north along the coast, the Laz, who are chiefly in Turkey, and various mountain groups, including the remarkably isolated Swan and Khevsur in whose mountain fortresses

many medieval customs were until recently preserved.

The Armenians

Like the Georgians, the two million Armenians in the USSR take pride in the long history of their church, their language, and their literature. Christian since the fifth century, they have maintained the general independence of their church despite some sectarianism. Only about 60 percent of the Armenians of the USSR live in their rather barren republic. Others are scattered over the Caucasus and through the major cities of the country in general. Many more—perhaps millions—are distributed over the rest of the world.

Persecution by the Turks has made the Armenians relatively amenable to Russian rule. Some have even come to the USSR since the revolution, but the poverty of life in Soviet Armenia is said to have disillusioned the majority of these immigrants. Nevertheless, the Armenian capital at Yerevan is reported by foreign travelers to be one of the cleanest and most modern-looking cities of the USSR, and Armenians such as Mikoyan and Tevosyan have risen to very high places in the Moscow government. Although Armenians have in the past been considered traditional enemies of the Georgians, little friction has been reported in recent years between the two groups. With the Moslem peoples of the Caucasus, however, relations are strained. Caucasian Moslems regard the Armenians as sharp traders likely to get the better of them; Armenians consider the Moslems backward and bloodthirsty. Within the Armenian SSR there is little Russian or other non-Armenian population, and Armenians hold most if not all of the positions of authority within their local government and party organization.

The Azerbaijani

The two million Azerbaijani within the Azerbaijan SSR are in effect not separated as a group from the larger number of Azerbaijani across the Iranian border, and they have been used by the Soviet regime — with little success — as bait to attract the group in Iran. Of the Turkic-speaking groups in the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani are among the most Westernized, though they maintain their religious affiliation as Shia Moslems. They seem to have had little national consciousness before the revolution, though some were from time to time involved in Pan-Turkic movements. Since 1917 the Azerbaijan SSR has been presented as a sort of model for other Turkic republics; but Russians, who are present in large numbers around the Baku oil fields, hold key posts in the government and party, and there have been occasional purges among Azerbaijani Communists who were suspected of "bourgeois nationalism."

The Azerbaijani are chiefly agricultural, except for those who work in the oil fields. Many stock-raising families migrate between winter and summer quarters, but most of the rural population has been collectivized. Education has apparently made rapid advances in Azerbaijan, and most of the population is believed to be literate. The position of women appears to have changed materially from the traditional Moslem situation that existed up to the revolution.

Minor Groups in Transcaucasia

TALYSH AND TAT. The Talysh and Tat are small, Iranian-speaking groups in southeast Azerbaijan. They also are Shia Moslems, except for some Jews among the Tat. Together the two groups amount to some 140,000 people. Like other small indigenous groups in the republic, they are all believed to know Azerbaijani as a second language.

KURDS AND ASSYRIANS. The Kurds and Assyrians, who live in scattered colonies in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR's, are fragments of much larger groups in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. The Kurds, considered a dangerous minority in other countries, are not sufficiently numerous in the USSR to constitute a problem for the Soviet regime. Amounting to perhaps 50,000, they have been settled on collective farms. There is very little available information concerning their present condition. A still smaller number of Assyrians — perhaps 20,000 — are believed to be still in existence in Armenia, where in the 1930's they retained their language, their writing system, and their branch of the Christian Church. Soviet attempts

in the 1920's to use these two peoples for propaganda to Assyrians and Kurds abroad have apparently been abandoned.

Peoples of Central Asia

The five Central Asian SSR's represent a division, at least partly artificial, of the major Turkic- and Iranian-speaking ethnic groups who have lived in that area for many centuries. Partly nomadic, partly settled in agricultural, artisan, and commercial communities, these peoples, as their physical appearance shows, are a mixture of immigrants and invaders from Iran, Siberia, and Mongolia. Almost all are Sunni Moslems, though among some groups Islam provides a thin veneer over earlier shamanistic practices. Highly conscious of past glories, they cling to the memory of heroes, historic and legendary, whom they celebrate in numerous epics, and to time-honored traditions and customs. Sovietization and Russianization have been especially repugnant to these peoples and have met with resistance both active and passive.

The Uzbek

Each of the five constituent republics of Central Asia contains elements of the whole area, but in varying proportion. Almost five million Uzbeks in the Uzbek SSR include the inhabitants of ancient Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva, whose language and culture show definite traces of earlier association with, or perhaps even immigration from, Iran. These cities are divided, as they have been since the Russian conquests of a century ago, into Uzbek and Russian quarters, and Russians still look down on the "squalid" native city with its narrow, dirty streets and on the people with their long cotton robes and skullcaps or turbans. Western costume has been adopted by many, and many of the more ambitious send their children to the Russian schools rather than to the native schools which are also available; but there is little social mingling between Uzbek and Russians, and hostility in general toward the conquering people and toward the disruption of the old way of life is strong. The Russian government, both before and since the revolution, has promoted the raising of cotton under irrigation in Uzbekistan, and fruits and cereals are also grown. Farming has been almost completely collectivized, and many Russians and Ukrainians have come in, especially to the cotten farms. A few Uzbek in the less fertile areas may have remained nomadic stock raisers.

As a result of their long association with the Islamic world, of

which their cities were once centers of commerce and learning, the settled Uzbek are among the most devout Moslems in the USSR.

The Turkmen

The 800,000 Turkmen in the SSR of that name are chiefly agricultural, though there are still some nomads in the extensive desert areas of the republic. Other Turkmen live in Iran, and there has been some friction in connection with border violations on both sides. The Turkmen are divided into several tribes, each centered at an oasis. Settled communities are chiefly along the Iranian border, where Ashkhabad, the capital, is located, and along the Amu Darya river near Uzbekistan. A few have migrated across the Caspian to the Caucasus. Traditionally, the men shave their heads and wear a skullcap, over which they put a high fleece cap. The republic has undergone less development than the others of Central Asia, having comparatively little to offer in the way of natural resources. The nomadic Turkmen are believed to be especially antagonistic to Russian rule.

The Kazak

The Kazak were formerly the most numerous of the Turkic peoples in the Russian empire, but resistance to the Russians, to collectivization, and to sovietization in general has reduced their numbers now in the USSR to about three million. Many emigrated across the border to Sinkiang province of China; others were killed or deported to forced labor camps. Among those who remain, the Kazak in and around the city of Alma-Ata are said to show little active resentment; and it is very difficult to assess the degree of animosity among the surviving nomads or the collective farmers of the remote districts. It is probable that collectivization created more resentment than did interference with religious practices, as the Kazak were probably the least profoundly Moslem of the Central Asian groups.

Soviet development of the Kazakh SSR has been both agricultural and industrial. The influx of Russians and others from the west has been such that the Kazak form a bare majority in the republic as a whole and a small minority in the northern part. The Kazakh SSR has also been one of the spots for "relocation" of liquidated minorities from European Russia and the Caucasus, and the great mixture

of peoples is said to have created new animosities.

Traditionally, the Kazak were almost entirely nomadic. Divided into several tribes, or "hordes," they lived in felt huts called yurts,

raised horses and cattle, and enjoyed such sports as horse racing and falconry. Travelers regarded them as a gay, carefree, friendly people. Historically, they have had much contact — though often as rivals and enemies — with their Mongol and Oyrot neighbors to the east, and they show more Mongoloid physical traits than do most of the other peoples of Central Asia.

The Kirgiz

The Kirgiz are close to the Kazak in location, language, appearance, and custom, but since their area is largely mountainous their way of life is somewhat different. Traditionally, they moved with their herds between high summer quarters and lower land in winter. About 800,000 Kirgiz form a large majority in their republic, though there has been considerable immigration from the west. The Kirgiz did not, before the revolution, consider themselves as an ethnic group distinct from the Kazak; there was, in fact, much confusion in the use of the two names, and the whole group was really a collection of "hordes," with minor variations of dialect from one to another. Like the Kazak, many Kirgiz now live across the Chinese border in Sinkiang province.

The Kara-Kalpak

Around the southern shores of the Aral Sea, in an autonomous republic of the Uzbek SSR, about 180,000 Kara-Kalpak, all rural, raise cotton and other agricultural products. By language these people appear most closely related to the Kazak and Kirgiz, but, perhaps through contact with the Uzbek, they are much more devout Moslems and further removed from nomadism. The Uzbek consider them rather a backward people. Forced conversion from food raising to collective cotton growing is said to have worked considerable hardship on them. The name Kara-Kalpak, signifying "black cap," refers to the traditional black fleece headgear of the men.

The Tadzhik

Of the Tadzhik, about a million live in the USSR, chiefly in the Tadzhik SSR, which, with the Kirgiz SSR, is the most mountainous area in the USSR. There are also many Tadzhik in the Uzbek SSR. Another million live across the border in Afghanistan and Iran. The Tadzhik speak a language closely related to Persian and share many traditions with the Persians. The Soviet regime has encouraged Tadzhik claims to a major share in early Iranian culture. Where the

soil and elevation permit, the Tadzhik have a reputation for being able and industrious farmers; they have also had a part in the commercial life of Central Asia. It appears that they have been less violent in their reaction to Soviet rule and collectivization than the other peoples of Central Asia. Although the Tadzhik are Sunni Moslem, some of the small related groups in the Tadzhik hinterland — known as Mountain Tadzhik — are Shiites. Some friction between the two sects is reported.

Minor Groups

THE UIGUR. The Uigur, amounting to perhaps 100,000, are actually a collection of several small groups, in language close to the Uzbek, who live in the neighborhood of Alma-Ata in the Kazakh SSR presumably as collective farmers. Others live in Sinkiang province in China.

THE DUNGAN. The Dungan, numbering 25,000 in 1926, are Chinese-speaking Moslems who are believed to have sought refuge in Central Asia from religious persecution in China during the nineteenth century. According to tradition, they are descended from Central Asian Moslems who were invited in medieval times to the court of the emperor of China. They are said to have initiated cultivation of rice and tea in the Fergana valley, near where the Kirgiz, Uzbek, and Tadzhik SSR's come together.

Peoples of East European Russia

The minority groups in east European Russia are numerous and vary widely from each other, but assimilation into the Great Russian group is far advanced in this area. The degree and pace of this assimilation varies with proximity to Russian centers of population and inversely to the concentration of the group within its area and its isolation from other groups. In areas where groups are mixed, the Russian language becomes a lingua franca and ethnic entity is more easily lost.

Each of the minority groups in this area is of sufficient account to have been given either an autonomous republic or a national okrug within the RSFSR. Linguistically, these groups fall into two main classes — Finnic and Turkic. These Finnic peoples are not very closely related to the west Finns, but the linguistic bond has been sufficient to have occasioned sporadic movements among them toward an all-Finnic unification.

Of the Turkic peoples in this area – the Chuvash, Tatar, and Bashkir – the Chuvash are so distantly related to the other two as to have no sense of kinship.

The Komi

The Komi are officially recognized as having two groups: about 220,000 Zyryans of the more northerly Komi ASSR, extending from 60 degrees north latitude almost to the Arctic Ocean, and an estimated 150,000 Permians, of the Komi-Permian National Okrug immediately to the south.

The economy of the Komi in general varies from reindeer herding, hunting, fishing, and lumbering in the north, to agriculture and some industry in the south. The population becomes denser and more mixed, the level of education higher, and the degree of

assimilation greater as one moves southward.

The Komi have been officially Russian Orthodox since the fourteenth century. Although the first written work in Komi dates back to the era of Christianization in 1372, there was no encouragement of national culture under the tsars and national aspirations arising in the nineteenth century were suppressed. The development of a national literature under the Soviet regime has been a source of satisfaction to the Komi.

A special feature of life in the Komi ASSR has been the existence of the great complex of labor camps around Vorkuta. Association with forced laborers in lumber camps and elsewhere did not seem to breed unrest among the Komi. Reports indicate, rather, that they were inclined to aid the government in keeping order and preventing the escape of convicts. Russianization is increasingly evident among the younger generation, and if present trends continue there seems little question of the eventual complete assimilation of the group.

The Udmurt

About 600,000 Udmurt, or Votyak, comprising slightly over half the population, live in the Udmurt ASSR, between the Komi-Permian National Okrug to the north and the Tatar and Bashkir ASSR's on the south. A few thousand more are scattered about the neighboring areas. Association with the now extinct Volga Bulgars, the Tatars, the Russians, and the Chuvash has materially affected their Finnic language, their customs, and their economy.

Their literacy rate before the revolution was low. Many had until recently retained their animistic faith, despite efforts to convert

them to the Russian Orthodox Church. They are chiefly agricultural, though their soil is poor and their implements, before the revolution, were primitive. Today their farms have been thoroughly collectivized.

Oppressed for centuries by more powerful neighbors, the Udmurt welcomed the autonomy promised them by the Communists. Shortly after the revolution, however, the Soviet authorities created resentment by transferring the Udmurt capital from Glazov, an almost purely Udmurt town, to Izhevsk, a more cosmopolitan and Russianized industrial center. Demands for greater autonomy came to nothing, however, and the Udmurt today seem resigned to their situation.

The Mari

In 1939 there were approximately 481,000 Mari, or Cheremis, in the USSR, of whom about 400,000 or less formed a bare majority in the Mari ASSR, which runs along the north shore of the Volga and the northern borders of the Chuvash and Tatar ASSR's. The rest of the group are scattered through these latter republics and the Bashkir, farther to the east.

In religion, most were officially Russian Orthodox by the time of the revolution. Although native animism persisted, a few Mari, especially in the Bashkir ASSR, were Moslems. A new nationalistic religion, called Kugu Sorta, which was developed in the nineteenth century by certain Mari, attracted numerous adherents. Its followers were tolerant toward other religions, but violently anti-tsarist. The religion experienced a boom after the October Revolution and, though condemned by Soviet leaders as being dangerously nationalistic, was openly practiced as late as the 1930's. Literacy, which before the revolution was rated as low as 14 percent, has risen with the expansion of native schools.

The Mari are primarily an agricultural people, whose farms are now almost completely collectivized. Industry in the republic is centered largely on lumbering, since forest resources are extensive.

In the civil war years many of the Mari joined with Tatars and others in counterrevolutionary fighting. Large numbers were liquidated as a result and no further uprisings have been reported, though it is possible that members of the Kugu Sorta sect and Pan-Finnic intellectuals are carrying on anti-Bolshevik activity underground. The exact degree of assimilation of the Mari into the Russian group is impossible to judge from available data.

The Mordvinians

The Mordva ASSR is closer to Moscow than any other officially recognized minority area, but only about one-third of an estimated 1.4 million Mordvinians, or Mordva, live within that republic, forming about 37 percent of its population. Other Mordvinians are scattered over surrounding areas, and in 1926 the Soviet census indicated more than 100,000 living in Siberia or in the Kazakh SSR.

Recent maps do not show any Mordvinians in these areas.

The language of the Mordvinians is divided into two dialects, Erzya and Moksha, so different from each other that Russian is generally used for communication between speakers of the two. All Mordvinians speak Russian, and many have lost their native language. Although they were largely illiterate before the revolution, illiteracy is by now generally overcome; a Mordvinian literature has developed, but large numbers of Mordvinians, especially those outside the ASSR, are literate in Russian rather than their original language. The familiar pattern of a Russian Orthodox overlay on an animist base applies to these people.

Before the revolution and throughout the NEP period, most Mordvinians worked on individual farms. There was less tendency toward collectivization than among other Finnic groups. As a result, many of the more successful resisted the forced collectivization of the first Five Year Plan. These were liquidated, along with other kulaks, and there is no further evidence that the Mordvinians, as such, have resisted sovietization or are likely to do so. Under Russian domination for centuries, they are the most Russianized of

any large minority group in the RSFSR.

The Chuvash

The culture of the Chuvash is isolated from that of other Turkic peoples. Their small ASSR, northeast of that of the Mordvinians, is the home of about 800,000 Chuvash, over 70 percent of the republic's total population. Another half million live in neighboring areas.

The Chuvash people accepted Russian Orthodoxy long before the revolution, and for many years they have mingled freely with the Russians. Their claim of being descended from the Volga Bulgars (or Bolgars), who ruled that general area before the Mongol invasion, is open to doubt but is a definite part of Chuvash mythology, frowned on by Soviet authorities.

The Chuvash is an agricultural region, and there has been no great concentration there of industrial development. Hence the

proportion of Russians has not increased as rapidly as in some neighboring republics, and the language has had more opportunity to survive and develop a literature. There was some resistance to collectivization in the early 1930's but it was quelled, and since then the Chuvash have made little trouble for the Soviet regime.

The Volga Tatars

More than three million Volga Tatars, the largest ethnic minority in the RSFSR, are scattered over an area extending from Moscow far into Siberia. The greatest concentration is in the Tatar ASSR, around Kazan on the Volga, where something over one million form less than half of the total population. With a well-developed literary and cultural tradition predating the revolution, they have been among those most "guilty" of Pan-Turkic activity. The Tatars have been described as "guinea pigs" for the Soviet nationality policy, since the Communists have conducted many experiments on them in making theoretical autonomy conform with Communist principles. Even Tatar Communists, forced to reconcile Communism with their Islamic and Turkic traditions, have had to be disciplined by the central authorities. But the Tatars have preserved their language and to some extent, despite a continuing campaign of antireligious propaganda, their Moslem religion.

The Tatar ASSR is largely agricultural, though some oil wells have been sunk in the area and there are also coal mines. A large number of the Tatars outside the ASSR are miners who migrated in the nineteenth century; others are among the industrial workers in the Moscow area. The Tatars constitute not more than half the population of the republic; in Kazan University, shortly before World War II, only 17.2 percent of the students were Tatars. It is evident that, although Tatars survive as an ethnic group, Russians, even in the Tatar ASSR itself, are strongly entrenched in positions

of control.

The Bashkir

The Bashkir, closely related in language to the Tatars, who sought to include them in the Tatar ASSR shortly after the revolution, were awarded a large ASSR east of the Tatars. There they represent only about 20 percent of the population. Including small groups scattered over a fairly wide surrounding area, they numbered, according to Soviet figures for 1939, about 843,000 in all. Many are reported to have been killed in uprisings shortly after the revolution.

Less developed before the revolution than the Tatars, the

Bashkir were in tsarist times pushed off their traditional pasture land by the Russians and took to marginal farming. Under the present regime, especially since the discovery of oil in their ASSR, they have been increasingly dominated by Russians; at the same time they have been repeatedly attacked for nonfulfillment of norms and other economic sins. They have not taken to industrialization, perhaps because of Russian domination.

Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir ASSR, is a religious center for the Moslems of the USSR. The Bashkir themselves are Moslems, but

reputedly are not very ardent in the practice of their faith.

Bashkir literature since the revolution has often been attacked for "nationalistic deviations." Available reports indicate that the morale of the Bashkir in general is low. There is some evidence that Bashkir who rise above the bottom of the Soviet social scale are likely to identify themselves as Tatars.

Peoples of Northwestern USSR

The minority peoples of the northwest are all speakers of west Finnic languages and descended from groups in the area before the influx of Russians during and after the eighteenth century. With the exception of the Lapps, their languages are mutually comprehensible.

The Karelians

About 150,000 Karelians are living today within the Karelian ASSR, where they constitute about one-fourth of the population. An approximately equal number live in the Kalinin Oblast, southeast of Leningrad. Other scattered communities in the same general area appear to have officially lost their identity through absorption into

the Russian group.

The Karelians are closely related to the Finns in language and cultural tradition, though, under Russian influence, they long ago accepted the Orthodox Church. Karelians, like Finns, are much given to cooperative, community activity, and much of their folklore is identical with that of the Finns — notably the great epic called *Kalevala*. They are traditionally small farmers in scattered villages, with a lower level of education and literacy than the average Finn. Many have emigrated to Finland, and many more would like to be united with that country. Outside the Karelian ASSR the process of assimilation has been at work, however, and the new generation of Karelians is becoming increasingly Russianized.

Others

THE FINNS. Scattered about the Leningrad area and the Karelian ASSR are an indeterminate number of Finns, some of whom have been in Russia since tsarist times, while others—including some from the United States—came to the USSR with the encouragement of the Soviet government during the depression years. Individual colonies are small; almost nowhere do they form a majority of the population. Their significance among the minorities of the RSFSR is slight.

THE VEPSE. East of Moscow and south of Lake Onega, the Vepse, least developed technically or socially of the west Finnic groups in the RSFSR, now are being rapidly Russianized. In 1926 there were 31,000 in the area; the number is probably smaller today. Even in tsarist times most Vepse were bilingual; though they were given a few native schools under the Soviet regime, these have apparently been abandoned.

THE LAPPS. Scattered over the Kola Peninsula in the extreme northwest of the RSFSR are 1,800 Lapps, members of a much larger group in an area which also includes parts of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The Kola Lapps are mostly seminomadic fisherman or reindeer herdsmen. They have created no serious problems for the Soviet regime, and there are no reports of notable defections into Finland or Sweden.

Peoples of Northwest Siberia

In the arctic tundra regions of northwest Siberia are the remnants of several hunting, fishing, and reindeer-herding peoples, amounting in all to not much more than 50,000 and greatly outnumbered by Russians.

Beginning in 1929 the area was divided into the Nenets National Okrug, running from the White Sea seven hundred miles east along the shores of the Arctic; the Yamalo-Nenets National Okrug, around the Ob estuary and east almost to the Yenisei; the Taimyr National Okrug, east of the Yenisei mouth; and the Khanty-Mansi National Okrug, immediately to the south. Some of the Yenisei valley is not included in any national okrug.

The Samoyed

In the three most northerly okrugs are various groups speaking related Samoyedic dialects distantly related to the Finno-Ugric lan-

guages. Chief among these are the Nenets, who numbered in 1945 about 15,000, including a scattering on the Kola Peninsula and on the Arctic islands of Novaya Zemlya. Other groups officially recognized are the Nganasani (about 1,000) and the Selkup (about 1,600). Under the Soviet regime, these peoples at first had the impression that they would become truly autonomous but were disillusioned and violently hostile when the central government collectivized their reindeer herds. Soviet attempts to educate them to Communism with the use of their own language were unsuccessful, and there is evidence that continuing attempts at education have been in Russian.

The Khanty and Mansi

The Khanty-Mansi National Okrug is inhabited by two groups speaking languages related to Hungarian. Of the Khanty there were reported to be 22,000 in 1945, of the Mansi about 6,000. In addition to herding, hunting, and fishing, they occasionally work in lumber camps; in the southern part of the area they have taken to agriculture. In appearance they are much like the Samoyedic groups, one of which, the Selkup, occupies a small part of their territory.

The Ket

Along the upper Yenisei, east of the Khanty-Mansi, a very small group known as the Ket, probably less than a thousand in number, still officially exist. Further information concerning them is not available.

Peoples of Southern Siberia

The peoples of the mountainous region along the Mongolian border speak Turkic and Mongolian languages and are often distributed over areas on both sides of the border. Since the Mongolian People's Republic is thoroughly dominated by the Soviet Union, the question of divided loyalties in this regard is not a problem for Soviet authorities: a more important question is that of these people's own aspirations as an ethnic group.

The Altai

Altai is the name officially used by Soviet authorities for a group of about 50,000 people who prefer to be known as the Oirot. They live in the Mountain-Altai Autonomous Oblast adjoining the Mongolian and Kazakh borders. In the eighteenth century this Turkic-

speaking group was a great force in Central Asia, at times controlling much of what is now the Kazakh SSR. Conquered by the Russians, they remained conscious of former triumphs. At the beginning of this century a nativistic religion, known as Burkhanism, was widely adopted among the Oirot, who began agitation for the setting up of an independent Oirot state. An attempt to set up such a state in the chaotic years after the October Revolution failed; the Oirot did, however, receive an autonomous oblast. The change of its name to Mountain Altai in 1948 is evidence of Soviet suppression of continuing Oirot nationalism.

In the lower parts of their oblast the Oirot have become settled farmers, now undoubtedly collectivized. Trapping, logging, and stock raising are among their other activities. Various newspapers and books are published in their language, using a Cyrillic alphabet. Most Oirot know Russian, but there is little to indicate that they are losing their ethnic identity.

The Khakas

Some 50,000 Khakas, now mostly collective farmers and stock raisers, compose only about 20 percent of the Khakas Autonomous Oblast, north of the Mountain-Altai. A few more live north of the oblast. This shamanistic, Turkic-speaking people has resented, both before and after the revolution, Russian encroachments on its land, and its leaders have from time to time tried to make common cause with other Turkic groups in this general area. These attempts have resulted only in repression, and since World War II there have been no reports of disorders.

The Shor

Although the Shor, or Shortsy, are still recognized as a "people" on Soviet maps, it seems probable that they have almost lost their identity as an ethnic group. In the 1920's they were awarded a national okrug to the west of the Khakas Oblast, but this was eliminated in 1939. In 1939 they were said to number about 16,000. Turkic-speaking Moslems, they lived largely by hunting. Extensive deposits of iron in their area attracted Russians both before and after the revolution; by 1950 the Shor, formerly hostile and suspicious, had apparently been largely absorbed into the mining community.

The Tuvinians

The Tuvinians are a Turkic-speaking people, but they have long been fairly closely associated with the Mongols and Mongolian was formerly their literary language. About 50,000 now live in the Tuvinian Autonomous Oblast (formerly the Republic of Tannu Tuva), on the Mongolian border east of the Mountain-Altai. Others are in the Mongolian People's Republic.

Their region is largely mountainous, but there is sufficient grassland to have supported successful cattle raising, and on this account the Chinese and Russians long contended for domination over them. Annexed by Russia in 1914, they were given independence after the revolution but tended to gravitate toward Mongolia. The Soviet regime, disapproving this tendency, assumed increasing control over Tuvinian affairs by means of Moscow-trained Communists. A Tuvinian alphabet with Latin and, later, Cyrillic letters was created, and newspapers, which had formerly been in Mongolian, were all changed to Tuvinian. In 1944 the Republic of Tannu Tuva was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Buddhism, with remnants of shamanistic practices and beliefs traditional among the Tuvinians, has been discouraged by Soviet

authorities but still persists to some extent.

The Buryat Mongols

These people, numbering about 250,000, are a minority in the Buryat-Mongol ASSR south and east of Lake Baykal, the Ust'-Orda Buryat Mongol National Okrug to the west, and the Aga-Buryat Mongol National Okrug farther east. Others are scattered in neighboring areas. Their language is closely related to that of the people of Mongolia, and attempts were made in the 1920's and 1930's toward a sort of synthesis of the two languages but the Soviet regime suppressed this evidence of Pan-Mongolism.

The Buryat Mongols are largely settled agriculturists, although in the eastern part of their area there were formerly many nomadic herdsmen. Some have become industrial workers in the cities of

their ASSR.

Although some Buryat are shamanists and others have officially adopted the Russian Orthodox religion, Buddhism is the religion of most. The Soviet authorities have varied between suppression of this faith and exploitation of it in connection with international policy in the Far East. At the time of the purges in 1936–38 many Buryats were accused of anti-Soviet activities and purged, but Soviet policy since then has been limited to a milder process of sovietization.

Peoples of Northeast Siberia

This huge area, containing some of the coldest places inhabited by man, was until the eighteenth century inhabited chiefly by nomadic groups of reindeer herders, hunters, and fishermen. They were

chiefly shamanistic.

Over the whole area, since the eighteenth century, there has been increasing colonization by the Russians, drawn by strategic considerations and by the rich mineral deposits in the area. Today, Russians in Arctic weather stations, Pacific ports, and mining enterprises — including large numbers of forced laborers — undoubtedly outnumber the total of other groups.

The Yakut and Dolgan

The Yakut are by far the largest and most advanced minority group in the area. More than 250,000 of them live in the Yakut ASSR, an area about as large as India. The city of Verkhoyansk, in the northeast of their republic, is probably the coldest town in the world. Farther to the southwest, however, around the Lena River,

the land is tillable and collectivized farming is practical.

The Yakut are a Turkic-speaking people who have produced some literature and are highly conscious of their ethnic identity. They resisted the revolution during and after 1918, and Yakut nationalism persisted even among those who accepted Communism in the 1920's. Collectivization encountered such resistance that many Yakut were deported to forced labor camps in distant areas, while other forced laborers were imported into the ASSR to work the gold mines in the eastern part. Sovietization of the Yakut appears to have been a difficult process, especially as they retained a deep-rooted dislike of Russians, but Russian control of their supposedly autonomous republic has been constantly increased, and even numerically the Yakut do not constitute a majority in their own ASSR.

The Dolgan, a group of less than 1,000 near the Arctic Ocean, speak Yakut, though they are historically related to the Evenki. They appear to be losing their identity by absorption into these two groups and into the neighboring Samoyeds.

The Even and Evenki

These peoples, who speak various dialects distantly related to Manchurian, wander over an area stretching all the way from the Yenisei River to Sakhalin. To the west of the Yakut ASSR, the Evenki, or Tungus, have at least given their name to a national okrug. Soviet efforts to organize and collectivize their reindeer herding have met with resistance, but since the total number of Evenki in this huge area is only about 50,000 their importance in the Soviet economy is slight. The Even, or Lamut, farther to the east, are even less in numbers and importance.

The Yukagir

Of the Yukagir, a fishing and reindeer-herding people, a remnant of about 500 were reported in 1945 in the Kolyma River area. Their language, bearing no established relationship to any other, has been largely replaced by Russian and other neighboring languages, and they are thus losing their identity as a group.

The Chukchee

These people, important chiefly because of their location, number about 12,000 on the Chukchee Peninsula, opposite Alaska, where they have been allotted a national okrug. Many fish and hunt sea mammals; others engage in reindeer herding. The Chukchee formerly had some contact with American and other fur traders from across the Bering Strait, and the Russians have gone to some effort to indoctrinate them with a bias against these "greedy merchants." In 1950, seventy-six schools (many of which are boarding schools) were established in the area, the largest being at the Russian port of Anadyr and at a center near the eastern tip of the Peninsula. The language of the Chukchee is one of a small group within the same general area. Many along the coast have adopted the language of the neighboring Eskimo.

The Eskimo (Yuit)

The Eskimo of the Chukchee Peninsula and Wrangel Island numbered in 1945 only 1,300, but were part of a group extending to the American St. Lawrence Island and Alaska. They are said to resent the restrictions on visits to the American-owned settlements, and the "specialization" on a single occupation (such as seal hunting or net mending) that has apparently been forced on them by the regime. Schools for the Eskimo have been established at Anadyr and elsewhere.

The Koryak

The Koryak National Okrug, south of the Chukchee, crosses the base of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the head of the Sea of

Okhotsk. The Koryak people, related to the Chukchee in language and with similar customs, totaled approximately 7,000 in 1948. Despite the setting up of some schools in the area, the Koryak are reported to have undergone very little sovietization.

The Kamchadal

This group, on the west shore and in the interior of Kamchatka, also speak a language related to Chukchee; but Russian has now replaced their own language to a great extent, and they have since before the revolution lived in close contact with the Russians, with whom in the nineteenth century they fought a losing battle that nearly brought about their extermination. In 1926 less than a thousand could speak Kamchadal, and they seem to be on the road to extinction as a separate group.

The Aleuts

This is a tiny group of about 400 in the Commander (Komandorski) Islands. Even before the revolution they were largely Russianized and had accepted the Russian Orthodox religion. They have not for many years maintained any contact with the Aleuts of Alaska. Soviet authorities reported that they were the first group to attain 100 percent literacy, presumably in Russian, and several are party members. They raise blue foxes on their island and hunt sea otters.

Peoples of the Lower Amur and Sakhalin Areas

On the lower Amur, in addition to the Jews of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, six ethnic groups are now recognized. Five speak Tungusic languages, related to those of the Even and Evenki, and all have representatives across the Manchurian border.

The Nanai and Related Groups

Chief among the Tungusic-speaking groups are the Nanai, or Goldi, of whom there are about 6,000 in the RSFSR. Soviet ethnic maps indicate that they, as well as other minority groups of the area, have been moved away from the border. Today these people show a mixture of Mongoloid and Russian physical traits. Formerly hunters and fishermen, they now are largely settled on collective farms or absorbed into the industrial labor force of Komsomolsk. Small related groups, the Udekhe, the Ulcha, Orochi, and Orok, amount to only about 3,000. Many persons in these five groups now

know Russian better than their own language. They are fast losing their identity as ethnic groups.

The Nivkh

About 4,000 Nivkh, or Gilyak, living near the mouth of the Amur, on adjacent islands, and in northern Sakhalin, speak an isolated language. They live chiefly by fishing and retain a shamanistic faith, for which they have from time to time been attacked by Soviet authorities. They understand Russian but appear to retain their own language, which has been given a written form.

The Ainu

Although recent Soviet ethnic maps do not recognize the existence of any Ainu within the RSFSR, Soviet sources have elsewhere noted the presence of over 1,500 in southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. A much larger number are on the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The relationship of the Ainu language to any other has not been established. The people are shamanistic and live chiefly by fishing and hunting sea mammals. They are generally short and stocky and possess Mongoloid traits, with one exception — they are notably hairy. This hairiness has led Europeans to create a sort of myth concerning the "Western" appearance of the Ainu. A Soviet claim that the Ainu are "fanatically pro-Russian" is perhaps connected with this myth; it seems to have no basis in fact.

Scattered Peoples of the USSR

The Jews

As in other countries, Jews in the USSR are unique when considered as an ethnic group: they have no traditional area within the country, many do not speak Yiddish, and they have long been at least partially assimilated into the Russian group. Even their religion, their strongest unifying and distinguishing factor, is not an infallible criterion for deciding whether a citizen of the USSR is considered, by himself or others, to be a Jew. In Russia, as elsewhere, the Jews might best be considered as those who are conscious of their descent from people who many centuries ago emigrated from the eastern Mediterranean, bringing with them a religion that was national in character; who lived, chiefly as traders and shopkeepers, in many cities of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, usually maintaining

some contact with their coreligionists across national borders; and who, as early as medieval times, were generally set apart in ghettos

and subjected to varying degrees of persecution.

Russia, before the revolution, had a larger Jewish population than any other country. In 1909 more than five million Jews, nearly half the Jewish people of the world, lived in the Russian empire. Though there had been much mixture with other groups, the majority were still distinguishable by dress and appearance, as well as by religious practice and language, and were generally restricted to certain cities, chiefly in Belorussia and the Ukraine. Many, however, were able to escape these restrictions, and by 1917 a number

were active among the Russian intelligentsia.

Several Jews, including Sverdlov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, were active in the October Revolution. As convinced Bolsheviks, these men were not inclined to identify themselves as members of any religious group. But a Jewish Communist group known as the Bund sought to preserve Jewish identity. In the 1920's the Jews were recognized as one of the nationalities within the Soviet Union. Iewish schools and Yiddish newspapers and theaters were encouraged, although the Jewish religion became a special target of the League of the Militant Godless. Zionism and other evidences of international connections were increasingly frowned upon, and many Jews were removed from border areas for strategic reasons - thus increasing the Jewish population of the RSFSR, since the border areas were chiefly in the Ukraine and Belorussia. However, many Jews of the tsarist Russian empire were in Poland and other areas lost by Russia in 1918; the total in 1927 for the Soviet Union as a whole was something under three million, of whom over a million were in the RSFSR.

Largely at the insistence of Kalinin, a party leader and chairman of the Supreme Soviet, a movement developed in the 1920's and 1930's to create a "Jewish homeland" within the RSFSR. In 1928 an area along the Amur River on the Chinese border, previously settled by small groups of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, was set aside for Jewish settlement. Generally known by the name of its capital, Birobidzhan, this area was officially set up as the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in 1934. As late as 1936, however, only 19,000 Jews, less than a third of its total population, had settled in Birobidzhan. Most Jews were unwilling to go so far from former homes or to take up the agricultural life that they felt might be forced upon them. Even within the oblast, as a matter of fact, most of the Jews managed to pursue an urban existence, allowing other groups to develop the

agricultural potential of the area. During the war the population of the oblast increased considerably, but in 1942 still less than half of its 100,000 inhabitants were Jewish. The population in 1948 has been estimated at 185,000; but recent Soviet ethnic maps indicate only a few spots of Jewish population within the oblast. The vast majority of Jews in the RSFSR, then, live outside the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.

During the NEP period of the 1920's, despite restrictions on religion and internationalism, Jews lived relatively well in the USSR. Many took part in the "free enterprise" trading that was permitted at this time. With the end of NEP, however, coinciding with the downfall of Trotsky and the eclipse of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Jews came under fire as profiteers, or "Nepmen," and many were liquidated during the early 1930's. Jewish schools were discontinued. There is good reason to believe that Stalin played upon the latent anti-Semitism of the Russians to win support for himself. After liquidation of the "Nepmen," however, active anti-Semitism receded, though many Jews fell victims, along with Russians or others, to the great purges of 1936–38.

The Nazi attack of 1941 caught many Jews in occupied territories, although the Soviet authorities evacuated some of them to the east. A great number of Jews in Russia lost their lives during World War II. The Soviet regime, meanwhile, called for Jewish loyalty and presented itself as a defender of Jews against the Nazis. In the United Nations the Soviet Union supported the foundation of

the State of Israel.

In 1948, as part of the campaign against "cosmopolitanism," Jews again came under attack in the RSFSR. The attack was not ostensibly aimed at Jews, but one by one Jewish newspapers were suppressed and Jewish theaters were closed. Earlier support for Israel was replaced by violent opposition to Zionism. According to recent Soviet announcements, Stalin was responsible for these anti-Jewish moves, and he is accused of the execution of a number of Jewish writers. In recent years, synagogues and at least one Jewish theater have reopened and Hebrew prayer books have been published; but deportation of Jews from cities in the western SSR's is reported.

The Poles

No recent figures have been released on the number of Poles in the USSR, but it is believed that there are several hundred thousand, chiefly in the western Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, despite transfers of population after World War II. Many were sent to Central Asia during the war, and some have undoubtedly remained there. Their attachment to the Catholic Church and the traditional animosity between Poles and Russians have undoubtedly made life difficult for them, and there is no evidence that the regime has given them any recognition whatever as an ethnic group. According to a 1957 report, the USSR is in the process of sending 400,000 Poles back to Poland.

The Germans

Before World War II, more than two million Germans lived within the territory now included in the USSR. About half of these were in the Volga German Republic, the southern Ukraine, and various small colonies in Siberia. The remainder were in and around Königsberg in East Prussia (now Kaliningrad Oblast) and in various parts of the three Baltic countries. Of the latter group, a large number migrated to or were moved to Germany after 1945, while others were shipped east for resettlement or forced labor, as were almost all the Volga and Ukrainian Germans.

Germans have lived in Russia for centuries, maintaining their language and customs as well as their efficient farming methods. In European Russia and the Ukraine they were inclined to look down on the Slavic farmers who surrounded them, and were resented

because of their attitude and their greater prosperity.

Liquidated Peoples

During World War II seven ethnic groups were removed en masse from their home territory and given no further recognition as ethnic groups. Their autonomous regions were renamed or incorporated into other administrative units, and members of other groups, chiefly Russians and Ukrainians, moved into these areas. Many people from the liquidated groups were sent to forced labor camps, but most were resettled in Siberia and Central Asia. Restricted to these areas, they were deprived of voting and party membership rights and limited in their choice of employment.

Five of the groups originated in or near the Caucasus. Of these the north-Caucasian-speaking Chechen and the closely related Ingush, numbering together about 500,000 in 1939, had the most consistent record of violent opposition to Russian rule. Two smaller groups from the northern Caucasus, the Turkic-speaking Karachai and Balkar, were also deported, as were some 130,000 Kalmyk, a

Mongolian group from the northwest shore of the Caspian. Signs of rehabilitation began with the publication of a Chechen-language newspaper in 1955; in 1956, Khrushchev denounced the Stalin policy of deportation of these peoples and hinted at the complete restoration of their rights as Soviet citizens. Finally, on February 11, 1957, it was officially announced that they would be permitted to return to their homelands, which would again become "autonomous" administrative units.

For the other two of the seven liquidated peoples, the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars, there has been no talk of restoration of their autonomous republics. Of the Crimean Tatars, a group closely related to the Turks of Turkey, there has been no recent official mention; it is possible that they are being absorbed by other Turkic groups in Central Asia. The Germans, on the other hand, have apparently regained full rights of citizenship, including permission to return to their homeland.

The announcement of rehabilitation of liquidated peoples leaves many questions as yet unanswered. The present size of these groups, undoubtedly reduced as a result of the hardships they have suffered, is not known. Further, there has been no announcement concerning the people who now occupy the lands to which these groups are to be returned. The rehabilitation policy in general seems to represent an effort to eliminate the source of some of the bitterest criticism leveled against the Soviet regime.

Languages

The fact that a great number of languages are spoken in the USSR gives substance to the Soviet claim that theirs is a multinational country. These languages vary in importance from the official languages of the fifteen constituent republics to moribund tongues in the Arctic and eastern Siberia, of no more present significance than the American Indian languages of the United States. Many of these lesser languages are dying out completely, while others are being absorbed, sometimes through official action, by related languages. The Soviet census of 1926 indicated that more than 150 languages were recognized as mother tongues of Soviet citizens; since then, the number has been reduced to about eighty.

Of these eighty languages, Russian, spoken as a mother tongue by a clear majority of the total population, is of even greater import in the linguistic structure than the present number of speakers indicates. The official language of the central government of the USSR, it has since 1938 been compulsory as a second language in the schools of all minority areas. Russians have spread to all parts of the country; throughout the RSFSR, and in many of the other republics, they are to be found in key governmental and party posts. The learning of Russian has become an obvious avenue of political and economic advancement for minority peoples; and Russianization, especially among the lesser minority peoples, has become a constant

and largely voluntary process.

Minority nationalism is, of course, a force working in the opposite direction. Among many of the minorities, especially those most conscious of their own cultural traditions, there has been some degree of resentment at the encroachment of the Russians and their language. This resentment dates back to tsarist times, and the Soviet government has sought to combat it by awarding linguistic autonomy to all significant minority groups. The constituent republics, containing most of the largest non-Russian ethnic groups, were encouraged to develop their own language and literature, and smaller units - autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and national okrugs - were set up, largely in the RSFSR, to give similar linguistic autonomy to smaller groups. Despite these gestures, the Russians have not been able to eliminate minority resentment. Their retention of political and party control results in their being identified with a regime that most of the minorities regard as oppressive. Nevertheless, the force of individual self-interest has been strong enough to outweigh this resentment, at least so far as language is concerned; and the percentage of Soviet citizens who neither speak nor understand Russian is being constantly reduced.

The Russian Languages

Standard Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian belong to the eastern branch of the Slavic language group, which in turn is a part of the extensive Indo-European language family. It is thus related to most of the languages of Western Europe, and more closely to West Slavic (including Polish and Czech) and South Slavic (Bulgarian and the languages of Yugoslavia). The three East Slavic languages are all descended from a common "Russian" of medieval times; only after the fifteenth century did Ukrainian and Belorussian gradually come to be recognized as separate languages. Standard Russian is still often known as "Great Russian" (velikorusskiy) to distinguish it from the other two, which are also considered fundamentally Russian. Actually, the speech of peasants in border areas shows a grad-

ual "shading off" among these three languages, and all three are easily understood by the speakers of any of them.

Standard Russian

Standard Russian, in addition to being the chief language of the USSR, has become a general language, or lingua franca, for all Slavic peoples. The international position of Russia and the brilliant flowering of Russian literature in the nineteenth century have made the language an object of study among South Slavs and Czechs, and even among the Poles, who have been traditionally inimical to Russia. Although degree of mutual comprehensibility is difficult to measure, there is no question that the other Slavic peoples find little difficulty in learning Russian, much less than Americans, for example, find in learning German. Russian has been the chief vehicle for Pan-Slavism - the appeal for unity and brotherhood among all Slavs - which some Russians, especially before the revolution, did their best to exploit. Since World War II the drawing of other Slavic nations into the Soviet orbit has further promoted the learning of Russian in these nations.

Americans and others accustomed to languages with few inflectional endings usually regard Russian as a "difficult" language. It has six cases and three genders which affect the inflection of nouns and adjectives, and the distinction of "aspects" of the verb presents difficulties for English-speaking students. Certain Russian combinations of consonant sounds also are difficult for Americans, but the stresses and intonation patterns of the language are very much like those of English. In vocabulary, the relationship of Russian to the Western European languages often can be clearly seen, and borrowings from Greek, French, German, and English are frequent. Russian also preserves a considerable legacy from Church Slavic, a medieval South Slavic language which was the vehicle for the introduction of Christianity in the tenth century, and which is still used in services of the Orthodox Church; and there are an appreciable number of borrowings from Turkic and other minority languages of the USSR. To provide for new ideological, scientific, and technical concepts, many words have been built on Slavic roots to parallel German or Latin structures; but the Russians never have gone as far as the Germans in seeking to "nationalize" new terms.

Russians regard their language as exceedingly rich and beautiful, and their view is shared by many foreigners. Oratory and recitation have flourished; while there has been little insistence on maintaining a "purity" of sound or grammar, there has been remarkably little dialectalization, except on the Belorussian and Ukrainian border. There are, however, slight differences between the educated pronunciations in Moscow and those in Leningrad, and people of other areas can be distinguished by minor phonetic peculiarities. The Moscow accent appears now to have become the official standard for radio broadcasting and for teaching non-Russians. There are sufficient traces of class distinction in pronunciation to permit the successful performance of a translation of Shaw's *Pygmalion* (which centers on such distinctions) in the Moscow theater.

Most Russians look down on the other languages spoken in their country; few make the effort to learn a minority language. Russian teachers in Central Asia have lately been attacked in the Soviet press for failing to learn the local language; but in general Russians see little need for such learning, since they can find Russian speakers in almost all parts of the USSR.

Ukrainian

The development of Ukrainian as an officially recognized separate language is intimately tied up with the history of the area in which it is spoken. Until the dissolution of the Tatar empire, Church Slavic was, for the ancestors of both Russians and Ukrainians, the official literary language. As early as the fifteenth century, however, writers were using the vernacular, with a strong overlay of Church Slavic, Polish, and Latin, and by the seventeenth century "Little Russian" (malorusskiy), or Ukrainian (ukrainskiy), was sufficiently recognized for a grammar of the language to be published. There was and still is - much dialectal variation among speakers of Ukrainian. Dialects have been classified into four groups: northern, Carpathian, southeastern, and southwestern. Of these, the last two, centered around Kiev and Lvov respectively, are by far the most extensive, and it was from them that standard literary Ukrainian developed. Standard Ukrainian established itself widely as a spoken language among urban and educated Ukrainians, and a considerable literature in the language was produced in the nineteenth century. The rise of Ukrainian nationalism in the last half of that century caused the Russian government to ban publication of works in the Ukrainian language. As a result, Ukrainian writers began publishing in those cities of Austria-Hungary where Ukrainian was spoken. After the revolution, Ukrainian became the official language, first of the Ukrainian National Republic, then of the Ukrainian SSR. World War II brought the incorporation of those areas of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania where Ukrainian was spoken (though not always

by a majority of the population) into the Ukrainian SSR.

The attitude of the Soviet government toward Ukrainian has been rather ambivalent. At the time of the revolution, peasants of the area spoke their various dialects and many were unfamiliar with standard Russian; but in the cities Russian was probably as much used as Ukrainian. However, suggestions that Russian be made official, since it was the language of the more "advanced" urban sector of the population, met with violent resistance from Ukrainian Communists. Until about 1930 use and philological study of the Ukrainian language was encouraged; after the disruptions caused by the first Five Year Plan, however, the Soviet regime began to decry nationalistic tendencies among Ukrainian scholars, and since that time the language has had little encouragement, though it continues to appear in many published works and to be taught in the schools.

Ukrainian speakers in the USSR are second in numbers to the Russians themselves. They have spread far beyond the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, even across Siberia as far as the Pacific Coast. Among Ukrainian peasants there are still many who use Ukrainian exclusively; but urban and educated Ukrainians are coming increasingly to the use of Russian, though often with an accent that identifies them.

Belorussian

Belorussian, or White Russian (belorusskiy), which has a history somewhat similar to that of Ukrainian, shows far less vitality and is of much less significance. Officially it is the language of the people in the Belorussian SSR, with a scattering elsewhere in the USSR. Actually, dialects having some of the peculiarities of Belorussian are spoken by peasants as far east as Bryansk in the RSFSR. As they move west, the dialects show increasingly the effect of their proximity to the Ukraine and Poland. The dialects have been classified into two main divisions, northeastern and southwestern.

The emergence of a standard literary Belorussian has been gradual. The Russian officially used in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the Duchy of Lithuania - an area embracing most of the present Belorussian SSR - was not recognized as a language different from that of Moscow, but surviving documents show many of the divergences characteristic of Belorussian today. Polish influence through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strongly affected vernacular writers in the area. After the annexation of this territory by Russia in the last half of the eighteenth century and the subsequent banning by the Russian government of publication in the vernacular, Belorussian came increasingly to be published abroad and in the Latin alphabet, with an orthography modeled on Polish rather than the traditional Cyrillic. The first dictionary in the language was published in St. Petersburg in 1870; a grammar was not published until 1918, at the time of the short-lived Belorussian National Republic. When the eastern part of the area was joined to the Soviet Union as the Belorussian SSR, there was much scientific study of the language; the present standard Belorussian alphabet, in Cyrillic letters, differing only in a few letters from the Russian, was made official in 1933.

The Belorussian language today is less divergent from standard Russian than is Ukrainian. Even some of the differences of orthography in the written language do not reflect actual divergences in pronunciation. Little is actually being written in Belorussian, and all the literate population of the SSR can read standard Russian. Teaching of Belorussian continues in the schools but is losing ground as a language among educated citizens of Belorussia.

Other Slavic Languages

The census of 1926 recognized the existence within the USSR of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, and Bulgarians who together numbered almost 500,000. While some of these peoples — especially the Poles — are probably still represented, they have not in recent years been recognized as indigenous ethnic groups, and there are few recent records concerning them, though Polish schools in Lithuania have been reported. Undoubtedly many of them have adopted Russian as their language.

The Baltic Languages

The languages of Latvia and Lithuania are the last survivors of the Baltic language group, more closely related to Slavic than to any other group within the Indo-European family, although far from being comprehensible to Slavic speakers. (Although Estonia is known as a Baltic republic, its language is of the Finnic group.) The Baltic languages, especially Lithuanian, are in some ways more closely related in structure to such older languages as Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit than is any other modern Indo-European language.

They are thus of special interest for historical linguists. Latvians and Lithuanians take much pride in this indication of the antiquity their language.

Lithuanian

The earliest surviving Lithuanian written documents date only from the sixteenth century, and not until the nineteenth, with the rise of nationalism, did a significant body of Lithuanian literature come into being. Lithuanian emerged as an official national language with the independence of Lithuania in 1918. The country had for centuries been under Slavic domination; Russian, Polish, Yiddish, and German were widely spoken in the cities and had contributed many loanwords to Lithuanian. Attempts at "purification" of the language involved the replacement of these loanwords with terms of true Lithuanian origin. In many cases the language was entirely lacking in words connected with modern urban life, and new words were created on old roots. The standard literary language was evolved from a dialect spoken in the southern part of the country. Its alphabet, based originally on Polish models, was reformed after 1918; it is in Latin letters, with certain diacritical marks.

In Soviet Lithuania today, despite the fact that Russian is taught in all the schools and is the language of much official business and of all scientific and technical textbooks for advanced study, there appears to be considerable resistance to mastering Russian, even at a fairly high level of education. It is even reported that some Russians in Lithuania still find it expedient to learn Lithuanian in order to communicate with the indigenous population - a rather unusual tribute to the persistence with which Lithuanians cling to their language.

Latvian

Latvian has undergone less Polish admixture than has Lithuanian and has been more influenced by German and the Scandinavian languages. Its relationship to Lithuanian is not close enough for mutual intelligibility.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Latvian was spoken chiefly by peasants. Urban Latvians, especially those in Riga, were at least as familiar with Russian or German as with Latvian. As in Lithuania, literature in the vernacular accompanied the nationalist movement which began shortly after 1800. The language was generally written in German letters and orthography. A standard literary language, based on a central dialect and using the Latin alphabet and an orthography similar to the Lithuanian, was evolved after the emergence of an independent Latvia in 1918. This remains the official language of Latvia today; but population shifts have increased the percentage of Russians, especially in the cities, and Russian has probably made more progress here than in Lithuania.

Iranian Languages

The Iranian languages, including the Persian of Iran and various languages of Afghanistan and Pakistan, belong, like Baltic and Slavic, to the Indo-European family. They are spoken by several groups in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Tadzhik

Tadzhik is the official language of the Tadzhik SSR. About 400,000 inhabitants of this mountainous republic speak related dialects which are not today officially recognized. Tadzhik is also spoken across the border in parts of northern Afghanistan. The language is closely related to standard Persian of Iran, and Persian was, before the revolution, the literary language of the people; but the spoken language shows the influence of Turkic, especially Uzbek. In 1927 the vernacular was standardized, with a Latin alphabet, which was replaced by the Cyrillic after 1939. Despite this standardization of a language distinct from Persian, the Tadzhik have been encouraged by the Soviet regime to maintain their bond with Persian culture. They had always shared with Iran the literary monuments of the Persian past; today they are claiming at least some of the early Persian poets as their own. There is considerable evidence that the USSR is using the language bond, here and elsewhere, as a means of attracting peoples of related languages outside the Soviet Union.

Ossetian

Ossetian is spoken by the inhabitants of the North Ossetian ASSR in the northern Caucasus and of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast immediately to the south and within the boundary of the Georgian SSR. Its difference from Tadzhik and Persian is great enough to prevent mutual intelligibility; it has been influenced by neighboring Caucasian phonetic patterns. The language has been written, using a modified Cyrillic alphabet, since before the revolution.

Talysh and Tat

Two other Iranian dialects, Talysh and Tat, are very close to the Persian of northern Iran. Talysh is spoken on both sides of the boundary between Iran and the Azerbaijan SSR, near the Caspian Coast. About 90,000 speakers are in the USSR and about 50,000 in Iran. All Talysh are reported to be bilingual, using Azerbaijani as their literary language.

Tat is spoken by about 90,000 Moslem and Jewish inhabitants of an area west of Baku in the Azerbaijan SSR, with scattered groups

to the north and west.

Kurdish

Of the five to ten million Kurds in the Near and Middle East, an estimated 50,000 to 80,000 are found in scattered groups in Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. Their language is distinctly separate from Persian and Tadzhik, although, like other Iranian languages of the USSR, it belongs to the same southwestern subgroup. Hundreds of Kurdish books and pamphlets have been published in the USSR, and a drive to attract Kurds into the country has apparently met with some success.

Others

A small group known officially as Dzhemshidy, whose native language is the Persian of Iran, are recognized as a separate "people" in southern Turkmenistan. In the same general area some 10,000 Baluchi — named Beludzhi on official Soviet maps — speak the Iranian language of the Baluchi of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Other Indo-European Languages

Moldavian

Moldavian is written in Cyrillic script, though during Rumania's interwar possession of the area Rumanian, in Latin characters, was the standard written language. Moldavian is a Romanic language, descended from Latin, but the admixture of Slavic is very high.

Armenian

Armenian is an isolated member of the Indo-European language family. The language has been written, in its own alphabet of Greek origin, since the fifth century. Slightly over a million Armenians live in the Armenian SSR, and almost as many in other parts of the USSR, especially in other parts of the Caucasus and in the Ukraine. All generally retain their language. More than a million others live outside the USSR, in the Near and Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. The language has developed several dialects, of which one has been established as the standard literary language of the Armenian SSR, while an older, "classical" Armenian is still used as a church language. Armenians have great reverence for the antiquity and literary records of their language; it is one of the few languages of the USSR on which the Cyrillic alphabet has not been imposed. Linguistic autonomy in Soviet Armenia has been a selling point in the movement to attract Armenians from other lands into the USSR.

Yiddish

The Yiddish language is based on Middle High German of the four-teenth century, with a large admixture of Hebrew and Slavic vocabulary. The number of speakers in the USSR is difficult to determine, because many Jews have taken Russian as their mother tongue. Yiddish speakers are scattered in various parts of the country, especially Moscow, Leningrad, Moldavia, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Birobidzhan), the Far East, Central Asia, and possibly Riga and Vilna where many lived before World War II.

Turkic Languages

The Turkic languages are outside the Indo-European family. They are generally grouped with the Mongolic and Tungusic (or Manchurian) groups in the Altaic language family. About fifty million Turkic speakers are spread out over an area stretching from eastern Siberia and China to Yugoslavia. Almost half of these are the Osmanli Turks of the Turkish Republic, while twenty million are within the USSR. The breaking down of Turkic languages into subgroups is a very difficult matter, since the paths of various Turkic peoples have crossed and recrossed, separated and come together many times in the course of their largely nomadic history. The languages today might be characterized as a number of central groups, close enough to be at least to some degree comprehensible to each other, with a few widely divergent peripheral languages.

A further complication arises from the fact that many of the Turkic languages, before the revolution, remained unwritten. Several groups used literary languages different from their spoken tongue, and vernacular speech developed an enormous number of dialectal

variations. There was little agreement among scholars or speakers as to the nomenclature of the various languages and dialects.

Soviet policy has brought some order out of this chaos, though often with ulterior motives. Standard Turkic languages for five constituent republics — the Azerbaijan, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirgiz — have been evolved, in some cases with little regard for national feelings and aspirations. Several smaller autonomous units have also been awarded official Turkic languages, and a total of eighteen Turkic-speaking ethnic groups is recognized on recent Soviet maps.

Historically, most of the Turkic languages have been influenced by their contact with Islam and with Iranian civilization. Arabic and Iranian words have been incorporated, and have in some cases affected the sound pattern of the language. Under the Soviet regime the officially recognized languages, many of which were traditionally written in Arabic letters, were given a Latin orthography, later replaced by Cyrillic. Many Russian words, especially

in the fields of politics and technology, have been added.

Most Turkic-speaking peoples, especially those of Central Asia, are conscious of the linguistic bond which unites them to each other and to the Osmanli Turks of Turkey; and the official measures described above may be at least partly explained as an effort to prevent potentially dangerous "Pan-Turkic" movements. Rural inhabitants of the Central Asiatic Turkic republics are inclined to reject not only Russian but also the standard language of their republic in favor of their own particular dialect. Only the Turkic peoples of European Russia seem to have been affected to any notable degree by Russianization.

Many groupings of the Turkic languages have been attempted by scholars, and the complications mentioned above have so far prevented any very general agreement. The grouping below is largely on a geographical basis, with an attempt to take into account notable similarities of languages far removed from each other in

space.

Azerbaijani and Turkmen

Azerbaijani and Turkmen, spoken on opposite sides of the Caspian Sea and in adjacent areas of Iran, are close to each other and to Osmanli Turkish. Azerbaijani has possessed a literary form since the fourteenth century and is used as a general means of communication through much of the Caucasus and northern Iran. Turkmen, with

under a million speakers in the Turkmen SSR and somewhat less in Iran, is also spoken by various scattered groups in other Central Asian SSR's and in the Caucasus.

Close relatives of these two are two others — the language of some 200,000 Gagauzi Turks of the Moldavian SSR and that of the remaining Crimean Tatars.

Volga Tatar and Others

The Volga Tatar language is spoken by about half of the inhabitants of the Tatar ASSR and in many settlements to the west, east, and southeast. Volga Tatars before the revolution formed a sort of link between the Russians and the peoples of Central Asia, acting as interpreters and traders. Today most of them speak Russian

in addition to their native language.

The Bashkir, who constitute about one quarter of the estimated 3 million citizens of the Bashkir ASSR, speak a language very close to Tatar, and many educated Bashkir become absorbed into the Tatar group. In this group may be included several languages of the northern Caucasus, among them Nogai and Kumyk, as well as Karachai and Balkar; the speakers of Karachai and Balkar were dispersed — and probably resettled in Central Asia — in 1943.

Kazakh and Kirgiz

The formation of the official languages of the Kazakh and Kirgiz SSR's is simply the standardization of two of a collection of closely related dialects covering both republics. The Kara-Kalpak, Oirot and Uigur languages may also be considered within this group, though influenced by Turkmen.

Uzbek

Uzbek is the language of settled communities in the old trading centers of Bukhara and Samarkand and of various neighboring groups, formerly nomadic. In the language of the settled Uzbeks there is a large admixture of Persian. Uzbek speakers are the largest Turkic-speaking group in the USSR.

Tuvinian and Others

To the northeast of Central Asia, near the Mongolian border, lies yet another concentration of Turkic peoples, whose languages do not differ greatly from those of Central Asia. Principal among these are the Tuvinians of the former republic of Tannu-Tuva (now an autonomous oblast of the RSFSR) and the Khakas immediately to

the north. The remnants of another people, the Shor, also speak a language within this group. The Tuvinians were formerly closely associated with the Mongols; until 1930, Mongolian was the literary and official language, spoken by the few educated people of the country. It was under Russian influence that Tuvinian assumed a written form, with a Latin alphabet, and officially replaced Mongolian. Some time after their annexation to the USSR in 1944 the Tuvinians adopted a Cyrillic alphabet, and many Russian words have been introduced into their official language.

Yakut

The Yakut language is sometimes classed with the northeastern Turkic group; but this classification is scarcely justifiable, since its divergence from Tuvinian is at least as great as that of Tuvinian from the Central Asian languages. The language had a Cyrillic written form before the revolution, though a large part of the population were illiterate nomads; and its literature before and since 1917 has been the vehicle for a nationalism that has raised considerable problems for the Soviet regime.

Chuvash

The language of the Chuvash is so different from the other Turkic languages as to be scarcely recognizable as a related language. The language has been written in Cyrillic letters since before the revolution, and the language connection is so distant as to form no bond with other Turkic-speaking peoples.

Mongolic Languages

Only two Mongolic languages are spoken in the USSR. Of these, Kalmyk has disappeared from that area as a result of liquidation. Buryat Mongolian is spoken by the inhabitants of the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, near Lake Baykal, and by two smaller groups in the same general area. It bears a fairly close relationship to Khalkha-Mongolian, spoken in the Mongolian People's Republic to the south.

Tungusic Languages

The Tungusic languages are spoken by two largely nomadic groups, the Even and Evenki. Along the border of Manchuria on the Amur River are a few other small groups of Tungusic-language speakers, most of whose languages are also spoken across the border.

Finnic Languages

The Finnic languages belong to the Uralic language family, which also includes the Ugric and Samoyedic groups. The question of relationship between Uralic and Altaic languages has been raised but not convincingly answered. Of the Finnic languages, the best known is the Finnish of Finland, which belongs in the western subdivision of the group.

West Finnic

These languages are spoken by over a million Estonians, some 400,000 Karelians, and perhaps 100,000 Finns in the USSR, as well as by several smaller groups, and they are by far the most important branch of the Finnic group.

FINNISH AND KARELIAN. Although Finns and Karelians were estimated to constitute not more than one quarter of the inhabitants of the former Karelo-Finnish SSR, Finnish was the official language of the republic. (In 1956 this SSR became the Karelian ASSR, as it had been known also until 1941, and no information is at present available on what may now be the official language.) The various Karelian dialects are so close to Finnish that Karelians find no difficulty in understanding it. In 1937 an attempt was made to set up an official Karelian language in Cyrillic characters for the Karelian ASSR, but with the annexation by Russia of bordering Finnish lands in 1940 the plan was dropped. The acceptance of Finnish, with the Latin alphabet which was already the standard in Finland, was undoubtedly connected with a desire to make the new SSR attractive to Finns across the border.

The distinction between Karelians and Finns arises not from linguistic differences but from extent of association with the Russians. The Karelian dialects are liberally salted with Russian loanwords, and many Karelians have even adopted Russian as their language.

ESTONIAN. During the period of Estonian independence (1918–40), a standard language was adopted from the many dialects spoken in the area, and attempts at "purification"—the elimination of German and Russian loanwords—were carried out with considerable success, partly through adaptation of words in the closely related Finnish language. Estonians take some pleasure, however, in the maintenance of local dialects, which are much used by Es-

tonian writers. Since annexation by the USSR, many Russian loanwords have again crept into the language – probably more than before 1918.

OTHERS. Minor West Finnic languages in the neighborhood of Leningrad – including Vepsian and Vodian (or Vote) – are either dead or moribund; but in the far north some 1,500 inhabitants of the Kola Peninsula speak the Lapp language, a conservative and divergent member of the West Finnic group, which is also spoken over northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

East Finnic

East Finnic includes Cheremis, or Mari, of the Mari and Bashkir ASSR's, and Mordvinian, spoken in and near the ASSR of that name a few hundred miles east of Moscow. Although under the Soviet regime they have developed a literature in their languages, there is little doubt that all of them, and especially the Mordvinians, are coming to use Russian increasingly as their mother tongue. East Finnic languages are too distant from West Finnic to allow for mutual comprehension.

Permian

The Permian languages include Udmurt, or Votyak, with probably less than 600,000 speakers in the Udmurt ASSR east of Kazan; and Zyryan, or Komi, spoken by some 400,000 citizens of the large Komi ASSR and the Komi-Permian National Okrug farther to the south. Udmurt speakers are turning gradually to the use of Russian, but the more isolated Komi, the written records of whose languages date back to the thirteenth century, show more inclination to resist the encroachment of Russian.

Ugric Languages

The Ugric languages, of which Hungarian is the most important, are represented in the USSR by two closely related languages — Khanty, or Ostyak, with about 23,000 speakers, and Mansi, or Vogul, with only 6,000. Both languages are spoken in the Khanty-Mansi National Okrug around the Ob River. They have developed a written language, chiefly under the Soviet regime and are said to have preserved considerable vitality, with little Russianization.

Samoyedic

Samoyedic, which stands as a separate group within the Uralic family, is spoken in various dialects by about 20,000 people in three national okrugs scattered along the Arctic shore from the White Sea eastward to a point well beyond the mouth of the Yenisey River. Their dialects have seen little development under the Soviet regime.

Caucasian Languages

In the area generally known as the Caucasus, the mountainous isthmus between the Black and Caspian Seas, there is one of the most remarkable conglomerations of languages in the world. The nature of the terrain has brought about a high degree of isolation for a great variety of peoples who, for one reason or another, moved into the area in the course of many centuries. In addition to the Turkic and Indo-European language groups mentioned above, there are two distinct language families represented, whose relationship to each other or to any other languages has not been established. These are generally known as the North Caucasian and South Caucasian language families. For intergroup communication, Azerbaijani has generally been used in the north and east, Georgian in the southwest. It is probable that Russian is increasingly replacing the others for this purpose.

North Caucasian

No very definitive analysis of the North Caucasian language family has yet been made, but a subdivision into two groups, the northeastern and northwestern, has been widely accepted. Both groups have affected, and been affected by, Turkic languages spoken in their general neighborhood.

NORTHEASTERN GROUP. The northeastern group, spoken chiefly in the Dagestan ASSR, includes more than 20 languages, of which 5 appear to be officially recognized by Soviet authorities to-day: Dargin (or Dargwa), Avar, Lezgin, Lek, and Tabassaran. Many of the lesser languages of the group are unwritten, and their speakers use one of these 5 as a literary language. Speakers of this group in the Caucasus today number about 500,000. The Chechen and Ingush, including approximately 400,000 speakers within the same

group, were deported from the area after 1943, but have lately been reported in Central Asia, where they have been granted some linguistic autonomy.

NORTHWESTERN GROUP. The languages of the northwestern Caucasus include Cherkess, or Circassian, whose various dialects are spoken by the Kabardins of the Kabardian ASSR and by the inhabitants of the Adyge and Cherkess Autonomous Oblasts, including in all about 250,000 speakers. Abkhaz, spoken by some 60,000 along the Black Sea Coast near Sochi, is of the same group.

South Caucasian

Of the South Caucasian languages, only Georgian, spoken by over 2 million in the Georgian SSR, is recorded on a recent Soviet ethnic map. Related languages, including Mingrelian (about 300,000 speakers) and Swan (about 25,000) as well as Laz (spoken chiefly across the border in Turkey), are apparently now considered no more than dialects of Georgian, which is used as the literary language; in the 1930's, however, there was some publication in the vernaculars, and some present use of Mingrelian in elementary schools is reported.

GEORGIAN. The Georgian language (Russian, *Gruzinskiy*, and Georgian, *Kartuli* or *Kartveli*) has a literature going back to the tenth century and written records as early as the fifth. The Georgian alphabet, formed, like Armenian, on a base of Greek, is still retained, despite Soviet efforts at Latinization in the 1920's. The language is jealously guarded by its people, and there has been little intrusion of Russian into its vocabulary.

Semitic Languages

The Semitic languages, which include Arabic, Hebrew, and Aramaic, are not widely represented in the USSR. Arabic, used in Moslem religious practices, has contributed some loanwords to the vernacular of Soviet Moslems in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Volga area. Hebrew is still used in the few remaining Orthodox Jewish synagogues but is not a vernacular language for Jews of the USSR. An Aramaic dialect, however, is still used by a group known as Assyrians, estimated in 1939 at 20,000, most of whom live in the Armenian SSR. Although in the 1930's the Soviet regime gave much attention to the Assyrians, they are no longer included on Soviet

ethnic maps. Attempts to use them as a magnet for dissident Assyrians in other countries apparently met with little success.

Paleo-Asiatic Languages

The term "Paleo-Asiatic" does not apply to a language family. It is used simply as a convenient name for the surviving remnants of five separate language families which show no kinship with other languages in the USSR and which are spoken by an estimated 30,000 people, chiefly in Eastern Siberia. They include: Yenisei Ostyak, or Ket, in a small area in the upper Yenisei valley; Yukagir, spoken by scattered groups near the Kolyma River; Nivkh, or Gilyak, on northern Sakhalin Island and the opposite mainland; Ainu (not recognized on Soviet ethnic maps) on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and in northern Japan; and the Chukchean languages, of Kamchatka and the Chukchee Peninsula. Of this last group there are three — Chukchee Koryak, and Kamchadal, of which Chukchee, spoken in the area near Bering Strait, is most important from an international point of view because of its location.

There has been some speculation as to the possible relationship of the Paleo-Asiatic languages with languages of North American Indians and the Eskimo. Though such a connection seems probable, it is certainly very distant and of little more than historical interest. Two other languages, however, are spoken on both sides of the Russo-American boundary: Aleut, on the Commander (Komandorski) Islands and the Aleutians; and Yuit, an Eskimo language, in the immediate neighborhood of Bering Strait.

Most of these languages were given a written form under the Soviet regime, but in recent years those speakers who had much contact with Russians or opportunities for education have tended to adopt Russian as their language.

Far Eastern Languages

Korean and Japanese, though undoubtedly spoken by large numbers of Japanese and Koreans in Eastern Siberia, have no official recognition as languages of the USSR. The same is true in general of Chinese, except that a small group of Chinese-speaking Moslems of Central Asia, known as the Dungans, have been recognized as a Soviet ethnic group with a language of their own. There is no available information as to the orthography used by these people.

Language under the Soviet Regime

Communist rule has affected language as well as all other aspects of life in the USSR. Soviet newspaper language today reflects the regime's effort to give specific "scientific" (though not necessarily permanent) meanings to various abstractions. Thus, words in Soviet languages which were formerly equivalent to such English words as "democracy," "progressive," "cosmopolitan," or "cultural" have been stretched and squeezed into special molds, often far removed from non-Communist usage. The authoritarian nature of the regime has also affected the meaning of such expressions as: "It is suggested . . ." or "It is proposed . . ." which have assumed the force of imperatives in official Soviet language.

Another notable development is the proliferation of abbreviated names for various officials and institutions. The custom existed before the revolution, but under the present regime it has run wild. Syllabic abbreviations (Gosplan, Ispolkom, Agitprop, Komsomol, Kolkhoz, etc.) and initials (MVD, VOKS, MTS, etc.) have become part of daily speech and have been taken over in their Russian

forms in the minority languages.

Soviet official language also abounds in slogans, which, from the American point of view, are repeated ad nauseam. The formulas "Overtake and surpass," "Fulfill and overfulfill" introduce innumerable exhortations to greater effort on the part of Soviet workers, while other slogans are directed toward glorifying the "invincible Soviet people" or to breeding hate for "imperialist warmongers." It is difficult to determine popular reaction to such slogans; it is possible that the Russian peasant, accustomed to repeating saws and proverbs, finds them less wearisome than does the American observer.

Linguistic studies in the USSR were for many years hampered by an official "line" which sought a direct relationship between language and socioeconomic development. Russian linguistic studies comparable with those in the outside world have now been resumed.

Writing Systems

Only five writing systems have an official blessing for the languages of the USSR today. Of these, the Latin alphabet, used in the three Baltic republics and the Karelian ASSR, and the systems of the Georgians and Armenians have already been mentioned. The writing

of Yiddish, in Hebrew letters, was for a time apparently abandoned but is now reported to have been revived. All other peoples of the USSR use the same alphabet as the Russians, with various modifications to cover sounds not appearing in the Russian language.

The Russian alphabet, usually referred to as Cyrillic, now contains 32 letters (see the plate, Russian Alphabet and Transliteration). Similar alphabets are used outside the Soviet Union by the

Bulgarians and most of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Until the ninth century there was no firmly established writing system among the Eastern and Southern Slavs, but when the evange-lizing Christians of the Byzantine Empire set out to convert the neighboring Slavs it was found expedient to create an alphabet in which the Gospel might be rendered into Slavic. According to tradition, this alphabet was the creation of two Macedonian monks, Cyril and Methodius, who presumably spoke Greek and Macedonian Slavic of the time. These two modified the Greek alphabet then in use by adding new letters, and they translated the Bible into Macedonian Slavic, much overlaid with Greek — a language now generally known as Old Church Slavic. The Christianization of Russia was done with the aid of this Bible and this language; and Old Church Slavic remains the ecclesiastical language of the Russian Orthodox Church.

By the late tenth century the alphabet had been somewhat simplified from its original very elaborate form, and it is this later form which has been given the name Cyrillic. In the twelfth century the alphabet began to be used for writing in the Russian vernacular. With various reforms and modifications, this alphabet has remained in use in Russia since that time. The latest reforms, promulgated since the revolution, reduced the alphabet from 36 letters to the present 32.

Before the revolution there was no concerted effort to standardize the writing systems of the minority peoples in the Russian Empire. The Roman Catholic and Protestant peoples of the western provinces – Poles, Balts, Finns, Estonians, and even some Belorussians – used the Latin alphabet. In Central Asia and other Moslem areas Arabic writing was the usual form. For Yakut, Chuvash, Ossetian, and a few other languages a modified Cyrillic alphabet had been devised; and many of the Siberian languages remained largely unwritten.

The nationality policy of the early years after the revolution involved the creation of an alphabet for any ethnic group large enough to be given quasi-autonomous administrative status. At first

RUSSIAN ALPHABET AND TRANSLITERATION

Type faces and handwriting styles differ as they do in countries using the Latin alphabet, but the forms shown here are basic to all the variations.

No. 4 No. 4 N

"Roman"	"Italic"	Script	Transliteration
Aa	Aa	Ala	a
Бб	Бб	55	Б
Вв	Be	BL	v
Гг	T 2	In	g
Дд	Ддд	Dad	d
Ee	Еe	Dgd Ex	ye initial and after (a.e.u.y. b, b, b, e elsewhere.
Ëë	Ëë	Ëë	yë and ë as for ye and e.
Жж	Жж	HC DIC	zh
З з	33	3 3 u	z
Ии	Ии	Uu	i
Йй	Йи	Ŭй	у
Кк	KK	KK	k
Лл	JIA	Na	1
Мм	Мм	Mar	m
Нн	Нн	HH	n
0 0	00	00	٥
Пπ	π_n	π_{m}	р
PP	Pp	Pp	r
C c	Cc	Co	s
TT	Tm	Illm	t,
Уу	Yy	yry	u
Фф	Φφ	Q Q	f
Х×	Xx	XW	kh
Цц	Цц	U 14	ts
44	44	44	ch
Шш	Шш	Ul w	sh;
Щщ Ъъ	Щщ	UJ 114	shch
Ыы	23	3 16	" (quotation mark)
Ьь	6/31	Hou	y
3 3	Ь ь Эз	b#	' (apostrophe)
Юю	Юю	Ээ 2010	е
Яя	Яя	91 01	yu ;
01 01	JI K	Яя	ya ;

all were devised on the basis of the Latin alphabet, with special letters or marks to take care of phonetic peculiarities. Similar alphabets were devised for the Central Asiatic groups, who had traditionally used the Arabic script. A movement was even begun to change Russian from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, and there was some agitation for the development of Esperanto as an international language for the USSR. These latter schemes were dropped by the 1930's; and by 1939 a new movement was under way, substituting Cyrillic for those Latin alphabets that had already been adopted. This change, virtually completed by the beginning of World War II, had the advantage of facilitating the study of Russian for minority peoples; and it effectively posed a barrier between the Turkic languages of the USSR and the Osmanli of the Turkish Republic.

Foreign-Language Study

The study of foreign languages, especially French, German, English, and Chinese, is highly developed in the USSR. Foreign language instruction officially begins in the fifth grade. There is some evidence that the language a child learns depends on which language happens to be taught in his particular district. At the highest levels, students often become proficient in speaking as well as writing a foreign language. Reportedly, schools have now been set up at the secondary level to give intensive instruction in one of the languages mentioned above. In the universities and diplomatic schools, training in most of the languages of the world is available. A myth, widespread in Europe and America, that the Russians are "natural-born" linguists is without foundation. It is probably based on the fact that upper-class Russians before the revolution received a multilingual training at home and in school.

Proverbs, Maxims, and Verbal Tricks

Russian peasants delight in citing proverbs, quoting their poets, and making rhymes of their own. Russian writers, especially Ostrovsky and Leskov, have exploited these peculiarities, as well as the peasant custom of twisting foreign words to fit their own patterns of speech.

Russians use proverbs very frequently, more often for encouragement or reassurance than for ridicule. Their use is by no means confined to peasants, nor does it imply provincialism. On the contrary, it is considered a sign of wisdom and sound reasoning.

Used throughout Russia without notable regional variations, many proverbs have survived unchanged for centuries. Following are a few representative examples.

"White hands love another's labors."

"To a drunken man the sea is only knee-deep."

"One man cannot eat the mir."

"An egg is dear at Easter."

"Where there is conscience there is shame, and where there is no shame, there cannot be any conscience."

"Ask much but take what is given you."

"If you don't cheat, you don't sell."

"You don't spoil the porridge if you add butter."

"Am I a priest to eat two dinners?"

"When the head is taken off, there's no use crying about the hair."

"Power is gained not by brains but by money and whip."
"A rich man has even the wind blowing on his back."

"Don't fear the law but the judge."

At a somewhat more sophisticated level, puns and other tricks of speech are the basis for many Russian jokes. Khrushchev's recent speeches show a very frequent use of proverbs and sayings — a device which appears highly successful in "bringing him close to the people."

Gestures

To an American, Russian gestures present few startling differences of meaning from his own; there are, however, differences of degree. Kissing and hugging are a frequent form of greeting, even among men. Handshaking is often preceded by a wide, straight-armed swing from the shoulder. Expository gestures are generally made with elbows held tight at the sides. It may be said in general that Russians are more demonstrative and violent with gestures than are Americans.

Literacy

Soviet policy has been to "liquidate illiteracy" throughout the USSR. There is no question that great strides have been made in this direction; but, whatever the claims, it should be remembered that effective literacy is rarer than "technical" literacy, which can

be and is measured in many, often meaningless, ways. After a few years of schooling a good many peasants and unskilled workers relapse into virtual illiteracy. The teaching of Russian in the lowest grades and the existence of many Russian schools in the minority areas provide evidence that most of those who are literate can read and write Russian at least as well as their mother tongue.

Names

All Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, plus a very large percentage of minority peoples in the USSR, have three names: the given name (*imya*), the patronymic (*otchestvo*), and the family name (*familiya*). This system of naming has been standard practice

among Russians since the days of Peter the Great.

The given names of Russians, even since the revolution, are taken from names of Biblical figures or of saints recognized by the Orthodox Church. Of a number of these there are some variations, depending on whether Russian, Church Slavic, Greek, or other forms have been used. In general the Russian forms predominate and have tended to replace the others. The total number of Russian first names is considerably less than the number in English and American use. Most of the commonest men's names, including Ivan (John), Pëtr, Nikolay, Mikhail, and Aleksandr, have familiar cognates in most countries of Europe and America; others, such as Dimitriy and Vasiliy (Basil), less well known in the West, are common in countries of early Byzantine connections; while still others stem from the Slavic past, for example, Vladimir, Boris, and Vyacheslav. Among women's names, Mariya and Anna are very common, while Yekaterina, Ol'ga, Yelizaveta, Natal'ya, Sof'ya, Vera, and Zinaida are among others frequently encountered.

Before the Revolution it was possible in a few cases to infer social status from given names. By the twentieth century, however, such distinctions had become very much blurred, and it is doubtful

whether any similar inferences could be made today.

Nicknames are in general use for both males and females and among intimates tend to replace the formal given name almost completely. Though derived from the given name, they often assume very different forms. A few examples are: Vanya, for Ivan; Kolya, for Nikolay; Sasha or Shura, for Aleksandr (or the feminine Aleksandra); Alësha, for Aleksey; Misha, for Mikhail; Volodya, for Vladimir; Masha or Marusya, for Mariya; and Sonya for Sofya. Few given names are without such standard nicknames, which are often

supplemented by additional diminutive endings, such as Vanyushka, for Vanya.

The patronymic has both masculine and feminine forms. The masculine is formed by adding -ovich, -evich, or simply -ich to the given name of the father; for girls the ending is -ovna or -evna. Thus

the sister of Mikhail Ivanovich might be Anna Ivanovna.

In the early eighteenth century, when the use of family names was decreed by Peter the Great, many peasants and others had no such names and in some cases were saddled with ridiculous names by those charged with effecting the change. Such names as Yagoda (berry), Batyushkov (from batyushka, a diminutive for father), and perhaps Zhukov (cf. zhuk, bug) may stem from this period, with accompanying implications of peasant origin. Several leading revolutionaries adopted aliases before the revolution, and retained them thereafter; among these were Stalin (from the word for steel),

Lenin, Trotsky, and Molotov (from molot, hammer).

The family name is most commonly formed by adding -ov or -ev (feminine -ova, -eva) to the given name of some male ancestor. There are, however, many family names outside this pattern, showing almost as much variation as in the United States. Names are frequently derived from a characteristic (e.g., Tolstoy, from a word meaning stout), an occupation (Kuznetsov, from the word for smith), an animal or plant (Solov'yev, from the word for nightingale. Gvozdikov, from poppy), or a place (Moskvin, from Moskva, Moscow). In addition to -ov, -ev, common endings include -skiy (feminine, -skaya), -oy (feminine, -aya), -in (feminine, -ina) and -ich (no feminine form). Upon marriage a woman takes the family name of her husband, with feminine ending if one exists, and retains her given name and patronymic.

In informal or intimate relationships among equals, the first name is generally used, most often in the form of a nickname; occasionally the patronymic will be so used. In more formal address, the most general practice is to use the first name and patronymic. Use of the last name without a title is common in the case of teachers speaking to students, or in comparable situations. The last name, preceded by Gospodin (Mr.), is now applied chiefly to foreigners. The titles Grazhdanin — feminine, Grazhdanka — (Citizen) and Tovarishch (Comrade), which have officially replaced it, have not been thoroughly incorporated into the spoken language and are

heard most frequently in official connections.

Among many of the minorities, especially the Moslem peoples, Russian usages are being increasingly adopted, and Russian patronymic and family-name endings are applied to characteristically Moslem names such as Ahmed, Mahmud, or Husein. Ukrainians and Belorussians show variations of much the same range of given names as Great Russians. Endings in -ko, -enko, -chik, or -chuk are frequent in Ukrainian family names. In the Baltics, naming practices are much like those of western Europe, either Catholic or Protestant, but when speaking Russian the Baltic peoples generally adopt the custom of using the given name and patronymic. Georgians and Armenians also use this form of address, but their last names are very distinctive. A vast majority of Armenian family names end in -van; while Georgian names have -vili, -veli, -dze, or -vani as characteristic terminations. Georgian first names, as given in official Russian documents, have the same form and range as the Russian; but Armenians retain their characteristic forms, such as Hovhanes (John), Hagop (Jacob or James), or Bedros (Peter). Jews tend to retain such Old Testament names as Samoil, Venyamin, Isaak, or Lazar names seldom used by Russians. Their surnames are likely to consist of -ovich, -evich, or -ich added to these given names, or -skiy (feminine -skaya) added to a place name (e.g. Minskiy). Although many Russians also use these endings, there is a tendency to regard -skiy as being Polish, Belorussian, or Jewish, and the endings in -ich as Jewish. There are also many Jews with German family names; but such names are also fairly frequent among Russians, often those of aristocratic background. Other foreign names, often much Russianized, are found among many Russians who would find it difficult to trace them back to a foreign ancestor.

Russians, like many other peoples, have tended to give nicknames of more or less opprobrious connotation to members of foreign or minority groups. Perhaps the best known of these is *Khokhol* (topknot), applied to Ukrainians. Such appellations have persisted to

some extent, despite the disapproval of Soviet authorities.

TABLES



Table 1. AREA AND POPULATION OF THE USSR

	Area	34			P	Population(a)		
		Percent of					Percent	Population
	Sq. Miles	Area	1940	rercent of Total	1956	Fercent of Total	Change 1940-56	Density 1956 per Sq. Mi.
USSR	8,570,600	100.0	191.7	100.0		100.0	4.43	93.4
RSFSR(b)	6,491,500	75.0	107.9	56.3	112.6	56.2	4.36	17.3
Ukrainian SSR(c)	232,600	2.6	41.0	21.4	40.6		- 0.97	174.5
Belorussian SSR	80,100	0.0	9.5	4.8	8.0		-13.04	6.66
Azerbaijan SSR	33,100	1.0	3.2	1.6	3.4		6.25	102.7
Georgian SSR	29,400	0.3	3.6	1.9	4.0		11.11	136.0
Armenian SSR	11,500	0.1	1.3	0.7	1.6		23.07	139.1
Moldavian SSR	13,100	0.2	25.57	1.3	2.7		8.00	206.1
Lithuanian SSR	31,200	0.0	2.9	1.5	2.7		6.90	86.5
Latvian SSR	24,600	0.3	1.9	1.0	2.0		5.30	81.3
Estonian SSR	17,400	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.1		10.00	63.2
Karelo-Finnish SSR(d)	68,900	8.0	0.5	0.3	9.0		20.00	8.7
Kazakh SSR	1,061,600	12.2	6.2	3.2			37.10	8.0
Kirgiz SSR	76,100	6.0	1.5	0.8	1.9		26.66	25.0
Tadzhik SSR	54,900	9.0	1.5	0.8	1.8		20.00	32.8
Uzbek SSR	157,400	1.8	6.3	3.3	7.3		15.87	46.4
Turkmen SSR	187,200	2.2	1.2	9.0	1.4		16.67	7.

(a) 1940 population figures have been adjusted to include territory added to the USSR since that date.

(b) Exclusive of the Crimea, which was transferred to the Ukraine in February 1954.

(c) Including the Crimea.

(d) Incorporated into the RSFSR as Karelian ASSR, July 1956.

Source: Adapted from Shabad, T., Geography of the USSR, pp. 500-505; and USSR Central Statistical Office, Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR (National Economy of the USSR), p. 18.

Table 2. GROWTH OF CITIES OF THE USSR

(Cities with population of 100,000 or more in 1956)

	Industry of City	Capital; port; textiles; steel;	Leading port; eng.; oil refining; steel; chemicals; paper; syn.	rubber; textiles. Eng.; chemicals; oil refining;	Ricci, part; eng.; sulphur; paper;	River port; eng.; chemicals; syn.		sawmilling. River port; eng.; ball bearings; oil refining; textiles; elec.	power. Eng.; syn. rubber; elec. power. Elec. power; eng.; syn. rubber; textiles: chemicals: sawmilling.	
Increase	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	1.7	- 0.5	36.0	94.7	40.7	8.2 23.9	37.8	22.3 25.5	16.3 11.9 8.8
Population and Percentage Increase	1956	4,839,000	3,176,000	876,000	760,000	565,000	552,000 525,000	518,000	400,000	320,000 319,000 276,000
tlation and	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	103.9	88.8	189.7	122.2	124.4	65.6	71.2	168.7 160.8	75.7 155.8 37.6
Popu	1939	e Urals 4,137,018	3,191,304	644,116	390,267	401,665	510,263 445,476	357,860	326,836 298,065	272,403 285,069 253,655
	1926	RSFSR: European area exclusive of the Urals A,137 Moscow	1,690,065	222,356	175,636	179,023	308,103 151,490	219,547	121,612 114,277	155,005 111,460 184.301
	City	RSFSR: European Moscow	Leningrad	Gor'kiy	Kuybyshev	Kazan	Rostov-on-Don Stalingrad	Saratov	Voronezh Yaroslavi'	Tula

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	Industry of City	Oil refining and also nower.	textiles. Eng.; textiles; elec. power;	chemicals. Port; sawmilling; timber; hydro-	elec.; eng. Eng.; paper. Oil; elec. power; oil refining;	eng.; chemicals; sawmilling. Textiles; eng.; sawmilling. Port; steel; eng.	Fort; eng.; paper. River port; elec. power; textiles;	eng. Coal; eng.; elec. power. Eng.; syn. rubber; textiles; iron	ore nearby. River port; oil; oil refining; eng. Port; eng.; elec. power. Hydroelec.; eng.; textiles. Hydroelec.; lead, silver, zinc	smelting. Fratiles. Eng.; chemicals; syn. rubber. Engineering.
Increase	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	32.9	11.0	-15.3	47.0	47.4	79.2	16.1 49.2	117.6 43.5 16.5	28.7 23.7 42.6 69.8 —16.2
Population and Percentage Increase	1956	271 000	240,000	238,000	231,000	211,000	183,000	180,000	169,000 168,000 162,000 159,000	156,000 150,000 136,000 132,000 131,000
lation and	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	inued)	99.4	266.1	71.0	130.6	45.6	277.9	54.5 1,233.6 150.3	64.4 67.9 87.3 227.8 99.5
Popu	1939	Urals (conti	216,131	281,091	157,145 172,468	143,181 188,808	102,106	155,081 119,972	77,679 117,054 139,011	121,205 121,285 95,358 77,727 156,677
`	1926	exclusive of the	108,413	76,774	91,924 97,087	62,097 86,444	70,130	41,043 82,440	50,293 8,777 55,546	73,732 72,256 50,919 23,711 78,520
	City	RSFSR: European area exclusive of the Urals (continued) Krasnodar 161.843 203.946 96	Kalinin	Archangel	Penza Grozniy	Kirov Taganrog	Ul'yanovsk	Shakhty Kursk	Syzran' Murmansk Shcherbakov Ordzhonikidze	Kostroma Tambov Ryazan' Perovo Smolensk

Table 2. (continued)

	Industry of City	Iron; eng. Eng.; textiles; sawmilling. Iron ore; iron; eng.; ferro-alloys. Eng.; natural gas.	River port; eng.; hydroelec. Eng.; chemicals. Eng.; tin smelting.	Elec. power; sawmilling; tex- tiles; eng.; chemicals; phos-	phates. Chemicals, eng. Textiles, elec. power. Port; oil refining; chemicals,	Eng.; chemicals, textiles. Eng.; textiles.	Steel; eng.; chemicals; textiles. Elec. power; iron and steel ferro-alloys; non-ferro metals refining; eng.; chemicals; oil refining; textiles.
Increase	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	15.8 33.4 84.6 44.5	36.3 81.2 56.0	26.9	42.7 9.7 22.1	46.1 21.9 12.4	66.1
Population and Percentage Increase	1956	128,000 127,000 123,000 123,000	122,000 121,000 113,000	111,000	109,000 109,000 106,000	103,000 102,000 102,000	707,000
lation and	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	45.5 45.2 64.2 210.8 45.1	73.5 68.4 265.9	90.3	58.1	351.1 12.3 62.4	203.3 360.5
Popu	1939	Urals (conti 110,567 95,194 66,625 85,100	89,484 66,761 72,422	87,473	76,207 99,329 86,847	70,480 83,677 90,766	425,544 273,127
	1926	clusive of the 75,968 57,976 21,439 58,640	51,565 39,654 19,793	45,962	62,841	15,624 74,523 55,891	140,300 59,307
	City	Action of the Urals (continued) Orel Vologda Lipetsk Stravopol'	(Stavropol' Kray) Kaluga Vladimir Podol'sk	Kuntsevo Bryansk	Stalinogorsk Orekhovo-Zuyevo Makhachkala	Babushkin Armavir Serpukhov	RSFSR: the Ural Region Sverdlovsk Chelyabinsk

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Population and Percentage Increase

Industry of City	River port; eng.; chemicals; copper and oil refining; hydroelec.;	textiles. Iron ore; iron and steel; eng.; sawmilling. chemicals	Iron ore; chemicals; elec. power; iron and steel; eng. River port; eng.; chemicals; tex-	tiles. Steel, eng. Eng.; chemicals, oil refining.	sawmilling. Oil refining; nickel; eng. Lignite. Steel; chemicals; sawmilling. Iron; bauxite; steel; aluminum;	River port; hydroelec.; steel; tin smelting; eng.; textiles;	chemicals; sawmilling. River port; eng.; chemicals; elec. power; textiles.	River port; coal; iron and steel; eng.; chemicals; aluminum. Coal.
Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	110.8	85.8	94.7	43.4	138.6 44.0 139.7	80.2	79.9	104.7
1956	538,000	297,000	284,000	252,000 226,000 206,000	157,000 149,000 143,000 122,000	731,000	505,000	347,000
Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	113.1	311.8	149.5	178.0 40.3	384.5 105.2 848.3	237.6	73.6	4,253.8 900.5
1939	255,196	159,864	145,870	175,740	65,799 99,272 50,897	405,589	280,716	169,538
1926	119,776	38,820	98,537	63,211 123,283	13,581 	120,128	161,684	3,894
City 1926	Molotov Molotov	Nizhniy Tagil ^(a)	Magnitogorsk Ufa	Izhevsk Chkalov Chernikovsk	Orsk Kopeysk Zlatoust Kamensk-Ural'skiy	RSFSR: Western Siberia Novosibirsk	Omsk	orginisk Prokop'yevsk

Table 2. (continued)

		Lopu	Population and Percentage Increase	ercentuge	ncrease	
City	1926	1939	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	1956	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	Industry of City
RSFSR: Western Siberia (continued) Barnaul	continued) 73,858	148,129	100.6	255,000	72.1	River port; textiles; eng.; chemi
Kemerovo	21,726	132,978	512.1	240,000	80.5	Coal; elec. power; chemicals
Tomsk	92,274	141,215	53.0	224,000	58.6	River port; eng.; chemicals;
Tyumen'	50,340	75,537	50.1	125,000	65.5	River port; eng.; sawmilling
Leninsk-Kuznetskiy Anzhero-Sudzhensk	19,645 30,199	81,980 71,079	317.3 135.4	119,000	45.1 63.2	Coal; elec. power. Coal.
Kiselevsk Biysk Kurgan	45,561	80,190	76.0	112,000	39.7	Coal. Textiles, eng. Engineering.
RSFSR: Eastern Siberia Krasnoyarsk	72,261	189,999	162.9	328,000	72.6	River port; sawmilling; oil refining; eng.; textiles; paper;
Irkutsk	108,129	243,380	125.1	314,000	29.0	syn. rubber. River port; eng.; elec. power oil refining; sawmilling; chem
Chita	61,526	102,555	66.7	162,000	58.0	cals. Coal; eng.; sawmilling; chem
Ulan-Ude	28,918	129,417	347.5	158,000	22.1	Eng.; textiles; elec. power; saw
Cheremkhovo	14,485	65,907	355.0	124,000	88.1	Coal; textiles; eng.

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(continued)
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	Industry of City	River port; oil refining; eng.	(incl. aircraft); sawmilling. Port; eng.; oil refining; saw-	milling. River port; oil refining; steel;	eng. (incl. aircraft); elec. power.		River port; eng. (incl. telephone and radio equipment); textiles:	elec. power. Eng.; chemicals; paper. Coal; iron and steel; eng.;	chemicals. Port; eng.; oil refining; chemi-	cals; elec. power. River port; iron and steel; eng.; elec. power: sawmilling: chem-	icals. Eng.; textiles; oil refining; chemicals; elec. power; saw-	milling. Steel; ferro-alloys; aluminum;	eng.; chemicals. Iron; iron ore; eng.
Increase	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	40.4	28.4	141.4	43.0		17.0	35.2 37.2	лċ	15.1	20.4	31.7	63.0
Percentage	1956	280,000	265,000	169,000	101,000		991,000	877,000 625,000	607,000	576,000	387,000	381,000	322,000
Population and Percentage Increase	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	283.1	91.2	:	8.66		64.8	99.7	43.5	111.5	: :	418.8	417.0
Popu	1939	199,364	206,432	70,746	70,628		846,293	833,432 462,395	604,223	500,662	316,177 (1931)	289,188	197,621
	1926	52,045	107,980	:	35,344		513,637	417,342 174,230	420,862	236,717	:	55,744	38,228
	City	Khabarovsk	Vladivostok	Komsomolsk(b)	Voroshilov	Ukrainian SSR	Kiev	Kharkov Stalino	Odessa	Dnepropetrovsk	L'vov	Zaporozh'ye	Krivoy Rog

Table 2. (continued)

		Popu	Population and Percentage Increase	ercentage	Increase	
City	1926	1939	Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	1956	Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	Industry of City
Ukrainian SSR (continued) Makeyevka Zhdanov	79,421 63,920	240,145 222,427	202.4 248.0	311,000 273,000	29.5 22.7	Iron and steel; eng.; coal. Port; zirconium; iron and steel;
Voroshilovgrad Gorlovka	71,765	213,007	196.8	251,000	17.8	chemicals. Eng.; textiles. Coal; chemicals; eng.
Nikolayev Kadiyevka Dnebrodzerzhinsk	104,909 17,224 34,150	167,108 68,360 147,829	296.9 332.9	170,000 170,000	23.3 148.0 10.7	Port; eng.; oil retining. Coal; iron and steel; syn. rubber. Iron and steel. eng. chemicals
Simferopol' Chernovtsy	87,213	142,678	63.6	159,000 142,000	11.4 26.3	Engineering. Textiles; chemicals; sawmilling;
Kherson Sevastopol'	58,801 74,551	$(1930) \\ 97,186 \\ 111,946$	65.3 50.2	134,000	37.9 18.8	eng. Port; oil refining; textiles; eng. Port (naval base): eng.
Poltava Kramatorsk Kirovograd Vinnika	91,984 12,348 66,467	130,305 93,350 100,331	656.0 50.9 10.9	129,000 117,000 115,000	- 1.0 25.3 14.6	Eng.; textiles. Iron and steel; eng. Engineering. From chemicals. taxtiles
Karelo-Finnish SSR(c) Petrozavodsk	27,105	69,728	157.3	118,000	69.2	Eng.; mica; paper.
Estonian SSR Tallin		137,792 (1934)	:	257,000	86.5	Port; cotton; eng.; textiles; chemicals; paper; elec. power.


					Table
Industry of City	Port; chemicals; paper; textiles; eng.; elec. power.	Eng.; chemicals; textiles; elec. power. Chemicals; eng.; textiles.	Eng.; sawmilling.	Eng.; textiles; elec. power. River port; eng.; paper; sawmilling. Textiles; eng. Eng.; textiles.	Port; oil refining; oil; eng.; chemicals; textiles; elec. power. Oil, barytes; textiles; chemicals.
Increase Percent Increase (1956 over 1939)	47.2	80.2	65.4	72.5	11.3
Population and Percentage Increase Percent Percent 39 Increase 1956 Increase (1939 over 1956 or 1926)	565,000	200,000	190,000	412,000 147,000 144,000 128,000 106,000	901,000
Percent Increase (1939 over 1926)	i	<u>:</u> :	:	81.2 66.8 69.4 98.0	78.5
Popi 1939	383,699 (1935)	208,000 (1937) 108,200 (1938)	114,896 (1930)	238,772 144,169 167,424 99,440	809,347
1926	:		:	131,803 86,409 98,857 50,222	453,333
City	Latvian SSR Riga Lithuanian SSR	Vil'nyus Kaunas	Moldavian SSR Kishinev	Belorussian SSR Minsk Dzerzhinsk Gomel' Vitebsk Megilov	Azərbaijan SSR Baku Kirovabad

Coal; eng. Eng.; textiles; elec. power. River port; textiles; sawmilling; Eng.; chemicals, syn. rubber; Chemicals; eng.; textiles; lead Oil refining; eng.; textiles; elec. Chemicals; textiles; barium; Industry of City textiles; aluminum. eng.; elec. power. eng.; sawmilling. Textiles; eng. Textiles: oil. Textiles; eng. Engineering. Textiles; smelting. Textiles; Textiles. power. 1956 over 32.9 26.5 37.4 34.4 Increase 75.2 43.1 23.9 90.5 28.1 Percent 22.3 39.9 1939) 52.1 Population and Percentage Increase 778,000 170,000 115,000 104,000 350,000 330,000 136,000 130,000 118,000 385,000 103,000 635,000 114,000 1939 over Increase 80.8 27.7 13.9 5.0 407.8 253.0 93.6 Percent 9.97 0.69 209.6 60.0 585,005 134,346 83,691 77,351 165,937 230,528 109,779 74,185 91,678 67,707 519,175 81,479 200,031 323,613 105,206 73,465 73,640 43,395 21,018 47,361 42,313 64,613 294,044 48,196 1926 Table 2 (continued) Armenian SSR Petropavlovsk Semipalatinsk Georgian SSR Thilisi (Tiflis) Kazakh SSR Samarkand Karaganda Uxbek SSR Namangan Alma Ata Andizhan Leninakan ashkent Chimkent Yerevan City Kutaisi

ige Increase	Percent Industry of City (1956 over 1939)		00 131.4 Eng.; textiles.	00 105.0 Eng.; textiles, elec. power.
Population and Percentage Increase	Percent Increase 1956 (1939 over 1926)	145.3 142,000	1,372.1 191,000	153.1 190,000
Pop	1926 1939	51,593 126,580	5,607 82,540	36,610 92,659
	City 195	Turkmen SSR Ashkhabad 51,	Tadzhik SSR Stalinabad	Kirgiz SSR Frunxe 38,

(a) Founded in 1931.
(b) Founded in 1932 on site of small fishing village of Permskoye by members of the Komsomol.
(c) Incorporated into the RSFSR as the Karelian ASSR, July 1956.

Source: Derived from Shabad, T., Geography of the USSR, pp. 506-511; USSR Central Statistical Office, Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR, p. 24; and Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The USSR and Eastern Europe.



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